Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 13307 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden 00. Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Jordan Yemen

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17 2011/05/18 2011/05/19 2011/05/20 2011/05/21 2011/05/22 2011/05/23 2011/05/24 2011/05/25 2011/05/26 2011/05/27 2011/05/28 2011/05/29

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/12
1996/07 1996/11
1997/06 1997/10 1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata Consulate Karachi
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana Consulate Thessaloniki
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AEMR AMGT AR APECO AU AORC AJ AF AFIN AS AM AFFAIRS AID ADM ALOW ACOA AA AND APER ADANA APEC ADPM ADCO ABLD ASEAN AL AMED AO AADP AROC ATRN ARF AG AY AORG ABUD AE AGAO APCS AINF AODE ACABQ AX AMEX AZ ASUP ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC ASIG ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AN AIT ANET AGMT ACS AGR AMCHAMS AECL AUC AFGHANISTAN ACAO
BR BB BG BEXP BY BA BRUSSELS BU BD BK BL BO BM BTIO BIDEN BP BE BH BILAT BC BX BF BBSR BT BMGT BWC BN BTIU
CPAS CA CASC CS CBW CIDA CO CODEL CI CROS CU CH CWC CMGT CVIS CDG CD CV CG CF CHIEF CJAN CBSA CE CY CM CONS CT CW CN CDC CONDOLEEZZA CR CICTE CYPRUS COUNTRY CBE COUNTER CARSON COPUOS CTR COM CIVS CFED CKGR CHR CVR CLINTON COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CARICOM CB CSW CIC CITT CAFTA CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CONSULAR CLMT CBC CIA CNARC CIS CEUDA CAC CL CACS CAPC
DR DJ DHS DAO DCM DA DEFENSE DOD DOMESTIC DO DK DE DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEAX
ECON ETTC EFIS ETRD EC EMIN EAGR EAID EU EFIN EUN ECIN EG EWWT EINV ENRG ELAB EPET EN EAIR EUMEM ECPS ELTN EIND EZ EI ER ET EINT EXIM ENIV ECONOMIC ES ECONOMY ERNG ELECTIONS ENERG EFTA EK EPA ENGR ETRC EXTERNAL ENVI ELN EAIDS ECA EINVEFIN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EUREM EFINECONCS ETC ENVR EAP EINN EXBS ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EREL EINVETC ECONCS ETRA ESA EAIG EUR EUC ERD ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ECINECONCS ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECUN
FR FI FINR FAS FOREIGN FBI FTAA FREEDOM FINANCE FJ FDA FTA FAO FM FARC FAC FOR FOI FO FMLN FISO
GM GG GERARD GT GA GR GTIP GV GLOBAL GTMO GOV GH GOI GL GF GANGS GCC GAERC GE GZ GAZA GY GUILLERMO GASPAR
HR HO HA HYMPSK HK HUMAN HU HILLARY HI HURI HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IZ IN IAEA IS IMO ILO IR IC IT ITU IV IMF IBRD IWC IRAQI ISRAELI ITALY ITPGOV ITALIAN IPR IO ICAO ITRA ICJ INMARSAT ID ICRC INTERNAL IIP IRS ICTY ILC IEFIN IQ IA INTERPOL IEA INR INRB IAHRC ISRAEL IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM IL IACI INDO IDA ISLAMISTS IGAD ITF INRA INRO IBET INTELSAT IDP ICTR IRC
JA JO JM JP JOSEPH JUS JOHN JAMES JOHNNIE JIMENEZ
KOMC KNNP KFLO KDEM KSUM KIPR KFLU KPAO KE KCRM KJUS KAWC KZ KSCA KDRG KCOR KGHG KPAL KTIP KMCA KCRS KPKO KOLY KRVC KVPR KG KMDR KWBG KTER KSPR KV KTFN KWMN KFRD KSTH KS KN KISL KGIC KSEP KFIN KTEX KTIA KUNR KCMR KMOC KCIP KTDB KBIO KU KSTC KICC KCRCM KIRC KIRF KSEO KSAF KR KPRP KNUP KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KTBT KOCI KBCT KMPI KNPP KSCI KIDE KPAONZ KNUC KHLS KHDP KCOM KAID KHIV KCSY KTRD KNAR KWAC KJUST KO KBTS KTLA KNNPMNUC KVRP KPRV KACT KCFE KNDP KAWK KHSA KMRS KERG KPOA KPWR KFSC KVIR KX KMFO KENV KRCM KCFC KNEI KCHG KPLS KREL KFTFN KTFM KLIG KDEMAF KRAD KBTR KGIT KGCC KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KPIR KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KRGY KREC KIFR KSAC KWMNCS KPAK KOMS KFPC KRIM KDDG KCGC KPAI KID KMIG KNSD KWMM
LY LE LABOR LO LI LTTE LH LG LAB LT LA LU LOG
MARR MX MASS MOPS MNUC MCAP MTCRE ML MR MRCRE MTRE MASC MY MK MAS MO MIL MP MTCR MAPP MZ MG MAR MD MU MA MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MT MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MARAD MDC MEPP MASSMNUC MUCN MEDIA MI MQADHAFI MPOS MPS MC
NZ NATO NI NO NG NL NU NPT NS NSSP NA NATIONAL NSF NDP NR NP NIPP NE NAS NGO NZUS NH NSG NAFTA NC NEW NRR NT NASA NAR NK NOVO NATOPREL NSC NV NPA NSFO NW NORAD NPG
OTRA OECD OVIP OREP OPRC ODC OPDC OAS OSCE OPIC OMS OIIP OPAD OEXC OPCW ODIP OFDP OIE OFFICIALS OSCI OHUM OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OVP ON OCII OES OCS OIC
PGOV PREL PARM PINR PHUM PM PREF PTER PK PINS PBIO PHSA PE PBTS PL POL PAK POV PGOF PPA POLITICS POLICY PAS PCI PALESTINIAN PROP PTE PREO POLITICAL PA PAIGH PO PROG PJUS PMIL PRAM PAO PTERE PARMS PSI PDOV PG PRGOV PORG PP PS PKFK PSOE PEPR PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PNG PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA PNAT POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PY PLN PHUH PEDRO PF PHUS PTBS PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PHUMPREL POGOV PEL PINL PBT PINF PRL PSEPC POSTS PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOC PNR PROV
QA
RS RP RU RW RFE RCMP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RO RICE RM REGION ROOD RSP RF RELATIONS RIGHTS RUPREL REMON REACTION REPORT RSO
SZ SENV SOCI SNAR SY SO SP SU SI SMIG SYR SA SCUL SG SW SR SYRIA SPECIALIST SEN SC SCRS SF SL SAARC SNARIZ STEINBERG SWE SARS SN SAN ST SIPDIS SSA SPCVIS SOFA SENVKGHG SANC SHI SEVN SHUM SK SH SNARCS SPCE SNARN SIPRS
TRGY TBIO TSPA TU TPHY TI TX TH TIP TSPL TNGD TZ TC TF TN TW TL TV TS TT TK TD TERRORISM TP TO TRSY TURKEY TINT TFIN TAGS TR TBID THPY
UK UNSC UNGA UN US USTR UZ USEU UV UG UP UNAUS UNMIK USUN USPS UNESCO UNHRC UNHCR UY UNEP UNCHR USAID USNC USOAS UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNDP UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNDC UNICEF UNCHC UNCSD UNFCYP UNIDROIT UNCND
VE VM VT VZ VTEG VTIZ VTPREL VENZ VAT VC VI VN
WHTI WIPO WTRO WHO WS WTO WZ WI WMD WBG WWARD WHA WITH WTRQ WEU WMO WA WFP WB
XA XR XW XX XK XL XM XS XF XG XT XH XY XV XB XU XD XC XE XZ XQ XI XTAG
YI YM YE YMCS
ZU ZI ZP ZR ZOELLICK ZF ZL ZJ ZO ZB ZEALAND ZN ZA ZK ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2064, NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05THEHAGUE2064.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05THEHAGUE2064 | 2005-07-27 08:12 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF
    DUTCH NAVY, JSF

    Classified By: Ambassador Cl...

    37388,7/27/2005 8:12,05THEHAGUE2064,"Embassy The
    Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,,"This record is a partial extract of the original
    cable. The full
    text of the original cable is not available.
    ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF
    DUTCH NAVY, JSF
    Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief met with Dutch
    CHOD Gen. Dick Berlijn on July 19. Gen. Berlijn reviewed
    Dutch thinking on participation in ISAF III, including a PRT
    consisting initially of 1000 personnel (later to be expanded
    to 1200) deployed most likely to Uruzgan province. Later
    discussions on July 26 with the Acting Director of Operations
    at the Dutch MFA confirmed this preliminary plan. The Dutch
    will host the Canadians and British on August 17-18 to
    follow-up on the force generation conference. Berlijn noted
    that a compromise in Parliament prevented plans for an
    1800-man deployment, as the main opposition party wanted
    personnel available for a potential African mission. Berlijn
    also talked about the possibility of U.S. support -- either
    through proximity to Dutch forces or embedded U.S.
    intelligence personnel -- as potentially helping convince
    Dutch Minister of Defense Henk Kamp and others in the Dutch
    government to deploy to Uruzgan.
    ¶2. (C) Cont. Summary: Gen. Berlijn reviewed changes occurring
    in the Dutch Navy. Quoting Minister Kamp, Berlijn described
    the Dutch Navy as ""demoralized and adrift"". Berlijn
    explained that they need to become expeditionary, relying
    less on their frigates and more on coastal patrol vessels and
    landing platform ships to support land battles. He outlined
    the possibility of selling six ""M"" frigates -- two to Belgium
    and four to Chile -- proceeds from which could potentially
    be used to purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform
    dock ships, Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets.
    ¶3. (C) Cont. Summary: Berlijn also stated that he was
    interested in finding a way to prioritize the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF) program within the Dutch government. He hoped
    to develop a plan to pursue the purchase of an initial,
    ""acceptably safe"" number of 50-60 JSFs in 2006, in order to
    ""depoliticize"" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections. By
    depoliticizing the issue through this initial purchase,
    Berlijn suggested that the Dutch could keep options open
    regarding the total eventual purchase of 80 or more JSFs.
    End Summary.
    --------------
    ISAF Stage III
    --------------
    ¶4. (C) Gen. Berlijn initially briefed on Dutch plans to
    participate in ISAF Stage III. These plans are still by and
    large under discussion within the Dutch government; Dutch FM
    Bot has been negotiating with Parliament over ISAF III for
    several weeks. MajGen Cobelens, MOD Director of Operations,
    drafted the preliminary plan presented to NATO during the
    July 25 force generation conference. According to the Acting
    Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA on July 26, this
    preliminary plan calls for Dutch partnership with the
    Canadians and Brits at the Forward Support Base (FSB) in
    Kandahar beginning in April 2006. The deployment will last
    for eighteen months; command responsibility for the FSB will
    be on a six-month rotation with the Canadians taking the
    first watch. The Dutch will assume command of the FSB in
    November 2006.
    ¶5. (C) According to the Acting Director of Operations at the
    Dutch MFA, the preliminary Dutch plan proposed a Dutch
    Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan province.
    The Dutch plan to initially deploy 1000 personnel, ramping up
    to 1200 personnel by the time they assume charge of the
    Kandahar FSB in November 2006. The 1200-person deployment
    will also include approximately 4 Chinooks, 4-6 Apaches, and
    the 4 F-16s currently stationed in Kabul. The Dutch MOD will
    host Canada and the UK on August 17-18 to follow-up on ISAF
    Stage III proposal details. (Note: A read-out from USNATO
    suggests that the United States may be invited to attend the
    meeting as well; according to the Dutch MFA, only the Brits
    and Canadians have thus far been invited. Post will seek
    more information on possible U.S. attendance. End note.)
    ¶6. (C) Gen. Berlijn explained that he was limited to a PRT
    consisting of 1000 personnel due to restrictions set by
    Parliament. Berlijn initially wanted 1800 personnel, but the
    Labor Party (PvdA) demanded that some personnel also be
    available for possible operations in Africa (NFI). A
    compromise within Parliament led to the 1000-person
    restriction to accommodate the Labor Party. (Note: Dutch
    governments prefer to make military deployment decisions
    backed by a parliamentary super-majority, usually to include
    the main opposition party. End note.) While the number of
    personnel in the PRT will eventually increase to 1200, the
    Acting Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA explained that
    this number is a ""maximum"" number set by Parliament that
    cannot be exceeded, and will also include air technicians and
    support for their deployed helicopters and F-16s. Actually,
    the Dutch initial plan calls for a fully operational PRT of
    1568 men; due to the 1200 restriction set by Parliament, the
    Dutch were actively encouraging the Australians to partner
    with them in the PRT.
    ¶7. (C) According to Berlijn, the Dutch had not yet agreed
    internally (as of July 19) on the location of the PRT. While
    the Dutch preliminary plan proposed during the force
    generation conference calls for a PRT deployment in Uruzgan,
    the subject is still open for debate. Berlijn and other
    members of the military staff were strongly recommending that
    the Dutch troops be deployed to Uruzgan province in central
    Afghanistan, where they could, in his view, make a real
    difference in a challenging environment. Others in the
    government, however, wanted the Dutch to deploy to the safer
    province of Nimruz near the Iranian border. Berlijn
    discussed the possibility of U.S. support -- either through
    proximity to Dutch forces or embedding U.S. intelligence
    within Dutch forces -- as potentially helping convince his
    minister and others in the Dutch government that they can and
    should deploy to Uruzgan.
    --------------------
    Future of Dutch Navy
    --------------------
    ¶8. (C) Following a question on the status of potential
    Tactical Tomahawk acquisition, Gen. Berlijn provided an
    extended background explanation on changes occurring in the
    Dutch Navy. According to Berlijn, Dutch Minister of Defense
    Kamp recently described the Dutch Navy as ""demoralized and
    adrift"". Kamp felt that the Navy relied too heavily upon
    their frigates. The Navy needed to reorient and ""focus on
    tasks"", becoming ""expeditionary and more coastal"".
    ¶9. (C) After studying the issue, Berlijn stated that the
    Dutch need to sell some of their frigates and buy more
    coastal patrol vessels (CPVs) and landing platform dock (LPD)
    ships. Berlijn cautioned that convincing Dutch admirals to
    sell their frigates would be very difficult -- ""Getting the
    Admirals to give up their frigates is like getting a fighter
    pilot to give up his fighter"" (Note: Berlijn is a fighter
    pilot.). Berlijn stated that he wants the Navy to support
    land battle and theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). He
    expressed firm support for a Dutch submarine capability,
    noting that ""the Dutch are in the submarine business"". In
    that respect, he needed to put an end to the current debate
    on submarines within the Dutch government. Berlijn also
    noted that they are looking at a study to improve its oiler
    ship, including its capacity to incorporate more helicopters
    in order to support Dutch troops in the field or for use
    during amphibious deployments.
    ¶10. (C) Berlijn then discussed the possibility of selling six
    ""M"" frigates, which he described as ""very sensitive"" as the
    Dutch are in competition with the Brits in this regard. He
    stated that the Belgians are interested in purchasing two
    frigates; the Chileans have expressed interest in buying the
    other four. (Note: In a conversation with Dutch FM Bot on
    July 21, Bot told ambassador that he was not in favor of
    selling the frigates, but would not/not disagree with Kamp in
    Cabinet. Bot noted, however, that there was resistance in
    the Dutch Navy regarding the sale of the frigates. End
    note.) Berlijn further explained that if the Dutch sold
    these frigates, proceeds could potentially be used to
    purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform dock ships,
    Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets.
    --------------------
    Joint Strike Fighter
    --------------------
    ¶11. (C) Berlijn then turned discussion to the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF), and noted that he was looking for ways to
    prioritize JSF in the Dutch government. He wished to
    ""depoliticize"" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections by
    working to get a commitment from the Dutch government in 2006
    for the purchase of an initial, ""acceptably safe"" number of
    50-60 JSFs. By depoliticizing the issue with this initial
    purchase, he suggested that options remained open to
    eventually buy over 80 JSFs in total. He commented that
    ""even the leftists agree that this is the best fighter we
    could acquire"". Berlijn acknowledged that if the Dutch want
    to keep their aerospace industry alive, they must be actively
    involved with both JSF and the Airbus 380.
    -------------------------------
    Tactical Tomahawks; UAV Project
    -------------------------------
    ¶12. (C) Berlijn noted that the Dutch are still committed to
    the acquisition of Tactical Tomahawks, but it needed to occur
    sequentially following the development and construction of
    coastal patrol vessels. (Note: Selling the six ""M"" frigates
    and replacing them with newly-built corvettes -- thus
    providing work for the Dutch ship-building industry -- may
    yield sufficient parliamentary support for acquisition of
    Tactical Tomahawk, which could be employed on the Dutch
    Navy's new Aegis-equivalent LCF frigates. End note.)
    Berlijn briefly addressed the Dutch unmanned aerial vehicle
    (UAV) project in partnership with the French. According the
    Berlijn, the partnership helps diffuse tensions within the
    Dutch government regarding the perception that the Dutch only
    buy military equipment from the United States. Berlijn
    explained, however, that the program has stalled as the
    French have taken a ""90 degree turn"". The French Defense
    Minister is scheduled to visit the Netherlands in September;
    the UAV project will be on the agenda for discussion.
    SOBEL

`