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### Viewing cable 05PARIS7352, FRENCH MFA READOUT ON CHAVEZ VISIT, COLOMBIA, AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05PARIS7352 | 2005-10-27 11:12 | 2011-04-29 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    id: 43788
    date: 10/27/2005 11:12
    refid: 05PARIS7352
    origin: Embassy Paris
    classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    destination: 05PARIS5211|05PARIS7124|05STATE192336
    header:
    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007352

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2015
    TAGS: PREL PGOV FR VE BL CO
    SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA READOUT ON CHAVEZ VISIT, COLOMBIA, AND
    BOLIVIA STATEMENT

    REF: A. STATE 192336
         ¶B. PARIS 7124
         ¶C. PARIS 5211

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
    1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary: MFA DAS-equivalent for South America
    provided a frank and unapologetic readout October 24 of
    French policy toward Venezuela and the recent visit of
    President Chavez.  The MFA highlighted France's economic
    interests in Venezuela, downplayed concerns about human
    rights, regional stability, and arms purchases, and professed
    to view Bolivian elections with more concern than those to
    take place in Venezuela.  According to the MFA, GoF strategy
    is to act discretely to steer Chavez to act responsibly and
    to counsel prudence rather than confrontation.  The one
    exception is on Iran, where FM Douste-Blazy delivered a
    strong message to FM Rodriquez Araque warning against
    dealings with Iran given its interest in acquiring nuclear
    technology.  The MFA said it was only interested for the
    moment in selling spare parts for French-origin equipment
    already in Venezuela but hinted at an interest in other arms
    sales.

    ¶2.  (C) Separately, the MFA affirmed that the French agreed
    in substance with the Bolivia Support Group text, but
    indicated it would await and support an EU statement.  End
    Summary.

    ¶3.  (U) Deputy Political Counselor and Poloff met October 24
    with MFA DAS-equivalent for South America Michel Pinard and
    Venezuela Desk Officer Lionel Paradisi to seek a readout of
    Venezuelan President Chavez's October 21-22 visit to Paris
    and his meetings with President Chirac as well as Foreign
    Minister Rodriguez's meetings with French FM Douste-Blazy.
    They also raised ref A demarche on the Bolivia Support Group
    statement.

    France's Economic Interests
    ---------------------------

    ¶4.  (C) Pinard highlighted at the outset extensive French
    economic interests in Venezuela, adding that Chavez had met
    with a broad array of public and private sector
    representatives in order to encourage increased French
    engagement in Venezuela.  Chavez, he said, was seeking to
    diversify its partners in the oil industry and had met toward
    that end with Total, which already has a 5 billion USD
    investment in Venezuela.  Other discussions focused on
    possible French involvement in the transport sector, social
    housing, and student exchanges (Colombian students in France
    number 1800, as opposed to only 200 French students in
    Venezuela).  Pinard indicated that the situation in Haiti had
    been discussed in the context of Chavez's Petro-Caribbean
    initiative; queried by Deputy PolCouns whether France had any
    concerns about Venezuelan use of oil diplomacy, Pinard
    characterized it as completely beneficial, arguing that Haiti
    was not a country likely to become Chaviste or Bolivarian in
    its outlook simply because of oil provided at favorable
    prices.  Pinard nonetheless asserted that French associate
    membership in the Amazonian Cooperation Treaty Organization
    (ACTO) on November 24 would provide a useful balancing
    factor.  The only critical note was Pinard's acknowledgment
    that the GoF had counseled Chavez on the need for judicial
    guaranties for companies to preserve international
    investment.

    Chavez Here to Stay
    ------------------

    ¶5.  (C) Pinard noted that he recently met with a member of
    the Venezuelan NGO Sumate and had carefully listened to that
    organization's concerns about human rights and democracy in
    Venezuela.  However, he characterized Sumate essentially as
    an oppositionist political organization.  The problem with
    the opposition, Pinard continued, was that it lacked
    organization and provided no real alternative or direction;
    moreover, the various opposition groups were united only in
    their opposition to Chavez.  Pinard downplayed our concerns
    about human rights and civil society, stating that, while
    France remained watchful of the situation, it saw no reason
    for immediate alarm.  He dismissed Chavez's famed
    revolutionary speeches as mere rhetorical fireworks that were
    part of the region's political traditions, and said there was
    no real threat behind the rhetoric.

    Colombia a Bigger Problem
    -------------------------

    ¶6.  (C) Pinard expressed GoF frustration that the Uribe
    government in Bogota had not been able to achieve greater
    progress in its efforts to secure a humanitarian exchange of
    prisoners with the FARC.  This was a French priority that
    included private GoF interactions with the FARC, Pinard said.
     If the Israelis could negotiate with Hizbollah for a
    prisoner exchange, he reasoned, then Colombia should be able
    to do the same with the FARC.  Pinard indicated that the
    French had asked for Venezuelan help in passing messages to
    both the Uribe government and the FARC to press them to seek
    a military accord that would allow for the humanitarian
    exchange of prisoners.  The FARC posed a problem for
    Venezuela as well, Pinard said, given its activities along
    the border.  Pinard said he knew that there were some in the
    Venezuelan government who, despite their claims that they
    were no longer associated with the FARC, still had ways of
    communicating with the organization.  It was through these
    channels that Pinard hoped to have the Venezuelans press the
    FARC to come to the bargaining table with the Colombian
    government.

    Kid Gloves, Except on Iran
    --------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) Chavez was skilled in using international criticism
    of his regime to his domestic political advantage, according
    to Pinard.  As a result, the French approach was one that
    privileged discrete counsel to Chavez over open criticism or
    confrontation.  Comments like those made recently by Pat
    Robertson (despite his position as simply a private citizen)
    only played into Chavez's hands, Pinard argued.  When
    queried, Pinard said that only on Iran had the French
    delivered a strong message to Chavez.  Specifically, French
    Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy had been clear with his
    Venezuelan counterpart, Ali Rodriguez Araque, that Iranian
    pursuit of nuclear military weapons capability was
    unacceptable.

    Arms Sales
    ----------

    ¶8.  (C) Asked directly whether the French, like Russia and
    Spain, were interested in arms sales to Venezuela, Pinard
    acknowledged that the subject had arisen.  Venezuela
    currently has 1960's-era French tanks, Mirage fighters, and
    older model helicopters, according to Pinard, and France was
    interested in supplying spare parts and refurbishing the
    equipment.  Asked again directly whether France was
    interested in the sale of more modern equipment, Pinard
    initially protested that "Venezuela is not interested in
    buying the Rafael," but then conceded that the general
    subject of future arms sales had been raised, although this
    was an issue the French would have to study.  Pinard was
    categorical that Chavez's arms acquisitions were not a threat
    to his neighbors, however, as Pinard was convinced that
    Chavez could have no possible interest in an external war.
    When Deputy PolCouns rejoined that arms build-ups were, at a
    minimum, instruments of influence, Pinard speculated that
    Chavez was more concerned with managing Venezuela's internal
    situation.  Pinard argued that purchases of heavy arms were
    intended primarily to placate bored generals, whose support
    Chavez needed internally; he nonetheless conceded that this
    would also give Chavez more clout within South America.
    Asked about light arms, such as the Kalishnakovs being
    purchased from Russia, Pinard suggested they had less to do
    with arming a population against external forces than with
    arming Chavez supporters to put down any internal
    insurrection.

    EU Observers in Venezuela, Support for Elections in Bolivia
    --------------------------------------------- --------------

    ¶9.  (C) When asked about French support for EU observers in
    upcoming Venezuelan elections, Pinard indicated that he did
    not know what decision Brussels had reached, but that the GoF
    recognized a potential need for election observers, "although
    the only risk would be in the margin of victory by which
    Chavez would win."  Pinard argued that it was in fact more
    important to send observers to Bolivia, where the results of
    elections were less than certain.  In response to ref A
    points (provided on October 17), Pinard stated that the GoF
    fully agreed in substance with the statement of the Bolivia
    Support Group.  However, for reasons of bureaucratic form,
    the GoF is waiting for the EU statement.  Again citing
    bureaucratic technicalities, Pinard did not know if EU
    observers would be possible for Bolivian elections (he
    implied that the system of EU allotments might force it to
    abandon observation of elections at another location), but
    indicated that he believed it was important to have a
    presence there.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶10.  (C) France sees no downside for now in pushing its
    economic interests over human rights and other
    considerations, especially since U.S.-Venezuelan tensions
    offer possibilities for new sales.  We thus can expect the
    French to continue to pursue investment and arms sales
    opportunities.  French toughness on Iran is more a reflection
    of its own involvement in the EU3 negotiations than its
    concerns about Venezuela per se.  The only surprise was just
    how warmly Chavez seems to have been welcomed.  Pinard
    attributed this to a friendship that has developed between
    members of the GoF and Chavez, as well as genuine
    appreciation for Venezuelan assistance following the deaths
    of 162 French passengers of an airliner that crashed in
    Venezuela over the summer.  There are also personal factors:
    Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin spent part of his
    childhood in Venezuela, and Chavez's back-slapping,
    "Caribbean" expansiveness is a match for Chirac's, according
    to Pinard.

    ¶11.  (C) French attitudes towards Colombia and Venezuela seem
    mirror images of U.S. views.  GoF attempts to bring Venezuela
    into Colombian negotiations with the FARC are disturbing, and
    appear to be driven almost entirely by the GoF's focus on the
    captivity of Franco-Colombian Ingrid Betancourt.  The
    presence of Chirac at an October 24 solidarity concert for
    Betancourt, Villepin's personal involvement in a failed 2003
    attempt to negotiate her release, and the reported civil
    union of MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Daniel Parfait
    to Betancourt's sister auger poorly for any real change in
    French policy until the situation is resolved.  End Comment.
    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
    Hofmann

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

`