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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2545, TFLE01: PM SINIORA HOLDS FAST ON SHEBA'A, INSISTS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2545 | 2006-08-07 06:59 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

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    VZCZCXRO2083
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2545/01 2190659
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 070659Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4923
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0028
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002545

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2016
    TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY
    SUBJECT: TFLE01: PM SINIORA HOLDS FAST ON SHEBA'A, INSISTS
    THAT LAF (ASSISTED BY UNIFIL) IS UP TO THE TASK

    Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman. Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C/NF) A/S Welch's second meeting with PM Siniora in 24
    hours clarified Lebanon's preferred sequence of events at
    cease-fire. But the Prime Minister would not budge from his
    "requirement" that the IDF withdraw from all Lebanese
    territory, including Sheba'a. Siniora argued hard that
    unless the Israeli occupation of Sheba'a ends -- even if the
    initial transfer into UN custodianship extends into years --
    the conflict will continue. He flatly stated, "there will be
    no deal without Sheba'a." Siniora also urged the U.S. not to
    allow Syria into the Sheba'a equation by forcing the issue of
    "border delineation" into the agreement. PM Siniora defended
    the adequacy of deploying LAF into the south at the time of
    the cease-fire, as long as the LAF was assisted at first by
    an augmented UNIFIL, and later by a multi-national
    stabilization force. Concerning the immediate deployment of
    LAF to the south, Siniora said Minister of Defense Murr had
    confirmed the army would be ready to move early next week.
    And he reiterated his claim that a mission-capable element of
    several hundred foreign troops would also be ready to deploy
    within days of the cease-fire. As the meeting concluded,
    Siniora produced a map that showed relatively conservative
    boundaries for what Lebanon considers Sheba'a in an attempt
    to demonstrate the reasonableness of their demands. PM
    Siniora also commented in passing on the kidnapped IDF
    soldiers. End summary.

    ¶2. (SBU) A/S Welch and the Ambassador met with PM Fouad
    Siniora for nearly two hours at the Grand Serail early in the
    afternoon of August 5. As with the previous day's meeting,
    senior Siniora advisors Mohammad Chattah and Rola Nouraddine
    attended the meeting, as did poloff (notetaker) and Jonathan
    Schwartz from L. The meeting took place immediately
    following the Assistant Secretary's meeting with Speaker
    Nabih Berri.

    ¶3. (C/NF) PM Siniora expressed keen interest in the
    reaction of Speaker Berri to the US/FR proposals presented by
    the Assistant Secretary earlier in the day. When informed
    that Berri was engaged, professional, and had even indicated
    some flexibility on timing with regards to Sheba'a, Siniora
    expressed relief that Berri was still on board with the
    7-point approach.

    BOILS DOWN TO TWO ISSUES
    ------------------------

    ¶4. (C/NF) Although he professed that each of the 7 points
    dealt with an important cause of the current hostilities, PM
    Siniora stated that the negotiations would go nowhere unless
    his Government could achieve two unalterable goals: the
    "immediate" withdrawal of IDF forces south of the Blue Line
    upon cease-fire, and a firm commitment on Sheba'a that would
    remove Israeli presence.

    INSISTS LAF IS READY TO MOVE
    15,000 TROOPS SOUTH
    ----------------------------

    ¶5. (C/NF) PM Siniora stated that his Minister of Defense,
    Elias Murr, had assured him that 15,000 LAF troops would be
    ready to deploy to the south in a "matter of days." Murr had
    assured the Prime Minister that the army was united and the
    officer corps ready to (finally) fulfill their constitutional
    responsibility. Siniora countered some skepticism by
    insisting that the LAF was not the "ragtag" outfit some
    experts have alleged. According to Siniora, the principal
    reason it had never moved south was political, specifically
    Syrian interests during the Syrian occupation, and since
    then, the political leverage of Hizballah.

    ¶6. (C/NF) Concerning his proposal that an "augment force"
    of several hundred mission-capable troops would strengthen
    UNIFIL, which would be assisting the deployment of the LAF,
    Siniora said he has already been in touch with the
    Governments of Malaysia and Indonesia, in addition to Turkey.
    He believes he has their commitment to send troops for a
    short-term mission. But he also acknowledged that the
    presence of "non-Muslim" contingents (he mentioned Spain,
    Italy, and even Russia) would be of great value -- especially
    as the Muslim contributors would be from Sunni countries, and

    BEIRUT 00002545 002 OF 003

    the area of deployment was largely Shia. His immediate
    objective is to win commitments for approximately 2,000
    mission-capable troops to augment UNIFIL.

    ¶7. (C/NF) In response to an inquiry on whether Hizballah
    would simply move aside as the combined LAF/UNIFIL force
    moved in, PM Siniora pointed to Amal leader Nabih Berri's
    recent statement that he would be "riding in the first
    military vehicle" into the south, implying Berri would never
    stick out his neck so far without knowing Hizballah's actual
    intentions.

    SHEBA'A FARMS REDUX
    -------------------

    ¶8. (C/NF) Following a review of Israeli concerns with
    including Sheba'a in the cease-fire agreement, PM Siniora
    paused for effect, and then stated flatly that without
    Sheba'a there would be no deal. He characterized the Israeli
    position as being close to blackmail and then emotionally
    declared that the Government of Israel "could bomb Lebanon
    for another month" if it refused to deal with the disputed
    territory.

    ¶9. (C/NF) Each time the Assistant Secretary posed a
    possible alternative treatment of the Sheba'a issue, the
    Prime Minister grew impatient and somewhat agitated. He
    insisted the "international community is getting what it
    wanted (presumably referring to UNSCR 1559) at a heavy cost
    to the people of Lebanon." He argued that every party came
    out ahead: the international community with a stable,
    democratic Lebanon; the pro-reform people of Lebanon received
    a disarmed Hizballah -- and the people of Israel a northern
    border at peace. He completed his exposition with the charge
    that if the Government of Israel does not leave Sheba'a now
    (initially turning it over to the UN, per his 7-point plan),
    it would never do so.

    ¶10. (C/NF) Following his somewhat emotional argument,
    Siniora fell back into an appeal to the U.S. and the
    international community not to allow Syria (and Iran) back
    into a controlling position in Lebanon. He maintained that
    if Sheba'a continues to remain in Israeli hands, Syria will
    always control the situation. He continued that if the
    international community put the land into the care of the UN,
    Syria would have to behave in a responsible manner -- it
    could no longer point to Israeli "occupation." Obliquely
    referring to the inevitable moment when the international
    community loses interest in Lebanon, the Prime Minister
    warned, "If you leave Lebanon in the claws of Syria,
    eventually it will crush us."

    THE ILLEGALITY OF HIZBALLAH'S ARMS
    ----------------------------------

    ¶11. (C/NF) Concerning the critical element of Hizballah's
    arms after the cease-fire, PM Siniora said that if the
    agreement was drafted in accordance with the 7 points, only
    the arms of the Government of Lebanon (LAF) or those it
    authorized (UNIFIL and the multi-national stabilization
    force) would be permitted in the south -- all other weapons
    would be "illegal."

    ¶12. (C/NF) When asked why should this give the Government
    of Israel any confidence -- indeed, what was different? --
    Siniora responded that the war had changed everything: the
    Lebanese people were now filled with "bitterness" and would
    not permit a return to the status quo, the international
    community was responding with a powerful stabilization force,
    and the cease-fire agreement would be perceived as
    comprehensive and just. Siniora implored that the time was
    finally right, like a "hammer hitting hot, malleable metal."

    COMMENTS ON IDF PRISONERS
    -------------------------

    ¶13. (C/NF) Although PM Siniora stated unequivocally he did
    not know where the two abducted IDF soldiers were, he
    realized that it was very important to establish whether they
    were alive. He acknowledged that on July 12, he had heard
    what he considered credible information that they "were out
    of the south" -- but that was the last word he had heard. PM
    Siniora promised to ask (presumably Nabih Berri, who in turn
    would have to ask others) about their condition.

    BEIRUT 00002545 003 OF 003

    ¶14. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Welch.
    FELTMAN

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