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### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2563, MEDVEDEV LOSES OUT IN RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW2563 | 2008-08-26 14:04 | 2010-12-01 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2563/01 2391404
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 261404Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9706
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002563

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR RS
    SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV LOSES OUT IN RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR

    Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Unlike Putin, whose leadership during the
    Chechen war strengthened his political power, Medvedev's
    performance to date has reinforced his status as junior
    member of the tandem. Two anecdotal reports suggest that
    Putin was displeased with the President's performance at the
    start of the conflict; Putin, not Medvedev, set the tone and
    tenor of Russia's war policy. The conflict exposed Medvedev's
    weaknesses, his lack of a "team" of advisers, and the paucity
    of levers that he holds to influence policy, particularly in
    foreign affairs. While most Russians have yet to calculate
    the long-term consequences of the Georgian war, a near term
    conclusion is that the conflict has reinforced Medvedev's
    need for a "regent" and validated Putin as the man most
    Russians trust to protect their national interests. End
    Summary.

    Medvedev Stumbles
    -----------------

    ¶2. (C) The war in Georgia capped Medvedev's first 100 days in
    office, and provided him the chance for a defining moment as
    the country's military and political chieftain. Yet, two
    anecdotal reports suggests that Medvedev blinked when the
    Georgian conflict began. xxxxx told the German Ambassador that Putin was deeply
    concerned by the failure of Medvedev to take immediate
    actions and to show resolve on August 8. Putin intervened
    repeatedly from Beijing, where he was attending the Olympics.
    Several phone calls took place between the Prime Minister
    and Medvedev, with Putin using a meeting with Kazakh
    President Nazarbayev to set the initial Russian public
    hard-line. Similarly, in either an indiscretion or a
    deliberate slight, FM Lavrov confided to the French
    Ambassador (on the margins of Sarkozy's August 12 visit to
    Moscow) that Medvedev had come in for significant criticism
    among the ruling party elite for his handling of the initial
    hours of the crisis.

    ¶3. (C) At first glance, the interaction between the two
    during the Georgia war appeared a confirmation of the
    "regency" model of leadership posited by many Kremlin
    observers about the tandem, with Putin taking charge when his
    protege faltered and then stepping back once he had righted
    the ship of state. Putin, not Medvedev, made the first
    strong public Russian address on the conflict after his
    return from China. His bristling speech in Vladikavkaz on
    August 9 set the tone and message of Moscow's approach:
    accusations of genocide, promises of aid to mitigate the
    "humanitarian disaster," and an explanation of Russian action
    as justified and legitimate. In the days that followed, a
    pale and tired Medvedev met with various military and
    government officials before the television cameras, but he
    never addressed the people directly -- in part because Putin
    had already done so. Olga Kryshtanovskaya of the Academy of
    Sciences Institute for the Study of Elites characterized
    Medvedev's performance during the first days of the war as a
    schoolboy who learned his lessons by rote, but without the
    vehemence of true conviction. Indeed, at one of the few
    public meetings between Putin and Medvedev, the Premier
    resorted to "suggestions" that the military prosecutor should
    look into evidence of "genocide" in South Ossetia, and
    Medvedev duly agreed to give the order.

    ¶4. (C) As the conflict cooled down and Medvedev took a
    visible role in hammering out a ceasefire agreement with
    French President Sarkozy, the public portrayal of the tandem
    began to shift back to its "proper" balance, even as the
    French told us it was Putin who joined the meeting to broker
    the "Medvedev-Sarkozy" agreement. Medvedev moved to the
    forefront of Russia's government controlled television stage
    and Putin returned to focus on other matters. According to
    the newspaper Kommersant, Levada Center polls in August
    showed a slight increase in popular perceptions of Medvedev's
    position in the tandem, with 14 percent of respondents
    agreeing that real power is in the President's hands, up from
    9 percent in June, but still far below the near 20 percent
    figure at the time of Medvedev's inauguration. Tellingly,
    nearly half of respondents saw Medvedev and Putin sharing
    power.

    100 Days Leaves Medvedev Poorly Prepared
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Few are surprised that Medvedev was unprepared for the
    Georgian war. Before the conflict, Medvedev had focused on
    domestic issues that had been his forte as Deputy Premier.
    He had taken initial steps in his first three months in
    office to define himself: promoting the domestic themes of
    anti-corruption, economic modernization, and, in foreign
    policy, a new European security architecture. He also went as
    far as indirect criticism of Putin's attack on the Mechel
    coal company in late July. Pro-Kremlin commentators like
    lawyer Pavel Astakov and analyst Dmitriy Orlov in recent
    weeks penned paeans to what they claimed were Medvedev's
    successes in launching judicial reforms, promoting small
    business, and tackling the thorny issue of pervasive
    corruption.

    ¶6. (C) While debates have continued over whether Medvedev is
    a "liberal" or a Putin flunky, there is general consensus
    that Medvedev remains circumscribed in his ability act
    independently. xxxxx conceded
    that Medvedev had ambitions and was being pushed by his inner
    circle (largely remnants of the Yeltsin team) to be "more
    liberal," but he had no capacity to carry them through.
    xxxxx attributed this to Putin's shift of Kremlin cadre to
    the White House -- a move that left Medvedev largely adrift
    in his own administration. Editor/owner of the independent
    xxxxx judged Medvedev
    politically naive, despite 17 years in the inner circle.
    xxxxx who with eight other prominent editors attended a
    long, liquid dinner with the President, described Medvedev as
    saying the right things, but with no clear ability to
    translate them into practice.

    ¶7. (C) While Medvedev spoke vaguely of new European security
    structures, some argued that Putin remained the real foreign
    policy helmsman, who used informal relations and the creation
    of new White House entities to forge his own policy team. The
    newly appointed Director of the Russian Institute for
    Democracy in NY, Andranik Migranyan, judged to us that even
    before the Georgia crisis, Medvedev had taken a beating in
    foreign policy, with the appointment of Ambassador Yuri
    Ushakov to the White House a clear sign of Putin's
    encroachment on Kremlin turf. Medvedev lacked a foreign
    policy team, and his hesitancy, or "lack of tonality," on
    important issues was apparent in the diplomatic mishap at the
    G8 over Zimbabwe. Migranyan predicted that Putin would
    continue to dominate the policy milieu through his connection
    to the intelligence services and deployment of Ushakov.

    Looking Ahead
    -------------

    ¶8. (C) For those who see Putin as protecting and developing
    his successor as "regent" -- including xxxxx and Gleb
    Pavlovskiy -- the conflict gave some indication of Medvedev's
    strengths and weakness during times of crisis. Medvedev
    stills needs Putin, according to Pavlovskiy, as the primary
    source of the President's legitimacy. If Putin were to leave
    office today, Medvedev would have a tough fight; in the eyes
    of half the Russian public, trust of Putin constitutes
    Medvedev's writ. Kryshtanovskaya argued that Putin cannot
    afford to allow Medvedev to lose his legitimacy as president,
    in that Putin has staked his reputation on his successor.

    ¶9. (C) For others, the war showed that Medvedev is not up to
    challenge of leadership. Russian Caucasus experts told DCM
    August 21 that Russia could not show weakness in the face of
    Georgia's challenge in South Ossetia for fear of both
    external and internal security consequences. Putin, not
    Medvedev, understood that and orchestrated the required
    action to meet the challenge, they argued.

    ¶10. (C) While most of our contacts agreed that 100 days is
    too short to draw conclusions, xxxxx and Kryshtanovskaya
    predicted the war could hasten a shift towards a
    parliamentary system. xxxxx characterized Putin's public
    persona as Russia's CEO, rolling up his sleeves on issues
    that matter more to Russians while Medvedev handles the
    ceremonial duties of President. He likened the situation to
    the German model, which Putin well understands, and posited
    that the Premier may aspire to play Chancellor to Medvedev's
    German President. Kryshtanovskaya likewise sees Putin as
    laying the foundation for a parliamentary republic, by taking
    the lead of Russia's most politically powerful party and
    shifting many formerly presidential functions to the White
    House.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶11. (C) After the Georgian conflict, nobody questions Putin's
    dominance of the political system. What remains to be seen
    is whether he intends to transfer the power mantle to
    Medvedev, as the "regency" school predicts, or to further
    consolidate his power as Premier. Putin's modus operandi is
    to create options and to avoid picking one particular path,
    suggesting that we will see him continue to follow both
    options as he waits to see how things play out. Among the
    populace, there is a sense of national pride and patriotism
    as the vast majority of Russians rally around the Kremlin.
    The success of Moscow's "short, victorious war" accrues to
    the tandem team, although we assess more so to Putin than the
    President. The Russian elite, highly attuned to signals from
    the Kremlin, are likely to see the Georgian war as evidence
    that it is too early to dismiss the influence of the silovik
    wing or its captain, Putin. And in light of the Kremlin
    wagon-circling we expect to follow the independence
    recognition decision, Medvedev's agenda of economic
    modernization, anti-corruption, and European security focus
    will lose any sense of urgency that it might have had. End
    comment.
    Beyrle

`