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### Viewing cable 09MEXICO2126, PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO2126 | 2009-07-21 00:56 | 2011-05-24 10:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/el-pacto-an-pri-se-anuncio-antes-a-washington

`

    VZCZCXRO1952
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #2126/01 2020056
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 210056Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7532
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    217414
    2009-07-21 00:56:00
    09MEXICO2126
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL
    09MEXICO1993|09MEXICO2018
    VZCZCXRO1952
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #2126/01 2020056
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 210056Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7532
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 002126

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2017
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MX
    SUBJECT: PRI CONCOCTING POST-ELECTION STRATEGY
     REF: A. MEXICO 2018
         ¶B. MEXICO 1993

    Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor James P. Merz.
    Reason: 1.4 (b), (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  Following its midterm elections victory, the
    Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI),is planning an agenda
    that increasingly looks focused on the budget and addressing
    the country's economic problems.  The party will also pursue
    political reform efforts geared at limiting presidential
    powers, as well as a more "holistic" approach to addressing
    security challenges. The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly
    obstructionist course, but it will look to distinguish itself
    more from the National Action Party (PAN) and to undercut its
    counterpart when it can, which may involve more outreach
    toward the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD).  Nevertheless,
    the country's security and economic woes are not easily
    resolved, and failure to see any improvements could leave the
    party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against
    the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that
    cannot get things done. End Summary.

    Economic Issues Dominate PRI Planning
    -------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Still in the planning stages, PRI's agenda for the
    next three-year legislative period will focus on the federal
    budget and deal with Mexico's economic recession, with an
    emphasis on job creation, poverty alleviation, and
    infrastructure projects.  Outgoing PRI Deputy Samuel Aguilar,
    who will take a job in the party's National Executive
    Committee (CEN) once the new Chamber of Deputies convenes in
    September, told Poloffs on July 16 that he expects the first
    year of the period to be consumed by efforts to ameliorate
    the economic crisis -- the PRI already has announced its
    intent to pass a new Emergency Economic Law to offset the
    impact of financial woes (ref a) -- and the 2010 budgeting
    process.

    ¶3. (C) In gearing up for the 2010 budget debates, the PRI
    hopes to chair the budget committee (as well as the foreign
    relations, social development, agricultural, and finance
    committee in addition to others it already controls).
    Aguilar, who currently sits on the budget committee, said the
    party will look to control the federal government's
    proclivity to "overspend," echoing public comments by PRI
    leaders that they would try to make modest budget cuts for
    the coming year.  More importantly, Aguilar noted that the
    party will look to devolve a greater portion of the budget
    and control over spending to state governments, of which the
    PRI now controls 19 of 31.  Aguilar argued that the budget
    has been too highly centralized in the federal government,
    which has done an inadequate job of distributing funds.
    Finally, Aguilar cited growing unemployment rates as a key
    challenge currently facing the country and argued that the
    GOM should target resources toward sectors that maximize job
    creation, such as big ticket infrastructure projects.

    Security...It's Still About the Economy
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Complaints about President Calderon's security
    strategy have dominated the press over the past several days,
    with PRI Chamber and Senate leaders grumbling about the need
    to review the government's law-and-order approach and other
    opposition parties questioning the utility of continued
    military deployment in the counterdrug fight.  Aguilar argued
    that Calderon's approach is one-sided, with an emphasis on
    arrests of cartel leaders rather than a more holistic method
    to attack the problem.  The PRI will look to distinguish its
    security approach from Calderon by focusing more on abuse
    prevention, anti-violence education programs in schools, and
    social development/job creation.  The PRI also will advocate
    the greater use of intelligence, as Aguilar complained that
    Calderon's approach is not narrow or focused enough when
    selecting targets.  Nevertheless, repeating what Poloff has
    heard from other PRI contacts (ref b), Aguilar indicated that
    the PRI is not looking to pull the military out of the
    streets in the short-term -- he does not expect such a
    measure would pass in Congress -- but instead argued that the

    MEXICO 00002126  002 OF 003

    military's current role cannot be considered a long-term
    solution.  He fears that the military's reputation as one of
    the country's most respected institutions is being tarnished
    by its domestic policing role and the increasing number of
    human rights complaints that have ensued.

    Limiting Presidential Powers
    ----------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Political system reform will also be high on the
    agenda, with the fundamental goal of reducing the power of
    the presidency.  The PRI wants to focus the debate away from
    electoral reform, according to Aguilar, and he opined that
    the new electoral regime survived its "trial by fire" in the
    recent midterm vote.  Based on conversations with other PRI
    contacts, it is likely the party will look to implement
    measures granting Congress the power to appoint, or at least
    approve, Cabinet ministers, as well as give the legislature
    more authority in regulating the deployment of the military
    domestically.  Mexico expert Jeff Weldon, a professor at the
    Technological Autonomous Institute of Mexico (ITAM) noted
    that the PRI will also try to pass legislation to break up
    the Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) and the
    Secretariat of Agriculture (SAGARPA) and pass their
    authorities to the states, which would give PRI governors a
    key tool in managing political support networks and
    maintaining incumbency.

    Friends and Foes
    ----------------

    ¶6. (C) The PRI is unlikely to pursue a highly obstructionist
    course over the next legislative period, but it almost
    certainly will look to distinguish itself more from the PAN
    and to get blows in against its "adversary" when it can.
    Aguilar noted that the PRI has been highly supportive of the
    PAN over the past three years, but that the high rates of
    voting coincidence between the two parties will change.
    Aguilar did not confirm rumors of a Senate alliance between
    the PRI and PRD, but said the party will attempt to divide
    the PAN and PRD to prevent them from forming a bloc.
    Moreover, the PRI may increasingly look to the PRD for
    support, as Aguilar noted it is the easier party to
    manipulate.

    ¶7. (C) In addition to greater PRI-PRD cooperation, the PRI
    also has formalized, more or less, a congressional pact with
    the Green Party (PVEM), with which it ran in an electoral
    alliance in over 60 districts.  Beatriz Paredes and Jorge
    Emilio Gonzalez, PRI and PVEM party presidents respectively,
    met on July 19 and agreed that the PRI's 237 deputies and the
    PVEM's 22 will coordinate in the Chamber, bringing the bloc
    to over the 250 majority to 259.  Leaving aside the PVEM's
    campaign proposal to reinstate the death penalty, the two
    have said they will work together on economic, social, and
    security issues, and may once again ally for the 2010 local
    elections.  While the pact does not significantly alter the
    balance of power in Congress, it, like the PRI's potential
    outreach to the PRD, is another sign of an attempt to
    distance itself from the PAN.

    Internal Party Dynamics
    -----------------------

    ¶8. (C) Even as PRI governors and other party leaders jockey
    to see which PRI faction controls what Chamber commission,
    the party is already gearing up for a series of local
    elections next year in key PRI states, including Chihuahua,
    Durango, Sinaloa, Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Puebla.  The party
    will try to capitalize on its electoral momentum coming out
    of the midterms and hopes to prove that its recent success is
    not merely a punishment vote against the PAN and the Calderon
    government for the country's security and economic
    challenges.  Aguilar said that the local PRI political
    machinery has served and will continue to serve them well; he
    explained that PRI operatives are assigned to certain
    districts during campaign season, where they maintain close,
    practically door-to-door contact with voters.

    ¶9. (C) These campaign techniques served Mexico State Governor
    Enrique Pena Nieto well during the recent legislative and
    local contests.  Aguilar said Pena Nieto has a crack team of

    MEXICO 00002126  003 OF 003

    political operatives assembled to campaign throughout the
    state and, due to their talent, even across the country as
    needed.  Pena Nieto campaigned in rural districts and
    literally went door-to-door, which greatly impressed voters.
    Moreover, Pena Nieto has won a great deal of support from his
    constituency, according to Aguilar, from his decision to sign
    a list of campaign promises in front of a notary, many with
    which he has apparently complied.  A certified list of
    accomplishments apparently resonates with voters,
    particularly given businessman and security activist
    Alejandro Marti's very public call on candidates to do the
    same in the run-up to the midterm election.

    ¶10. (C) With about 43 Mexico State deputies represented in
    the Chamber through direct election and plurinominal
    selection, Pena Nieto will control the largest PRI bloc.  His
    proxies will probably be placed on key commissions.  His
    ally, Emilio Chuayffet, a former governor of Mexico State, is
    likely to be the coordinator of the PRI group in the Chamber
    should party president Beatriz Paredes choose not to assume
    the role, according to Aguilar. Press has speculated that
    Francisco Rojas or Rogelio Cerda Perez, both from Nuevo Leon,
    may also be on the short list.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶11. (C) While the party is still formulating specific
    proposals -- the congressional bloc will soon convene to
    discuss its 61st legislative agenda -- the PRI's general
    approach and focus for at least next session seems to be
    coalescing.  It is likely to be less generous toward the PAN
    and perhaps a bit more friendly toward the PRD, but with an
    eye to distinguishing itself as the party capable of
    proactively confronting the country's problems.  The PRI
    stands to score points with a more assertive economic agenda
    (targeted at least in part at securing support from key
    constituencies) and "softer side" security proposals.  It
    will have to manage carefully its public relations campaign.
    The country's security and economic woes are not easily
    resolved, and failure to produce improvements could leave the
    party vulnerable to the very accusations it has made against
    the PAN -- that the PRI is just another political party that
    can't get things done.

    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

    FEELEY

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