Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12576 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13 2011/05/14 2011/05/15 2011/05/16

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/05 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AMGT ASEC AMED AEMR APER AORC AR ARF AG AS ABLD APCS AID AU APECO AFFAIRS AFIN ADANA AJ ADCO AA AECL AADP ACAO ANET AY APEC AORG ASEAN ABUD AGR AROC AO AE AM AODE AL ACABQ AGMT AX AMEX ATRN AFGHANISTAN AZ ASUP AND ARM AQ ATFN AMBASSADOR ACBAQ AFSI AFSN AGAO AC ADPM ASIG AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE ACOA ASCH AFU AINF AMG ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL ADM AN AIT AMCHAMS ALOW ACS
BR BA BK BD BU BEXP BO BM BT BRUSSELS BIDEN BTIO BE BY BB BL BG BP BC BBSR BH BX BF BWC BN BTIU BMGT BILAT
CA CASC CS CU CWC CBW CO CH CE CI CDG CVIS CG CM CICTE CMGT COUNTER CPAS COUNTRY CJAN CIDA CD CT CODEL CBE CW CDC CFED CONS CONDOLEEZZA CL COM CR CKGR CHR CVR CIA CLINTON CY COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE COE CN CARICOM CB CACS CSW CIC CITT CACM CDB CF CJUS CTM CAN CLMT CBC CAC CNARC CV CROS CIS CBSA CEUDA CARSON CAPC COPUOS CTR
DR DA DK DHS DPRK DEPT DEA DJ DISENGAGEMENT DE DOMESTIC DOD DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE DO DAO DCM DEAX
EFIN ECON EAID ENRG EAIR EC ELAB ETRD EINV ETTC ECIN EPET EG EAGR EFIS EUN ECPS EU EN EIND ELTN EINT ECA EPA EWWT EMIN ENVI ENGR ETRC EXTERNAL EI ELN ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ET EZ EK ES EINVEFIN ETRDECONWTOCS ER EUR ETC ENVR EAP ENIV ECONOMY EINN EFTA ECONOMIC EXBS ELECTIONS ECUN ENGY ECONOMICS EIAR EINDETRD ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EREL EINVETC ECONCS EUMEM ETRA ESA ECINECONCS EAIG ETRO EUREM EUC ENERG ERD EEPET EUNCH EXIM EFINECONCS ETRN ESENV ENNP EINVECONSENVCSJA ERNG
FI FR FTA FARC FJ FTAA FAC FBI FAO FAS FM FINR FREEDOM FOR FINANCE FOREIGN FOI FDA FMLN FO FISO
GV GG GM GH GOV GOI GL GT GF GR GCC GAERC GE GZ GA GAZA GY GLOBAL GTIP GERARD GANGS GTMO
HA HR HO HK HU HILLARY HI HURI HUMAN HYMPSK HSTC HEBRON HUMOR
IS IC IR IT IN IAEA IBRD ITU ILO IZ ID ICRC IPR ISRAELI IIP IMO INMARSAT IWC IV ITPGOV ITALIAN IO INTERNAL IRS ICTY IA INTERPOL IRAQI IEA INRB IL ICAO ICJ INR IMF ITALY IAHRC IZPREL IRAJ ITF IQ ILC IF ITPHUM ISRAEL IACI ICTR IEFIN INTELSAT INDO IDP IRC ITRA IBET INRA INRO IDA IGAD ISLAMISTS
JA JUS JO JOSEPH JM JP JAMES JOHN JOHNNIE
KCRM KNNP KDEM KFLO KTIP KFRD KWMN KJUS KSCA KSEP KFLU KOLY KHLS KCOR KTBT KPAL KISL KIRF KTFN KPRV KAWC KUNR KV KIPR KTIA KTDB KPAO KZ KBCT KN KPKO KSTH KSUM KIDE KS KU KWBG KPAONZ KOMC KNUC KMDR KE KNNPMNUC KSTC KWAC KERG KACT KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSCI KGHG KHDP KVPR KICC KPRP KBIO KCIP KTLA KMPI KHIV KCSY KTRD KCFE KGIC KRVC KNAR KSPR KMRS KNPP KDRG KJUST KMCA KOCI KPWR KFIN KFSC KCMR KTER KRCM KIRC KSEO KNEI KCFC KSAF KSAC KR KG KCHG KAWK KGCC KPLS KREL KMFO KFTFN KTEX KCOM KO KLIG KDEMAF KBTR KRAD KGIT KVRP KPAI KICA KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHUM KREC KSEC KPIN KESS KDEV KWWMN KOM KBTS KCRS KWNM KRFD KVIR KMIG KDDG KRGY KMOC KIFR KID KAID KWMNCS KPOA KPAK KRIM KHSA KENV KOMS KWMM KNSD KX KCGC KCRCM KNUP
LE LY LI LH LTTE LG LO LAB LOG LT LABOR LU LA
MARR MNUC MX MOPS MO MCAP MASS MY MZ MTCRE MIL ML MPOS MP MG MD MK MA MI MOPPS MR MTS MLS MILI MAR MU MEPN MAPP MEPI MASC MEETINGS MERCOSUR MW MAS MTCR MT MCC MIK MARAD MAPS MV MILITARY MDC MEPP MEDIA MASSMNUC MUCN MC MTRE MRCRE MQADHAFI
NZ NU NP NO NATO NI NL NS NAFTA NDP NIPP NPT NE NZUS NH NR NA NSF NG NSG NC NEW NRR NATIONAL NT NASA NAR NV NSSP NK NATOPREL NPG NSFO NSC NORAD NW NGO NPA
OTRA OVIP OPCW OPDC OREP OAS OPIC OECD OFDP OPRC OIIP OEXC ODIP OSCE OIE OSCI OTR OMIG OSAC OBSP OFDA OFFICIALS OVP OIC OHUM ON OCII OES OPAD OCS
PGOV PREL PRAM PTER PREF PARM PHUM PINR PA PE PM PK PINS PMIL PROP PALESTINIAN PBTS PARMS PHSA POL PO PROG POLITICS PBIO PL PTERE PRGOV PORG PP PS PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PREFA PINF PNG POLICY PFOR PUNE PGOVLO PAO PHUMBA PSEPC PNAT PNR POLINT PGOVE PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PROV PBT PAK PGOC PY PLN PGIV PHUH PF PRL PG PHUS PTBS PU POV POLITICAL PARTIES PCUL PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PINL PAS PDOV PHUMPGOV POGOV PREO PEL PHUMPREL PCI PAHO PSI PAIGH POSTS
QA
RO RU RS RP RW RICE RM RSP RF RCMP RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL RUPREL RELATIONS REACTION RFE ROOD REGION REPORT RSO ROBERT
SENV SMIG SNAR SOCI SP SY SYRIA SZ SU SA SCUL SW SO SL SR SENVKGHG SF SI SEVN SARS SN SC SAN STEINBERG SG ST SIPDIS SNARIZ SNARN SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SYR SANC SWE SHI SEN SHUM SH SPCE SNARCS SIPRS SAARC SCRS
TSPL TF TU TRGY TS TBIO TT TK TPHY TI TSPA TERRORISM TH TIP TC TNGD TW TX TO TRSY TN TURKEY TL TV TD TZ TBID TINT TP TFIN TAGS TR THPY
UK UNGA UN UNCHC UNSC UV US UY USTR UNHRC UP UG USUN UNESCO USPS UZ USEU UNCHR USAID UNMIK UNHCR UE UNVIE UAE UNO UNDP UNAUS USOAS UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNEP UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNC UNPUOS UNCSD UNDC UNICEF USNC UNCND
VE VT VZ VTPREL VM VTIZ VAT VN VC VI VTEG
WTO WTRO WS WI WZ WHO WBG WB WWARD WHA WITH WIPO WTRQ WEU WMO WA WHTI WFP WMD
XF XM XG XT XZ XA XY XK XL XW XV XB XU XS XR XH XD XC XX XE XQ XTAG XI
YM YI YE YMCS
ZI ZU ZR ZB ZJ ZP ZEALAND ZN ZL ZA ZK ZF ZANU ZO ZOELLICK

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06SOFIA198, NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR"

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SOFIA198.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SOFIA198 | 2006-02-07 16:27 | 2011-05-13 19:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sofia
Appears in these articles: http://www.bivol.bg/wlvelchev.html http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2011/05/13/1089147_na_chetiri_ochi_s_boris_velchev/

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000198

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2011
    TAGS: PREL KCOR KCRM BU
    SUBJECT: NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR"

    REF: SOFIA 82

    Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, for reason 1.4 (b) & (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 3 meeting with the Ambassador,
    newly elected Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev made clear that
    despite pressure to produce immediate results for an EU
    audience, his main focus would be on building solid cases
    against OC figures and asserting control over a deeply
    dysfunctional prosecution service.  Velchev conceded the
    challenge of managing short-term expectations, but displayed
    impressive candor and resolve in outlining his priorities and
    the obstacles he expects to face once in office.  We should
    be prepared to support Velchev's reform of the prosecution
    service with technical assistance, however difficult a time
    he may have meeting the high expectations of Bulgaria's
    political elite and EU observers. END SUMMARY.

    -------------------------------------------
    DISARMING A 'TERRORIST' PROSECUTION SERVICE
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Velchev spoke frankly about the current state of
    affairs in Bulgaria's prosecution service, stating that from
    what he has learned in recent weeks, the situation is "even
    worse than I had imagined."  In his words, the prosecution
    service under current Chief Prosecutor Nikola Filchev has
    evolved into "some kind of terrorist organization" used to
    settle political and business scores, but totally incapable
    of fighting crime.  So entrenched is the outgoing Chief
    Prosecutor's influence that just three weeks shy of Velchev's
    inauguration, his future deputies refuse to speak with him,
    openly hinting at fears of repercussions from Filchev.
    Citing a lack of access to information, Velchev declined to
    provide a detailed "100-day plan," but outlined three
    potential sources of opposition to change: criminals,
    politicians, and the prosecutors themselves.  Velchev
    declared that he was "not afraid" of criminals, and "could
    find a way to deal with" politicians, but was most surprised
    and discouraged by resistance from within the prosecution
    service.  He indicated that his first moves as Chief
    Prosecutor would be to prepare for "some kind of a war" with
    corrupt incumbent prosecutors.

    ¶3. (C) Velchev did not expect this struggle to be easy.  Like
    the Chief Prosecutor, Deputy Chief Prosecutors are elected
    rather than appointed, and the current deputies have several
    years remaining in their terms.  In Velchev's evaluation, his
    only near-term chance to build a team he can trust will be to
    approach these deputies individually and convince them to
    resign.  As he attempts to assemble his team of trusted
    deputies, Velchev plans to simultaneously tackle the "easy
    work" of sending signals that political influence in
    prosecutions will no longer be tolerated, as well as the more
    challenging task of beginning to collect hard evidence on 15
    years of unchecked OC activity.  After a house-cleaning
    period of 3-4 months, Velchev hopes to start moving against
    high-profile OC and corruption targets.

    ¶4. (C) On the issue of Filchev's future, Velchev acknowledged
    the conventional wisdom that he will likely be sent abroad as
    ambassador to Belarus or Kazakhstan.  Filchev, who counts
    Belarussian President Lukashenko as a personal acquaintance
    and has made several official and unofficial trips to Minsk
    in the past year, has lobbied for such a post unabashedly.
    Velchev acknowledged that many aspects of his job would be
    easier if Filchev were physically out of the country and not
    "looking over my shoulder."  However, Velchev also worried
    out loud that as details of Filchev's activities became
    clear, pressure to investigate him might build, causing
    bilateral problems with the country of his posting.

    ---------------
    EU EXPECTATIONS
    ---------------

    ¶5. (C) Velchev acknowledged the importance of the EU's April
    monitoring report on Bulgaria's readiness for accession, but
    said he could not plan his priorities as Chief Prosecutor
    based on the European Commission's timeline.  The previous
    Chief Prosecutor's lack of progress in fighting corruption
    and solving over 30 high-profile OC-related killings has long
    been a concern of the EU and the U.S. Embassy alike.
    Although many OC figures in Bulgaria continue to operate in
    plain sight, progress toward speedy prosecutions will be
    hampered by years of shoddy evidence collection and a team
    whose previous lack of success indicates they are
    "incompetent, afraid, or corrupt."  In his meetings with EU
    officials, Velchev intends to stress the importance of real,
    rather than cosmetic reform, while holding out hope that a
    reformed, functioning prosecution service will eventually
    "give hope to people" that the war on organized crime and
    corruption can be won.  With regard to domestic public
    opinion, the future Chief Prosecutor mentioned the possible
    need to publicly reveal "the facts" regarding the state of
    the prosecution service in order to manage expectations and
    illustrate the scope of the challenges before him.

    ------------------
    BENDING THE RULES?
    ------------------

    ¶6. (C) Despite his respect for the rule of law, Velchev
    argued that bending rules of evidence and procedure was
    justified in the case of certain organized crime leaders.
    Referring again to the failure of Bulgarian prosecutors and
    law enforcement officials to collect more than "feeble
    evidence" against OC figures, Velchev announced his intention
    to pursue a "contract with the courts" - i.e., to appeal to
    judges to convict OC leaders based on evidence that otherwise
    might not pass muster.  He estimated that such an arrangement
    would be justified against the country's 20-30
    highest-ranking criminals, in whose cases adherence to
    "strict legal principles will be counterproductive."
    According to Velchev, Interior Minister Petkov had already
    enlisted his support in deploying this strategy in the
    high-profile prosecution of the Marinov brothers for
    attempted murders linked to organized crime.

    --------------
    THE U.S. ANGLE
    --------------

    ¶7. (C) Velchev said he appreciated the Ambassador's offer of
    USG support, and agreed with the Ambassador's statement that
    while the U.S. could help build the technical competency of
    prosecutors, the moral and ethical foundation for an
    effective prosecution service would have to come from the
    Bulgarian side.  Velchev stressed that while technical
    assistance would be necessary in time, the need to
    consolidate control of the prosecution service and initiate
    successful cases made USG cooperation in gathering and
    sharing information a more pressing priority.  Velchev cited
    Bulgarian law enforcement's lack of previous success against
    OC as justification for a lack of confidence in
    "professional" officials of the Ministry of Interior, raising
    the possibility that even USG information previously shared
    with GoB law enforcement counterparts might be "filtered"
    before making it to his desk.  In a request that highlighted
    his lack of support among the corps of prosecutors, Velchev
    asked Post's Resident Legal Advisor to suggest a shortlist of
    effective regional prosecutors we have worked with in other
    cities who could serve as potential allies in his reform
    efforts.

    -----
    LIBYA
    -----

    ¶8. (C) Despite working extensively on the issue of the
    Bulgarian medics in Libya in his role as the President's
    Legal Advisor, Velchev was not aware of the outcome of recent
    meetings in London.  He expressed guarded optimism about the
    prospects for an eventual favorable resolution of the case.
    Specifically, he predicted that the Libyan side would push
    for a solution "in the hardest possible way for us" - by
    re-convicting the nurses, sentencing them to death again, and
    finally pardoning them, perhaps by late summer.  He thanked
    the Ambassador for the USG's efforts on behalf of the nurses,
    and noted that the last six months had seen a notable
    increase in Libya's willingness to find a quick resolution to
    the crisis.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9. (C) Velchev is clearly open to cooperation with the U.S.:
    he specifically mentioned that some public expression of U.S.
    support for his efforts once in office would send a strong
    and positive message to the Bulgarian people and strengthen
    his position.  Velchev's outline of his concerns and
    priorities struck us as right on target: only a short-term
    focus on internal house-cleaning will make the longer-term
    war against organized criminals effective.  However, even if
    his attempts at meaningful reform are fully successful,
    results are likely to materialize in months, not days.  The
    high expectations of many observers for short-term results
    are unrealistic given the extent to which the "old way of
    doing business" is entrenched in the prosecution service.
    Nonetheless, after seven years of pervasive, systemic
    corruption under the outgoing prosecutor, Velchev offers the
    best chance for change Bulgaria could have hoped for, and we
    should be ready to offer all the support he can use.  END
    COMMENT.
    Beyrle

`