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### Viewing cable 08STATE50050, MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE50050 | 2008-05-12 15:25 | 2011-04-24 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1367868-eeuu-temio-un-plan-para-revivir-el-misil-condor

`

    R 121525Z MAY 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 050050

    BUENOS AIRES FOR EST:A. SCHANDLBAUER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2033
    TAGS: MTCRE PARM PREL ETTC TSPL AR

    SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR):
     ARGENTINE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE (SLV) PROGRAM  (U)

     REF: A. LA NACION ARTICLE OF 05 AUGUST 07 (AND SUBSEQUENT)
          ¶B. 00 BUENOS AIRES 1211 (AND PREVIOUS)
          ¶C. 00 STATE 43295
          ¶D. 99 STATE 153139 (AND PREVIOUS)
          ¶E. 99 BUENOS AIRES 4356
          ¶F. 99 BUENSO AIRES 5768
          ¶G. 99 BUENOS AIRES 657
          ¶H. 99 BUENOS AIRES 694
          ¶I. 99 BUENOS AIRES 598
          ¶J. 99 STATE 261161 (AND PREVIOUS)
          ¶K. 92 BUENOS AIRES 6466
          ¶L. 92 BUENOS AIRES 4636
          ¶M. 92 STATE 186032
          ¶N. 93 STATE 33962
          ¶O. 94 STATE 245377
          ¶P. 94 BUENOS AIRES 2735
          ¶Q. 94 BUENOS AIRES 6094
          ¶R. 94 BUENOS AIRES 7658
          ¶S. 00 STATE 1581
          ¶T. 07 STATE 10771
          ¶U. 07 BUENOS AIRES 1793
          ¶V. 08 BUENOS AIRES 138
          ¶W. 08 BUENOS AIRES 170
          ¶X. 08 BUENOS AIRES 124
          ¶Y. DURHAM-VAROTTO DISCUSSION OF 14 SEPTEMBER 07

     Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
     Reason:  1.5 (B), (D).

     ¶1.  (U)  Classified by ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.  Reason:
     1.5 (B), (D).

     ¶2.  (U)  This is an action request.  Embassy Buenos Aires,
     please see paragraph 15.

     ¶3.  (C)  BACKGROUND:  According to published reports (REF A),
     the Argentine Commission for Space Activities (CONAE) is
     overseeing an enterprise known as VENG to develop space
     vehicles, particularly satellite launch vehicles (SLVs), and
     launch services.  Pursuant to this effort, VENG has developed
     and tested the Tronador I rocket.  Development of the
     Tronador rocket and development of a hydrazine concentrate
     pilot plant at Falda del Carmen also are underway.  Hydrazine
     is a key substance in liquid rocket fuel, and the Falda del
     Carmen plant was part of Argentina's dismantled Condor II
     missile program.  Per REF V, this ""space program"" seems to
     have approval from the Government of Argentina (GOA).

     ¶4.  (C)  The GOA's/CONAE's plans to develop a rocket for
     space launch purposes -- and to develop rocket propellant at
     the Falda del Carmen facility -- is of interest to the U.S.
     because it appears inconsistent with the understanding on
     SLVs and dismantlement of the rocket motor production
     facility at Falda del Carmen reached between Argentina and
     the United States prior to Argentina becoming a member of the
     Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994.

     ¶5.  (C)  In the 1980's/early 1990's, Argentina was actively
     engaged in the development of the Condor ballistic missile
     program, which clearly was intended to produce MTCR Category
     I military missiles, including for export to Egypt and Iraq.
     (NOTE:  An MTCR Category I missile system is one that can
     carry a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300
     km. END NOTE.)  The Condor program represented a serious
     missile proliferation concern and a major irritant in our
     bilateral relationship.  This situation was further
     aggravated by Argentina's attempts to camouflage - and
     thereby maintain - the Condor program by calling it an SLV
     program.  SLVs and ballistic missiles are almost identical in
     design, fabrication, and function.  Their technologies are
     essentially interchangeable, and there are virtually no
     technologies that support SLV development that would not also
     facilitate ballistic missile development.  Any rocket capable
     of putting a satellite into orbit also is by definition an
     MTCR Category I syste
     m.  It also is inherently capable of delivering weapons of
     mass destruction (WMD) against surface targets, and many
     countries have used the same boosters to deliver both weapons
     and satellite payloads.

     ¶6.  (C)  To address the concerns raised by the Condor
     program, the United States insisted that Argentina dismantle
     its existing missile facilities and agree to forego Category
     I missiles.  In addition, because Argentina sought to
     disguise the Condor program as an SLV program, we also
     insisted on restrictions on Argentina's SLV activities.  The
     United States -- and the MTCR as a whole -- sought and
     obtained from the GOA written assurances that Argentina would
     undertake specific actions to dismantle the rocket production
     facilities at the Falda del Carmen plant.  The MTCR Partners
     requested these actions to ensure that Argentina's MTCR-class
     missile program could not be revived.

     ¶7.  (C)  Accordingly, in 1992, the GOA assured U.S. officials
     -- including then-Under Secretary Bartholomew -- that
     Argentina had no SLV program and that Argentina did ""not now
     or anytime in the foreseeable future"" contemplate development
     of an SLV (REF K and REF L).  The GOA provided similar
     assurances to the MTCR during April 1992 meetings with the
     multinational MTCR outreach team.  While Argentina did not
     state unequivocally that it would ""never"" pursue an
     indigenous SLV capability, the diplomatic record indicates
     that the United States has understood this to be the case
     since 1992.

     ¶8.  (C)  With regard to dismantlement of the Falda del Carmen
     rocket-motor production facility, the GOA provided written
     assurances to the MTCR in late 1993 that it would take
     specific steps to dispose of the MTCR Category I missile
     manufacturing equipment located at the Falda del Carmen plant
     (REFS N-R).  These assurances were key to the MTCR Partners'
     decision to admit Argentina to the Regime  and included
     agreement to:

     --seal the casting pits in such a way that they cannot be put
     to their originally intended use (i.e., rocket motor
     production);

     --remove from the propellant mixer all sets of gears and
     mixing blades; and

     --relocate from the Falda del Carmen rocket motor plant
     either the AP grinder or the X-ray machine, and use both
     items only for non-missile (which includes non-SLV) purposes.

     To our knowledge, Argentina has honored faithfully its
     explicit commitments related to dismantlement of the Condor
     II missile program.

     ¶9. (C)  In 1999 (REF D), the GOA sought release from its 1992
     commitments regarding SLV development, and expressed great
     disappointment when the U.S. declined to do so.  The GOA
     argued that the U.S. decision disadvantaged Argentina
     vis-~-vis other MTCR Partners and infringed on Argentine
     sovereignty.  It also argued that while Argentina did provide
     assurances to the U.S. in 1992 regarding SLV development, it
     had not permanently renounced its right to peaceful use of
     space technologies, including SLV development.  Subsequently,
     in late 1999/early 2000, following further discussion of the
     issue, the GOA made clear that it had no intention of
     pursuing development of an indigenous SLV capability, largely
     due to financial concerns.  However, in an April 2000
     non-paper (REF S), the GOA reiterated its view on SLV
     development, noting that it believed it inappropriate to
     limit Argentina's future ""peaceful pursuit"" of an SLV based
     on past events.  It also indicated that U.S. dialogue on this
     matter would continue.

     ¶10.  (C)  After seeing press reporting in August 2007 on the
     Tronador program, U.S. officials informally raised the launch
     vehicle issue with the CONAE Director Dr. Conrado Varotto
     (REF U and REF Y).  During those September 2007 discussions,
     Varotto said Argentina has no intention of proliferating
     missile technology but needs a reliable solution to its space
     launch problem.  It has decided that contracting for launches
     of its satellites on foreign boosters is too costly, and is
     pursuing an SLV program as a cost-effective way to get its
     satellites into orbit.  With regard to its 1992 commitments,
     Varotto said the commitment on SLVs was for the ""foreseeable
     future,"" not ""forever,"" and that the passage of time had
     changed Argentina's situation.  At the same time, Varotto
     said Argentina is serious about nonproliferation and its
     commitments with regard to the Condor program.  The
     facilities used in the Condor program have been completely
     dismantled, and Argentina has developed a new facility (at
     the same industria
     l park) for the SLV program that does not implicate the old
     Condor facilities.  Additionally, the Tronador SLV is a
     liquid-propellant system whereas the Condor was a solid
     propellant system.

     ¶11.  (C)  During REF Y discussions, the U.S. was skeptical of
     Dr. Varotto's suggestion that building and maintaining an SLV
     infrastructure would be less costly than contracting for
     launches, but noted that the priority concern for the U.S.
     was nonproliferation.  SLVs are MTCR Category I systems and
     inherently capable of WMD delivery.  SLVs and ballistic
     missiles also are essentially identical in design, form, and
     fabrication and any developments in one area could be applied
     to the other.  Given past concerns about Argentina trying to
     disguise its missile program as an SLV program and the
     interest of the U.S. and other MTCR countries in preventing
     the spread of missiles and missile-related technology that
     could potentially fall into the hands of proliferators and
     terrorists, the U.S. hoped that Argentina would continue to
     abide by its 1992 commitments.  U.S. officials also noted
     that the United States has maintained a policy since
     September 1993 of not encouraging MTCR member countries'
     ""new"" SLV programs. (NO
     TE:  In this context, ""new"" means SLV programs the United
     States did not cooperate with prior to the advent of the MTCR
     in 1987.  END NOTE.)  Argentina therefore should not expect
     U.S. support for its program even if the United States and
     Argentina simply agree to disagree about Argentina's 1992
     commitment on SLVs.  Varotto hoped that the two sides could
     think creatively about ways to resolve the issue, possibly
     including by the United States agreeing to support
     Argentina's SLV program if certain transparency measures were
     implemented.

     ¶12.  (C)  In light of sensitivities in the broad
     U.S.-Argentina bilateral relationship, the United States has
     not raised this issue formally with the GOA.  However, during
     discussions with the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires in February
     2008 (REF V), Dr. Varotto indicated that the SLV program
     remains a high priority.  He also suggested strongly that the
     GOA would be open to unobtrusive transparency measures,
     including briefing the MTCR on the details of the program.

     END BACKGROUND.

     ¶13.  (C)  PURPOSE/OBJECTIVE: We support the peaceful pursuit
     of space as outlined in the President's Space Policy.
     Washington agencies have been considering how to balance its
     response to Argentina's pursuit of a space launch vehicle
     program in light of the understanding on SLVs and
     dismantlement of the Condor missile program reached in 1992
     between the United States and Argentina prior to Argentina
     becoming an MTCR member.  That review has now concluded, and
     the United States has determined that while the United States
     and Argentina continue to hold different understandings of
     Argentina's SLV commitments, there is little likelihood that
     the GOA could be persuaded to abandon its SLV program and we
     do not intend to pursue such an outcome.  Rather, given the
     past history of the SLV issue and the ongoing priority we
     place on missile nonproliferation, we want to seek full
     transparency into the GOA's SLV program, including annual
     consultations on the status of the program and the option for
     periodic site/s visits
     . We also want to request Argentina brief its SLV program to
     the MTCR Partners and encourage the GOA to describe its
     ongoing SLV efforts in its annual declaration to the Hague
     Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
     (HCOC).  We believe this approach will keep this issue from
     being an irritant in our bilateral relationship.  It also
     will reinforce our broad missile nonproliferation objectives
     by providing ongoing insight into the Argentine program and
     opportunities to weigh in with the GOA if program
     developments - including imports/exports relation to the
     program - raise concerns.

     ¶14.  (C)  We therefore propose to raise the SLV issue
     formally with the GOA, making clear that while the United
     States and Argentina continue to hold different
     understandings of Argentina's SLV commitments, we greatly
     value Argentina's ongoing support for missile
     nonproliferation and transparent approach to this matter and
     do not want this issue to be a source of concern in our
     bilateral relationship.  In that spirit, we also want to note
     that while the United States does not support Argentina's
     pursuit of an MTCR Category I SLV, we understand that
     Argentina intends to go forward with development of such a
     system.  Accordingly, we seek a GOA commitment to provide the
     United States with full transparency into its SLV program,
     including annual consultations on the status of the program
     and on imports/exports relating to the program and the option
     of periodic site/s visits.  This could take the form of a
     letter from Dr. Varotto to Ambassador Wayne, for example.  As
     an additional transparency measure, we also see
     k Argentina's commitment to brief the MTCR Partners on its
     SLV program - perhaps via a short information paper to all
     MTCR Partners - and to describe its SLV efforts in its annual
     declaration to the HCOC.

     ¶15.  (C)  ACTION REQUEST:  Drawing on the talking points
     provided below and, as necessary and appropriate, the
     information in paragraphs 2-14 above, request Embassy Buenos
     Aires raise the SLV issue with CONAE Director Varotto and
     appropriate Argentine MFA officials and seek GOA commitment
     to providing the United States with full transparency into
     its SLV program.

     BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

     (CONFIDENTIAL/RELEASABLE ARGENTINA)

     --During the past several years our two governments have
     cooperated closely on missile nonproliferation issues, and we
     greatly value your leadership and support for the Missile
     Technology Control Regime's (MTCR's) efforts to stem the flow
     of missile technology and equipment worldwide.

     --In the cooperative spirit of our nonproliferation
     partnership, we would like to discuss with you Argentina's
     development of a space launch vehicle (SLV).

     --Specifically, we understand that the Commission for Space
     Activities (CONAE) is working to develop the Tronador rocket
     in order to launch satellites into orbit.  Such an SLV would
     clearly be an MTCR Category I system, and raises questions
     concerning Argentina's commitments to the United States
     concerning SLV development.

     --Our two governments have discussed issues relating to these
     commitments on several occasions since 1992, and continue to
     hold vastly different understandings of Argentina's SLV
     commitments.

     --However, despite these differences, the United States
     recognizes and appreciates Argentina's efforts to pursue SLV
     development in an open and transparent manner.  We also
     continue to highly value Argentina's activism on missile
     nonproliferation issues and look forward to continued
     collaboration in this area.

     --In this context, we want to advise your government that
     while the United States does not support Argentina's pursuit
     of an MTCR Category I SLV, we understand that Argentina
     intends to go forward with development of such a system.

     --We therefore would like to ask that as this effort
     proceeds, Argentina undertake to provide the United States
     with full transparency into its SLV program.

     --In our view, such transparency would be in keeping with our
     shared missile nonproliferation objectives and help to ensure
     that this matter does not become a source of irritation in
     our bilateral relationship.

     --Specifically, we would urge your government to agree to
     annual consultations on the status of Argentina's SLV program
     -- to include, as necessary and appropriate, discussion of
     potential imports/exports relating to the program -- as well
     as the option of periodic site/s visits by U.S. officials.

     --Additionally, we would like to ask that Argentina provide a
     one-time briefing to the MTCR Partners on its intention to
     pursue an SLV program.  We similarly would urge Argentina to
     describe its SLV program in its annual declaration to the
     Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
     (HCOC).

     --We know Argentina shares our commitment to international
     nonproliferation efforts and look forward to continued close
     cooperation with Argentina on issues of mutual concern.  We
     hope we can work together to address the SLV issue in a
     mutually satisfactory way.

     END TALKING POINTS.

     ¶16.  (U) Washington POC is ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham
     (Phone: 202-647-4931).  Please slug any reporting on this
     issue for ISN and WHA.

     ¶17.  (U) A word version of this document will be posted
     AT WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/DEMARCHE.
     RICE

     NNNN

     End Cable Text

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