Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12648 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/12
1996/11
1997/06 1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AF AU ASEC AMGT AS APER AR AG ARF AJ AA AINF APECO AODE ABLD AMG ATPDEA AE AEMR AMED AGAO AFIN AL ASUP ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AID ASCH AM AORL ASEAN APEC ADM AFSI AFSN ADCO ABUD AN AY AIT AGR ACOA ANET ASIG AMCHAMS AGMT AADP ADPM ATRN ALOW ACS APCS AFFAIRS ADANA AECL ACAO AORG AROC AO ACABQ AX AMEX AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AC AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AFU
BR BTIO BY BO BA BU BL BN BM BF BEXP BK BG BB BTIU BBSR BRUSSELS BD BIDEN BE BH BILAT BC BX BT BP BMGT BWC
CS CA CH CD CO CE CU CVIS CASC CJAN CI CPAS CMGT CDG CIC CAC CBW CWC COUNTER CW CT CY CNARC CACM CG CB CM CV CIDA CLINTON CHR COE CR CIS CDC CONS CF CODEL COPUOS CIA CFED CARSON CL CROS CAPC CTR CACS CN CBSA CEUDA COM CONDOLEEZZA CICTE COUNTRY CBE CKGR CVR COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CARICOM CSW CITT CDB CJUS CTM CAN CLMT CBC
DA DEA DR DEAX DHS DAO DCM DJ DOD DOMESTIC DO DK DPRK DEPT DISENGAGEMENT DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE DE
EAID ECON EFIS ETRD EC ENRG EINV EFIN EAGR ETTC ECPS EINT ES EIND EAIR EU EUN EG EPET ELAB EWWT EMIN ECIN ESA ER ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EAIG ET ETRO ELTN EI EN EUR EK EUMEM EPA ENGR EXTERNAL EUREM ELN EUC ENERG ENIV EZ ERD EFTA ETRC ETRN EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ESENV ENNP ENVI ETRDECONWTOCS ECINECONCS EFINECONCS ELECTIONS ENVR EXIM ERNG ECA EINVEFIN ETC EAP ECONOMY EINN ECONOMIC EXBS ECUN ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EREL EINVETC ECONCS ETRA
FI FJ FR FDA FBI FTAA FAC FARC FTA FAO FMLN FO FAS FOREIGN FM FREEDOM FISO FOR FINR FINANCE FOI
GG GM GOI GT GR GH GTIP GV GA GAERC GE GCC GOV GZ GY GANGS GERARD GTMO GL GF GAZA GLOBAL
HR HA HU HO HURI HILLARY HYMPSK HSTC HK HEBRON HUMOR HI HUMAN
IC IV IAEA IR IO IT IN IS IZ IMO IPR IWC ICAO ILO ID ICTY ICJ INMARSAT INDO IL IMF IRS IQ IA ICRC IDA IAHRC IBRD ISLAMISTS IGAD ILC ITU ITF INRA INRO IDP ICTR IEFIN IRC ITRA ITALY INRB INTELSAT IBET IRAQI ISRAELI IIP ITPGOV ITALIAN INTERNAL INTERPOL IEA INR IZPREL IRAJ IF ITPHUM ISRAEL IACI
JA JO JM JOSEPH JP JUS JOHNNIE JOHN JAMES
KBTR KPAO KOMC KCRM KDEM KHIV KBIO KTIA KMDR KNNP KSCA KTIP KWMN KIPR KCOR KRVC KFRD KPAL KWBG KE KTDB KUNR KSPR KJUS KGHG KAWC KCFE KGCC KOLY KSUM KACT KISL KTFN KFLU KSTH KMPI KHDP KS KHLS KMRS KID KN KU KAWK KSAC KCOM KAID KIRC KWMNCS KMCA KNEI KCRS KPKO KICC KPOA KV KDRG KIRF KSEO KVPR KSEP KTER KBCT KFIN KGIC KCIP KZ KG KWAC KRAD KPRP KTEX KNAR KPLS KPAK KSTC KFLO KSCI KIDE KOMS KHSA KSAF KPWR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFSC KRIM KVRP KENV KNSD KCGC KDDG KPRV KTBT KWMM KMFO KMOC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPAI KO KVIR KREC KX KR KCRCM KBTS KOCI KGIT KNUP KPAONZ KNUC KNNPMNUC KERG KTLA KCSY KTRD KNPP KJUST KCMR KRCM KCFC KCHG KREL KFTFN KLIG KDEMAF KICA KHUM KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KMIG KRGY KIFR
LH LY LE LI LG LO LA LU LTTE LAB LOG LT LABOR
MARR MOPS MASS MX MNUC MCAP MO MR MEPP MTCRE MAPP MEPN MZ MT ML MA MY MIL MD MASSMNUC MU MK MTCR MUCN MAS MEDIA MAR MC MI MQADHAFI MPOS MTRE MASC MG MARAD MRCRE MW MP MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MDC
NATO NZ NL NO NK NU NPT NI NG NEW NSF NA NPG NSG NE NSSP NS NDP NSC NAFTA NH NV NP NPA NSFO NT NW NASA NORAD NATIONAL NGO NR NIPP NZUS NC NRR NAR NATOPREL
OEXC OTRA OPRC OVIP OAS OIIP OSCE OREP OPIC OFDP OMIG ODIP OVP OSCI OIC OECD OIE OPDC ON OCII OPAD OBSP OFFICIALS OPCW OHUM OES OCS OTR OSAC OFDA
PGOV PREL PM PHUM PTER PINR PINS PREF PARM PL PK PU PBTS PBIO PHSA PE PO PROP PA PNAT POL PLN POLITICAL PARTIES PCUL PAK PGGV PAO PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PAS PGIV PHUMPREL PCI PG POGOV PHUMPGOV PEL POLITICS POLICY PINL PP PREO PAHO PBT PMIL POV PRL PDOV PTBS PRAM PREFA PSI PAIGH POSTS PALESTINIAN PARMS PROG PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PINF PNG PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA PSEPC PNR POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PROV PGOC PY PHUH PF PHUS
QA
RU RS RO RW RP RFE REGION REACTION REPORT ROOD RCMP RM RSO ROBERT RICE RSP RF RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL RUPREL RELATIONS
SENV SU SCUL SOCI SNAR SL SW SMIG SP SY SA SHUM SZ SYRIA SF SR SO SARS SN SC SIPRS SI SYR SEVN SG SPCE SK STEINBERG SH SNARCS SAARC SCRS SENVKGHG SAN ST SIPDIS SNARIZ SNARN SSA SPCVIS SOFA SEN SANC SWE SHI
TW TU TBIO TSPL TPHY TRGY TC TT TSPA TINT TERRORISM TX TR TS TN TD TH TIP TNGD TI TZ THPY TP TBID TF TL TV TK TO TRSY TURKEY TFIN TAGS
UN UK UNSC UNGA US UNESCO UP UNHRC UNAUS USTR UNDP UNEP UY UNCHR UG UZ UNPUOS USEU UNMIK UNDC UNICEF UV UNHCR UNCHC UNCSD USOAS UNFCYP USUN USNC UNIDROIT UNO UNCND USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC
VE VAT VZ VN VC VT VM VI VTPREL VTIZ VTEG
WMO WHO WHA WA WI WWARD WHTI WTRO WS WTO WTRQ WBG WMD WFP WIPO WZ WB WITH WEU
XK XF XY XG XB XV XR XA XZ XL XW XS XM XD XX XU XI XT XH XQ XE XTAG XC
YE YM YI YMCS
ZB ZI ZEALAND ZF ZK ZR ZP ZU ZO ZL ZOELLICK ZJ ZN ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09DAMASCUS880, SYRIAN-IRANIAN SHOW OF SOLIDARITY MASKS TENSIONS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09DAMASCUS880.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09DAMASCUS880 | 2009-12-22 03:40 | 2010-12-07 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Damascus

`

    VZCZCXRO2360
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHDM #0880/01 3560340
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 220340Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7147
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5891
    RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0233
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0829
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0783
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0999
    RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0145
    RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0261
    RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY 2473
    RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0438
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0773

` `

    Tuesday, 22 December 2009, 03:40
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000880
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/I
    NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
    PARIS FOR NOBLES
    LONDON FOR LORD
    EO 12958 DECL: 12/20/2029
    TAGS PREL, IR, LE, IZ, TU, SY
    SUBJECT: SYRIAN-IRANIAN SHOW OF SOLIDARITY MASKS TENSIONS
    OVER IRAQ, YEMEN, AND WAR WITH ISRAEL
    DAMASCUS 00000880 001.2 OF 004
    Classified By: CDA Chuck Hunter for reasons 1.4 b and d.
    ¶1. (S/NF) The successive visits of three high-level Iranian officials to Damascus in early December appear at first glance to reaffirm strong Iranian-Syrian security ties and other forms of bilateral cooperation, but they may, in fact, mask deepening rifts over Iraq, Yemen, and the possibility of war with Israel. Syrian observers suggest the a shifting balance of power between Iran and Syria. The Iranian government, challenged domestically by anti-regime protests and abroad by building pressure over its nuclear program, has sought Syria’s help just when Syria has begun to enjoy other strategic options, such as its relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Asad’s government proved willing to host the visits, sign a defense MOU, and allow Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal to visit Tehran, all the while continuing close cooperation with Iranian security services and Hizballah operatives. But Asad reportedly resisted Iranian arguments for closer bilateral coordination in Iraq and Yemen and flatly rejected being drawn into a war between Iran and Israel. End Summary.
    -----------------------------------------
    Reaffirmation of Staunch Syrian-Iran Ties
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶2. (C) On the surface, the early-December visits of three Iranian officials -- National Security Advisor Saeed Jalili on December 3, Vice President and head of the Environmental Department Mahammed-Javad Mahamadzideh on December 5-6, and Minister of Defense Ahmad Ali Vahidi on December 8-11 -- represented a concerted reaffirmation by both countries of their strong security ties and their commitment to expanded relations. Set against a backdrop of rising international pressure on Iran over its nuclear program and an exchange of threats between Israel and Iran, the visits signaled continuing cooperation in confronting Israeli policies. Asad publicly praised Iran’s support for resistance against Israeli occupation after his December 3 meeting with Jalili. According to the Syrian press, Jalili also met with Palestinian leaders based in Syria, including Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Meshaal, whom he invited to visit Tehran the following week. Though less focused on security issues, the visit of VP Mahammadzideh affirmed both countries’ commitment to expanding economic cooperation and working together on responding to climate change. On December 11, Vahidi and his Syrian counterpart, Ali Habib, expressed a desire for a deepening of defense and military ties, formalized in a memorandum of understanding calling for “efforts aimed at the establishment of a comprehensive regional security pact,” and establishing recurrent meetings of the Joint Defense Cooperation Committee.
    ¶3. (S/NF) The public showcasing of these three visits contrasted with the secrecy with which Iranian Revolutionary Guard Commander/al-Quds Force Ghassem Soleimani conducted his. Reportedly accompanying Jalili, Soleimani returned to Damascus after a long absence, perhaps a reflection of lingering tensions between Iran and Syria that erupted after the February 2008 assassination of Hizballah military strategist Imad Mugniyah in the Syrian capital.  XXXXXXXXXXXX spoke very reluctantly about Soleimani’s presence in Damascus, saying only that “he was here,” and “when he visits, it’s usually significant.” XXXXXXXXXXXX reported seeing Jalili and Soleimani at a XXXXXXXXXXXX meeting with Syrian officials that included FM Muallim, as well as unspecified members of Hizballah. “Soleimani represents the
    DAMASCUS 00000880 002.2 OF 004
    business end of the resistance,” commented XXXXXXXXXXXX, also reluctant to discuss the sensitive issue of Iranian-Syrian-Hizballah military cooperation.
    ¶4. (S/NF) Taken collectively, the Iranian visits over eight days were meant to dispel doubts that Syria would or could abandon its ties to Iran, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX The visits allowed the Syrian government to project an image of strength at a time when Israel was rejecting Syria’s demand for a commitment to withdraw to the June 4 lines and a return to Turkish-facilitated proximity talks prior to moving to direct peace negotiations. In a joint press conference with Jalili, FM Muallim supported Iran’s right to enrich uranium and to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, the Iranian visits coincided with the introduction of a law in the Knesset to require a national referendum on any peace treaty. “Iran provides us diplomatic cover as well as the military might to back up our demands for peace,” argued XXXXXXXXXXXX. “In return, we’re providing Iran support when the West is pressuring Iran on its nuclear program,” he said.
    ----------------------------------
    But Did Iran Wear Out Its Welcome?
    ----------------------------------
    ¶5. (S/NF) Whatever Syrian rationale there may be for showcasing military ties to Iran, many Syrian observers are emphasizing the shifting balance of power in their bilateral relationship. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX Iran, not Syria, sought the visits as a sign of Syrian reassurance. “Be assured,” commented XXXXXXXXXXXX “they needed these visits far more than we did.” Summing up a view heard repeatedly around Damascus, “things in our relations with Iran are starting to return to normal” after a long period of Syrian dependence, XXXXXXXXXXXX asserted. He added, “U.S. isolation and the invasion of Iraq made it necessary to adopt such extreme measures. But now, things are moving back to equilibrium.”
    ¶6. (S/NF) By the time of Vahidi’s visit, some Syrian officials were quietly grousing that the Iranians were “too needy.” The Syrian government wanted to extend support to a loyal Iranian ally, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, but the dramatic display of multiple Iranian visits in a short period of time “was Iran’s doing.” The Syrian government, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, perceived a note of panic in the Iranian requests and some were saying Syria’s renewed relations with Saudi Arabia, its deepening ties to Turkey, and even Washington’s desire to re-engage Syria had made Iran “jealous.”
    ¶7. (S/NF) While the Syrian government responded positively to Iranian requests for public statements of support on the nuclear issue and against Israel, it remained silent after the Iranian Minister of Defense’s arrival statement denounced Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States. By the time Vahidi arrived on December 8, press contacts noted, the Syrian government’s attitude had shifted to “let’s get this over with,” according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Indeed, at the same time Vahidi was parading his 20-car motorcade around Damascus, several other visits were occurring, including one by the Turkish military commandant and President Sarkozy’s Middle East advisors, Nicolas Gallet and Jean-David Levitte. Most of Presidential Media Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban’s December 10 press conference was dedicated not to Syrian-Iranian relations, but to Syria’s ties to other countries, according to press contactsXXXXXXXXXXXX.
    DAMASCUS 00000880 003.2 OF 004
    ----------------
    Signs of Discord
    ----------------
    ¶8. (S/NF) Going beyond atmospherics XXXXXXXXXXXX reported several disagreements between Jalili’s delegation and their Syrian counterparts. On Iraq, Jalili reportedly proposed a “joining of Syrian and Iranian efforts” to influence the upcoming Iraqi elections. “They (the Iranians) basically asked us to focus on co-opting Shia politicians and to drop our support for the Sunnis and former Baathists,” arguing that the center of gravity in Iraq lies with the Shia. On this issue XXXXXXXXXXXX reported, Syrian officials expressed great reluctance and continued to insist on the reintegration of former Iraqi Baathists into the political system. Some Syrian officials XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed that Syria needed to extend the range of its political connections in the Iraqi Shia community, said XXXXXXXXXXXX. But Iran’s vision for Iraq was “a Shia-dominated state made of up of mini-states,” an outcome the Syrian government opposed, he said. The SARG continues to desire a stronger centralized power base in Baghdad.
    ¶9. (S/NF) On Yemen, Vahidi’s public remarks rebuking Saudi Arabia for interfering in its neighbor’s affairs drew sharp criticism from Syrian officials during the Iranian Defense Minister’s meetings XXXXXXXXXXXX Vahidi was clearly trying to drive a wedge between Damascus and Riyadh, but “it didn’t work,” he said. Asad stopped short of publicly contradicting the Iranian official during his visit, but he reassured Saudi King Abdullah’s son Abdul Azziz, in Syria to pay personal condolences after the death of President Asad’s brother Majd, that Syria fully supported Saudi Arabia’s efforts to defeat the Huthi separatists. “There weren’t any newspaper reports of Iranian ministers here (paying condolences),” noted XXXXXXXXXXXX.
    ¶10. (S/NF) More significantly, Syria reportedly resisted Iranian entreaties to commit to joining Iran if fighting broke out between Iran and Israel or Hizballah and Israel. XXXXXXXXXXXX said Iranian officials were in Syria “to round up allies” in anticipation of an Israeli military strike. “It (an Israeli strike on Iran) is not a matter of if, but when,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said, reporting what Syrian officials had heard from their Iranian counterparts. The Syrian response, he continued, was to tell the Iranians not to look to Syria, Hizballah or Hamas to “fight this battle.” “We told them Iran is strong enough on its own to develop a nuclear program and to fight Israel,” he said, adding, “we’re too weak.” The Iranians know Syria has condemned Israeli threats and would denounce Israeli military operations against Iran. “But they were displeased with Asad’s response. They needed to hear the truth,” XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
    ¶11. (S/NF) Asked what advice Syria was giving Iran, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that Syria, along with Turkey and Qatar, was preparing for an Israeli-Iranian military exchange in the near future. “Military officials tell me they have noticed Israeli drones snooping around our sites,” he explained, noting some Syrian officials saw Israeli reconnaissance as an indication that Israel might seek to disable anti-air radar stations as part of a plan to fly bombers over Syrian territory en route to Iran. “We expect to wake up one morning soon and learn the Israeli strike took place. Then we expect an Iranian response. At that point, we, Turkey, and Qatar will spring into action to begin moderating a
    DAMASCUS 00000880 004.2 OF 004
    ceasefire and then a longer-term solution involving both countries’ nuclear programs. That’s the best scenario. All the others are bad for us and the region,” summed up XXXXXXXXXXXX. “We would hope the U.S. would recognize our diplomatic efforts to resolve a regional crisis and give us some credit for playing a positive role.”
    ------------------
    Comment: So What?
    ------------------
    ¶12. (S/NF) Many Syrian and some diplomatic observers believe Syria is in the process of re-calibrating its relations with Iran and is seeking to avoid choices that would constrain the country’s flexibility as it faces an uncertain regional setting. Does, however, Syria’s instinct for self-survival and desire for less dependence on Iran represent anything other than a shift of emphasis as long as Damascus insists on maintaining its military relations with Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas? Some analysts here argue that Syria’s improved relations with Turkey, France, and Saudi Arabia afford Damascus a greater range of choices in dealing with the West, the Arab world, Israel, and Iran. This school asserts that better ties with the U.S. would further increase Syria’s range of options and its potential to move farther away from Iran. Even if Damascus and Tehran maintained some semblance of their political-military relationship, the extent of their ties would be constrained by Syria’s competing equities in deepening relations with others, including the U.S. Others argue that a wider range of options would only perpetuate Syria’s decision-averse orientation; if the Iranians can’t pin down Syria on matters of war and peace, then what chance would the United States have? Syria could pocket openings offered by Washington and simply use our gestures to play rivals off one another.
    ¶13. (S/NF) At the end of the day, it may be impossible to assess Syria’s intentions with any confidence until the regional context becomes clearer. In the meantime, the U.S. should take a modicum of quiet satisfaction that Syria is showing signs of wanting to moderate Iran’s influence in its affairs, even though expecting the relationship to end altogether remains unrealistic. If Syria’s improved relations with France, Saudi Arabia and Turkey can initiate cracks in the Syrian-Iranian axis, then perhaps discrete U.S.-Syrian cooperation could add further stress to these fault lines. A willingness to offer concrete deliverables as evidence of a U.S. desire for improved relations would force Syrian officials to calculate how far they would go in response, providing us with a more accurate measure of their intentions. At a minimum, increased Washington interest in Syria would increase Tehran’s anxiety level and perhaps compound Syrian-Iranian tensions, at a time when Syrian officials themselves may be unsure how they will react to unfolding events.
    HUNTER

`