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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING560, PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING560 | 2009-03-04 12:55 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO9112
    OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #0560/01 0631255
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 041255Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2655
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000560

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2034
    TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
    SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: CHINA SEEKS CLARITY ON U.S. IRAN POLICY,
    OFFERS HELP IN TALKING TO IRAN

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
    Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  China is keen to understand the direction of
    U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and is
    willing to facilitate dialogue between the two sides,
    according to an MFA official.  China remains committed to the
    P5-plus-1 process but values its bilateral engagement with
    Iran.  Nonetheless, the Iran should not take for granted its
    economic relations with the PRC.  Despite PRC urging that
    Iran respond positively to American overtures, initial rounds
    of direct talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue would
    be difficult, the official suggested.  The official said that
    it is too soon to contemplate what actions should be taken
    should Iran develop a nuclear weapon.  An academic contact
    suggested that there is no "point of no return" on Iran's
    development of nuclear technology and that the Iranians
    believe they are in a strong bargaining position should some
    form of new diplomatic engagement emerge.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) PolOff discussed Iran-China relations and the
    international community's efforts to deal with the Iran
    nuclear issue with Deputy Director Xu Wei of MFA's West Asian
    Affairs Department Iran Division March 3.  PolOff also met
    with Li Guofu, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies
    at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International
    Studies (CIIS) February 27.

    China Seeks Clarity on Policy Review
    ------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) MFA's Xu Wei told PolOff that China was closely
    following the ongoing review of our Iran policy.  He said
    that China believed that the United States maintains a
    leadership role in the Middle East and that the results of
    the review will have an impact on Chinese engagement with the
    region.  He said that Beijing hoped for more clarity from the
    United States on policy adjustments resulting from this
    review, adding that China had been left to guess at how U.S.
    policy might change on a very important set of shared
    concerns.  In the meantime, Xu stressed, China's overall
    policy toward Iran had not changed, and China would continue
    to emphasize the importance of stability in the Middle East
    and its opposition to the development of nuclear weapons in
    the region.  Xu noted that additional clarity was especially
    important because China perceives several voices in the USG
    with different viewpoints on Iran speaking publicly on the
    issue.

    PRC Committed to P5-plus-1, Willing to Facilitate Talks
    --------------------------------------------- ----------

    ¶4. (C) Xu stressed the need to resolve the nuclear impasse
    through dialogue, and added that China remained committed to
    the P5-plus-1 process, as indicated in its support for the
    recent P5-plus-1 joint statement on Iran.  He said that China
    sincerely hoped that the outcome of our Iran policy review
    would be direct U.S.-Iran talks, and offered China's
    assistance in creating a channel for communication with the
    Iranians.

    Official: PRC Effective at Communicating with Tehran
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶5. (C) China and Iran continued to enjoy "good" relations in
    both the political and economic realms, Xu said, but this did
    not indicate that China supports all of Tehran's policies.
    He said that China had developed strong communication with
    the Iranian regime and used these channels to express to the
    Iranian leadership the concerns of the P5-plus-1 and the Gulf
    Cooperation Council over nuclear proliferation.  Beijing
    sought to persuade Iran to play a positive role in the
    region, and Chinese communication with Tehran to that end was
    effective, Xu said, adding that Iran's cooperation with the
    IAEA and the P5-plus-1, though limited, was due in part to
    Chinese intervention.  China had made clear to Iran that
    PRC-Iran economic cooperation should not be interpreted as an
    indication that China is not serious about concerns over
    nuclear proliferation or about working with the international
    community to deal with the nuclear issue.

    Talking to Iran Would Require Patience
    --------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Xu said that the U.S. policy review had generated
    debate within Iran over how to respond, especially over the
    possibility of direct dialogue.  China was urging the Iranian
    regime to respond positively to American overtures, but Xu
    said that based on his experience working on Iranian issues,
    he believed the leadership will find it difficult to show a

    BEIJING 00000560  002 OF 003

    positive attitude in public.  Xu counseled patience, saying
    that he was concerned that expectations in the United States
    on how Iran would respond may be too high.  Still, he said
    that the issues involved were too important for the United
    States to fail to press forward with dialogue even if any
    such discussions are difficult.

    "Too Soon" to Contemplate Weaponization Concerns
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶7. (C) Pressed on how China would respond if Iran developed
    nuclear weapons, Xu said that China took proliferation
    concerns seriously and opposed such a development.  However,
    he indicated that China did not yet see Iranian development
    of nuclear weapons as an immediate concern, noting that China
    was willing to "wait and see how far Iran can go" in
    developing nuclear technology before it would change its
    position.  He added that it was still too soon to contemplate
    what actions should be taken should the Iranians develop a
    nuclear weapon.

    ¶8. (C) CIIS's Li Guofu echoed this approach, saying that
    while China followed the Iranian nuclear program closely,
    China was not 100-percent convinced that Iran is pursuing
    nuclear weapons.  He indicated that observers who believe
    there is a "point of no return" in Iran's technical
    development of nuclear weapons were incorrect, because the
    problem was fundamentally a political one and not technical.
    He said that Iran was moving ahead with its nuclear program
    without a clear internal position on whether it would want to
    weaponize the technology, but added that Iran hoped to bring
    the technology to the point where it could produce a nuclear
    weapon in a short period of time.  He stressed, however, that
    in his view, a complicated series of steps remained between
    the current level of technology and the point of
    weaponization, including the necessity for a nuclear test.
    Such a test, he indicated, would have a profound effect on
    the political questions facing the international community.

    U.S. Needs to Offer "Something Real"
    ------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Li said that direct U.S. engagement with Iran would be
    complicated by the reality that there is little the United
    States can offer at present that would persuade Tehran to
    change its behavior.  As the regime's confidence in its own
    domestic legitimacy has grown, the value to the regime of
    normalized relations with the United States has decreased.
    Similarly, security guarantees would mean little to an
    Iranian Government convinced that it can already ensure its
    own security.  Li stressed that the U.S. side would need to
    be prepared to make concessions in any engagement, and would
    need to offer "something real."  Li sugested starting with
    demonstrating a position of "mutual respect."

    Iran Remains Suspicious of U.S. Intentions
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Based on his conversations with Iranian
    policy-makers, Li said, Iran remained suspicious of U.S.
    intentions.  He suggested that dialogue with Iran should have
    a "symbolic" beginning to avoid a false start.  He said that
    the two sides should first agree on principles not directly
    related to the nuclear issue.  He suggested that if the
    Iranians show a willingness to suspend uranium enrichment,
    the United States should be prepared to follow up immediately
    with new cooperation.  He stressed that the Iranian
    leadership regarded itself an important player on the
    regional issues that concern the United States, especially
    efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.

    IRI Official: Nuclear Weapon Would Be "Disastrous"
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶11. (C) Li reported that he was told by a Deputy Foreign
    Minister in Tehran that Iran considers itself a regional
    power, but understands that if Iran were to develop a nuclear
    weapon, the United States would likely deploy nuclear weapons
    to the Persian Gulf region, which would be "strategically
    disastrous" for Iran.  He said that the official had told him
    Iran wants to develop "nuclear capability" as a symbol of its
    status as a regional power.  The official told Li that Iran
    was nevertheless willing to open a dialogue with the United
    States.

    Other Challenges to Opening a Dialogue
    --------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Li said that the atmosphere had improved for
    developing new engagement with Iran, but obstacles remained.

    BEIJING 00000560  003 OF 003

    The regime in Tehran continued to see opportunities for
    changing Iran's engagement with the world under the new U.S.
    administration, and there was debate in Iran on how best to
    respond.  Serious debate among the Iranian people on the need
    for a nuclear program had yet to take place, Li stressed,
    although the notion of weaponizing the results of the nuclear
    program continued to generate debate among the Iranian
    leadership.  Li stressed that the Iranian leadership
    continued to dismiss the notion of U.S. military action in
    response to its ongoing nuclear development and was convinced
    that suspension of uranium enrichment is not necessary for
    starting a "new process" with the United States.

    Election Politics also a Factor
    -------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) Li said that this year's presidential election in
    Iran would be an important factor in the chances for
    meaningful talks with the United States.  Noting that the
    candidacy of former President Khatami posed the first real
    challenge of the campaign to incumbent President Ahmadinejad,
    Li stressed that Khatami would not have been able to announce
    his candidacy without explicit approval from Supreme Leader
    Ayatollah Khamenei.  Unlike previous elections, other
    reformist candidates had since dropped out of the campaign,
    Li said, improving Khatami's chances.  Still, the hard-liners
    had acted to overcome their internal divisions in light of
    the Khatami candidacy, and Ahmadinejad remained "likely" to
    be re-elected.  Li argued that the top-level blessing of the
    Khatami candidacy indicated that the Supreme Leader deems
    Khatami reliable enough and would not expect bold reforms
    even if Khatami were elected.  In the meantime, Li suggested,
    Ahmadinejad might feel the need to demonstrate his hard-line
    credentials in the run-up to the June election.

    PRC to Iran: Don't Take Economic Cooperation for Granted
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶14. (C) Li said that China continued to value development of
    its economic ties with Iran in order to maintain economic
    growth.  He noted that Chinese officials told their Iranian
    counterparts that they are frustrated with the lack of
    progress on the nuclear issue, progress which would create a
    foundation for new investment in the energy sector.
    According to Li, to prod the Iranians to show progress on the
    nuclear issue, the Chinese had warned them not to take
    China's economic interests in Iran for granted.  Furthermore,
    China's dependence on Iranian energy is decreasing given
    recent improvements in Sino-Saudi relations (as evidenced by
    President Hu's recent travel there) and their potential to
    bring about increased Chinese access to Saudi energy
    supplies.

    PICCUTA

`