Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12559 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12 2011/05/13

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AF ASEC AMBASSADOR AS AJ AM AORC AEMR ASEAN AFFAIRS AFIN AMGT AODE APEC AE ABLD ACBAQ APECO AFSI AFSN AY AO ABUD AG AC APER AU AMED ATRN ADPM ADCO ASIG AL ASUP ARF AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE ACOA AADP ASCH AA AFU AN AID ALOW AINF AMG AIT ANET AGAO AROC ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AORL AMCHAMS ACS APCS ADANA AECL ACAO AORG AGR ACABQ AGMT AX AMEX ADM AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN
BR BK BL BA BO BRUSSELS BM BEXP BU BG BB BTIO BF BD BBSR BIDEN BX BP BE BH BT BY BILAT BWC BN BMGT BTIU BC
CI CU CO CS CVIS CA CJAN CARICOM CB CASC CE CH CN CONDOLEEZZA CMGT CWC CW CG CACS CY CPAS CFED CSW CIDA CIC CITT CBW CONS CD CLINTON CHR CACM CDB COE CDG CDC CAN CR CF CT CODEL CJUS CTM CM CLMT CBC COUNTERTERRORISM CAPC CAC COUNTER CV CL CBSA CNARC CEUDA COM CROS CIA CARSON COPUOS CTR CICTE COUNTRY CBE CIS CKGR CVR CITEL CLEARANCE
DR DISENGAGEMENT DE DJ DA DOMESTIC DEA DOD DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE DHS DEAX DO DAO DCM DK DPRK DEPT
ECA EU ENRG EPET ETTC ETRD ELN ELAB EC EFIN ECON EFIS ELTN EAGR EIND EWWT EMIN EINV EAID EG EUN ECPS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENGR ENIV ECIN EAIR EI ECUN EFTA ENGY ECONOMICS ES ELECTIONS EN EIAR ET EINDETRD EUR EZ EREL ER ECONEFIN EINT EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EK EPA ENVR EINVETC ETRC ENVI ECONCS ECONOMIC EXTERNAL EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA ESA ECINECONCS EAIG ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS EUREM ESENV ETRN ENNP EFINECONCS EEPET ENERG EUC EUNCH EXIM ERD ERNG EINVEFIN ETC EAP ECONOMY EINN EXBS
FAO FR FI FTAA FAC FOI FREEDOM FJ FMLN FARC FDA FTA FBI FM FO FOREIGN FISO FOR FAS FINR FINANCE
GM GG GZ GAZA GR GOI GANGS GV GCC GY GT GA GAERC GOV GE GH GLOBAL GTIP GERARD GTMO GL GF
HK HR HA HURI HO HU HILLARY HUMAN HUMOR HSTC HYMPSK HEBRON HI
IIP IC IR IN IAEA IS IT IMF IBRD IZ IWC ISRAELI INTERPOL IO ISLAMISTS ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI ILO IPR IQ IV IRS INRB ICAO IMO ID IZPREL IRAJ ICTY ICRC IAHRC ITF INR IGAD ILC ITU IF ITPHUM IL INTERNAL ISRAEL IACI ICJ ITRA INMARSAT ICTR IA IEFIN INTELSAT IBET INRA INRO IDP INDO IRC IDA ITPGOV IEA
JA JP JO JAMES JOSEPH JM JUS JOHN JOHNNIE
KPAO KCRM KNNP KCOR KIRF KISL KSCA KDEM KDEMAF KZ KBTR KUNR KMDR KRVC KPAL KTIA KV KJUS KOMC KTFN KWBG KTIP KMPI KSUM KIRC KE KIPR KWMN KFRD KSEP KN KOLY KPKO KIDE KMRS KFLU KSAF KGIC KRAD KU KHLS KOCI KSTH KS KGHG KAWC KICC KG KSPR KPRP KDRG KGIT KVPR KGCC KSEO KMCA KSTC KBIO KHIV KBCT KPAI KICA KTDB KACT KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHUM KFLO KREC KSEC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPIN KCOM KESS KDEV KCFE KNUC KAWK KPLS KWWMN KCIP KPRV KHDP KTEX KFIN KOM KBTS KCRS KNPP KWNM KRFD KVIR KLIG KMIG KDDG KRGY KFSC KR KMOC KPAONZ KNAR KIFR KCGC KID KSAC KAID KNSD KWMNCS KCMR KO KNEI KPOA KTER KOMS KPAK KTBT KWMM KWAC KHSA KX KMFO KPWR KRIM KSCI KVRP KENV KCRCM KNUP KNNPMNUC KERG KTLA KCSY KTRD KJUST KRCM KCFC KCHG KREL KFTFN
LY LTTE LE LH LO LI LG LT LU LABOR LA LAB LOG
MARR MX MOPS MNUC MZ MASS MEETINGS MG MW MIL MTCRE MCAP MAS MO MTCR MD MK MP MY MR MT MCC MIK MU ML MARAD MA MAPS MV MERCOSUR MASC MPOS MILITARY MDC MQADHAFI MEPP MRCRE MEDIA MAPP MTRE MEPN MI MC MUCN MAR MASSMNUC MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPI
NATO NL NZ NI NU NO NPT NRR NA NATIONAL NIPP NAFTA NT NS NE NASA NSF NP NAR NV NORAD NG NSSP NW NK NDP NR NATOPREL NEW NPA NPG NSG NSFO NGO NSC NH NZUS NC
OFDA OTRA OPRC OIIP OAS OPDC OVIP OEXC OPIC OSCE OPCW OREP OFFICIALS ODIP OECD OMIG OFDP OBSP OIE OSCI OES OPAD OVP OHUM OIC ON OCII OCS OTR OSAC
PREL PGOV PINR PTER PARM PHUM PA PBTS PINS PM PREF PHSA PK POL PL PE PFOR PALESTINIAN PUNE PGOVLO PAO POLITICS PO PHUMBA PSEPC PNAT PNR PROP POLINT PGOVE PROG PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PROV PSOE PU POGOV PMIL PINL PHUMPREL PGIV PBT PAK PP PGOC PY PLN PMAR PHUH PBIO PF PRL PG PHUS PTBS PRAM POV PEL PAS POLICY PGGV POLITICAL PARTIES PCUL PSA PDOV PCI PREO PAHO PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PHUMPGOV PREFA PSI PAIGH POSTS PARMS PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PEPR PPA PINT PRELP PINF PNG
QA
RU RS RICE RW RCMP RO RFE RP RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT REGION RUPREL RF RELATIONS RM REACTION ROOD REPORT RSO RSP
SNAR SENV SOCI SCUL SY SR SU SO SP SA SZ SF SMIG SW SIPDIS STEINBERG SN SNARIZ SG SNARN SSA SK SI SPCVIS SOFA SC SL SARS SNARCS SIPRS SYR SANC SEVN SWE SHI SEN SHUM SYRIA SH SPCE SAARC SCRS SENVKGHG SAN ST
TW TRGY TU TPHY TBIO TX TN TSPL TC TZ TSPA TS TF TI TIP TH TINT TNGD TP TD TFIN TAGS TK TL TV TT TERRORISM TR THPY TO TRSY TURKEY TBID
UK UP US UNSC UNHCR USEU UNGA UG UY UNESCO UN USTR USOAS UZ UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNEP UNIDROIT UNHRC UNDESCO UNMIK UNDP UNC UNO UNAUS UV UNICEF UNCHR UNDC UNCHC UNPUOS USUN USNC UNCSD UNCND USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE
VM VE VZ VT VN VTPREL VTIZ VAT VC VTEG VI
WITH WI WHO WTRO WIPO WTO WS WTRQ WWARD WHTI WEU WZ WHA WMD WMO WA WBG WFP WB
XF XG XT XK XM XR XZ XA XV XL XH XE XB XU XW XQ XS XX XY XD XC XI XTAG
YM YI YMCS YE
ZP ZR ZB ZI ZA ZK ZU ZOELLICK ZF ZO ZANU ZEALAND ZL ZJ ZN

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07TELAVIV3385, PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07TELAVIV3385.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07TELAVIV3385 | 2007-11-29 07:07 | 2011-02-03 21:30 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO8518
    PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHTV #3385/01 3330707
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 290707Z NOV 07
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4363
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RHEBAAA/USDOE WASHDC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 003385

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017
    TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PTER IR IS
    SUBJECT: PDAS MCNERNEY'S OCTOBER 24 MEETING AT THE ISRAELI
    MFA ON IRAN: THE INTERNAL SITUATION (CABLE 1 OF 5)

    Classified By: Marc J. Sievers, Political Counselor.
    Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (S) In an October 24 meeting at the MFA, an Israeli
    government interagency team led by MFA Deputy Director
    General (Strategic Affairs) Miriam Ziv shared its assessment
    of the internal situation in Iran with a U.S. team led by ISN
    PDAS Patricia McNerney. The Israeli side made the following
    points: (A) it is not clear what the replacement of Iranian
    nuclear negotiator Larijani means; (B) sanctions are having
    an effect in Iran, and increasing pressure on Ahmadinejad and
    his supporters; and (C) Ahmadinejad is facing obstacles in
    his effort to garner support from leaders and marginalized
    peoples in Latin America, Asia and other parts of the
    developing world. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (S) On October 24, ISN PDAS Patricia McNerney, ISN/RA
    Middle East Team Leader Kurt Kessler, ISN/CPI Director Tony
    Foley, and NEA Iran Desk Officer Sean Misko and embassy
    POL-MIL officer met at the Israeli MFA with an interagency
    team led by MFA DDG for Strategic Affairs, Miriam Ziv, to
    exchange information on Iran and its nuclear program. The
    Israeli team included representatives from the MFA, the Prime
    Minister's office, Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI), and
    the Mossad. This is the first of three reporting cables
    reporting on the discussions at the MFA, and concerns the
    internal situation in Iran and the effects of sanctions.
    Septels will review discussions in the MFA on the
    technological stage of Iran's nuclear program, and ongoing
    and future counter-terror finance efforts, as well as
    discussions with Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)
    officials about Iran and the IAEA.

    ¶3. (S) Ambassador Ziv opened the meeting by noting that she
    had met with four of the P-5 ambassadors (Russia, France, UK,
    China) in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
    She was, she said, disturbed to learn that there was no
    activity going on in New York with respect to a third UNSC
    sanctions resolution on Iran.

    -----------------------------------------
    UNCLEAR WHAT LARIJANI'S REPLACEMENT MEANS
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶4. (S) An official from the MFA's Center for Strategic
    Research (the equivalent of State's INR Bureau) then provided
    his analysis of Iran's change in its nuclear negotiator. He
    said that the change left Israel with more questions than
    answers. Iran, nevertheless, remains able to convey to the
    rest of the world that it is cooperating, as the new
    negotiator had already met with EU High Represenative Javier
    Solana. In the MFA's view, Iran is "going through the
    motions" to suggest that everything is fine. Iran's new
    negotiator reportedly stated that negotiations with Solana
    would continue into November. Larijani's resignation was a
    surprise for Israel. There appears to be no urgency on the
    Iranian side. The Iranians know that nothing will happen
    until the beginning of next year. Negotiations with Iran in
    the IAEA context will go on as if nothing had happened.

    ¶5. (S) The MFA official suggested that the change in
    negotiators may have been connected with Russian President
    Putin's October 15-17 visit to Iran to attend the Caspian
    Summit. The MFA official claimed that Iran expected that
    Putin would "bring something good with him." Instead, Putin
    met with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and only proposed
    supplying power plants to Iran, and did not discuss
    enrichment. He observed that there was no statement about
    the Bushehr reactor. Ziv recalled that the Russian
    ambassador to the UN had told her before PM Olmert's visit to
    Russia that Putin would tell Olmert that Russia would not
    supply Iran with fuel for the Bushehr reactor. PM Olmert
    subsequently declared in public that the Russians would not
    provide the fuel for the Bushehr reactor. MFA
    Nonproliferation and Counterterrorism Department Deputy
    Director Jonathan Miller added that a Russian embassy
    official told him that the contracts over Bushehr need to be
    "re-done," that this will take a long time, and that fuel
    supply is not even "on the table" for now. The Mossad
    representative said that the Russians have decided to supply
    fuel, but are in a "wait-and-see" mode, and that it will not
    happen for a few months. An IDI officer said that work on

    TEL AVIV 00003385 002 OF 003

    the contracts continues, and that the IAEA is involved in the
    arrangements, such as the sealing of the fuel.

    ¶6. (S) Returning to Larijani's resignation, the MFA official
    said that it may be part of an escalating power struggle
    among Iran's conservative elites. The signals it sends are
    unclear. The MFA noted that Jalili is reportedly a close
    associate and supporter of Ahmadinejad. While Ahmadinejad
    does not control the Supreme Council for National Security
    (SCNS), the appointment of Jalili as SCNS secretary -- a
    crucial position -- was significant and appeared to reflect
    fallout in the relationship between Ahmadinejad and Larijani.
    As to the question, "Why Jalili?" the MFA official noted
    that he is inexperienced and young, and wondered out loud
    whether Jalili is just a front man. He noted that several
    high-ranking conservatives, including former Iranian FM
    Veleyati, have criticized the change. Former Iranian
    President Rafsanjani's brother also criticized Larijani's
    removal. The MFA official wondered whether it meant that
    Rafsanjani is coming out of silence and positioning himself
    for a comeback. The MFA official continued by suggesting
    that Ahmadinejad was dissatisfied that Larijani had been
    appointed as Iran's nuclear negotiator. Larijani had
    unsuccessfully run against Ahmadinejad in the 2005
    presidential elections, and was appointed by Iran's Supreme
    Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. He also observed that there were
    conflicting rumors -- one, that Larijani remains in the
    system, with Jalili merely serving as a go-between; and the
    other, that Larijani and his entire team have been removed.

    ¶7. (S) Discussion then led to the view that Iran's Supreme
    Leader is strengthening Ahmadinejad, and that the hard-line
    conservatives are gaining power at the expense of
    traditionalists like Larijani. Jalili seems to be more of a
    revolutionary, like Ahmadinejad. The view also emerged that
    external factors appear to be the primary driver on the Iran
    nuclear issue. The resignation may simply reflect a change
    in tactics as opposed to policy. All agreed that Jalili
    would probably be more difficult to negotiate with than
    Larijani.

    --------------------------------------
    SANCTIONS ARE HAVING AN EFFECT IN IRAN
    --------------------------------------

    ¶8. (S) The MFA official then observed that it appears that
    some of Iran's assumptions have been shaken. First, two
    Chapter VII UNSC sanctions resolutions have been passed
    unanimously. Secondly, internal opposition to Ahmadinejad's
    hard-line faction appears to feel more empowered, as
    demonstrated by more vocal criticism of Ahmadinejad's
    policies. Indeed, the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1737 led
    to a flood of public criticism of Ahmadinejad. The MFA
    official assessed that the sustained criticism of
    Ahmadinejad's handling of the economy suggests that sanctions
    are working in Iran. Ahmadinejad had recently run into
    protests at two universities, and appears to be losing his
    popularity among Iran's lower class. Anecdotal information
    shows that the public is still dissatisfied with the fuel
    rationing, especially as cheap fuel was a promise of the
    Revolution, and one of Ahmadinejad's election promises. The
    MFA official assessed that the fuel rationing was the result
    of long-standing USG sanctions and fears within the regime
    that the West would attempt to restrict Iran's import of
    refined petroleum. (COMMENT: This differs from the USG
    assessment that Iran's fuel rationing program is the result
    of Iran's limited domestic refining capacity. END COMMENT.)

    ¶9. (S) The MFA official said that sanctions are also
    increasing the risk premium associated with investments in
    Iran. Ahmadinejad had recently dismissed the head of Iran's
    Central Bank, who was not appointed by Ahmadinejad, as well
    as the oil minister. The MFA official assessed that the high
    profile personnel changes may be a response to public
    criticism of Ahmadinejad's handling of the economy. The
    official added that Ahmadinejad believes he should do "more
    of the same" on the economy, even if it does not work.
    Despite these challenges, Israeli analysts were originally of
    the view that Ahmadinejad was losing power. His ability to
    shuffle personnel and insert supporters into high-level
    positions in key ministries, however, suggests that
    Ahmadinejad may be adapting and learning how to cope.

    ¶10. (S) The Mossad official said that Iran's middle class and
    bazaar merchants are running into real problems at Iran's
    banks. Even simple transactions through Dubai carry an

    TEL AVIV 00003385 003 OF 003

    increased risk premium between 20-40 percent. The Israeli
    MFA official also noted that problems are cropping up in
    Iran's investment sector, with many companies having doubts
    which in turn have led to hesitation in doing business.
    There is an increasing view among the bazaaris that something
    must be done about the sanctions. As a result, Iran is
    forced to look for new partners in Europe and Asia.

    ¶11. (S) The IDI officer observed that Ahmadinejad made a huge
    mistake when he lowered interest rates below the rate of
    inflation. He cautioned, however, that Ahmadinejad could
    survive. He could say that his ministers have made mistakes,
    dismiss them, and continue with his own policies.

    ¶12. (S) Regarding sanctions, the IDI officer observed that
    half a year later, they are having a psychological effect
    across the board. Advisors on the Iranian economy, in
    addition to bankers, are now feeling the pressure. Even the
    Supreme Leader might see problems and decide that something
    must be done. At the same time, Ahmadinejad disputes this.
    He feigns confidence by asserting that the Hidden Imam will
    return and solve all of Iran's problems.

    --------------------------------------------- -------
    AHMADINEJAD FINDING IT HARD TO GARNER SUPPORT ABROAD
    --------------------------------------------- -------

    ¶13. (S) Regarding Ahmadinejad's efforts to build alliances
    with leaders in Latin America and Asia, the MFA official said
    that he has reached out to the developing world through his
    outlandish statements on the Holocaust. He is viewed as a
    hero by some in the Arab world, and leftists in Latin America
    support him. The problem for Ahmadinejad, the official
    observed, is that the friction between the Sunnis and Shia is
    at its height due to Iraq. Leaders of the Arab world are
    also worried that Hizballah might steal the show in Lebanon.
    Ahmadinejad is working hard but is facing obstacles in
    developing diplomatic support for his stance. The IDI
    officer said that Ahmadinejad is having problems getting
    support from "people in the street" in Latin America. Those
    people do not share his comparison of the Iranian Revolution
    and their revolutions. According to the MFA official, the
    Iranian Government recently hosted a conference in Tehran
    aimed at comparing the Latin American and Iranian
    revolutions. One of the invited guests was Che Guevara's
    daughter, who used her speech to criticize the Iranian
    Revolution and make clear that her father's ideas were very
    different from those propagated by Iran's revolutionary
    mullahs. Some of the Latin American leaders are also wary of
    his attempts to reach out to their peoples. They see it as a
    challenge to their power. The IDI officer said Israel is
    concerned about "opaque Hizballah / Al Qods Force activity"
    in Latin America. He did not elaborate.

    ¶14. (S) Discussion then turned to public diplomacy, and the
    success Israel has had with its Farsi-language Radio Israel
    broadcasts into Iran. The MFA official said that pressure is
    increasing on Tehran, and that this is evidenced by more
    criticism of the regime on blog sites, and the expansion of
    criticism into new areas.

    ¶15. (U) This cable has not been reviewed by ISN PDAS Patricia
    McNerney.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    MORENO

`