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### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1447, WHA A/S VALENZUELA RECEIVED BY EAGER BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA1447 | 2009-12-29 17:16 | 2011-02-13 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO7348
    RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
    RUEHTM
    DE RUEHBR #1447/01 3631716
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 291716Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0225
    INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 001447

    SIPDIS
    DEPARTMENT FOR WHA
    AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE
    AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA
    AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/29
    TAGS: PREL BR
    SUBJECT: WHA A/S VALENZUELA RECEIVED BY EAGER BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT

    CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, charge d'affaires a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. On his first visit to Brazil as Assistant
    Secretary, Arturo Valenzuela was received December 14 by senior
    government officials eager to minimize differences and demonstrate
    their interest in working with the USG on a range of topics.
    Meetings with the Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor, Foreign
    Ministry (Itamaraty) officials, and Defense Minister addressed
    shared concerns with resolving the crisis in Honduras, the need to
    lower tensions in South America (particularly between Colombia and
    Venezuela), interest in working together in Haiti, and
    possibilities for counternarcotics cooperation in Bolivia. Whereas
    the Presidency highlighted Lula's efforts related to Iran and the
    Middle East peace process, Itamaraty focused on the need to expand
    our bilateral, regional, and trilateral cooperation, as well as our
    discussions on global issues into new areas. The worried media
    reports highlighting "tensions" in the U.S.-Brazil relationship
    prior to A/S Valenzuela's arrival were replaced following his visit
    with upbeat stories regarding the renewed possibilities for
    cooperation. End summary.

    Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Garcia Focuses on Honduras...

    ¶2. (C) In a long and friendly meeting, Presidential Foreign Policy
    Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia laid out Brazil's position and ongoing
    concerns regarding Honduras. He said President Zelaya's decision
    to go abroad had given Brazil greater "flexibility" in dealing with
    the crisis. Brazil believes it is essential for de facto leader
    Micheletti to step down, and Garcia expressed his hopes that the
    USG would "turn the screws" on him. Personally, Garcia said he
    thought a constituent assembly would be a way to give legitimacy to
    the political solution being crafted.

    ¶3. (C) A/S Valenzuela disagreed with Garcia's assertion that the
    Honduras crisis had created "a division" between the United States
    and Latin America. Rather, he said the failed effort by Mexico to
    gain safe passage for Zelaya out of the country, of which the USG
    had not been informed and which had negatively affected other
    efforts on Zelaya's behalf, demonstrated the need for more fluid
    communication. In later discussions at Itamaraty, Honduras was
    also a leading topic of conversation. There, officials insisted
    that they had no contact with the Micheletti regime and that their
    ability to influence Zelaya was limited.

    ...Proposes U.S. Visit to Venezuela...

    ¶4. (C) Garcia made a point to reiterate a suggestion he had made to
    NSA General Jones, that Valenzuela should go to Caracas to
    establish a "direct link" and relationship with President Chavez.
    Without such a move, Garcia said, "Chavez will respond to everyone"
    (i.e., to USG officials whatever their position); "he has no sense
    of proportion." Garcia said that, because of "ambiguity" and "a
    bad process," the issue of the Colombia bases had complicated
    matters in the region. Although the November 27 meeting of the
    South American Defense Council (SADC) had reduced tensions, the
    idea that the bases might be used to launch an action against
    Venezuela "was common." Neither Colombia nor Venezuela was willing
    to make a goodwill gesture toward the other, and Brazil's efforts
    to mediate had been rebuffed by both sides. He predicted that
    Venezuela "will maintain the pressure" on Colombia for several
    months. Venezuelan FM Maduro had indicated to Garcia that a visit
    by A/S Valenzuela would be "no problem" to arrange; Garcia felt it
    would help reduce tensions and improve dialogue with the region.
    A/S Valenzuela was noncommittal, and noted that it is difficult to
    ignore both the provocative statements by Chavez and his
    authoritarian tendencies.

    ...Assesses Regional Developments...

    ¶5. (C) Over the course of the conversation, Garcia expressed a

    BRASILIA 00001447 002 OF 005

    preference for former President Frei in Chile's elections;
    described Ecuador's and Bolivia's political systems as "rotten";
    said that Mujica's election in Uruguay was good as he would be
    "more active"; and called the future of Argentina "a big question
    mark," depending on whether the Kirchners recover or not, although
    he did not foresee problems for relations with Brazil. Garcia
    hoped to "revive Mercosur" during the upcoming Argentine
    presidency. With regard to relations with the United States,
    Garcia noted that the "delay" in USG initiatives toward the region
    caused frustration and disappointment.

    ... And Indicates Middle East Peace and Iran Top Brazil's Global
    Agenda

    ¶6. (C) Beyond Latin America, Garcia described Brazil's priorities
    as climate change and expanding participation in the Middle East
    peace process "to put more air" into them. Brazil is concerned
    with the success of the Israel-Palestine peace process both because
    of the impact on its own global interests and because it
    "contaminates" other issues in the region-including Iran,
    Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Garcia said Brazil has encouraged Iran
    to use its influence with Hamas to help move the process forward.
    With regard to Iran itself, Garcia described Brazil's engagement as
    "a bet" that might not work. In light of President Obama's request
    to help, Brazil is trying to build a relationship with Iran. He
    described Brazil's reception of President Ahmadinejad in November
    as "not warm" and stressed that President Lula had delivered
    "direct messages." Brazil is encouraging Iran to "submit to the
    rules," regarding non-proliferation, but Brazil had abstained on
    the recent IAEA vote on Iran as because of the timing; a vote in
    favor at that moment would have neutralized their efforts to sway
    Iran. In Brazil's view, the worst thing to do is to further
    isolate Iran. A/S Valenzuela welcomed Brazil's efforts to
    encourage Iran to comply with its international obligations but
    expressed serious concerns with their nuclear aspirations. He
    emphasized that Iran had a deficit of trust with the international
    community but assured Garcia that the Administration would continue
    to try to engage Iran, despite the difficulties.

    Itamaraty: Eager to Move Forward Bilaterally...

    ¶7. (C) Over lunch with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Vera
    Machado and acting Under Secretary for Latin America GonC'alo
    MourC#o, and in a separate meeting with newly installed Deputy
    Minister and former ambassador to the United States AntC4nio
    Patriota, Brazilian officials stressed the need to move forward in
    expanding our bilateral relationship. Patriota cited the
    high-level dialogue we are hoping to start and said the GOB is glad
    there is a broadening of the bilateral political agenda to match
    the excellent dialogue on the economic side. With regard to
    current cooperation, he praised the Economic Policy Dialogue, under
    way at the same time in Washington, and said that Civilian
    Household (Prime) Minister Dilma Rousseff wants to see more
    bilateral cooperation on biofuels. He highlighted the success of
    the Joint Action Plan to eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination
    (JAPER) and suggested creating linkages with the CEO Forum. Both
    he and Machado said Brazil has much to learn from the United States
    regarding inclusion of civil society and the private sector in such
    initiatives. Patriota noted the meeting of the Brazil Studies
    Association (BRASA) next year as a good opportunity to do some
    cross-fertilization between private sector and social initiatives.
    Patriota hoped we could increase discussions on other social
    issues, including human rights and advancement of women.

    ¶8. (C) Patriota and Machado both expressed interest in moving
    forward with the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and asked for
    serious consideration of language Brazil had just proposed on
    "guarantees" of respect for sovereignty of third countries, which
    Brazil was seeking to add in light of concerns over the
    U.S.-Colombia DCA and commitments made at the November 27 meeting
    of the South America Defense Council.

    BRASILIA 00001447 003 OF 005

    ¶9. (C) Although even the suggestion of work on terrorism-related
    programs has caused problems in Brazil for some USG agencies,
    Machado acknowledged that Brazil would need to address potential
    terrorism issues with Brazil's hosting of the 2014 World Cup and
    the 2016 Olympics. A/S Valenzuela said the USG is willing to
    cooperate and assist in any way we can and he suggested that State
    and Itamaraty should increase our effort to coordinate cooperation
    among our various agencies in advance of these events. ChargC)
    d'Affaires Kubiske noted that the Olympics also open an avenue for
    cooperation to advance social issues, for example, by ensuring that
    efforts are made to secure English training and jobs for minorities
    and the poor.

    ...Regionally...

    ¶10. (C) A/S Valenzuela stressed that Secretary Clinton is committed
    to working closely and more intently on Haiti. The United States
    can benefit from Brazil's expertise in Haiti and the region, he
    said. Acting U/S MourC#o said Brazil's focus in Haiti is on
    policing, as it is important to strengthen Haiti's law enforcement
    capabilities. Patriota noted the efforts of USAID and Brazil's
    Cooperation Agency (ABC) to establish joint projects. He recalled
    that, in the second paragraph of President Lula's letter to
    President Obama last month, he had mentioned the priority of
    constructing a hydroelectric dam and plant. Although the letter
    had suggested a cost of $150 million to build, Patriota believed it
    would actually cost $250 million. He felt this would be an
    important project for the United States and Brazil to work on
    jointly.

    ¶11. (C) During lunch, Machado asked if Bolivia might be
    re-certified next year for counternarcotics cooperation. A/S
    Valenzuela noted some very strong U.S. opposition to this, but said
    that strong communication with the Morales government is essential
    and suggested that there is now an opportunity for trilateral
    cooperation on counternarcotics. Machado raised the 3+1 Security
    Dialogue between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and the United
    States, saying the name of the talks should be changed to avoid a
    sense of opposition.

    ...And Globally

    ¶12. (C) Patriota indicated Brazil's interest in expanding
    "trilateral cooperation" between Brazil, the United States, and
    third countries as a particularly valuable form of engagement,
    particularly in Africa. As Brazil is entering the Security Council
    in January, the GOB wants to coordinate agendas with the USG and
    engage more on Security Council reform. Looking ahead to the NPT
    Review Conference and Nuclear Security Summit, Patriota described
    President Obama's speech in Prague on nuclear non-proliferation and
    disarmament as "groundbreaking" and said it was very well received
    in Brazil. For her part, Machado praised the U.S. announcement of
    voluntary measures related to climate change, which had inspired
    "moderate enthusiasm" and preserved the possibility for
    "non-failure" at Copenhagen. She highlighted agreement for Brazil
    to host a "Rio + 20" next year, which would allow for more
    comprehensive debate.

    Defense Minister Jobim Describes Brazil's Concern with Regional
    Stability...

    ¶13. (C) Following a one-on-one meeting, a friendly and engaged
    DefMin Jobim was joined by senior military personnel for a broad
    discussion of regional issues. Jobim raised the U.S.-Colombia DCA,
    saying that, from a strictly Brazilian point of view, there was no
    problem. The region was "sensitive," however, and as Brazil has no

    BRASILIA 00001447 004 OF 005

    problems with any of its neighbors, it tries to be a "moderator"
    among them. Jobim had made an enormous effort, along with
    Itamaraty and President Lula, to visit all South American countries
    to gain agreement to establish the South American Defense Council,
    which would help create a regional identity on defense issues,
    advance "military diplomacy," link defense to the real economy by
    establishing niches for each country in defense industries, and
    encourage exchanges among military academies.

    ¶14. (C) Noting our common concern with stability in the region, A/S
    Valenzuela asked how Jobim viewed the situation between Colombia
    and Venezuela and the situation in Paraguay. Jobim said that he
    did not see the tensions escalating, but that Lula's efforts to
    mediate a discussion between Chavez and Uribe had not been
    successful. With regard to Paraguay, he said that for political
    reasons Brazil had made concessions on the price it was paying for
    energy from Itaipu and would finance the construction of a
    transmission facility on the Paraguayan side of the border. "This
    is part of the game" with Paraguay, he said. Jobim encouraged A/S
    Valenzuela to continue this dialogue on regional stability. He
    said the United States needs to be "re-introduced" to Latin
    America; although it might be a false impression, there is a
    feeling in the region that the United States needs to build more
    trust following a "difficult era" in the Bush Administration.

    ...And Provides an Update on FX2 Fighter Competition

    ¶15. (C) Jobim noted that delay in a decision on the FX2 fighter
    competition, saying that he would be studying documents from the
    Brazilian Air Force (BRAF) over the holidays and that the National
    Defense Council would meet to make its recommendation after
    congress reconvenes in early February. He was awaiting additional
    documentation from Boeing later in the week and was particularly
    intrigued by the possibilities of the Global Super Hornet program.
    Jobim noted the importance of the purchase in Brazil's national
    defense strategy, adding that technology transfer is the main
    consideration and the U.S. "precedents" on this score are not good;
    but he acknowledged that the portfolio of transfer items was large
    and that it was a new U.S. government. Jobim reiterated the five
    criteria they will be using to make a decision: the quality of the
    platform, the technology being offered, the training being offered,
    the price, and the life-cycle cost. A/S Valenzuela assured him the
    Boeing was best on all counts.

    Political Analysts See Less Aggressive Foreign Policy Post-Lula

    ¶16. (U) Three leading political analysts told A/S Valenzuela that
    Dilma Rousseff, President Lula's choice to succeed him in 2011, has
    at least a break-even chance of winning the October 2010 elections,
    despite Serra's lead in the polls. They expect that many of the
    GOB's current foreign policy positions - including on Iran and
    Honduras - are facilitated by Lula's strong internal position and
    personal reputation, and will not outlast his presidency. They
    described in detail the failure of the delegation of Iranian
    businessmen that accompanied Ahmadinejad, and argued that attempts
    by Rousseff or anyone other than Lula to engage authoritarian
    states in such a high-profile manner would not be tolerated
    domestically, as it is seen as a departure from Brazil's
    traditionally cautious approach to such matters. A Serra
    presidency, they believed, would not alter Brazil's basic economic
    strategy but would lead to a return to more traditional Brazilian
    foreign policy stances, especially in Latin America.

    Media Coverage Goes From Nervous and Negative to Hopeful and
    Positive

    ¶17. (SBU) In advance of A/S Valenzuela's trip, media coverage
    focused on "tensions" in the bilateral relationship, highlighting

    BRASILIA 00001447 005 OF 005

    differences over Honduras, Iran, climate change, and
    non-proliferation. However, following a press roundtable by A/S
    Valenzuela with leading news dailies and weeklies and comments to
    the press by both Garcia and Itamaraty officials, press reports on
    Tuesday, December 15 highlighted apparent points of agreement on
    Honduras and Iran. BrasC-lia daily Correio Braziliense ran one of
    the most powerful headlines: "Disagreements Between Good Allies."
    These reports were reinforced by equally positive headlines in
    online coverage from major news portals such as UOL and Terra.

    ¶18. (U) Although articles began to reappear within days reporting
    views from both Washington and BrasC-lia that tensions persist in
    the bilateral relationship, prominent columnists have supported the
    conclusion that Valenzuela's visit put the U.S.-Brazil relationship
    on a new footing. One of the more forceful columns came from Folha
    de SC#o Paulo's Eliane Catanhede, who highlighted the contrast
    between the prior expressions of "frustration" and "disappointment"
    from Amorim and Garcia, and the much more friendly remarks they
    made during his visit. Her conclusion was that the GOB knows who
    is really in charge on issues such as Honduras, Iran, and
    Copenhagen: "This is how diplomacy is done: Valenzuela was in
    BrasC-lia yesterday; Secretary Hillary Clinton is on her way; Obama
    should be here early in 2010. Deep down, Lula, Amorim, Jobim,
    Garcia, and [former Itamaraty Secretary General; current Minister
    of Strategic Planning] Samuel [Pinheiro Guimaraes] may bark, but
    they never bite. And the 'pitbull' [the United States] knows its
    own strength."

    Youth Ambassadors Meeting Opens the Door for New Media Outreach

    ¶19. (U) A/S Valenzuela met with alumni of the Youth Ambassadors,
    Student Leader Exchange, and English Immersion programs in an
    informal gathering hosted by CDA Kubiske. Valenzuela explained his
    role in over-seeing policy for the Western Hemisphere and fielded
    questions from the young leaders on issues ranging from the value
    of youth exchange programs, to the Obama administration's approach
    to U.S.-Brazil relations and the best way to work with the various
    types of democratic systems found in the region. "I think it was a
    great opportunity to meet Dr. Valenzuela and discuss Brazil-U.S
    relations...it's interesting to see how diplomacy engages youth,"
    said 2008 Youth Ambassador, Pedro Henrique Torres after his
    discussion with the Assistant Secretary. The Public Affairs
    Section posted photos of the meeting on the Mission's Flickr site
    that were also carried on the Assistant Secretary's newly launched
    blog. PA recorded the event and will create short clips to post on
    the Mission's YouTube channel and to distribute to youth contacts.

    ¶20. (U) A/S Valenzuela cleared this message.
    KUBISKE

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