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### Viewing cable 07TOKYO2690, ABE-PUTIN G-8 SUMMIT: RUSSIA AGREES TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07TOKYO2690 | 2007-06-14 08:12 | 2011-05-10 05:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo

`

    VZCZCXRO4839
    OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
    DE RUEHKO #2690/01 1650812
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 140812Z JUN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4494
    INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7420
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1716
    RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 3478
    RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 1539
    RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 3962
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    RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 2385
    RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG PRIORITY 0499
    RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
    RUAGAAA/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4602
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002690

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET JA RU
    SUBJECT: ABE-PUTIN G-8 SUMMIT: RUSSIA AGREES TO
    ""ACCELERATE"" TALKS ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES

    REF: TOKYO 01267

    Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reasons 1.4 (B) (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  During their June 7 summit, PM Abe and
    President Putin agreed not to shelve the Northern Territories
    issue, and Putin promised to instruct his deputies to
    ""accelerate"" the negotiations, according to MOFA Russian
    Division Director Muto.  On North Korea, Putin expressed
    frustration at what he claimed was a lack of transparency by
    the U.S. in the Six-Party process, but showed greater
    understanding of Kim Jong-il's complex nature and the
    abduction issue.  Russia has begun to express more interest
    in the Asia-Pacific region, Muto noted, a move stoked by
    new-found Kremlin concerns about the rise of China.  Japan is
    prepared to assist Russian integration into the region, but
    only if Moscow acts in a ""transparent"" and ""helpful"" manner
    that includes both public and private entities.  Muto
    specifically asked Embassy Tokyo to convey the message that
    the U.S. ""can play a role"" in furthering this process.  End
    Summary.

    ----------------
    Abe-Putin Summit
    ----------------

    ¶2. (C) European Affairs Bureau Russian Division Director
    Akira Muto briefed Embassy Tokyo Deputy Political Chief June
    12 on recent developments in Japan-Russia relations,
    including PM Shinzo Abe's June 7 meeting with Russian
    President Putin on the margins of the G-8 Summit.  Muto
    offered that Japan used the summit opportunity to re-vitalize
    an exchange in Russia-Japan dialogue.  Tokyo officials were
    pleasantly surprised that Putin failed to say anything
    negative about bilateral relations with Japan.  Putin,
    referring to the 2003 Japan-Russia six-part action plan, said
    that relations were progressing well in five of the six
    fields - the sixth being conclusion of a peace treaty.

    ¶3. (C) The two leaders agreed that they would not shelve the
    Northern Territories issue, Muto related.  Putin, according
    to Muto, said he was ready to talk, wanted to remove any
    obstacles to settlement, and hoped to avoid stagnation in the
    discussions.  Muto asserted that Putin promised to instruct
    his deputies to ""accelerate"" the negotiations.  Abe asked for
    a clarification of Russia's plans to ""introduce the
    reciprocity principle"" in restricting foreign vessels from
    fishing in Russian territorial waters; Putin indicated that
    it would be forthcoming.  Muto surmised this might mean that
    Moscow would begin to charge fishing vessels to fish in
    domestic waters - a practice similar to that done for
    aircraft crossing Russian Siberian/Arctic air space.

    ¶4. (C) Japan offered a new proposal to the Russians entitled
    ""Initiative for the Strengthening Japan-Russia Cooperation in
    the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia"" (e-mailed to EAP/J)
    which highlights 8 areas for potential cooperation: energy,
    transportation, information/communication, environment,
    security, health/medicine, promotion of trade and investment,
    and Japan-Russian exchanges.

    -----------
    North Korea
    -----------

    ¶5. (C) According to Muto, who attended the G-8 and the
    Russian summit meeting, Putin attempted to discuss the Banco
    Delta Asia (BDA) issue at the G-8 plenary session, but was
    quickly asked by President Bush not to raise the topic in a
    public fashion before other G-8 members.  Putin, Muto
    surmised, raised the issue as a way of highlighting Russian
    frustration at what it claimed is a lack of transparency by

    TOKYO 00002690  002 OF 003

    the U.S. in the Six-Party negotiations.  Putin reportedly
    asked the President to provide more information, particularly
    about intentions to use a Russian bank to transfer BDA funds.

    ¶6. (C) Putin appeared to hold a ""different attitude"" toward
    the DPRK during the G-8 session, Muto observed.  Putin
    reportedly said that he now understood how complex Kim
    Jong-il was, and expressed a fuller understanding of the
    abduction issue.  Japanese officials assessed that Putin's
    ""threat recognition"" concerning North Korea had not changed
    substantially, but that his understanding of the DPRK's
    impact on the region had shifted.  Muto stated that Russia's
    original goal of obtaining as much benefit from the Six-Party
    process as possible appeared to have changed as well in favor
    of a more helpful posture.

    ¶7. (C) Japan did not attempt to raise the abduction issue at
    the bilateral because of time constraints, according to Muto.
     Describing Japan's prior conversations on the issue, he
    noted that the Russians have said they want to be helpful on
    the abduction issue, but ""don't count on us"" to resolve the
    problem.  Moscow did not want the abduction issue to restrict
    Russia's room for maneuver with the DPRK.

    ---------------------------------------------
    Reassessing Russia,s Role in the Asia-Pacific
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶8.  (C) Russia has begun to express more interest in the
    Asia-Pacific region, according to Muto.  The implications of
    this new-found interest would not be limited to bilateral
    affairs but would extend throughout the region.  According to
    Muto, Russia began to re-evaluate Japanese bilateral ties
    ""early last year"" when a new Moscow assessment raised Kremlin
    concerns about the growth of China.  This re-examination
    forced Russia, in Muto's view, to view Japan-Russia relations
    in a security context, rather than as simply an economic one,
    as Moscow has previously done.  Russia's new perspective on
    the altered security environment in East Asia acted as the
    primary incentive behind Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's
    February 27-28 Tokyo visit (reftel), FM Aso's May 3
    discussion with FM Lavrov, and the DFM Denisov-VFM Yachi
    strategic dialogue on June 3.  Moscow also expressed concern
    about the PRC's ASAT test, and environmental issues such as
    the chemical pollution of the Amur River.

    ¶9. (C) Russia also appeared to be motivated by concerns about
    oil resources, Muto claimed.  Denisov told his Japan
    interlocutors that Moscow placed a high priority on
    increasing the percentage of Russia's oil exports to Asia
    from 3% to 30%, and to shift some production from West to
    East Siberia by 2020.

    ------------------
    Responsible Russia
    ------------------

    ¶10. (C) Muto said that Japan wants to see a responsible
    Russia integrated into the Asia-Pacific region.  Tokyo was
    prepared to assist Russian development in the region, but
    only if Moscow acted in a ""transparent"" and ""helpful"" manner.
     Japanese officials would not provide direct investment in
    Russia, but would target assistance at areas  which the
    private sector had already identified as profitable.  Muto
    noted, by way of example, Japanese plans to take up tenders
    being offered by firms associated with Sakhalin 1.

    --------------------
    Areas of Cooperation
    --------------------

    ¶11. (C) Cooperation in the field of high-speed rail
    transportation, Muto observed, provided another possible

    TOKYO 00002690  003 OF 003

    field of cooperation.  The Russians seemed interested in
    obtaining Japanese technology as Moscow considered
    establishing rail links between Moscow-St. Petersburg;
    Moscow-Sochi; Moscow-Nizhniy-Novgorod; and
    Khabarozsk-Vladivostok.  Japanese telecommunications company
    KDDI hoped to place optical fiber lines between Vladivostok
    and Naoetsu, Japan, a step that would decrease internet
    response times for Japanese internet users from the current
    0.30 seconds (via trans-Pacific lines to the U.S.), to 0.18
    seconds using direct Russia-Japan links.  That tiny
    difference loomed large for industries conducting numerous
    financial transactions, he said.  Muto, employing
    good-natured needling, warned the KDDI plans would negatively
    affect its U.S. competitors.

    ------------------
    Russia-China Wedge
    ------------------

    ¶12. (C) Muto asked the Deputy Political Chief to communicate
    to Washington that Japan was attempting to involve Russia in
    a constructive manner in the Asia-Pacific region.  Failure to
    encourage Moscow's integration increased the risk that Moscow
    and Beijing might forge a closer strategic partnership - one
    that could provide unconstructive proposals.  Japan hoped to
    ""drive a wedge between Russia and China,"" Muto noted.

    ¶13. (C) Muto also requested the message be conveyed to
    Washington that the Japanese government believes the U.S.
    ""can play a role"" in promoting Moscow's desire to become more
    involved in the region.  Japan's on-going program of
    financing the dismantlement of retired Russian strategic
    nuclear submarines, Muto said, offered opportunities on the
    security and environmental front.  The main point was that
    the U.S. and Japan should avoid the perception that the two
    countries were ""ganging up"" on Russia, but were instead
    offering to cooperate.  Japan was interested in the
    environment impact of the dismantlement work and would be
    glad to ""divide the labor.""
    SCHIEFFER

`