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### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2425, PRESS BIAS SHIFTS IN FAVOR OF MEDVEDEV, BUT PUTIN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW2425 | 2008-08-15 10:49 | 2010-12-01 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0002
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2425/01 2281049
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 151049Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9519
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002425

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL RS
    SUBJECT: PRESS BIAS SHIFTS IN FAVOR OF MEDVEDEV, BUT PUTIN
    STILL IN CONTROL

    Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Alice G. Wells for reason
    1.4(d).

    ¶1. Summary: xxxxx reported the results xxxxx in a recent meeting with PolOff. While
    Medvedev dominated Russian programming on four of five
    surveyed stations, his appearances were disproportionately
    ceremonial in contrast to Putin's hands on control of the
    Russian government. The virtual absence of airtime provided
    to most opposition parties continued to slow an already weak
    opposition, and experience and intuition told xxxxx that
    his study would fall on deaf ears, a prediction already
    supported by the empty auditorium at his press conference
    hours before our meeting. Russian Communist Party (KPRF)
    leader Gennadiy Zuganov publicly and privately praised
    xxxxx for his research as a boost to KPRF calls for
    greater press freedom. Medvedev's sagging standing in the
    polls, despite lavish T.V. coverage, is one indication of his
    difficulty in coming out from Putin's shadow. End Summary.

    Medvedev Main Headliner, but Putin Top Dog
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) On August 4, xxxxx told PolOff that while
    Medvedev received twice as much press coverage as Putin
    during the testing period, most of his meetings were largely
    ceremonial, while Putin's on-air performances continued to
    give the impression that he held the reins of power. xxxxx
    unabashedly called Medvedev a "no one" in Russian politics,
    claiming he was nothing more than a "pen in one's pocket" or
    "a glass on the table" as he raised a pen and glass from his
    desk. Medvedev continued to attract interest with his
    anti-corruption campaign, but Putin still called the shots
    that mattered.

    ¶3. (C) An August 7 poll from Levada Center indicated only 9%
    of Russians believe Medvedev controlled Russia's direction,
    while 36% believed Putin remained in sole power and almost
    50% saw a tandem presidency. A related Levada Center poll
    from July 18-22 showed that 82% of Russians believed, to some
    degree, that Medvedev merely continued Putin's policies,
    while only 11% saw Medvedev gradually changing the country's
    political course. Leading pollsters tended to agree with
    survey results. xxxxx hinted to
    PolOff on August 6 that Russians would probably see Medvedev
    as even less in control after Putin's recent Mechel comments
    and subsequent stock market scare. xxxxx told PolOff on
    August 8 that the then-emerging conflict in South Ossetia
    clearly painted Putin as the country's leader.

    Study Results: Winners Won, Losers Lost
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶4. (SBU) xxxxx detailed the results of his recent
    research project on propaganda in the press, done in
    conjunction with Memo 98 Media Monitoring. The project
    tracked primetime press coverage of major political figures
    and government departments from June 5-20 on three
    government-run television stations (Channel One, TV Rossiya,
    and TV Center) and two privately-owned channels (NTV and REN
    TV). xxxxx ascribed a positive, neutral, or negative
    connotation to each news item, then calculated the total
    amount of time devoted to each person or group.

    ¶5. (SBU) The study revealed that all channels, except for
    REN TV, dedicated a disproportionate amount of airtime to
    positive or neutral coverage of incumbent politicians and
    cabinet members, rarely casting them in a negative light. REN
    TV, however, distributed airtime more evenly to a greater
    number of political parties and levied negative commentary
    against the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Vladimir
    Zhirinovskiy-led Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).
    Most of REN TV's remaining coverage was neutral and biased.
    Stations devoted remaining airtime to less important
    government figures including Duma Speaker and Chairman of the
    High Council of United Russia Party Boris Gryzlov, First
    Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Russian Minister for
    Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, Vice Premier and Finance
    Minister Alexei Kudrin, Regional Development Minister Dmitriy
    Kozak, and Economic Development Ministry chief Elvira
    Naibullina. xxxxx produced the following
    results:

    Channel One (16.9% market share, formerly ORT,
    state-controlled network): Medvedev (48.9%), Putin (22.9%),
    United Russia (6.1%), Russian Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov
    (3.0%), A Just Russia (1.4%), FSB (1.3%), KPRF (0.3%).

    TV Rossiya (15.8% market share, formerly RTR,
    state-controlled network): Medvedev (50%), Putin (26.8%),
    Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2.7%), Ivanov (2.0%),
    United Russia (1.9%), FSB (0.9%), KPRF (0.9%), LDPR (0.8%), A
    Just Russia (0.1%).

    TV Center (4.2% market share, city of Moscow-owned national
    network): Medvedev (43.9%), United Russia (17.1%), Putin
    (16.9%), Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov (15.7%), Lavrov (4.8%),
    Ivanov (3.0%), A Just Russia (0.2%), FSB (0.1%).

    NTV (12.3% market share, Gazprom-owned national network):
    Medvedev (57.3%), Putin (17.6%), Ivanov (5.7%), United Russia
    (2.2%), Lavrov (2.0%), KPRF (1.1%), FSB (0.6%).

    REN TV (7.1% market share, Rossiya Bank majority ownership,
    independent network): Medvedev (28.6%), Zhirinovsky (12.2%),
    KPRF (12.0%), LDPR (12.0%), Yabloko (11.3%), United Russia
    (10.4%), Union of Right Forces (SPS) (6.7%), FSB (6.0%),
    Putin (2.1%), A Just Russia (0.8%).

    xxxxx and Communists: an Unexpected Alliance
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶6. (C) xxxxx showed PolOff a letter from Zuganov that
    lavished praise on xxxxx his outstanding
    contribution to political reform in Russia. xxxxx then
    recalled to PolOff that Zuganov approached him at the Embassy
    Independence Day celebration at Spaso House, joyously thanked
    him in front of numerous witnesses, hugged him, and named
    xxxxx a "friend of the Communist Party." xxxxx retorted
    to Zuganov saying "I did not do this research for you, I did
    it for my country's future." xxxxx shuddered as he relayed
    the story, sheepishly noting that his grandfather and father
    would turn in their graves had they heard he had helped the
    Communists. (Note: xxxxx grandfather was shot and killed
    by Communists, and his father spent time in the Gulag)

    ¶7. (U) On July 14, the Communist Party presented the results
    of the June 2008 Center for Research of Russian Political
    Culture's complementary study on press freedom and propaganda
    as it pertained to the KPRF. Zuganov noted that the study
    found 45% of all KPRF references to be decidedly negative and
    only 14% decidedly favorable. The Russian channel TVT
    provided the most negative coverage while NTV projected the
    KPRF most favorably. Considering xxxxx, however, NTV only dedicated about 1% of its
    programming to the KPRF; therefore, its resonance with and
    impact on the public remained minimal despite its positive
    tone.

    Opposition Hamstrung by Press Bias
    ----------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) xxxxx said data supported the opposition claim
    that they received less government-controlled airtime, but
    didn't address the GOR counter-charge that the classic
    "liberal" opposition is doing little to generate news. xxxxx agreed, charging that "Russians feed from the same
    information trough." xxxxx attributed much of the blame for
    the stagnation of Russia's political opposition to a lack of
    leadership; however, he claimed the lack of unbiased press
    coverage reinforced the Russian population's unwavering
    support of the current leadership.

    Press Research Lacks Public Influence
    -------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) xxxxx bemoaned the fact that no one showed up to
    the August 4 press conference at the House of Journalists
    organized to discuss the results of his research. (Note:
    PolOff was the only attendee present) While he admitted that
    both he and the organizers did a poor job of informing the
    press and publicizing the event, he felt that the public's
    general ennui about press freedom contributed to the lack of
    attendance. When asked about the projected influence of his
    research, xxxxx told PolOff that he hoped organizations
    such as the UN and OSCE would utilize his analysis to
    advocate for greater political transparency in Russia.
    Conversely, he claimed the largest influence of his
    organization sprung from its relations with foreign
    journalists at the Washington Post, Le Monde, and other
    western papers. While his center operated quietly, trying not
    to attract attention, it cooperated with foreign journalists
    by supplying opinions and information for more scathing
    articles. xxxxx told PolOff with obvious delight, "when
    western press articles have infuriated Kremlin officials in
    the past, xxxxx

    Comment
    -------

    ¶10. (C) xxxxx data strikingly demonstrates that despite
    Medevedev's lavish courage in the media, he has yet to come
    out from Putin's shadow and create a political identity that
    resonates with Russian viewers.
    Beyrle

`