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### Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2064, NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05THEHAGUE2064 | 2005-07-27 08:12 | 2011-01-17 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF
    DUTCH NAVY, JSF

    Classified By: Ambassador Cl...

    37388,7/27/2005 8:12,05THEHAGUE2064,"Embassy The
    Hague",CONFIDENTIAL,,"This record is a partial extract of the original
    cable. The full
    text of the original cable is not available.
    ","C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002064
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2015
    TAGS: MARR MOPS NL PGOV PREL NATO
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: DUTCH THINKING ON ISAF III; FUTURE OF
    DUTCH NAVY, JSF
    Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel for reasons 1.4 (b,d).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, DATT and ODC Chief met with Dutch
    CHOD Gen. Dick Berlijn on July 19. Gen. Berlijn reviewed
    Dutch thinking on participation in ISAF III, including a PRT
    consisting initially of 1000 personnel (later to be expanded
    to 1200) deployed most likely to Uruzgan province. Later
    discussions on July 26 with the Acting Director of Operations
    at the Dutch MFA confirmed this preliminary plan. The Dutch
    will host the Canadians and British on August 17-18 to
    follow-up on the force generation conference. Berlijn noted
    that a compromise in Parliament prevented plans for an
    1800-man deployment, as the main opposition party wanted
    personnel available for a potential African mission. Berlijn
    also talked about the possibility of U.S. support -- either
    through proximity to Dutch forces or embedded U.S.
    intelligence personnel -- as potentially helping convince
    Dutch Minister of Defense Henk Kamp and others in the Dutch
    government to deploy to Uruzgan.
    ¶2. (C) Cont. Summary: Gen. Berlijn reviewed changes occurring
    in the Dutch Navy. Quoting Minister Kamp, Berlijn described
    the Dutch Navy as ""demoralized and adrift"". Berlijn
    explained that they need to become expeditionary, relying
    less on their frigates and more on coastal patrol vessels and
    landing platform ships to support land battles. He outlined
    the possibility of selling six ""M"" frigates -- two to Belgium
    and four to Chile -- proceeds from which could potentially
    be used to purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform
    dock ships, Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets.
    ¶3. (C) Cont. Summary: Berlijn also stated that he was
    interested in finding a way to prioritize the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF) program within the Dutch government. He hoped
    to develop a plan to pursue the purchase of an initial,
    ""acceptably safe"" number of 50-60 JSFs in 2006, in order to
    ""depoliticize"" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections. By
    depoliticizing the issue through this initial purchase,
    Berlijn suggested that the Dutch could keep options open
    regarding the total eventual purchase of 80 or more JSFs.
    End Summary.
    --------------
    ISAF Stage III
    --------------
    ¶4. (C) Gen. Berlijn initially briefed on Dutch plans to
    participate in ISAF Stage III. These plans are still by and
    large under discussion within the Dutch government; Dutch FM
    Bot has been negotiating with Parliament over ISAF III for
    several weeks. MajGen Cobelens, MOD Director of Operations,
    drafted the preliminary plan presented to NATO during the
    July 25 force generation conference. According to the Acting
    Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA on July 26, this
    preliminary plan calls for Dutch partnership with the
    Canadians and Brits at the Forward Support Base (FSB) in
    Kandahar beginning in April 2006. The deployment will last
    for eighteen months; command responsibility for the FSB will
    be on a six-month rotation with the Canadians taking the
    first watch. The Dutch will assume command of the FSB in
    November 2006.
    ¶5. (C) According to the Acting Director of Operations at the
    Dutch MFA, the preliminary Dutch plan proposed a Dutch
    Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Uruzgan province.
    The Dutch plan to initially deploy 1000 personnel, ramping up
    to 1200 personnel by the time they assume charge of the
    Kandahar FSB in November 2006. The 1200-person deployment
    will also include approximately 4 Chinooks, 4-6 Apaches, and
    the 4 F-16s currently stationed in Kabul. The Dutch MOD will
    host Canada and the UK on August 17-18 to follow-up on ISAF
    Stage III proposal details. (Note: A read-out from USNATO
    suggests that the United States may be invited to attend the
    meeting as well; according to the Dutch MFA, only the Brits
    and Canadians have thus far been invited. Post will seek
    more information on possible U.S. attendance. End note.)
    ¶6. (C) Gen. Berlijn explained that he was limited to a PRT
    consisting of 1000 personnel due to restrictions set by
    Parliament. Berlijn initially wanted 1800 personnel, but the
    Labor Party (PvdA) demanded that some personnel also be
    available for possible operations in Africa (NFI). A
    compromise within Parliament led to the 1000-person
    restriction to accommodate the Labor Party. (Note: Dutch
    governments prefer to make military deployment decisions
    backed by a parliamentary super-majority, usually to include
    the main opposition party. End note.) While the number of
    personnel in the PRT will eventually increase to 1200, the
    Acting Director of Operations at the Dutch MFA explained that
    this number is a ""maximum"" number set by Parliament that
    cannot be exceeded, and will also include air technicians and
    support for their deployed helicopters and F-16s. Actually,
    the Dutch initial plan calls for a fully operational PRT of
    1568 men; due to the 1200 restriction set by Parliament, the
    Dutch were actively encouraging the Australians to partner
    with them in the PRT.
    ¶7. (C) According to Berlijn, the Dutch had not yet agreed
    internally (as of July 19) on the location of the PRT. While
    the Dutch preliminary plan proposed during the force
    generation conference calls for a PRT deployment in Uruzgan,
    the subject is still open for debate. Berlijn and other
    members of the military staff were strongly recommending that
    the Dutch troops be deployed to Uruzgan province in central
    Afghanistan, where they could, in his view, make a real
    difference in a challenging environment. Others in the
    government, however, wanted the Dutch to deploy to the safer
    province of Nimruz near the Iranian border. Berlijn
    discussed the possibility of U.S. support -- either through
    proximity to Dutch forces or embedding U.S. intelligence
    within Dutch forces -- as potentially helping convince his
    minister and others in the Dutch government that they can and
    should deploy to Uruzgan.
    --------------------
    Future of Dutch Navy
    --------------------
    ¶8. (C) Following a question on the status of potential
    Tactical Tomahawk acquisition, Gen. Berlijn provided an
    extended background explanation on changes occurring in the
    Dutch Navy. According to Berlijn, Dutch Minister of Defense
    Kamp recently described the Dutch Navy as ""demoralized and
    adrift"". Kamp felt that the Navy relied too heavily upon
    their frigates. The Navy needed to reorient and ""focus on
    tasks"", becoming ""expeditionary and more coastal"".
    ¶9. (C) After studying the issue, Berlijn stated that the
    Dutch need to sell some of their frigates and buy more
    coastal patrol vessels (CPVs) and landing platform dock (LPD)
    ships. Berlijn cautioned that convincing Dutch admirals to
    sell their frigates would be very difficult -- ""Getting the
    Admirals to give up their frigates is like getting a fighter
    pilot to give up his fighter"" (Note: Berlijn is a fighter
    pilot.). Berlijn stated that he wants the Navy to support
    land battle and theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD). He
    expressed firm support for a Dutch submarine capability,
    noting that ""the Dutch are in the submarine business"". In
    that respect, he needed to put an end to the current debate
    on submarines within the Dutch government. Berlijn also
    noted that they are looking at a study to improve its oiler
    ship, including its capacity to incorporate more helicopters
    in order to support Dutch troops in the field or for use
    during amphibious deployments.
    ¶10. (C) Berlijn then discussed the possibility of selling six
    ""M"" frigates, which he described as ""very sensitive"" as the
    Dutch are in competition with the Brits in this regard. He
    stated that the Belgians are interested in purchasing two
    frigates; the Chileans have expressed interest in buying the
    other four. (Note: In a conversation with Dutch FM Bot on
    July 21, Bot told ambassador that he was not in favor of
    selling the frigates, but would not/not disagree with Kamp in
    Cabinet. Bot noted, however, that there was resistance in
    the Dutch Navy regarding the sale of the frigates. End
    note.) Berlijn further explained that if the Dutch sold
    these frigates, proceeds could potentially be used to
    purchase coastal patrol vessels, landing platform dock ships,
    Tactical Tomahawk, helicopters, and other assets.
    --------------------
    Joint Strike Fighter
    --------------------
    ¶11. (C) Berlijn then turned discussion to the Joint Strike
    Fighter (JSF), and noted that he was looking for ways to
    prioritize JSF in the Dutch government. He wished to
    ""depoliticize"" the issue prior to the May 2007 elections by
    working to get a commitment from the Dutch government in 2006
    for the purchase of an initial, ""acceptably safe"" number of
    50-60 JSFs. By depoliticizing the issue with this initial
    purchase, he suggested that options remained open to
    eventually buy over 80 JSFs in total. He commented that
    ""even the leftists agree that this is the best fighter we
    could acquire"". Berlijn acknowledged that if the Dutch want
    to keep their aerospace industry alive, they must be actively
    involved with both JSF and the Airbus 380.
    -------------------------------
    Tactical Tomahawks; UAV Project
    -------------------------------
    ¶12. (C) Berlijn noted that the Dutch are still committed to
    the acquisition of Tactical Tomahawks, but it needed to occur
    sequentially following the development and construction of
    coastal patrol vessels. (Note: Selling the six ""M"" frigates
    and replacing them with newly-built corvettes -- thus
    providing work for the Dutch ship-building industry -- may
    yield sufficient parliamentary support for acquisition of
    Tactical Tomahawk, which could be employed on the Dutch
    Navy's new Aegis-equivalent LCF frigates. End note.)
    Berlijn briefly addressed the Dutch unmanned aerial vehicle
    (UAV) project in partnership with the French. According the
    Berlijn, the partnership helps diffuse tensions within the
    Dutch government regarding the perception that the Dutch only
    buy military equipment from the United States. Berlijn
    explained, however, that the program has stalled as the
    French have taken a ""90 degree turn"". The French Defense
    Minister is scheduled to visit the Netherlands in September;
    the UAV project will be on the agenda for discussion.
    SOBEL

`