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### Viewing cable 10MEXICO45, Tijuana Bilateral Assessment

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10MEXICO45 | 2010-01-12 22:35 | 2011-05-19 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/wikileaks-y-reunion-de-osuna-con-delegacion-de-alto-nivel-de-eu

`

    VZCZCXYZ0005
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHME #0045/01 0122235
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 122235Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0028
    INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC

` `

    243326
    2010-01-12 22:35:00
    10MEXICO45
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL
    10MEXICO3468|10TIJUANA1275
    VZCZCXYZ0005
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHME #0045/01 0122235
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 122235Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0028
    INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC

    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX
    C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000045

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/12
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX
    SUBJECT: Tijuana Bilateral Assessment
     REF: TIJUANA 1275; MEXICO 3468

    CLASSIFIED BY: Carlos Pascual, Ambassador, DOS, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B),
    (D)

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS: One of the early fruits of the new
    security policy coordination mechanism with Mexico has been an
    agreement to focus our joint efforts on the border cities where the
    most violence occurs and where the DTOs have carved out the
    greatest operating space. As part of this effort an unprecedented
    joint team representing all U.S. and Mexican law enforcement
    agencies traveled to Tijuana and San Diego to conduct an assessment
    of security and review opportunities for increased bilateral
    cooperation. In its two-day visit the team came away with the
    following key judgments:

    -- Presidential focus: The joint assessment and increased
    cooperation on the border is greatly helped by the express support
    of President Calderon.

    -- Mexican interagency coordination is improving both in Tijuana
    and the DF, yet it is still too tied to personalities and
    under-institutionalized.

    -- Judicial prosecutions lagging: Frustration in Tijuana is rising
    over the inability of the federal judiciary to produce convictions.

    -- Social fabric strained: The recession, ineffective schools, and
    the transient nature of Tijuana's population work in the DTOs'
    favor. The GOM is not certain how to integrate Pillar IV (Build
    Strong and Resilient Communities) into its broader drug strategy
    and is still uncomfortable with NGOs.

    -- Assistance requests modest: Mexican interlocutors identified
    discrete areas where they believe the USG can help: some
    technology, lots of intelligence sharing, limited equipment
    (armored cars, ballistic vests), training (aimed at managing police
    forces rather than how to do operations), and support to vetting
    processes.

    -- State and local forces are critical (and weak): State and local
    law enforcement know their beat better than federal counterparts
    and must be included in the equation if public security is to
    improve. They are rich in manpower, institutionally weak, and
    easily corrupted; they must be made more effective.

    -- Task force model: The San Diego meeting drove home the utility
    of the task force approach to investigations. The GOM will be
    receptive to exchanges and visits on this key model -- and perhaps
    also to detail more staff to task forces stateside.

    -- Centrality of Control de Confianza: The importance of vetting
    and internal controls was made clear by U.S. entities and GOM
    officials accepted this premise.

    -- Strategic communications: Both sides agreed that there is a
    crying need to change the perception of the outside world with
    regards to Tijuana, and to change the perception of the citizens of
    Tijuana about law and order. Public diplomacy efforts have been
    weak to date and must be a key part of any program.

    ¶2. (SBU) NEXT STEPS: We will wait to see what comes out of the
    assessment of Ciudad Juarez/El Paso and then develop an interim
    program to support the needs of the GOM in taking back the Tijuana
    and Juarez DTO corridors. We will have a preliminary joint plan to
    present to the Policy Coordination Group in late January and a more
    focused plan to present to the High Level Group in February. NAS
    and AID will conduct more detailed assessments by Training,
    Judicial, Civil Society, IT, and Control de Confianza program
    coordinators once the Juarez/El Paso assessment is completed, and
    begin to look at specific programs which could be quickly
    implemented. A critical first step will be to place a full-time
    program coordinator in each city to manage the emerging programs.
    END SUMMARY.

    BILATERAL TEAM CONCEPT

    ----------------------

    ¶3. (SBU) High-level bilateral discussions over the past several
    months have produced agreement to focus on targeted cooperation in
    frontline Mexican border cities. We have agreed to pilot new
    cooperative strategies initially in Tijuana/San Diego and Ciudad
    Juarez/El Paso. Our joint objective is to demonstrably degrade drug
    trafficking organizations (DTOs), decrease violence, recognize and
    disseminate current best practices, and build models readily
    applicable elsewhere in Mexico. The GOM has insisted that we
    approach the assessments in a balanced fashion with issues on both
    sides of the border acknowledged and factored in as we develop new
    programs.

    ¶4. (SBU) A GOM-USG bilateral assessment team, chaired by the
    Ambassador and CISEN Director General Valdes, traveled to Tijuana
    December 3 and San Diego December 4. The Mexican delegation was
    comprised of high-ranking representatives from CISEN, PGR, SEMAR,
    SEDENA, SRE, Hacienda, and SSP. The U.S. delegation included USAID,
    DHS, ICE, CBP, OPAD, DAO, ODC, FBI, State, NSC, and ConGen Tijuana.
    In both locations we focused on law enforcement in the morning and
    civil society in the afternoon. In setting the scene for the team,
    the Ambassador asked for particular focus on sharing best practice,
    relationships between the military and the three levels of
    government, and seeking ways to better use real-time intelligence
    to guide operations. Valdes emphasized co-responsibility in
    confronting a transnational threat running from Colombia to the
    U.S., noted the southbound flow of arms and cash, and underscored
    the direct interest of President Calderon in the endeavor.

    TIJUANA SECURITY IMPROVING BUT FRAGILE

    --------------------------------------

    ¶5. (SBU) Baja California Norte Governor Jose Osuna Millan  hosted
    the bilateral team December 3 in Tijuana.  SEDENA and SEMAR
    regional commanders, state SSP, state PGR, Tijuana Public Security
    Secretary Julian Leyzaola, and representatives from the Governor's
    office participated in the discussions. The Governor's technical
    secretary led with a briefing on the situation on the ground. Baja
    California Norte beats the Mexican average on education, employment
    and GDP per capita but as a migrant entry point and an industrial
    city of working parents, its social fabric is strained. The
    proximate cause of the spike in violence was Mexican success
    against leaders of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), which
    splintered and saw Sinaloan rivals move in, sparking a fight to
    control border crossing routes. After a terrible 2008, violence in
    Baja California Norte state subsided somewhat in 2009, with
    Tijuana's share of Mexico's total killings dropping from 11% to 4%.
    High impact crimes including kidnapping, car theft, and homicide
    are down significantly. Yet the turnaround is not complete, and 40
    police had died statewide through early November, close to the 49
    officers lost in 2008. NOTE: Just after the bilateral team visit, a

    truce between elements of the AFO disintegrated, unleashing a new
    wave of killings (ref A). END NOTE.

    ¶6. (SBU) Governor Osuna said Mexican forces had launched an
    offensive against the DTOs via the Baja California Coordination
    Group (state and federal SSP, state preventative police (PEP),
    CISEN, SEDENA, SEMAR, state and federal PGR). He said his main
    effort was building up state government institutions.  Control de
    confianza measures coupled with firings of corrupt cops were
    cleaning up the police corporations, with 83% of state and local
    operational police forces now vetted. DTOs, he said, still
    infiltrate the forces, but with a continuous review process, there
    is less room for impunity and responsive performance over time is
    gaining public confidence.

    ¶7. (SBU) A single academy, Osuna said, now trains state and local
    police. 7,000 applicants applied in the last year but only 10%
    gained entrance. If police reform efforts were beginning to bear
    fruit, the governor said the next focus would need to be on
    deficiencies in the judicial system ("I want to put a judge in
    jail," he said, to demonstrate that judicial corruption was not
    beyond the law.) The Governor thanked USAID for support to the
    state's justice reforms and noted that he had signed cooperation
    agreements with 14 U.S. state attorneys general under a
    USAID-funded program to increase cooperation between Mexican and
    U.S. states. Baja California Norte, he said, will begin the
    transition from inquisitorial to accusatory trials in 2010 in the
    Mexicali judicial district. Other districts will follow after the
    appropriate training.

    ¶8. (SBU) Further briefings were offered by the State Security
    Director, Municipal Security Chief Leyzaola, and SEDENA General
    Alfonso Duarte who oversees overall interagency coordination
    between the military and federal, state, and local forces. The GOM
    shifted a planned meeting away from the Unidad de Inteligencia
    Tactica Operativa (UNITO), a fusion center concept the GOM is
    implementing in multiple regions, either because the center is not
    yet up and running or for simple lack of space. There did not seem
    to be a central location where coordination takes place but rather
    a virtual system that was largely personality driven.

    REQUIREMENTS AND REQUESTS

    -------------------------

    ¶9. (SBU) State-level SSP presented proposals to improve the
    performance of Mexican forces: better coordination of operations
    and information-sharing between Mexican agencies and cross-border,
    a more robust security force presence and better equipment for all
    forces, more drug treatment centers on both sides of the border,
    advance warning of repatriation to Mexico of prisoners freed from
    U.S. prisons, and U.S. notification of border incidents to the
    Mexican C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Coordination)
    system in time for the Mexicans to react. The key ask from
    Municipal Dirctor Leyzaola was for equipment (primarily vests and
    armored cars), and training in professionalism and leadership.

    ¶10. (SBU) The Governor made limited appeals for USG assistance. He
    noted he had asked California Governor Schwarzenegger in an October
    meeting to share biometric data of prisoners being released and
    repatriated to Mexico, and for coordination at the point of
    repatriation on the border. He suggested a road along the southern
    side of the border fence to facilitate patrols and positive control
    of the borderline. He spoke positively of a "culture of legality"
    in the U.S. and noted that the drug fight is not just about
    confronting the cartels but must include programs to prevent
    addiction in schools. Finally, he asked for help turning around

    Mexico and Tijuana's perception problem, stating that Brazil is
    more violent than Mexico, Detroit is more violent than Tijuana, and
    California plays more narcocorridos than Mexican radio stations. He
    asserted that USG travel alerts that warn U.S. citizens not to
    visit Baja California severely damage tourism and the economy.  A
    weak economy creates a fertile recruiting ground for the cartels.
    He asked for our help in turning around the image of Tijuana as a
    violent and unapproachable place.

    C-4 CENTER A GLORIFIED CALL CENTER

    ----------------------------------

    ¶11. (SBU) The team visited Tijuana's C-4 center later in the day.
    The C-4 is primarily a call center for emergency calls and does not
    have a strong analytical component. It handles city 911 calls
    (5,200 per day), and includes federal police and military liaison
    officers with links to the SSP's countrywide Plataforma Mexico data
    base. A filtering overlay has reduced hoax calls from 50% to 30% of
    total volume and a center in Mexicali fields state-wide anonymous
    tip (denuncia) calls. The 911 and denuncia numbers both receive
    calls regularly from U.S.-based callers, which as of mid-2009 can
    be made from the U.S. toll-free. An SMS/text message-based add-on
    interface is planned for 2010.

    SAN DIEGO LAW ENFORCEMENT SESSION

    ---------------------------------

    ¶12. (SBU) Acting U.S. Attorney Kevin Kelly hosted the December 4
    meeting in San Diego, with participation by San Diego-based ICE,
    FBI, CBP/Border Patrol, DEA, ATF, San Diego Police Department
    (SDPD), Chula Vista Police Department, San Diego Sheriff's
    Department, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD), Joint Task
    Force-North, and the Mexican Consulate. The meeting moved
    thematically from U.S. federal interagency coordination to state
    and local law enforcement cross-border coordination, intelligence
    architecture and cross-border information sharing, cross border
    investigations, and ICE's Border Enforcement Security Task Force
    (BEST). DG Valdes remarked he had never seen such a profusion of
    USG partners for Mexican efforts, nor a cross-border law
    enforcement gathering on this scale.

    U.S. Federal Interagency Coordination

    ¶13. (SBU) Kelly began with an outline of the Southern California
    region he represents: 141 miles of border, 6 Ports of Entry with
    many interstate transportation links, 7% of the U.S.-Mexico border
    but fully 60% of the border population. Drug caseloads Kelly said,
    are up 60% in fiscal year 2009 and the district sees more drug
    cases than California's three other districts combined. A
    well-situated crossroads for trade, the San Diego area is also
    suffering cartel creep, as pressure in Mexico pushes DTO leaders
    and operations north across the border. In response, agencies in
    the area have created numerous task forces to facilitate the
    collection, analysis, and dissemination of information across
    jurisdictions, agencies, and borders.

    ¶14. (SBU) Agencies also assign officers as border liaisons to work
    with Mexican counterparts. CBP briefed on a prime example of a
    tunnel discovered using tunnel detection equipment made available
    by NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force-North to identify a seismic anomaly
    one kilometer west of the Otay Mesa port of entry. CBP's sharing of
    this information with Mexican counterparts led to a USG and GOM
    operation to take down the tunnel simultaneously at both ends

    before the smugglers could finish construction.

    State and Local Law Enforcement Cross-Border Coordination

    ¶15. (SBU) SDPD briefed on programs to train local police in
    Tijuana, Rosarito, and Ensenada using a train-the-trainer approach.
    This kind of training on culture of lawfulness, community policing,
    and intel-led operations creates channels for information-sharing
    between SDPD and Mexican counterpart forces. SDPD reps also attend
    the funerals of slain Tijuana police to build trust and show
    support for their colleagues. The Los Angeles Police Department
    (LAPD) runs one of the largest international police training sites
    in the U.S. In addition to the skills imparted, these programs too
    are a huge boost to trust and inter-operability.

    Intelligence Architecture and Cross-Border Intel Sharing

    ¶16. (C) OPAD stressed the critical role of vetting to give agencies
    the confidence to share information. Participants agreed that often
    cross-border liaison is built around a relationship between
    counterparts and is not institutionalized in the positions
    themselves. DEA stressed the burden assumed by Mexican officials
    receiving information from the USG, saying that they have lost
    Mexican colleagues because of information they shared. GOM
    interlocutors throughout the assessment stressed the need for
    greater intel sharing to guide operations south of the border. U.S.
    participants agreed this is key, but added a note of caution that
    intelligence alone will not turn things around. Intelligence is an
    input -- it does not direct operations and it does not reform
    institutions.

    Cross-Border Investigations

    ¶17. (SBU) The FBI field office described its approach to
    cross-border violence cases (primarily kidnappings). Critical
    elements include border liaison officers, proactive
    information-sharing, and a multi-agency task force focused tightly
    on kidnappings and extortion (and not straying into gang/DTO
    territory). When asked whether drug and other violence could really
    be disaggregated, the FBI rep agreed that complete separation of
    related crimes was not possible, but said steps such as co-locating
    task forces help integrate the law enforcement community while
    maintaining the discrete focus of individual task forces. The
    briefer offered a recent example where a dual-national was
    kidnapped on the Mexican side. Her family notified the FBI, which
    collected information from an informant who knew of a kidnapping
    crew operating in Mexico. FBI disseminated the lead to Mexican
    counterparts through its border liaison and Mexican police
    apprehended the crew and freed the hostage.

    ¶18. (SBU) Border Enforcement Security Task Force: The Mexican
    delegation specifically requested a briefing on ICE's Border
    Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST). BEST is the only task force
    in San Diego with an embedded Mexican official, a promising
    approach also in use at EPIC.

    Closing Comments

    ¶19. (C) The Ambassador closed by drawing out a few key lessons. To
    address these law enforcement challenges requires multiple agencies
    with multiple talents. Task forces, as cross-cutting entities,

    bridge jurisdictions and build trust. Intelligence and information
    collection function on several levels. In a rough cut, he laid out
    a continuum: community tips and information drawn from beat cops;
    tactical information derived from, for example, humint and judicial
    wiretaps; information on high value targets; and both intelligence
    and analysis on the operations of DTOs.  Establishing such a
    framework on intelligence could also inform the architecture for
    sharing intelligence.  Different aspects of intelligence sharing
    would require different protocols for sharing, disseminating and
    protecting information. He underscored that the issues covered in
    the day's discussion would only bear fruit when brought back to
    specific cases. The imperative to solve a case drives USG and the
    GOM to cooperate across the border and successful case establishes
    goodwill, durable communications channels, and an example for use
    in subsequent actions.

    CIVIL SOCIETY SESSIONS OPEN A DOOR

    ----------------------------------

    ¶20. (SBU) The team met with academics and non-governmental
    organizations (NGOs) in separate meetings at the Autonomous
    University of Baja California (UABC) and the University of
    California-San Diego (UCSD). In Tijuana, the GOM organizers did not
    seem to understand the focus of Pillar IV.  They brought in three
    academics working on immigration issues, who stressed that
    deportees are cannon fodder for the cartels and described GOM
    support to deportees. They said that unemployment in the state has
    tripled from two percent to seven percent in the economic downturn
    and is providing a boon to DTO recruiters, but did not have
    suggestions on how to turn the situation around.

    ¶21. (SBU) Former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Jeffrey Davidow presided
    at the UCSD session, which was a much more varied and comprehensive
    exchange with NGO, business, and academic leaders. California NGOs
    and non-profits described their activities south of the border and
    speakers urged the GOM to strengthen NGOs rather than mistrust
    them. DG Valdes remarked that in the late 1990s, he was tasked with
    analyzing the "threat" from NGOs and came away with a strong
    appreciation for their ability to strengthen civil society. The
    Chamber of Commerce explained their efforts for several years have
    been on the Tijuana-San Diego metro area as one economic block.
    Chamber members include business people from both sides of the
    border, and their investment/trade promotion trips also represent
    both cities.

    ¶22. (SBU) COMMENT: This part of our evolving strategy has been the
    most uncomfortable for the GOM. Civil society organizations are
    often vocal in their criticism of the federal government, including
    the security strategy. What the GOM saw in San Diego was a strong
    and uniform support for Mexico. Academics, business, city and civil
    society leaders all echoed their interest in expanding cooperation
    in all sectors to the benefit of both sides. The message was "do
    not fear us, but let us be part of the solution to our common
    problems." END COMMENT.

    PASCUAL
    PASCUAL

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