Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12613 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16 2011/05/17

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01 1988/03 1988/07
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/03 1992/06 1992/09 1992/12
1993/01 1993/10
1994/12
1996/11
1997/06 1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AS AM AR AMGT ASEC AFIN AL AORC AU AG AF APER ABLD ADCO ABUD AID AMED AJ AEMR AE ASUP AN AY AIT ADPM APEC ACOA ANET APECO ASIG AA ASEAN AGAO AADP AMCHAMS ARF AGR ATRN ALOW ACS APCS AFFAIRS ADANA AECL ACAO AORG AROC AO AODE ACABQ AGMT AX AMEX AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AC AUC ASEX AINF AER AVERY AGRICULTURE ASCH AFU AMG ATPDEA ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL ADM
BA BM BR BL BH BO BK BD BEXP BU BILAT BTIO BF BT BX BG BY BE BP BC BBSR BB BRUSSELS BIDEN BMGT BWC BN BTIU
CO CS CA CD CR CPAS CH CDG CI CU CE CBW CVIS CASC CDC CONS CMGT CV CY CIA CW CIDA CWC CG CJAN CODEL CT CM CAPC CTR CACS CLINTON CBSA CEUDA COM CF CARSON CN CIC COPUOS CONDOLEEZZA CICTE COUNTER COUNTRY CBE CFED CL CKGR CHR CVR COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CARICOM CB CSW CITT CACM CDB CJUS CTM CAN CLMT CBC CAC CNARC CROS CIS
DEAX DA DHS DAO DCM DJ DR DOD DOMESTIC DO DK DPRK DEPT DEA DISENGAGEMENT DE DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE
ETTC EN ENRG EAGR EAID ECIN EFIN EINT EINV ETRD EUN ECON EAIR EWWT EG EPET EMIN EU EFIS ELTN ELAB EC EIND ECPS ENVR EZ ET ENERG EI ETRN EUREM EINVECONSENVCSJA ER EEPET EUNCH EFTA EXIM EK ES ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ESENV ENNP ENVI ESA ELN ETRDECONWTOCS EFINECONCS EUMEM ENGR ERNG ELECTIONS ECA EPA ETRC EXTERNAL EINVEFIN EUR ETC EAP ENIV ECONOMY EINN ECONOMIC EXBS ECUN ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EREL EINVETC ECONCS ETRA ECINECONCS EAIG ETRO EUC ERD
FR FI FTAA FJ FBI FO FM FDA FAO FAS FREEDOM FTA FISO FOR FARC FAC FINR FINANCE FOI FOREIGN FMLN
GG GV GM GH GT GR GA GE GY GANGS GTIP GAERC GOI GOV GTMO GL GF GCC GZ GAZA GLOBAL GERARD
HR HEBRON HSTC HA HUMOR HU HO HK HILLARY HI HURI HUMAN HYMPSK
IR IS IC IZ IAEA IN ICRC IT ID IDA IWC IO ICJ ICAO IV IAHRC IBRD IMF IQ INRA INRO ILC IGAD IMO ITRA ICTY ITU ILO ISLAMISTS ICTR IBET IRC IRAQI ITALY IPR ISRAELI IIP INMARSAT ITPGOV ITALIAN INTERNAL IRS IA INTERPOL IEA INRB IL INR IZPREL IRAJ ITF IF ITPHUM ISRAEL IACI IEFIN INTELSAT INDO IDP
JA JO JM JP JUS JAMES JOHNNIE JOSEPH JOHN
KSCA KSUM KIPR KTEX KJUS KIDE KDEM KIRF KV KNNP KTIA KN KGHG KG KISL KTFN KUNR KCRM KPWR KPAL KTIP KFRD KWMN KOLY KPAO KMDR KCOR KPRP KU KZ KPKO KO KOMS KAWC KMCA KMPI KFLU KGIC KOMC KRVC KVRP KS KSEP KIRC KSPR KVPR KWBG KACT KFLO KFSC KHIV KHSA KMFO KCIP KENV KHLS KDRG KSAF KRAD KNSD KBCT KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCFE KE KSTC KCGC KR KPOA KPLS KICC KRIM KAWK KWMM KPRV KVIR KTDB KX KCRS KMOC KCRCM KBTS KSEO KHDP KFIN KSTH KOCI KGIT KNUP KTBT KPAONZ KNUC KNNPMNUC KWAC KERG KSCI KBIO KTLA KCSY KTRD KNAR KMRS KNPP KJUST KCMR KTER KRCM KNEI KCFC KSAC KCHG KGCC KREL KFTFN KCOM KLIG KDEMAF KAID KPAI KICA KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHUM KREC KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KWNM KRFD KMIG KDDG KRGY KIFR KID KWMNCS KPAK
LE LY LH LU LI LG LO LA LTTE LAB LOG LT LABOR
MTCRE MNUC MARR MOPS MASS MX MK MO MCAP MIL MAS ML MR MEDIA MAR MC MD MG MI MY MU MTRE MA MQADHAFI MASC MW MARAD MPOS MRCRE MTCR MAPP MZ MP MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPN MEPI MEETINGS MERCOSUR MT MCC MIK MAPS MV MILITARY MDC MEPP MASSMNUC MUCN
NL NZ NI NPT NATO NO NK NS NU NP NG NA NSG NT NW NE NSF NR NPA NAFTA NASA NSFO NDP NGO NORAD NSSP NATIONAL NIPP NZUS NH NC NEW NRR NAR NV NATOPREL NPG NSC
OREP OSCE OSCI OTRA OVIP OPDC OAS OIIP OPRC OPAD OBSP OEXC OECD OFDP OFFICIALS ODIP OPIC OHUM OES OPCW OVP OCS OIE OTR OMIG OSAC OFDA OIC ON OCII
PARM PGOV PREL PTER PE PHUM PINR PINS PREF PM PK POL PBTS PNAT PHSA PAS PA PO PDOV PL PHUMPGOV PAK PGIV PAO PHUMPREL PCI PROP PP PTBS PINL POV PEL PG PREO PAHO PREFA PSI POLITICAL POLITICS PAIGH POSTS PMIL PRAM PALESTINIAN PARMS PROG PBIO PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PINF PNG PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PHUMBA PSEPC POGOV POLICY PNR POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PROV PBT PGOC PY PLN PHUH PF PRL PHUS PU PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA
QA
RS RU REGION REACTION REPORT RO RW RP RFE RM RCMP RSO ROBERT RICE RSP RF ROOD RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL RUPREL RELATIONS
SNAR SENV SY SP SU SOCI SMIG SR SCUL SF SO SA SI SARS SZ SW SG SIPRS SEVN SNARCS SYR SN STEINBERG SH SAARC SC SCRS SYRIA SL SENVKGHG SAN ST SIPDIS SNARIZ SNARN SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SANC SWE SHI SEN SHUM SPCE
TSPA TU TBIO TD TT TS TRGY TINT TF TPHY TN TH TSPL TW TC TX TZ THPY TL TV TNGD TI TP TBID TK TERRORISM TIP TO TRSY TURKEY TFIN TAGS TR
UNESCO UK UNGA UN UNMIK UNHRC UP UNSC USTR US UNDC UY UNICEF UV UNDP UNAUS UNCSD USUN USOAS USNC UNEP UNHCR UNCND UNFCYP UNIDROIT UG UZ UNCHC UNCHR USEU USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS
VZ VT VE VI VM VTPREL VN VTIZ VTEG VAT VC
WHTI WTRO WTRQ WBG WHO WFP WI WS WMD WIPO WTO WHA WZ WB WWARD WITH WEU WMO WA
XR XS XA XV XH XF XL XG XM XT XK XD XI XE XW XB XQ XX XTAG XY XZ XU XC
YI YM YE YMCS
ZI ZP ZR ZK ZO ZU ZL ZOELLICK ZF ZB ZJ ZEALAND ZN ZA ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2706, LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS LEBANESE MARSHALL PLAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BEIRUT2706.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2706 | 2006-08-21 05:40 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    VZCZCXRO5452
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2706/01 2330540
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 210540Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5160
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0137
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1006

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002706

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2026
    TAGS: PREL PTER LE SY IS
    SUBJECT: LEBANON: HARIRI WANTS LEBANESE MARSHALL PLAN

    REF: BEIRUT 2680

    Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason 1.4(d).

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C/NF) During a difficult 8/20 meeting at his Qureitem
    mansion with Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman and poloff, a
    somewhat erratic Saad Hariri pressed for the immediate
    reopening of Lebanon's ports and airports. Pushing back, the
    Ambassador said that until the Government of Lebanon (GOL)
    does more to improve monitoring of points of entry, as is
    required under UNSCR 1701, the U.S. will not be able to
    convince the Israelis to lift their blockade. During the
    meeting, Saad called Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri to ask
    (in a misleading way) that Hizballah-sympathetic LAF officers
    be removed from the cargo terminal at Rafiq Hariri Beirut
    International Airport (BIA).

    ¶2. (C/NF) Calling for "a Marshall Plan for Lebanon," Saad
    said the USG must help strengthen Lebanese government
    institutions, in particular the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
    and Internal Security Forces (ISF). When the Ambassador was
    critical of a recent statement by LAF commander Michel
    Sleiman supportive of "the resistance," Saad argued that the
    LAF has been left in a weak position by the international
    community and so must act submissive in front of Hizballah.
    The Ambassador said that, in terms of assistance, no one will
    be able to help Lebanon until the GOL presents a clear
    reconstruction plan. Saad laid out the latest GOL plan,
    which involves channelling funds through a new Arab fund for
    Lebanon, and promised to push PM Siniora to present the plan
    to ambassadors as soon as tomorrow 8/21. Regarding the
    "special tribunal with international character" to try those
    suspected in the Rafiq Hariri assassination, Saad said the
    draft framework had been approved within the GOL at the
    working level and it now only requires Nicholas Michel from
    the UN's Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to come and sign it,
    before the Lebanese cabinet and parliament consider it. End
    Summary.

    CHANGING THE BALL GAME
    ----------------------

    ¶3. (C/NF) Seated in his funereal basement study, surrounded
    by images of his late father and fidgeting nervously with his
    prayer beads, Saad said that there needs to be "a different
    ball game" in the South. Responding to the Ambassador's
    complaints about LAF chief Michel Sleiman's recent 8/17 'Amr
    ul-'Amaliyyat' (Operations' Order) saying that the LAF would
    deploy "beside the resistance," implying tacit approval of an
    armed Hizballah, Saad said that Sleiman is hardly in a
    position to say anything else right now. So long as the army
    remains militarily weaker than Hizballah, he said, the LAF
    will have to maintain such a less-threatening posture. But
    once the army has "some teeth and some morale," Saad urged,
    then he promises to "smack Hizballah down." Growing more
    strident (and clearly hoping to be recorded verbatim), Saad
    assured the Ambassador, "Give me a chance, and I will f***
    Hizballah." Saad also complained -- as have others including
    PM Siniora and Speaker Berri -- that Israeli attacks like the
    8/19 raid north of Baalbek only serve to buttress Hizballah.

    ¶4. (C/NF) Bothered that the USG has not come through yet on
    items he has asked for previously -- Saad mentioned
    specifically machine guns and helicopters -- for the military
    and security forces, Saad urged that the U.S. do more to help
    strengthen these institutions. The Ambassador said that,
    indeed, we were increasing our assistance to both the LAF and
    ISF. But, he noted, it is difficult to find sympathetic ears
    in Washington when senior Lebanese officials like General
    Sleiman (not to mention President Lahoud) are still crowing
    about the merits of the resistance. It also makes it harder
    for us to convince the Israelis of the LAF's seriousness in
    containing Hizballah. Ticking off numerous speeches since
    Sleiman's that strike a different tone (his own, PM
    Siniora's, Walid Jumblatt's, Defense Minister Murr's), Saad
    implied the Ambassador is blowing Sleiman's statement out of
    proportion. He said that all that is needed is for the USG
    to lean on some of the Gulf Arab states -- Qatar, Kuwait,

    BEIRUT 00002706 002 OF 003

    UAE, and Saudi Arabia -- to cough up military equipment for
    the ISF and LAF. Saad pleaded, "Just please tell the Arabs
    to help the army." He said that the UAE came up with $50
    million for the ISF immediately once the USG asked. Now the
    USG needs to ask for the army.

    CONTROLLING POINTS OF ENTRY
    ---------------------------

    ¶5. (C/NF) Referring to lukewarm statements from Lebanese
    ministers, the Ambassador asked why the GOL is treating UNSCR
    1701 as a burden rather than a blessing to help Lebanon
    secure its sovereignty. Why, for instance, is the GOL not
    willing to quietly ask for UNIFIL assistance at the ports,
    airports, and Lebanese-Syrian border to stop Iran and Syria
    from supplying arms to Hizballah and others? This is a key
    point. Saad replied that this is a sovereignty issue, adding
    shockingly (surely in reference to violations of sovereignty,
    not intent) that "there is no difference between UNIFIL and
    Syria." The Ambassador told Saad that this answer would not
    suffice in getting the Israeli blockade lifted, and if the
    GOL wants to achieve that objective, then they need to ensure
    effective monitoring at points of entry.

    ¶6. (C/NF) Saying that "we are the ones who control the port
    and the airport," Saad complained emotively that the U.S.
    policy has led to an "embargo that has suffocated the Cedar
    Revolution for one month." The embargo does not hurt
    Hizballah but cripples March 14. Saad assured the Ambassador
    that "99 per cent" of arms smuggled into Lebanon come across
    the Syrian frontier. Only very few come through the port and
    airport, and the GOL has made recent significant changes in
    security at BIA. When the Ambassador told Saad that ISF
    chief Ashraf Rifi had informed us that the BIA cargo terminal
    remains under the influence of LAF officers sympathetic to
    Hizballah (reftel), Saad picked up the phone and called Nabih
    Berri directly. Speaking in Arabic, Saad cle粑rly lied to
    Berri on the phone, saying that "the United Nations had told
    him to just change the Shi'a officers at the cargo terminal,"
    and also that "that will be the end of the issue. It will
    solve the problem." Later on in the meeting, Saad said he
    would resolve the issue of the cargo terminal with Nabih
    Berri "today." "If I do, then open the airport." The
    Ambassador did not guarantee that the Israelis would accept
    this measure as sufficient, and again urged Saad to ask PM
    Siniora to quietly request UNIFIL to come help at the
    airport. (Comment. Striking throughout this meeting was
    Saad's absolute disregard for Siniora's prime ministerial
    prerogative. End Comment.)

    ¶7. (C/NF) When the Ambassador asked what the GOL intends to
    do to secure the border, Saad complained that the army is
    already stretched thin and has enough on its hands already in
    the South. "We're asking the army to do everything at the
    same time!" He said that the international community needs
    to take a "stand" on the border. When the Ambassador asked
    what this meant, Saad suggested getting the UN to place
    sanctions on Syria.

    RECONSTRUCTION PLAN TAKES SHAPE
    --------------------------------

    ¶8. (C/NF) The Ambassador asked whether the GOL is any
    closer to developing a clear plan for reconstruction. Saad
    replied confidently that, "We're going to rebuild all the
    homes that were destroyed with money from the Saudis,
    Qataris, Emiratis, and Kuwaitis." The first step will be to
    assess the destruction and provide cost estimates for the
    rebuilding of each village, a process well underway. The
    assessment in southern Lebanon would be carried out under the
    auspices of Nabih Berri's Council for the South (considered a
    cash black hole, the Council will wisely not have any control
    over project funds, but will still get much of the credit for
    rebuilding). The donor countries, in conjunction with the
    GOL, would then choose which villages they want to rebuild as
    well as select the contractors. Sufficient project funds,
    Saad said, would then be disbursed from a new 'Arab Fund for
    Rebuilding Lebanon.'

    ¶9. (C/NF) On the Ambassador's urging that the GOL launch a
    more effective public relations campaign to broadcast all

    BEIRUT 00002706 003 OF 003

    that it is doing to rebuild Lebanon, Saad said that PM
    Siniora would be visiting him later today (8/20) to finalize
    the plan. Following this, there will be a public
    announcement of the GOL effort. Saad also noted that PM
    Siniora and Speaker Berri had (finally) visited the southern
    suburbs together earlier today, and that he himself would be
    going there at some point in the next few days. Saad pressed
    again for U.S. assistance in rallying international support
    -- "Go freaking help Lebanon! Unleash everything on Lebanon!
    We need a Marshall Plan!" The Ambassador mentioned that, in
    order to see how much the international community could
    pledge towards Lebanon, there must be GOL coordination so we
    all have some idea of what work needs to be done and which
    country will undertake what project. Saad promised he would
    tell PM Siniora to convene ambassadors soon to give them a
    list of "1 billion dollars worth of what needs rebuilding."
    He said that the GOL's new relief coordinator, Ghassan Taher,
    started work today, and that Taher was previously involved in
    the German-supported Hizballah-Israeli prisoner swap
    negotiations in 2003/04.

    TRIBUNAL
    --------

    ¶10. (C/NF) Noting that Bashar al-Asad's 8/15 speech was
    "the best thing he could have done," Saad said the Saudis had
    "gone ballistic" over Bashar's bullying anti-Lebanon
    rhetoric. The Ambassador asked how things are proceeding on
    the establishment of a "special tribunal with international
    character" to try suspects in the Hariri assassination. Saad
    said the GOL, particularly Justice Minister Charles Rizk, had
    reviewed the draft tribunal agreement provided by the UN's
    OLA and had made some "fixes" to it. The next step is for
    UN/OLA's Nicholas Michel to come to Lebanon to finalize and
    sign the agreement. (Note. Then comes the hard part, which
    is gaining Lebanese Cabinet and Parliamentary approval while
    avoiding a government collapse. End Note)

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11. (C/NF) Locked away in his palace, 'Sheikh Saad' was in
    an erratic mood. His claim that the USG's failure to get
    supplies to the LAF leaves Michel Sleiman with no choice but
    to say the LAF would deploy "beside the resistance" is simply
    preposterous, and the Ambassador pointed out to Saad that it
    would have been better had Sleiman simply not mentioned "the
    resistance" at all. (Sleiman himself seems to have gotten
    the message about the outrageousness of comments, for he is
    busily spinning his comments -- delivered last Thursday -- as
    meaning that the army would stand with the "heroic people of
    the south," a dubious interpretation.) In addition, we were
    shocked by Saad's total dismissiveness of Siniora,
    particularly in phoning Speaker Berri, lying to him and
    asking him outright to "change the Shi'a officers" without
    consulting Siniora on this action. Saad tried to get through
    to Acting Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat following his call
    with Berri, presumably to inform Fatfat of his decision.
    Throughout the meeting, Saad referred to GOL actions over the
    past week (since his return from Paris) as if he himself had
    carried them out, not Siniora. One wonders whether Siniora
    might have preferred Saad to remain outside of Lebanon
    conducting his so-called "diplomatic resistance."

    ¶12. (C/NF) Saad's comments on the reconstruction planning
    and the tribunal indicate things are at least moving in the
    right direction. The reconstruction effort seems to have
    coalesced into a scheme which allows joint donor and GOL
    control, along with transparency and accountability -- no
    doubt due to Siniora's cautious, if agonizingly deliberative,
    approach. In addition, by putting Berri's organization out
    in front, but not allowing it to handle the funds, you give a
    needed public relations boost to a secular Shi'a alternative
    to Hizballah while not lining Randa Berri's pockets. We very
    much hope to receive a clearer idea in the next days as to
    Lebanon's specific reconstruction needs. On the tribunal
    framework, if it is indeed ready to be signed, we should urge
    the UN send Michel out to Lebanon as soon as possible,
    perhaps -- as suggested by Marwan Hamadeh (see septel) -- to
    accompany Kofi Annan during the SYG's visit next week.
    FELTMAN

`