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### Viewing cable 09PANAMA625, THE GANG THREAT ON PANAMA'S COSTA RICAN BORDER

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PANAMA625 | 2009-08-17 19:09 | 2011-05-28 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0625/01 2291909
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 171909Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3659
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2836
    RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 0793
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3848
    RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 2034
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 1564
    RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0434
    RUEABND/DEA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T PANAMA 000625

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR PM
    SUBJECT: THE GANG THREAT ON PANAMA'S COSTA RICAN BORDER

    REF: PANAMA 00470

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR BARBARA J. STEPHENSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND
     (d)

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1.  (S//NF)  The border between Panama and Costa Rica has
    been described as a "no mans' land", where drugs flow across
    into Costa Rica and guns and money flow back into Panama.
    With parallel roads along either side of the border, over 200
    possible crossing points, a free trade zone town sitting on
    the border itself, and chaotic and corrupt security agencies
    on the Panamanian side, it is virtually impossible to control
    the border itself.  This wide open border has led to the
    growth of an important gun market on the Costa Rican side of
    the border which supplies the FARC, DTOs and local gangs with
    weapons, while large amounts of drugs and cash flow across
    the border. It has also created an "undergoverned space" that
    Central American and Mexican gangs may be exploiting to lay
    low and build a new base of operations. Panama's National
    Frontier Service (SENAFRONT) reports an increase in
    assassinations in the area, which has traditionally been
    largely free of violent crime. The National Aero-Naval
    Service (SENAN) believes that recent maritime interdiction
    efforts may be forcing traffickers to move loads to land and
    take them through Panama on the Pan-American Highway, and
    across the border into Costa Rica. Post is concerned that an
    increase in overland drug and arms trafficking may further
    destabilize Panama and the other Central American nations.
    This is the exact opposite result than was intended when the
    strategy to increase maritime pressure was implemented (see
    reftel). Post is further concerned that incremental attempts
    to increase law enforcement pressure on the land route may
    lead the Mexican, Central American or Colombian DTOs to move
    to take control of the border through increased acts of
    violence to ensure their control over the route.

    ¶2.  (S//NF)  Post will work with the GOP to design a law
    enforcement strategy for the border area to disrupt the land
    trafficking routes, and so discourage the cartels from trying
    to gain control of the area. Law Enforcement agencies at Post
    are redirecting assets to the Costa Rican border, and NAS is
    proposing the expansion of the ICE vetted unit so that part
    of it can be turned over to the Panamanian National Police
    (PNP) as a major crimes unit that can concentrate on the
    Costa Rican border area, where local police units are highly
    corrupt. Post will also work with PNP to develop an effective
    highway patrol force to interdict drugs throughout the
    Pan-American highway, and move maritime assets to cut off
    maritime-land transfer points along the coast. As the
    Department determines Merida Initiative funding and
    allocations for the next year, Post encourages all concerned
    to direct as much support as possible into flexible NAS and
    USAID funding that can be used to respond to emerging threats
    in a creative and flexible manner. End Summary.

    ------------------
    The Virtual Border
    ------------------

    ¶3.  (S//NF)  The Panama-Costa Rica border is described by
    CBP, ICE, DEA and NAS personnel as a "joke." Panamanian
    Minister of Government and Justice Jose Raul Mulino told
    Charge July 24 that the border area was a "no man's land"
    without effective GOP control. There is virtually no control
    over people or goods flowing across the border due to two
    factors. First, at the main international crossing point on
    the Pan-American Highway at Paso Canoas, there is a small
    Free Trade Zone (FTZ) sitting directly on the border. Mostly
    controlled by Palestinian families linked to relatives in the
    Colon Free Trade Zone, this FTZ is not in and of itself of
    great concern to law enforcement, though some of the
    businesses are involved in money laundering and smuggling.
    Rather, the very existence of the FTZ renders the border
    ineffective, as there are houses and businesses with one door
    in one country, and another door in the other. People wander
    in and out of the two countries as they shop. In order not to
    disrupt a local generator of wealth, officials in both Costa
    Rica and Panama have adopted laissez faire customs and
    immigration policies to accommodate the FTZ. The second
    factor is the existence of parallel roads on either side of
    the border from the Pacific to the top of the Talamanca
    mountain chain that runs through the two countries. In
    Panama, this corresponds to the province of Chiriqui, long a
    laid back agricultural area. The presence of the parallel
    roads on either side of the border, with over 200 crossing
    points between them, means that there is no way to
    effectively control the cross border traffic in people or
    goods at the border. Post believes that Panama must move to a
    U.S. Border Patrol-style mobile patrol doctrine to control
    the goods and people following into Panama from Costa Rica.
    To that end, NAS has been sponsoring periodic deployments of
    U.S. Border Patrol agents to Chiriqui to help train the
    SENAFRONT police who patrol the area.

    --------------------
    Ingrained Corruption
    --------------------

    ¶4.  (S//NF)  Adding to the difficulties of controlling the
    Costa Rican border, Post has credible information that the
    Panamanian National Police (PNP) commander for the Chiriqui
    province, Sub-Commissioner Bartolome Aguero, is himself
    working with criminal networks in Panama. Aguero is
    reportedly a member of a network of corrupt officers at the
    sub-commissioner rank in the PNP. PNP Director Gustavo Perez
    told POLOFF and NAS July 23 that the PNP had a corruption
    problem at "very high levels" in Chiriqui, and that he was
    examining how to deal with it. Even if Aguero is relieved of
    his command, the PNP upper ranks in the province are probably
    also tainted, and cleaning up the police force in the region
    will take time, and probably lead to a period of lower
    operational efficiency. At the same time, members of the
    SENAFRONT deployed on the Costa Rican border are reluctant to
    search vehicles for fear of uncovering criminal acts linked
    to powerful local or national politicians, according to PNP
    sources in Chiriqui. Several of the local criminal networks
    are led by local elected politicians, who traffic drugs and
    weapons in vehicles with official license plates. While
    SENAFRONT officers are generally more dedicated and honest
    than PNP officers in Chiriqui, their institution is focused
    on securing the Darien Province on the other end of Panama
    from the FARC and Colombian DTOs, and the officers on the
    Costa Rican border have not felt, up to now, that they had
    high level support to confront entrenched corruption among
    politicians. There is also considerable corruption among
    officers of the National Immigration Service (SNM) and the
    National Customs Authority (ANA) throughout Panama, meaning
    that governmental institutions are disinclined to work
    together because they cannot be sure if their colleagues from
    other institutions are honest or corrupt. This fact has
    undermined the effectiveness of the NAS-funded and
    CBP-assisted Guabala checkpoint on the Pan-American Highway
    in eastern Chiriqui, which is the last real checkpoint on the
    highway before the border. The checkpoint has highlighted the
    difficulty of controlling smuggling in the area through fixed
    checkpoints, as new roads quickly sprouted up around it
    allowing vehicles to circumvent the checkpoint.

    ------------------------
    The Mexicans are Coming!
    ------------------------

    ¶5.  (S//NF)  DEA, NAS and other agencies at Post report that
    there is a growing presence of Mexicans near the Costa Rican
    border. However, they also report that the presence is not
    yet massive, nor are there signs that one particular cartel
    is dominating the market. One member of MS-13 has been
    identified on the border, and there are reports that up to
    ten MS-13 members are in the area. It is not clear if the
    Mexicans and Central American gangs are using the area to
    hide out (some are reportedly prison escapees from Honduras),
    or if they are setting up operations in the area. Their
    presence on the border, however, coincides with an increase
    in violence, including horrific murders of a kind associated
    with Mexican and Central American gangs. SENAFRONT Deputy
    Commander Commissioner Cristian Hayer told PolOff July 24
    that there had been ten executions in the area this year,
    where previously there had been none. He speculated they
    could be a result of score settling, or attempts to rob drug
    shipments. The up-tick in violence, and the Mexican and
    Central American presence near the border have drawn
    attention to Panama's vulnerability to these gangs should
    they eventually decide to move decisively into the area. With
    U.S. and Panamanian security assets mostly concentrated on
    the drug trafficking problem in Panama City, the Darien, and
    Panama's territorial waters, the Costa Rican border is
    Panama's unguarded back door.

    ---------------------
    Drugs, Guns and Money
    ---------------------

    ¶6.  (S//NF)  Adding to Post's concern over the Costa Rican
    border is the possibility that overland traffic is becoming
    more important. SENAN Deputy Director Commissioner Juan
    Vergara told PolOff July 17 that as a result of recent
    increased pressure by U.S. and Panamanian maritime assets in
    Panama's territorial waters (see reftel), there had been an
    increase in the number of go-fast vessels making short trips
    up from Colombia to the Gulf of San Miguel in the Darien, and
    transferring their drug loads onto vehicles for shipment
    through Panama and across the border by road. Post's TAT and
    DEA/TAT Cartegena have also reported that Colombian drug
    traffickers have shifted their tactics in response to the
    added pressure, and are now taking a shore-hugging route at
    low speed, and transferring their loads to the road as soon
    as possible. Post TAT has also noted that some maritime
    trafficking routes end off the coast of Chiriqui, where loads
    are transferred to the Pan-American Highway at one of several
    small isolated landings within a short distance of the
    highway. In one case, a go-fast loaded with cocaine from the
    FARC 57th Front was loaded directly on to a truck before
    being seized by police. In the last month DEA has had several
    multi-ton land seizures from tractor trailers traveling on
    the Pan-American Highway. If this trend is confirmed, the
    border area would emerge as a strategic choke point in the
    drug trade. Panamanian attempts to suppress this route might
    then be expected to bring about a violent response, and to
    encourage Mexican, Central American  or Colombian
    gangs/cartels to move aggressively to control the area and
    resist Panamanian efforts.

    ¶7.  (S//NF)  Javier Fletcher, former Deputy Secretary General
    of the National Intelligence and Security Service (SENIS)
    told PolOff June 11 that the Costa Rican side of the border
    functioned as a weapons super market for Drug Trafficking
    Organizations (DTOs), the FARC and other illegal armed groups
    in Panama and Colombia. He said buyers in Panama could
    approach agents of weapons dealers in David, the capital of
    Chiriqui, or at pre-identified locations along the border,
    indicate the weapons they were interested in, examine
    representative samples, and if they were satisfied, place
    their orders. Agencies at Post concur with this assessment,
    and add that the weapons are then delivered to buyers via
    local smuggling organizations. Small shipments may be handled
    by one of the 30 small Panamanian gangs operating in the
    area, while larger shipments are brought over by established
    smuggling networks, which are usually Panamanian-Colombian in
    their make up, and often have local political ties. SENAFRONT
    estimates that $10-20 million in cash may pass across the
    border to Panama every month as repatriated drug profits, but
    Post cannot confirm the number.

    ------------------------
    Law Enforcement Strategy
    ------------------------

    ¶8.  (S//NF)  Post believes that the reason the Mexican
    cartels and Central American gangs have not moved in force to
    take control of the Panamanian-Costa Rican border area has
    been that the guns, drugs and money are flowing so freely,
    that it is not necessary at this time. Post also believes
    that if they were to move into the area, the Panamanian law
    enforcement agencies would stand no chance against them, due
    to their poor morale, pay, and training, in addition to their
    relative lack of highly trained tactical units, body armor,
    or armored vehicles. However, allowing the Pan-American
    Highway land route to absorb ever greater volumes of drug
    trafficking threatens the stability of Central America, as it
    brings with it an even greater logistical support structure
    that strengthens the corruption, gangs and violence that
    threaten the region.

    ¶9.  (S//NF)  Post believes that it is essential to launch a
    comprehensive and synchronized campaign to strengthen the
    GOP's ability to control this area immediately, in an attempt
    to reduce its relative importance in the Central American
    transit corridor before it attracts the attention of the
    major cartels. To this end, NAS proposes to expand the size
    of the recently created ICE vetted unit in the PNP by 25 men,
    and to place part of this group under the control of PNP
    Director Gustavo Perez and his deputy, Jaime Ruiz. Such a
    unit, operating out of Panama City, would be used to
    intercept drug and weapons shipments discovered by PNP
    intelligence units without having to share the information
    with local PNP units penetrated by drug-traffickers. This
    unit would be protected by PNP and SENAFRONT tactical units,
    to dissuade acts of intimidatory violence on the part of
    Panamanian, Mexican and Central American gangs present in the
    area. Post will also encourage the PNP to increase the mobile
    patrolling of the Pan-American Highway to reduce the
    effectiveness of the land route. Post is also discussing with
    the MOGJ the possibility of creating a counter-narcotics
    maritime task force by combining SENAN assets with the
    NAS-supported PNP maritime unit, the UMOF. This would
    centralize Panama's maritime counter-narcotics assets, and
    allow Panama to attempt to block the maritime access routes
    to the Pan-American Highway in Chiriqui, which would help
    relieve pressure on the area, and reduce its attractiveness
    to Mexican cartels. Taking advantage of the desire of the new
    leadership in the SNM and ANA, Post's CBP and ICE offices
    will also work to set up establish units that can work with
    the police and help establish an effective border control
    system. Post's DEA office is also planning to increase the
    size of its highly successful Sensitive Investigative Unit
    (SIU) and increase its coverage of Chiriqui.

    -------------------------
    Merida Initiative Support
    -------------------------

    ¶10.  (S//NF)  As Post moves forward with this flexible
    inter-agency strategy to suppress land-based trafficking in
    drugs and weapons in Panama and on the Costa Rican border, we
    request that the Department exert efforts in the Central
    American Security Initiative budget process to direct as much
    support as possible to NAS in the form of flexible funds that
    can be used to fund creative responses to a rapidly evolving
    security situation. NAS funds have been critical in
    developing Post's extremely successful Community Policing
    Strategy, which has been wholeheartedly adopted by the new
    PNP leadership under Director Perez. NAS has also been a
    leader at Post in focusing on the problems on the Costa Rican
    border. But earmarked funds from Washington do not allow Post
    to quickly react to a shifting threat, or to rapidly move to
    support a good idea, or to abandon one that is not taking
    off.

    --------------------
    Anti-Gang Programming
    --------------------

    ¶11.  (S//NF)  Recent reports from the PNP and local contacts
    also indicate a significant increase in gang activity along
    the Panamanian highway west from Santiago, in Veraguas, to
    the Costa Rican border.  Some of these gangs may be linked to
    gangs in Panama City, indicating a disturbing trend towards
    national gangs. To respond to the increased gang activity in
    these non-traditional areas, USAID proposes expanding the
    scope of the USAID Merida-funded gang-prevention program. The
    USAID program focuses on the role of the community and
    broader civil society in preventing and mitigating youth
    violence, and strengthening coordination of government and
    non-government actors to provide expanded positive
    alternatives for youth.  The USAID approach works closely
    with key government counterparts, notably the Ministry of
    Social Development and the PNP, in order to provide improved
    and coordinated multi-sectoral responses, while engaging a
    network of private sector entities and community groups to
    take a proactive role in providing expanded alternatives for
    young people while simultaneously fostering a demand for
    improved services from government entities.

    ------------------
    Increased Manpower
    ------------------

    ¶12.  (S//NF)  Post would also strongly encourage increased
    staffing of its DEA, TAT and ICE offices. Among the most
    efficient in the region, these offices need more staff to
    apply sufficient pressure on the Costa Rican border area
    while maintaining pressure on the maritime routes. The
    successful implementation of this strategy would also relieve
    drug trafficking pressure on other Central American
    countries, and disrupt FARC drug and weapons trafficking to
    and from Colombia.

    STEPHENSON

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