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### Viewing cable 10TOKYO228, U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10TOKYO228 | 2010-02-04 09:00 | 2011-05-07 05:00 | SECRET | Embassy Tokyo

`

    VZCZCXRO6124
    OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
    DE RUEHKO #0228/01 0350900
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 040900Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
    TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9205
    INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9631
    RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2950
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3169
    RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8678
    RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 1019
    RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2494
    RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9174
    RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 7569
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHKO/USDAO TOKYO JA PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 000228

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2030
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR JA
    SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING

    REF: SECDEF DTG 292154ZJAN10

    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission James P. Zumwalt; reasons 1.4 (b
    /d)

    ¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  Initiatives for the Security Treaty,s 50th
    anniversary, updates on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
    and Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Host Nation Support (HNS),
    Realignment/Futenma Replacement Facility, possible new
    bilateral exchanges and F-X procurement were the main
    Alliance issues discussed during the February 2 Security
    Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting, led by EAP A/S Campbell and ASD
    Gregson on the U.S. side, and MOFA DG for North America
    Umemoto and MOD DG for Defense Policy Takamizawa on the
    Japanese side.  Regarding the 50th anniversary, both sides
    raised the possibility of a new security declaration, a 2 2
    (SecState, SecDef, and GOJ counterparts) meeting, and
    trilateral engagement with India in 2010.  DG Umemoto,
    however, relayed Foreign Minister Okada,s decision not to
    form an eminent persons panel to shepherd anniversary
    activities.  In terms of new exchanges, DG Umemoto called for
    the start of formal bilateral dialogues on regional security
    (focusing initially on China), extended deterrence, and
    cyber-security.

    ¶2. SUMMARY cont'd: The Japanese side expressed support for
    beginning HNS discussions at an early point with a view to
    presenting a more efficient support package to the Japanese
    public.  ASD Gregson pressed for green energy technologies as
    a possible component of a successor HNS agreement, and A/S
    Campbell noted the political sensitivities of the HNS issue
    during a time of FRF-related Alliance challenges.  On the
    realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, A/S Campbell urged the
    Japanese side to refrain from going public with FRF
    alternative proposals before consulting with the USG.  ASD
    Gregson expressed concern that politicization of FRF
    decisions are bleeding into other realignment projects,
    particularly Iwakuni.  DG Takamiza provided an update on F-X
    procurement, noting that MOD has started a process to brief
    the Defense Minister on the candidate aircraft, threat
    assessment and procurement and delivery issues.  DG
    Takamizawa expressed concerns about barriers to F-35
    information, Japanese industrial to participation in F-35
    production, and rumors of delivery delays.  End summary.

    ¶3. (U) The United States and Japan held a Security
    Sub-Committee (SSC) meeting on February 2 hosted by the
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.  Assistant Secretary of
    State Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of Defense
    Wallace ""Chip"" Gregson chaired the U.S. side, with Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs Northern American Affairs Bureau Director
    General Kazuyoshi Umemoto and Ministry of Defense Bureau of
    Defense Policy Nobushige Takamizawa chairing for Japan.
    Representatives from Embassy Tokyo, Pacific Command and U.S.
    Forces, Japan joined the U.S. chairs, with representatives
    from the Japan Joint Staff filling out the Japan side.  A
    full list of participants is at the end of the cable.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    Quadrennial and Ballistic Missile Defense Reviews
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶4. (C) OSD Director for Japan Basalla drew on talking points
    in Ref A to provide an overview of the Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) and Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR).
    ASD Gregson emphasized that the United States is not reducing
    its presence in Northeast Asia, but rather expanding
    throughout the Pacific the presence of its existing
    alliances.  The United States encourages the increase in
    Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) presence and operations
    around Guam and Asia.  This will help protect sea lanes of
    communication from non-traditional and conventional threats.
    The USG seeks the expanded use of Guam for U.S.
    military-Japan Self Defense Force training.  This joint

    TOKYO 00000228  002 OF 007

    training, combined with Japan's increased experience with
    humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR),such as
    with the JSDF deployment to Haiti, will demonstrate to the
    region Japan's ability to react to humanitarian aid
    situations and improve its national image.  A permanent JSDF
    presence on Guam to support the training would be
    appropriate, ASD Gregson noted.

    ¶5. (C) JSDF Joint Staff Director for Plans and Policy MG
    Koichi Isobe offered that the HA/DR missions match JSDF
    capabilities and experience and are supported by the public
    and politics in Japan, as evidenced by the quick Cabinet
    decision on the Haiti dispatch.  MOD Defense Policy DG
    Takamizawa noted that a critical factor for Japan's HA/DR
    operations will be having sufficient quick lift capability.

    ----------------------
    Nuclear Posture Review
    ----------------------

    ¶6. (S) Basalla provided an update on the Nuclear Posture
    Review (NPR) using interagency-cleared talking points, noting
    its release has been delayed until March 1 as a result of
    serious and sustained U.S. leadership attention on the
    contents.  A key theme will be the U.S. commitment to reduce
    the number of nuclear weapons and at the same time strengthen
    deterrence and extended deterrence to reduce the potential
    for conflict that would threaten the United States, as well
    as its allies and partners.  The United States is looking to
    strengthen regional deterrence architectures and deepen
    security cooperation, including with Japan.  A key
    recommendation in the NPR will be to retire the
    nuclear-armed, submarine-launched Tomahawk Land Attack
    Missile (TLAM-N), as it has been deemed redundant and would
    require a costly replacement program.  The United States has
    sufficient other means to project nuclear power and the NPR
    will indicate investments into the U.S. strategic deterrent
    force.  Non-nuclear strike capabilities and BMD also play
    critical roles in regional deterrence and the United States
    seeks continued and additional cooperation with Japan in
    these areas.  The United States is aware of Japan's interest
    in these issues, as indicated by Foreign Minister Kazuya
    Okada's letter to Secretaries Clinton and Gates, and is
    looking forward to continued dialogue with Japan, Basalla
    stated.

    ----------------------------
    Extended Deterrence Dialogue
    ----------------------------

    ¶7. (S) ASD Gregson added that the United States has been
    consistent and strong in its public messages, such as Deputy
    Secretary of State Steinberg's statement following North
    Korea's missile and nuclear activities in the spring of 2009,
    that the United Stated would take every action possible to
    reassure and defend its allies.  The United States seeks to
    expand the dialogue with Japan on extended deterrence issues.
     This should include a GOJ visit to U.S. Strategic Command to
    ensure Japan understands, to the extent possible, U.S.
    deterrence plans and concepts, and to allow Strategic Command
    to hear Japan's interests and concerns, ASD Gregson stated.

    ¶8. (S) MOFA DG Umemoto informed the U.S. side that Foreign
    Minister Okada, who was not interested in the strategic
    issues associated with extended deterrence when first taking
    office, is now eager to start a bilateral dialogue on the
    issue.  MOFA would like to send a team to the United States
    during the week of February 15 to begin formal discussions.
    A/S Campbell stressed that there are three distinct issue
    sets that must be managed: 1. extended deterrence, 2. nuclear
    history (known as the ""secret agreements"" in Japan), and 3.
    the ability of U.S. aircraft and ships to call at Japanese
    ports without needing to confirm or deny the presence of
    nuclear weapons.

    TOKYO 00000228  003 OF 007

    ¶9. (S) DG Umemoto said nuclear propulsion is not much of a
    concern in Japan, especially following the USS George
    Washington's deployment, but nuclear weapons are very much
    tied to the ""secret agreement"" issue.  Japan does not want to
    end up like New Zealand and needs to find a path forward that
    allows U.S. operations and port visits to continue while also
    responding to questions from the Japanese public.  He also
    noted that the Japanese public has high expectations
    following President Obama's Prague speech, and so it will be
    necessary to reconcile the contradiction between working to
    reduce nuclear weapons and strengthening deterrence.  The
    public also needs to understand that reducing reliance on
    U.S. nuclear weapons for Japan's security will mean an
    increased reliance on U.S. and Japanese conventional forces,
    DG Umemoto said.  Both sides agreed on the need to draw up a
    terms of reference and begin the extended deterrence dialogue
    as soon as possible.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    50th Anniversary: Regional Security Assessment
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶10. (C) DG Umemoto proposed that a key bilateral activity
    associated with the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Mutual
    Cooperation and Security Treaty should be a Deputy Director
    General/Deputy Assistant Secretary-led assessment of the
    security environment in East Asia, with a specific initial
    focus on China.  The work should kick-off in March.  Both
    sides agreed on the benefit of including experts, which
    should come from the interagency policy community, including
    the National Security Council and the White House, as well as
    the armed forces and intelligence community.  A/S Campbell
    recommended State and MOFA lead this assessment.  MOD DG
    Takamizawa offered that the assessment should incorporate
    previous dialogues, such as the bilateral airpower dialogue.
    The results could lead to renewed discussions on Alliance
    roles, missions and capabilities, and also inform Japan's
    revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines and
    drafting of the next 5-year Mid-Term Defense Plan, DG
    Takamizawa said.

    ¶11. (C) A/S Campbell stated that, given North Korea's
    activities, China's growing military, and increased
    non-traditional threats, including extremism, piracy and
    climate change, the United States and Japan face the most
    challenging security environment in the history of the
    Alliance.  However, the messages to the public regarding
    bilateral dialogues often gloss over this reality.  DG
    Umemoto agreed with A/S Campbell's statement that this needs
    to change with an  assessment of the regional security
    picture so that the public better understands threats to
    Japan.  He also said FM Okada wants to discuss the security
    environment with his counterparts as well and suggested this
    topic could be part of a future 2 2 meeting.

    --------------------------------
    50th Anniversary: Cyber-security
    --------------------------------

    ¶12. (S) DG Umemoto said cooperation on cyber-security would
    be another activity to kick off during the 50th Anniversary
    year. He expressed appreciation for the U.S. offer to
    continue discussions on cyber-security issues, including
    those related to China.  ASD Gregson noted the importance of
    getting real experts together, given the highly technical
    nature of the subject.  DG Umemoto suggested having a joint
    cyber exercise at some point.  ASD Gregson agreed, noting
    that the United States was setting up a military command to
    defend and combat threats to networks.  DG Takamizawa said
    Japan was not as far along as the United States and has had a
    hard time assigning responsibility to the right agency, which
    has hindered Japan's approach to the issue.  A/S Campbell
    replied that USG coordination on cyber security was not as

    TOKYO 00000228  004 OF 007

    developed as was believed.  He suggested, and all agreed,
    that the best path forward for progress would be a
    DOD-MOD-led dialogue.  DG Umemoto said Japan is also ready to
    ""upgrade"" the until now classified Bilateral Information
    Security Task Force (BISTF) into a public working group on
    information security that would build on BISTF's work to date.

    ------------------------
    Wisemen's Group/Mini-SSC
    ------------------------

    ¶13. (C) A/S Campbell reiterated the USG,s interest in
    forming a bilateral &wisemen,s group8 for shepherding
    events related to the 50th anniversary of the security
    treaty, an idea originally suggested by the Japanese Embassy
    in Washington.  DG Umemoto pointed out that FM Okada remains
    firmly opposed to creating a formal group.  As a practical
    matter, the DPJ government is not able to identify sufficient
    numbers of security experts outside the government with no
    ties to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  Although MOFA
    had supported the idea at one point, the change in government
    and the current political environment have rendered it
    unfeasible, DG Umemoto said.

    ¶14. (C) DG Umemoto also called for discussions at the
    upcoming mini-SSC on bilateral planning and each of the
    sub-elements.  While both sides have achieved considerable
    progress in moving forward on individual sub-elements, senior
    Japanese political leaders could not connect them together
    well in the overall bilateral planning construct, Umemoto
    noted.  ASD Gregson responded that he supports discussing
    bilateral planning at the mini-SSC, and suggested that both
    sides explore and discuss further some of the key takeaways
    from the recent Keen Edge bilateral exercise.  OSD Director
    for Japan Basalla suggested discussing bilateral training in
    the mini-SSC, emphasizing that training is an issue that
    crosses over both strategic and operational issues.

    ¶15. (C) A/S Campbell suggested that both sides try to
    schedule another SSC in March, either in Washington or in
    Hawaii, with perhaps a half-day set aside for a trilateral
    meeting with India.  DG Umemoto expressed support for the
    idea, noting that the GOJ has been seeking trilateral
    discussions with India and bilateral discussions with China.
    A/S Campbell noted difficulties in pursuing a bilateral
    summit between the President and Prime Minister Hatoyama in
    April, adding, however, that considerable interest exists for
    a Security Consultative Committee (SCC) &2 28 meeting.
    Scheduling an SCC meeting sometime after the GOJ,s decision
    on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) in May would be a
    good opportunity to announce the direction to be taken by the
    U.S.-Japan Alliance, as well as to celebrate the hard work of
    both sides on FRF.  An SCC prior to a resolution on FRF,
    however, could be difficult.  DGs Umemoto and Takamizawa
    noted difficulties in following such a timeline, as the Diet
    would be in session in June and Defense Minister Kitazawa
    would also need to focus on campaigning in the July Upper
    House election.

    ---------------------------
    50th Anniversary: End State
    ---------------------------

    ¶16. (C) A/S Campbell asked, given the proposed bilateral
    activities that include the extended deterrence dialogue,
    regional security assessment and cyber-security cooperation,
    what the GOJ sees as the end state for the 50th anniversary
    of the Security Treaty.  DG Umemoto said FM Okada sees the
    process starting with the current discussions on planning for
    the 50th anniversary commemoration, followed by the
    abovementioned dialogues, and culminating in a joint
    declaration that would articulate the Alliance in the 21st
    Century.  A/S Campbell noted that a joint declaration could
    be possible, if the Futenma Replacement Facility issue is

    TOKYO 00000228  005 OF 007

    solved in a timely fashion.  FM Okada has the same view, DG
    Umemoto responded.  A/S Campbell noted that President Obama
    will stop in Guam in March on his way to Australia and
    Indonesia.  The stop should signal to Japan the importance of
    Guam to Alliance transformation and the realignment of U.S.
    forces, particularly the FRF plan.  A/S Campbell also noted
    the need to begin laying the ground work for President
    Obama's trip to Japan in November.

    -------------------
    Host Nation Support
    -------------------

    ¶17. (C) DG Umemoto called for both sides to begin the formal
    process for conducting a comprehensive review of Host Nation
    Support (HNS) as agreed in the current Special Measures
    Agreement (SMA) on Host Nation Support (HNS) for U.S. forces.
     He stressed that, from the GOJ,s perspective, comprehensive
    review does not necessarily equate to drastic reductions in
    HNS, but rather, managing HNS funds more efficiently by
    examining all areas of use to demonstrate to the Japanese
    public that HNS contributes to the defense of Japan.  The
    focus, DG Umemoto stated, should be on more efficient use of
    HNS or on slight reductions with greater results.  ASD
    Gregson cautioned against portraying the comprehensive review
    as &slight reductions,8 as some Washington observers could
    misinterpret Japanese calls for &slight reductions8 as
    calls for &less defense.8  He also stressed that the goal
    for both governments should be to attain the greatest value
    out of HNS, not to minimize cost.

    ¶18. (C) A/S Campbell sought DG Umemoto,s views on the idea
    of extending current levels of HNS by one year and delaying
    negotiations in order to avoid raising yet another
    contentious bilateral issue.  He pointed out that precedent
    for such extensions exist, as the two goverments had done so
    on two other occasions.  DG Umemoto rejected the idea,
    stressing that simple continuation of current levels of HNS
    would be toocontroversial.  He underscored that, precedent
    notwithstanding, the new government would not support a plan
    in which both sides did nothing to address perceived
    inefficiencies in HNS spending.  DG Umemoto noted, however,
    that immediate changes to current levels of HNS are not
    necessary, given both sides, respective budget cycles.  A
    five-year agreement, for example, that demonstrates changes
    either at the end of the five-year period or sometime earlier
    would allow for continuation of current HNS levels for a
    short period, DG Umemoto said.

    ¶19. (C) A/S Campbell stressed that the contents of HNS
    discussions ought to be kept out of the public.  He also
    noted that USG would integrate Assistant Secretary for
    Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro and his bureau more
    deeply in the HNS negotiations, a bureaucratic change in the
    USG,s approach to HNS.  The USG wants to pursue periodic
    senior-level talks led by the DOS Office of the Senior
    Advisor for Security Negotiations and Agreements to review
    progress made at the Director-level SMA negotiations in
    Tokyo, as well as to address broader, strategic issues.  ASD
    Gregson suggested including renewable energy in the HNS
    discussions, as utilities costs present a considerable
    portion of HNS.  He offered to send to Japan a DOD briefing
    team to engage in discreet information exchanges on some of
    the energy efficiency projects being pursued by DOD,
    including the Office of Naval Research.

    ----------------------------
    Futenma Replacement Facility
    ----------------------------

    ¶20. (C) DG Umemoto underscored that the &entire8 GOJ is
    committed to finding a solution on FRF by the end of May, as
    Prime Minister Hatoyama and other senior officials have
    commented publicly.  He noted that the ruling party,s

    TOKYO 00000228  006 OF 007

    consultations are progressing and stressed that the possible
    alternatives do not exclude the current plans.  He assured
    the U.S. delegation that any alternative put forth by the GOJ
    must meet U.S. military requirements and will, therefore,
    require prior consultation with the USG.  Referring to the
    results of the Nago City mayoral elections (won by an
    anti-FRF candidate), DG Umemoto pointed out that decisions on
    FRF will be made by the GOJ, not local communities.  He also
    asked that the USG support the proposed visit to Guam by
    members of the Coalition Working Group, with whatever
    conditions or restrictions it wants to impose on them.  The
    members want to examine the current conditions in Guam to
    inform their own deliberations.  While the GOJ understands
    U.S. concerns about possible ulterior motives of Social
    Democratic Party (SDP) and People,s New Party (PNP) members
    of the working group, MOFA would like the USG to agree to
    support a multiparty delegation in principle, DG Umemoto said.

    ¶21. (C) A/S Campbell said the USG would agree to support the
    visit in principle.  He pointed out that the USG would
    continue to maintain that the current FRF plan remains the
    best approach, that the USG is prepared to engage on the
    issue with the GOJ, that it seeks expeditious results, and
    that any decisions on FRF must be made bilaterally.  A/S
    Campbell also noted that the U.S. side would respond strongly
    if the Japanese side were to go public with unilateral FRF
    alternative proposals before consulting with the USG.  DG
    Umemoto pointed out that the Realignment Roadmap is not
    limited to FRF and urged both sides to make progress on other
    areas of realignment.  ASD Gregson responded that while the
    Roadmap goes beyond Futenma, the politicization of FRF is
    bleeding into other realignment projects, particularly
    Iwakuni.

    ---
    F-X
    ---

    ¶22. (S) DG Takamizawa reported that MOD had held the first of
    four internal meetings to bring the Defense Minister and Vice
    Ministers up to date on the F-X (Japan's next fighter
    aircraft) procurement.  The remaining meetings will focus on
    why the F-X is necessary, the security environment, candidate
    aircraft (F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F/A-18E/F, F-15X and the
    Eurofighter) and procurement timelines for each aircraft.
    Meetings will be held every other week until end of March or
    early April.  MOD is planning to reach out to other countries
    that have the candidate aircraft to determine their rationale
    for procurement.  MOD will be looking at F-X procurement not
    just from the perspective of replacing the aging F-4
    squadrons, but also with a view to replacing Japan's F-15s
    and countering the growing multilayered China threat.  This
    could lead to fewer resources for the F-X and more for other
    assets, such as submarines for instance, depending on Japan's
    assessment of the threat.  Domestic industrial participation
    will also be a factor, as Japan's indigenous F-2 line will
    soon be shut down, leaving Japan with no domestic fighter
    production program.  MOD's assessment is that, if the F-35 is
    selected, there would be no room for Japanese industrial
    participation.  Moreover, MOD would also not be able to
    purchase indigenously produced missiles for the F-35.  DG
    Takamizawa assessed that MOD will request funding for the F-X
    in the JFY2011 budget, although perhaps without specifying a
    platform.

    ¶23. (C) A/S Campbell affirmed that the United States is
    committed to providing as much information as possible so
    Japan can make the right decision.   DG Takamizawa said
    getting information has been a difficult and frustrating
    process, while noting the information security issues
    associated with the Joint Strike Fighter.  MOD has accepted
    that it will not be able to receive radar cross section (RCS)
    data on the F-35 and will try to determine why other
    countries decided to purchase the platform prior to receiving

    TOKYO 00000228  007 OF 007

    RCS data.  DG Takamizawa expressed concern about delivery
    timelines, indicating he had heard rumors that there were two
    to three-year delays.  ASD Gregson said it is important to
    dispel rumors and have people with accurate information
    provide Japan with an update on the current status.

    ¶24. (U) Meeting participants:

    State Department
    ----------------
    Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
    Affairs Kurt Campbell
    Embassy DCM James Zumwalt
    Robert Luke, Embassy Political Minister Counselor
    Kevin Maher, EAP/J Director
    Joseph Young, Embassy Political-Military Unit Chief
    Nirav Patel, EAP Special Assistant
    Mark Tesone, EAP Special Assistant
    Simon Lee, Embassy Political Military Officer
    Dan Cintron, Embassy Political Military Officer

    Defense Department
    ------------------
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security
    Affairs Wallace ""Chip"" Gregson
    Brig Gen William Uhle, PACOM Deputy J3
    Suzanne Basalla, OSD Director for Japan
    COL Jeffrey Wiltse, USFJ J5
    LCDR John Bradford, OSD Country Director for Japan

    Ministry of Foreign Affairs
    ---------------------------
    North American Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto
    North American Deputy Director General Koji Tomita
    Embassy of Japan Minister Akiba
    Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division Director Funakoshi
    Senior Japan-U.S. Security Coordinator Arai
    Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Div. Dep. Director Okazaki

    Ministry of Defense
    -------------------
    Defense Policy Director General Nobushige Takamizawa
    Japan Joint Staff Policy and Plans Director MG Isobe
    Defense Policy Deputy Director General Tetsuro Kuroe
    Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Div. Director Serizawa
    Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Dep. Director Araki

    ¶25. (U) A/S Campbell's and ASD Gregson's staff cleared this
    cable.
    ROOS

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