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### Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3432, FORMER PM ADVISER ON GOI POLITICAL FUTURE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06TELAVIV3432 | 2006-08-28 15:53 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    null
    Leza L Olson  08/29/2006 09:52:48 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Leza L Olson

    Cable
    Text:

    C O N F I D E N T I A L        TEL AVIV 03432

    SIPDIS
    CXTelA:
        ACTION: POL
        INFO:   ECON DCM DAO AMB IPSC AID ADM RSO PD CONS IMO
                RES

    DISSEMINATION: POL
    CHARGE: PROG

    APPROVED: AMB:JONES
    DRAFTED: EXEC:SISKAL
    CLEARED: NONE

    VZCZCTVI220
    OO RUEHC RUEHXK
    DE RUEHTV #3432/01 2401553
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 281553Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5953
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003432

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
    TAGS: PREL MOPS LE IS PGOV
    SUBJECT: FORMER PM ADVISER ON GOI POLITICAL FUTURE

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 25 luncheon meeting former PM
    Advisor Dov Weissglas told the Ambassador that the GOI is in
    political trouble because it placed too much faith in
    military advice and set overly ambitious goals, which were
    impossible for it to achieve and trapped it into continuing
    the war against Hizballah for too long. Nonetheless, he
    applauded the strategy of massive response, which he saw as
    discouraging future missteps by Hizballah and a sine qua non
    for future Israeli withdrawals from occupied territory.
    Despite its problems, Weissglas doubted that a vote of no
    confidence in the government was likely or would succeed.
    Instead, new elections would probably be called sometime
    within the next year, possibly following a successful
    challenge to Labor Party Chairman and Minister of Defense
    Amir Peretz within his own party. Weissglas discounted
    rumors that new parties might be enticed into the coalition
    in the meantime. With regard to the way forward, Weissglas
    argued that after a few months separation and in the context
    of successful contacts on operational issues, it might be
    possible for the GOI to enter into talks on Shebaa Farms,
    which were "totally unimportant" to Israel. He also thought
    that talks on an exchange of POW's could take place within
    weeks and revealed that former PM Sharon was personally
    favorably disposed toward talks with Syria. End Summary

    ¶2. (C) Former Prime Minister Senior Advisor Dov Weissglas
    joined the Ambassador for a 1-1 lunch Friday, August 25, and
    shared his observations on the current situation. They can
    be summarized as follows:

    Current State of Play

    -- The GOI is in trouble now because it over promised; the
    Israeli public only sees what wasn't accomplished and ignores
    what was. To repair the damage, the GOI should lay low for a
    while and focus on day-to-day governance. Any new policy
    initiatives now would be dismissed as "political gimmicks."

    -- The basic GOI strategy of responding massively was sound.
    Although Hizballah has many Iranian sympathizers, it is still
    a mass Lebanese movement. It is impossible for it to ignore
    that Lebanese interests suffered greatly during the war.

    -- In addition, the strong Israeli response helped disabuse
    Hizballah of the notion that it can keep pursuing Israel
    after it pulls out from an area. If Olmert had not responded
    the way he did, any further withdrawal from the West Bank
    --negotiated or not-- would have become impossible.

    -- The US policy of supporting the GOI during the conflict
    was "just right" and is highly appreciated within Israel.

    The Coalition Government's Prospects

    -- The government is not in any immediate danger. It is
    doubtful that a no confidence vote would succeed; history
    shows that it is very difficult for GOI opponents to muster
    more than 30-40 votes due to sharp divisions among the
    various parties.

    -- Nonetheless, new elections will probably occur within a
    year, for example if Labor Party rebels succeed in defeating
    Amir Peretz in the party's leadership elections due next
    spring.

    -- In the meantime, do not look for new coalition partners
    for Olmert's government. "Why would mice swim to a sinking
    ship?" (Note: there have been rumors in the press speculating
    that Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael Beteinu party might join
    Olmert's government.)

    -- Lieberman himself told Weissglas in early July that at a
    minimum he would want the Defense Minister portfolio to join
    the government. His price would be much higher now.

    What would have Sharon done?

    -- It is unlikely that Nasrallah expected that Hizballah's
    strike would provoke a big crisis. There were too many
    variables that he could not have forecast, including that one
    of the cameras on the border had malfunctioned, allowing the
    Hizballah team to approach without being detected; that two
    soldiers would be captured alive; that the IDF would
    immediately launch a half-baked rescue attempt that would hit
    a mine and incur eight more casualties, upping the ante for
    Israel; etc.

    -- Given the circumstances, Sharon might not have even
    reacted to the kidnapping of the two soldiers, certainly not
    immediately. If he had responded, Sharon would have known
    not to set ambitious goals (e.g., the rescue of the soldiers;
    the destruction of Hizballah) that were beyond his power to
    deliver. When Olmert and Peretz did, they were forced to
    continue military operations. The longer the war dragged on,
    the worse they looked.

    -- Instead, Sharon would have just said that we had to punish
    Hizballah. Then he could have let them have it for a few
    days and declared victory whenever he chose.

    -- Olmert and Peretz placed too much faith in what they were
    told and had no experience that could allow them to suggest
    alternatives. Sharon knew that IDF Generals always
    exaggerate capabilities. "Arik always said, take everything
    they tell you and divide it by ten." Peretz, in particular,
    had no such "BS detector".

    Shebaa Farms

    -- The Shebaa Farms are "totally unimportant" to Israelis.
    However, in the current circumstances it is necessary to
    separate any talks on them from the current crisis related to
    the captured soldiers.

    -- Any such talks should wait "some months" and only take
    place in the context of perceived progress on contacts with
    Lebanon, e.g., through a revived Armistice Committee.

    -- Similarly, any talks regarding POW exchanges also need to
    wait, but the delay in this case need only be a matter of
    weeks rather than months.

    Syria

    -- Contrary to his public position, in private Sharon always
    said that he was not personally opposed to talks with Syria.
    He said that he refused them to avoid undercutting the Bush
    administration's anti-terror policy against Syria.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    JONES

`