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### Viewing cable 05QUITO1048, ECUADOR'S ABRUPT CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT: EMBASSY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05QUITO1048 | 2005-05-06 20:36 | 2011-05-02 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Quito

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 QUITO 001048

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PREL SNAR ASEC PGOV AMGT EC CONS
    SUBJECT: ECUADOR'S ABRUPT CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT: EMBASSY
    PREPARATIONS, RESPONSE AND LESSONS LEARNED

    ¶1.  (SBU) Summary: The abrupt overthrow of the Gutierrez
    government on April 20 was not unprecedented here, but tested the
    Embassy's capacity to respond quickly to a crisis.  In this after
    action report we examine the lessons we learned from this
    experience, hoping that it will be useful for us and other posts
    when similar circumstances arise in the future.  End summary.

    Lesson One - Don't Ignore the Vice President
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (SBU) Former Vice President and now President Palacios was a
    peripheral figure from early on in the Gutierrez government,
    disagreeing publicly with the president on many occasions.
    Although he was not involved in issues of particular interest to
    the Embassy, the Ambassador and other Embassy officials visited
    him, returned his calls, and maintained relations with him and
    his staff.  We have used this ongoing relationship to great
    advantage in the early days of his administration to open dialog
    and avoid early missteps on key issues such as the Forward
    Operating Location (FOL) in Manta and ongoing free trade
    negotiations that could have tainted our ongoing relationship.

    Cultivate Contacts and More Contacts
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (SBU) Embassy officials spoke with literally hundreds of our
    contacts in the 24-hour period during and after the change in
    government.  These ranged from as high as the ex-president and
    incoming and outgoing cabinet members to working level
    secretaries with up-to-date information on the fast-breaking

    SIPDIS
    changes within their offices.  Since we had well-established
    relationships with these people, they answered our calls and we
    were able to put a certain amount of faith in the information
    they gave us.  Access to the Ecuadorian military high command and
    U.S. Southcom was particularly valuable, as was access to key
    politicians and government officials in Quito and Guayaquil.  We
    were also able to maintain contact with many police sources to
    keep informed about protests that might endanger the Embassy or
    US community.  Without this broad range of contacts, our analyses
    and our actions would have been less well informed, and might
    have been distorted by inaccurate media reports.

    Have Your House in Order Beforehand
    -----------------------------------

    ¶4. (SBU) The RSO's emergency preparedness training over the past
    three years enabled the Mission to be ready for any eventuality.
    We conducted hands-on training for the emergency floor wardens,
    the Marine Security Detachment, the local guard force and the
    Ecuadorian police detailed to protect the perimeter of the
    Embassy compound.  This ensured that there were no injuries to
    USG personnel during the crisis - even though hundreds of
    Ecuadorians were injured and there were several deaths.  This
    training enabled us to evacuate and close the Embassy within 15
    minutes on April 22 when there was a credible threat to Embassy
    security.  We also had frequent meetings of the Emergency Action
    Committee (EAC) before the crisis, which allowed the Ambassador
    to give direct, clear instructions, and ensured that key members
    could exchange detailed information to coordinate responses.
    These meetings ensured that EAC members were well prepared on
    Emergency Action Plan procedures.  We set up an e-mail collective
    for EAC members so people could remain informed between meetings.
    Clearly written security bulletins detailing standard operating
    procedures were distributed to all Embassy employees on a regular
    basis before and during the crisis, which pre-empted panic and
    helped enable a quick and calm response during the evacuation of
    the Embassy building.

    ¶5. (SBU) The safety of American citizens (Amcits) is always
    paramount in our minds.  During the evolving political crisis,
    our existing warden net, which communicates with the large Amcit
    community by e-mail and fax, was used to great effect.  By
    sending timely, accurate information, we helped control rumors
    and inhibit panic among the community.  As a result, we received
    virtually no calls from Amcits resident in Ecuador during the
    crisis.  When the Embassy opened operations at the Alternate
    Command Center (ACC), Consular officers established a Hotmail
    account to facilitate communications with wardens in the event
    that State Department systems failed.

    Good Management is Key
    ----------------------

    ¶6.  (SBU) Early preparations made by the Management section for
    emergency transport and fueling, provisioning the ACC, and
    checking and setting up primary and alternate communications
    systems proved invaluable.  Once the center was up and running,
    we found that there were not enough phone extensions at the ACC,
    and noted that a pre-positioned TV, radio, copier and shredder
    would have been useful.  The need for a small public address
    system at the ACC is being reviewed and issues addressed above
    are being rectified.  Management's initiative in safeguarding and
    transporting Embassy children who were dismissed early from
    several different schools was greatly appreciated by all,
    especially given the traffic jams and protests throughout the
    city on April 20.  We have now initiated a process to update the
    list of school-age dependents and respective schools every three
    months and are developing "pick-up" standard operating procedures
    to be reviewed by and distributed to parents.

    Political Asylum, Recognizing the New Government
    --------------------------------------------- ---
    ¶7. (SBU) After Gutierrez fled the presidential palace, he flew to
    several locations before dropping temporarily out of sight.
    Foreseeing the possibility that he might come to the Embassy or
    Ambassador's residence to seek political asylum, we reviewed a
    recent instruction cable on the subject and called Washington to
    fully clarify the issue.  As it happened, Gutierrez sought asylum
    in the Brazilian Ambassador's residence, three blocks away from
    USG facilities.

    ¶8. (SBU) Another issue of concern for several days after the
    government changeover was whether the USG would "recognize" the
    new Palacios government.  Our consistent response was that the
    USG and GOE had never broken relations, and we advised Washington
    to respond similarly.  Since that time, the State Department's
    legal department has confirmed that the USG does not recognize
    new governments, except in rare circumstances for political
    objectives.  Ecuador's new government did not warrant special
    recognition or denial, and therefore the question became moot.

    ¶9. (SBU) Shortly before the Gutierrez government fell, post began
    a review of former high-level government officials who might flee
    to the US.  There are already several high-profile asylum and
    extradition cases concerning Ecuadorians who fled to the U.S.
    after previous government overthrows or banking scandals.  Hoping
    to prevent a similar occurrence, we entered one official and are
    considering entering others into the visa lookout system as
    potential flight risks.

    Things We Will Do Different Next Time
    -------------------------------------

    ¶10.  (SBU) Post will incorporate the many lessons we learned into
    our Emergency Action Plan for future crises.  For example, we
    will designate an officer to serve as a clearinghouse for both
    incoming and outgoing information.  He/she can receive phone
    calls and e-mails from the USG and other interlocutors, clear
    cables and route information to the appropriate levels in the
    Embassy.  We will also schedule specific times for conference
    calls from key Embassy officers to disseminate updates to
    interested parties in the State Department and other USG
    agencies.  We will also help inform other Embassies in the region
    by greatly expanding our cable distribution and setting up a
    classified e-mail collective.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶11. (SBU) In retrospect, it is easy to see how the maelstrom of
    April 20 and afterwards could have easily overwhelmed an
    unprepared Embassy.  While our best efforts ultimately could not
    prevent an irregular change of government, other preventative
    actions paid off handsomely.  In the two years of the Gutierrez
    presidency, post cultivated a wide range of contacts and had
    excellent access to high government officials, the military high
    command, and civil society leaders and opinion makers.  We also
    prepared continuously for emergencies, taking into account the
    ever-present threat of protests and the risk of natural
    disasters.  Our management team was able to respond effectively
    because it is held to a high standard by demanding leadership.
    The fact that the Embassy's team was already well integrated and
    had prepared beforehand for such a crisis, permitted a calm,
    virtually seamless mobilization and response to April 20's
    events.

    KENNEY

`