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### Viewing cable 07CAIRO2871, EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07CAIRO2871 | 2007-09-23 16:01 | 2010-12-13 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHEG #2871/01 2661601
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 231601Z SEP 07
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6995
    INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002871

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR RWATERS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EG
    SUBJECT: EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK

    REF: A. CAIRO 2839
    ¶B. CAIRO 2825

    Classified By: ECPO Minister Counselor William R. Stewart
    for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a
    post-Mubarak future. It has been almost exactly twenty-six
    years since Egypt last faced such a transition. Although one
    could argue that some of the elements that led to the
    dramatic events of September and October 1981 are back in
    place -- shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political
    pressures, and crackdowns on political adversaries --
    tensions now are different, and not on the same scale. While
    we should not place too much weight in analogy, it can
    nevertheless be instructive to review the events of September
    and October 1981 to see what useful comparisons can be made.
    End summary.

    ---------------
    Rumors Run Amok
    ---------------

    ¶2. (C) This September, as in past late summers, salon talk
    and front page headlines have focused on that most sensitive
    of topics: the health of the president and the eventual
    transfer of power. Talk has been so pervasive, Prime
    Minister Nazif felt obliged to announce that "there is a
    system for the smooth transfer of power." Rumors of
    President Mubarak's deteriorating health -- and even his
    demise -- have been so insistent, even Suzanne Mubarak felt
    the need to publicly assert that he is alive and well.

    ¶3. (C) At least half a dozen editorials have compared the
    tensions and rumors of this September to September 1981.
    Although the majority of Egyptians are too young to recall
    personally those momentous times, the lore of it remains deep
    in the national consciousness. Even young Egyptians recall
    hearing of the great "round up" of September 3, 1981 when
    Sadat seemed to "go crazy" as one commentator recalled,
    arresting and imprisoning opponents and critics of every
    stripe. Communists, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, academics,
    and liberal-minded journalists found themselves cell-mates
    that late summer day. Even Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed
    under house arrest. Although Mubarak has hardly gone so far,
    some observers have argued that his feuds with Ayman Nour,
    Anwar Esmat El-Sadat (the late president's nephew), Saad
    Eddin Ibrahim, independent editors, and other perceived
    opponents, combined with his sweeping roundup of the Muslim
    Brotherhood -- arguably his only real political threat -- is
    reminiscent of 1981, and they fear it could lead to similar
    consequences.

    -------------------
    Mubarak Is No Sadat
    -------------------

    ¶4. (C) According to some of Egypt's most astute political
    observers, this is over-analyzing the situation and drawing
    very wrong -- and dangerous - comparisons. Mohammed
    El-Bassiouni, chairman of the Majlis al-Shura's National
    Security Committee (which also has responsibility for Foreign
    Affairs and Arab Affairs), believes that the two Septembers
    have very little in common. El-Bassiouni recently told
    MinCouns that in 1981, when he was Egypt's military attach
    in Tel Aviv, President Sadat was under extreme pressure for
    not providing the "peace dividend" he had promised would be
    the result of his bold move towards Israel, and his deepening
    friendship the United States. When prosperity for all did
    not appear, Sadat felt under enormous pressure. Combined
    with Egypt's isolation in the Arab world, it seemed that his
    gamble had failed. In his pride, he lashed out at perceived
    opponents.

    --------------
    No Comparison?
    --------------

    ¶5. (C) Such a scenario simply does not exist today,
    El-Bassiouni opined. Egypt's economy is growing, the fruit
    of President Mubarak's reform program launched in 2004.
    While relations with Israel are still "problematic," Mubarak
    has taken Egypt back to its rightful position as leader of
    the Arab world. The external pressures that helped stoke the
    tension of September 1981 "simply do not exist today."

    ¶6. (C) Another alleged similarity between the present and
    Sadat's September is the shortage of basic commodities.
    Egyptians have been angered in recent weeks by reports of
    villages without access to drinking water -- in some cases,
    for years (ref A). Shortages of subsidized bread have also
    been in the headlines, as the poorest Egyptians wait in
    queues for shrinking loaves. At least one observer has made
    the case that September 2007 is more reminiscent of January
    1977 -- when riots erupted throughout Egypt due to price
    increases for bread and other basic foodstuffs -- than
    September 1981. But Dr. Galal Amin, economics professor at
    AUC (as he was in 1981) thinks there is little in common,
    economically, between the two eras. Egypt under Sadat, he
    argued, was actually better off in many ways: unemployment,
    which he sees as the single greatest problem facing Mubarak
    today, was lower then, and the overall standard of living was
    higher. The average Egyptian, he said felt that
    opportunities were greater in 1981, leading to general
    optimism. Sadat's "infitah" program, opening up Egypt's
    economy to foreign investment appeared to be working and
    creating jobs. Tourism was taking off, and the average
    Egyptian "felt good" about his life and better about his
    future than Egyptians today, according to Amin. Economic
    statistics refute Amin's assertions, but there is a
    perception within a certain statist/elite/academic
    demographic, represented by Amin, that somehow Sadat's were
    "the good old days."

    -------------------------------------------
    Economic Reform Still Masks Underlying Woes
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Sadat trumpeted economic reform, touting
    privatization, pointing to a freer market that would benefit
    all Egyptians. These thoughts have been echoed under
    Mubarak, especially since the appointment of Prime Minister
    Nazif and his cabinet of economic reformers in 2004.
    However, as in 1981, recent economic advances are incomplete.
    Gigantic government subsidies then, as now, have served to
    brake greater economic reform. In 1981, 21.5% of the Gross
    National Income (GNI) went to the wealthiest 5% of the
    population, while the poorest 20% of the population received
    a mere 5% of Egypt's income. In 2007, there remains the
    general sense that Egypt's economic growth is benefiting only
    a tiny portion of the population. 17% of today's population
    lives under the poverty line, almost identical to the
    percentage in 1981, and the poorest 20% of the population
    received 4.8% of the GNI in 2004/05, while the richest 10% of
    the population received 30% of GNI. Although statistically
    the standard of living has not dramatically deteriorated,
    neither has it improved, leaving Egyptians with the feeling
    that others have passed them by to a brighter economic
    future.

    --------------
    The Odd Couple
    --------------

    ¶8. (C) What the two periods unquestionably do have in common
    are a pair of increasingly isolated dictators, set in their
    ways and fearful of any kind of dissent. But though alike in
    certain personal characteristics (particularly paranoia),
    there are at the same time some very fundamental differences,
    including age (Sadat was a robust 63 years old when
    assassinated; Mubarak is a slowing 79) and length in office
    (barely 11 years for Sadat, closing on 26 years for Mubarak).
    Importantly, Sadat had a clear successor -- his vice
    president, Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak, in turn, has scrupulously
    avoided naming a VP, and although most believe that son Gamal
    will succeed him, no one can say for certain how that will
    play out. Another dissimilarity: Minister of Information
    Enas El-Fiqi, under intense scrutiny and pressure himself for
    allowing the rumors about Mubarak's health to get out of
    control, recently told the Ambassador that "there is no
    comparison" between Sadat and Mubarak because, "Mubarak never
    loses his temper." (El-Fiqi, though, admitted that the
    stress of his job was literally driving him to drink.)

    ¶9. (C) Mubarak relishes his self-image as a benign, paternal
    leader, tough but fair. Still, he has shown signs of moving
    toward Sadat's modus operandi in dealing with political
    opponents. In the past year, Mubarak has arrested upwards of
    a thousand Muslim Brothers. While some have subsequently
    been released and only 40 are facing trial before a military
    tribunal so far, the message is unmistakable: after allowing
    the MB to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections as
    "independents" (in which they won 88 seats, 20% of the
    Assembly), Mubarak is cracking down. Another similarity is
    the recent phobia Mubarak has developed towards the press.
    The Egyptian media, arguably as free as it has ever been (and
    certainly freer than it was under Sadat), is suddenly facing
    a cost for that liberty. In early September, four editors of
    independent newspapers were convicted of insulting the
    president and other GoE officials, while another editor is
    facing trial October 1 for allegedly spreading false rumors
    about Mubarak's health which were damaging to Egypt's
    reputation and to its economy. These arrests have been
    widely seen here as blatant attacks on the freedom of the
    press, much as Sadat's rounding up of journalists was in
    ¶1981.

    -------------------------
    Love and Hate For the USA
    -------------------------

    ¶10. (C) One of the more striking similarities between the two
    leaders is their uneven relationship with the United States.
    Sadat's September madness came close on the heels of a
    profoundly disappointing trip to the United States to meet
    the new President, Ronald Reagan. By discarding the Soviet
    Union and reaching out to the United States -- and Israel --
    he had taken considerable political risk. He had calculated
    that the payoff in tangible and intangible terms would more
    than justify that risk. But as his international stature
    increased spectacularly as the Arab world's "Man of Peace,"
    his standing at home did not keep pace, as heightened
    expectations for peace and prosperity were unrealized.
    Still, in the U.S. he felt he had found a faithful ally, one
    that would stand by him even when his own people did not.
    Unfortunately, President Reagan's reception of Sadat in
    August 1981 was lukewarm, and Sadat came under severe
    criticism by the U.S. press for not delivering true peace to
    the Middle East. According to Mohamed Heikal, Sadat's former
    Minister of Information (who was himself arrested on
    September 3, 1981), Sadat returned to Egypt a bitter man,
    feeling betrayed by the Americans. Shortly afterwards came
    the arrests.

    --------------
    Twin Twilights
    --------------

    ¶11. (C) At the end of the day, and the end of their reigns,
    Sadat faced and Mubarak faces similar situations. But
    Mubarak seems to have managed the dilemma better in at least
    one key area: he has systematically and "legally" eliminated
    virtually all political opposition, leaving only the MB
    standing, having foresworn violence and politically
    emasculated. Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an
    estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it
    was under Sadat. Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the
    legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent
    change of leader unlikely.

    ---------------------
    The One Certain Thing
    ---------------------

    ¶12. (C) The two presidents share another undeniable point in
    common: their mortality. Mubarak's street credibility, like
    Sadat's, is very low. The was illustrated by the insistent
    rumors of Mubarak's illness and death, despite numerous
    official denials. This lack of faith by the people of Egypt
    in their political leaders could well come back to haunt
    Mubarak's successor, whomever he may be. Will it make the
    transition more difficult? Yes. Will it matter in the end?
    Probably not, as long as the successor enjoys the support of
    the elite and the security apparatus, including the military.
    And even if there is a valid analogy to draw between
    September 1981 and September 2007, it is at best uneven. The
    world -- and Egypt -- have fundamentally changed. While
    President Mubarak clearly faces significant challenges, and
    has reacted with at least some measure of Sadat's paranoia,
    we do not foresee September 2007 leading to another October
    ¶1981.
    JONES

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