Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR ASEC AF AMBASSADOR AS AJ AM AORC AEMR ASEAN AFFAIRS AFIN AMGT AODE APEC AE ABLD ACBAQ APECO AFSI AFSN AY AO ABUD AG AC APER AU AMED ATRN ADPM ADCO ASIG AL ASUP ARF AUC ASEX AGAO AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AIT AADP ASCH AA ANET AROC AFU AN AID ALOW ACOA AINF AMG AMCHAMS AORL ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ACS APCS ADANA AECL ACAO AORG AGR ACABQ AGMT AX AMEX ADM AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN
BR BK BL BA BO BRUSSELS BM BEXP BU BG BB BTIO BF BD BBSR BIDEN BX BP BE BH BT BY BMGT BWC BTIU BN BILAT BC
CO CI CU CS CVIS CA CJAN CARICOM CB CASC CE CH CN CONDOLEEZZA CMGT CWC CW CG CACS CY CPAS CFED CSW CIDA CIC CITT CBW CONS CD CLINTON CHR CACM CDB COE CDG CDC CR CAN CF CODEL CJUS CTM CM CLMT CBC CT CL CBSA COUNTERTERRORISM CEUDA COM CTR CROS CAPC CAC COUNTER CV CIA CARSON COPUOS CNARC CICTE COUNTRY CBE CIS CKGR CVR CITEL CLEARANCE
DR DISENGAGEMENT DE DJ DA DOMESTIC DEA DOD DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE DHS DEAX DO DAO DCM DK DPRK DEPT
ECA EU ENRG EPET ETTC ETRD ELN ELAB EC EFIN ECON EFIS ELTN EAGR EIND EWWT EMIN EINV EAID EG EUN ECPS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENIV ENGR ECIN EAIR EI ECUN EFTA ENGY ECONOMICS ES ELECTIONS EN EIAR ET EINDETRD EUR EZ EREL ER EINT ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EK EPA ENVR ETRDECONWTOCS EINVETC ECONCS ECONOMIC EUC ENERG EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA EXTERNAL EUNCH ESA ECINECONCS EUREM ESENV ETRC ENVI EAIG EXIM ETRO ETRN ENNP EFINECONCS EEPET ERNG EINVEFIN ERD ETC EAP ECONOMY EINN EXBS
FR FI FTAA FAC FOI FREEDOM FJ FMLN FARC FDA FTA FBI FAO FM FO FOREIGN FISO FOR FAS FINR FINANCE
GM GG GZ GAZA GR GOI GANGS GV GCC GY GT GA GAERC GOV GE GH GLOBAL GTIP GERARD GTMO GL GF
HK HR HA HURI HO HU HILLARY HUMAN HSTC HUMOR HEBRON HYMPSK HI
IIP IC IR IN IAEA IS IT IMF IBRD IZ IWC ISRAELI INTERPOL IO ISLAMISTS ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI ILO IPR IQ IV IRS INRB ICAO IMO ID IAHRC IZPREL IRAJ ICTY ICRC ILC ITF ICJ ITU IF ITPHUM IL ISRAEL IACI ITRA INMARSAT IA ICTR IBET INR IGAD INRA INRO IRC IDP IDA INDO IEFIN INTELSAT INTERNAL ITPGOV IEA
JA JP JO JAMES JOSEPH JM JOHN JUS JOHNNIE
KPAO KCRM KNNP KCOR KIRF KISL KSCA KDEM KDEMAF KZ KMDR KRVC KPAL KTIA KV KJUS KOMC KTFN KWBG KTIP KMPI KSUM KIRC KE KIPR KWMN KFRD KSEP KN KOLY KCFE KPKO KIDE KMRS KFLU KSAF KGIC KRAD KU KHLS KOCI KSTH KUNR KS KGHG KAWC KBTR KICC KG KPLS KSPR KPRP KDRG KNSD KGIT KVPR KGCC KSEO KMCA KSTC KFSC KBIO KHIV KBCT KPAI KICA KTDB KACT KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHUM KFLO KREC KSEC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPIN KCOM KESS KDEV KNAR KNUC KPWR KAWK KWWMN KWMNCS KCIP KPRV KHDP KOM KBTS KCRS KNPP KWNM KRFD KVIR KLIG KTEX KDDG KRGY KR KMOC KPAONZ KCMR KO KIFR KHSA KAID KSCI KPAK KCGC KID KPOA KMFO KFIN KTBT KWMM KX KSAC KVRP KRIM KENV KNEI KTER KWAC KOMS KCRCM KNUP KMIG KNNPMNUC KERG KTLA KCSY KTRD KJUST KRCM KCFC KCHG KREL KFTFN
LY LTTE LE LH LO LI LG LT LU LABOR LA LAB LOG
MARR MX MNUC MOPS MZ MASS MEETINGS MG MW MIL MTCRE MCAP MAS MO MTCR MD MK MP MY MR MT MCC MIK MU ML MARAD MAR MA MV MERCOSUR MPOS MILITARY MDC MQADHAFI MEPP MAPP MASC MTRE MUCN MRCRE MAPS MEDIA MASSMNUC MEPN MI MC MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPI
NATO NL NZ NI NU NO NPT NRR NA NATIONAL NIPP NAFTA NT NS NE NASA NSF NP NAR NV NORAD NG NSSP NK NDP NR NPA NATOPREL NSG NW NGO NSC NEW NH NPG NSFO NZUS NC
OFDA OTRA OPRC OIIP OAS OPDC OVIP OEXC OPIC OSCE OPCW OREP OFFICIALS ODIP OECD OMIG OFDP OSCI OES OBSP OHUM OVP ON OIE OIC OPAD OCII OCS OTR OSAC
PREL PGOV PINR PTER PARM PHUM PA PBTS PM PREF PHSA PK POL PINS PL PE PFOR PALESTINIAN PUNE PGOVLO PAO POLITICS PO PHUMBA PSEPC PROP PNAT PNR POLINT PGOVE PROG PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PROV PSOE PHUMPREL PGOC PY PMIL PLN PDOV PMAR PGIV PHUH PBIO PF PRL PG PRAM PHUS PAK PTBS PCI PU POGOV PINL POV POLICY PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGGV PP PREFA PHUMPGOV PBT POLITICAL PARTIES PAS PCUL PSA PREO PAHO PEL PSI PAIGH POSTS PARMS PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PEPR PPA PINT PRELP PINF PNG
QA
RU RS RICE RW RCMP RO RFE RP RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RUPREL RF RELATIONS RM ROOD REGION REACTION RSO REPORT RSP
SNAR SENV SOCI SCUL SY SR SU SO SP SA SZ SF SMIG SW SIPDIS STEINBERG SN SNARIZ SG SNARN SSA SK SI SPCVIS SOFA SC SL SEVN SIPRS SARS SANC SWE SHI SHUM SEN SNARCS SPCE SYR SYRIA SAARC SH SCRS SENVKGHG SAN ST
TW TRGY TU TPHY TBIO TX TN TSPL TC TZ TSPA TS TF TI TIP TH TINT TNGD TD TP TFIN TAGS TK TL TV TT TERRORISM TR THPY TO TRSY TURKEY TBID
UK UP US UNSC UNHCR USEU UNGA UG UY UNESCO UN USTR USOAS UZ UV UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNEP UNIDROIT UNHRC UNDESCO UNMIK UNDP UNC UNO UNAUS USUN UNCHC UNCND UNPUOS UNCHR UNICEF UNCSD UNDC USNC USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE
VM VE VZ VT VTPREL VTIZ VAT VN VC VTEG VI
WITH WI WHO WTRO WIPO WTO WS WTRQ WWARD WHA WHTI WEU WZ WMD WA WMO WFP WBG WB
XF XG XT XK XM XR XZ XA XV XL XH XE XB XU XX XW XQ XS XC XD XI XY XTAG
YM YI YMCS YE
ZP ZR ZB ZI ZA ZK ZU ZOELLICK ZF ZO ZANU ZEALAND ZL ZJ ZN

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09PANAMA799, President's Top Advisor Affirms Security is GOP's Biggest

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PANAMA799.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PANAMA799 | 2009-10-23 18:04 | 2011-05-09 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0799/01 2961804
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O R 231804Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0019
    INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHGT/AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0001
    RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 0001
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0001
    RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0001
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T PANAMA 000799

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2029/10/23
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PM
    SUBJECT: President's Top Advisor Affirms Security is GOP's Biggest
    Challenge, Requests US Help in Organizing Response

    REF: PANAMA 626; PANAM...

    S E C R E T PANAMA 000799

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2029/10/23
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PM
    SUBJECT: President's Top Advisor Affirms Security is GOP's Biggest
    Challenge, Requests US Help in Organizing Response

    REF: PANAMA 626; PANAMA 699; PANAMA 639

    CLASSIFIED BY: Barbara Stephenson, Ambassador, State, EXEC; REASON:
    1.4(B), (D)

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: President Ricardo Martinelli's most trusted
    advisor, Minister of the Presidency Jimmy Papadimitriu, has
    appealed to the Embassy to assist him in focusing the president's
    attention on security issues and bringing order to the GOP's
    chaotic security policy apparatus.  Papadimitriu lamented
    Martinelli's limited attention span and the infighting among senior
    GOP security officials, at a time when skyrocketing crime and drug
    trafficking are threatening Panama's future stability and
    prosperity.  He acknowledged that the president's preoccupation
    with political wiretaps had sidetracked more serious GOP security
    efforts, and he asked the Ambassador to meet regularly with
    Martinelli to give him the USG's views on security directly from
    the source. End Summary.

    ¶2. (S/NF) During an October 21 meeting with Ambassador, DCM and
    PolSec officer, Papadimitriu said he had come to realize that
    citizen security is the key issue for the Martinelli government,
    and that failure to address the problem could undermine the GOP's
    success in other areas and threaten future investment and economic
    growth. (Comment: This represents serious progress.  When we met
    last month with Papadimitriu to coordinate anti-gang and Darien
    strategies, he had dismissed rising crime as a perception problem
    driven by irresponsible media, a view we challenged.  End comment)
    He acknowledged that President Martinelli's preoccupation with
    obtaining wiretap capability to keep tabs on his political
    opponents (ref B) had diverted attention from serious action to
    confront Panama's true security threats.  He expressed regret that
    the wiretap issue had been a source of tension with the Embassy.

    ¶3. (S/NF) Papadimitriu said he had advised Martinelli to tone down
    his aggressive public campaign to destroy former president Ernesto
    Perez-Balladares, and to focus his attention on citizen security.
    He admitted that he has had limited success in that regard, and
    that the president was still receiving a briefing first thing every
    morning from intelligence chief Olmeido Alfaro on the activities of
    his political adversaries.  He observed that Martinelli's
    hyperactive management style and exceedingly short attention span
    made it difficult to direct him toward the necessary work of fixing
    Panama's broken government administrative systems, which are the
    greatest impediment to security reform.

    Everybody and Nobody is in Charge
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶4.  (S/NF) Describing in great detail his frustration with the
    chaotic state of GOP security policy, Papadimitriu complained that
    senior GOP security figures -- Vice President Juan Carlos Varela,
    Minister of Government and Justice Jose Raul Mulino, national
    police director Gustavo Perez, and intelligence chief Olmeido
    Alfaro -- were all continually jockeying for power.  He said,
    "Every one of them thinks he is in charge, and everyone has his own
    version of what the gringos say."  Papadimitriu said this situation
    sowed confusion, because each claimed to have the Embassy's
    endorsement for their pet projects and each brought Martinelli a
    different view of the Embassy's positions on security issues.

    ¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Papadimitriu that this was precisely
    why she had pressed so persistently for their meeting to take
    place.  She suspected that the hours she and the Embassy security
    team had been devoting to meeting with their GOP counterparts were
    not resulting in a clear picture reaching the president., and that
    she had personally spent many hours briefing GOPQncipals and had
    provided extensive documentation.  She assured him that we would
    continue in that effort.

    ¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador explained the Embassy's efforts to provide
    President Martinelli with some quick wins on security -- chiefly
    the dismantling of the FARC drug trafficking operation in the

    Darien, which we believe is fueling the serious uptick in murders
    in the capital -- in order to buy time for police reforms that are
    as necessary as they are tedious.  She explained that she had, in
    the wake of her mid-September meeting with Martinelli (ref C),
    moved on multiple fronts on the green light he had given her to
    develop a comprehensive plan of action in the Darien. While she and
    her team had repeatedly briefed the vice president/foreign
    minister, the minister of government and justice, and service
    chiefs, she wanted to be sure she was still acting within the
    president's guidance.

    The USG is Key
    --------------------

    ¶7.  (S/NF) Papadimitriu acknowledged he was very worried about the
    disarray in the GOP's security team, because he knows that security
    is far and away the top concern among Panamanians and recent polls
    show increasing concern that perceptions of citizen insecurity are
    getting worse.  He admitted that, "We are riding on a huge
    honeymoon" that would soon end, and the GOP's perceived lack of
    effective action on security could cause grave damage to the
    president's image.

    ¶8.  (S/NF) As for what to do, he first suggested that the
    Ambassador join the GOP's regular weekly security briefings.  He
    then suggested the Ambassador meet every week with the president.
    He then suggested that VP/FM Varela was the best GOP official to
    coordinate GOP security policy.  The Ambassador replied that there
    were pros and cons to each of these approaches, and suggested
    Papadimitriu let her know how the president wishes to proceed.

    ¶9.  (S/NF) That evening, the AmbassadoQeceived a BlackBerry chat
    message from the president stating, "Get Silver [the ringleader of
    the FARC drug trafficking ring]. You have my blessing. Need to meet
    every week."  The Ambassador replied suggesting blocks of time
    suitable for a meeting.  To cover all the bases, she is hosting
    VP/FM Varela for lunch on October 23 to review security and other
    issues.  At the request of MOGJ, she will also host the minister
    and his service chiefs for breakfast on October 28.

    ¶10. (S/NF) Comment: Effective GOP coordination on security is
    clearly still a work in progress.  Embassy support to this effort
    will remain robust.
    STEPHENSON
    C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000891

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/17
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PM
    SUBJECT: Ambassador's November 25 Meetings with President, Vice
    President, and Minister of the Presidency

    REF: PANAMA 777; PANAMA 829; PANAMA 831
    NOVEMBER 10, 2009 BROWNFIELD-STEPHENSON EMAIL

    CLASSIFIED BY: Debra L. Hevia, Political Counselor, State, POL;
    REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary/Introduction: The Ambassador and DCM spent six hours
    in meetings with top government officials on November 25 to work
    through a number of specific security issues, as well as to agree
    on a structure for better coordination on security issues.  End
    summary/ introduction.

    The U.S. Is Panama's Partner

    ---------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and DCM met first with Vice President/Foreign
    Minister Juan Carlos Varela and Minister of the Presidency Demetrio
    "Jimmy" Papadimitriu, after which they all joined President Ricardo
    Martinelli for lunch.  The Ambassador turned to the top concern of
    Panamanian citizens: security, noting that the Embassy's top
    priority in Panama is security, and that violence threatens
    long-term governance and prosperity.  She assured the GOP that the
    Embassy would strongly support both aggressive efforts against
    traffickers and robust programs to keep youth out of gangs.
    However, she expressed concern that many initiatives have been
    stalled due to divisions within the government or a lack of
    internal coordination, and in the case of the Council for Public
    Security and National Defense (Consejo), leadership that has worked
    directly counter to our bilateral information-sharing programs (ref
    A).

    ¶3. (C) The Ambassador detailed the many programs the USG provides
    to assist Panama on security issues, including NAS assistance,
    Coast Guard and Navy patrols, Southcom humanitarian and development
    projects, gang-prevention initiatives, and 30 U.S. federal law
    enforcement agents working side-by-side with Panamanian
    counterparts.  The Ambassador underscored that Panama does not need
    to search for a partner on security issues; it already has one.

    GOP: No Plan or Leadership on Security

    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶4. (C) Papadimitriu acknowledged the lack of GOP coordination,
    saying that there is no consensus about security and no plan to
    address it.  He said the Ministry of Government and Justice (MOGJ)
    was too unwieldy, and that Minister Jose Raul Mulino did not have
    the full support and confidence of the government, but no one else
    wanted the job.  Papadimitriu added, "We don't have anyone who
    wakes up thinking about security in the way you do.  No one feels
    accountable or responsible."  Martinelli ridiculed Mulino, saying
    that at Cabinet meetings he often talks for 20 minutes nonstop,
    with an attitude that he knows more than everyone else because he
    served in government previously, causing the other ministers to
    stop listening and start working on their blackberries.

    ¶5. (C) The Ambassador asked who the GOP was considering naming as
    the new minister of security, and Martinelli admitted he had not
    thought about it, but it would not be Mulino.  He said Director of
    the Panamanian National Police Gustavo Perez wanted to remain in
    his job, and Martinelli was happy to leave him there.  The
    Ambassador and DCM urged Martinelli to choose a strong manager, who
    did not necessarily have to be a security expert.

    Joint Task Force/Maritime Bases

    --------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) The Ambassador detailed how our efforts to help the GOP
    stand up a small maritime task force that could operate off the
    Darien's Pacific coast using existing Panamanian security resources
    had spiraled into a vitriolic public debate about U.S. involvement
    in "maritime bases" (ref B).  Papadimitriu was dismayed, and asked
    for a paper detailing the operation that the President could sign
    off on as a direct order to Mulino and the service chiefs. (Note:
    DCM provided a NAS-drafted paper the same afternoon, which
    Martinelli signed.)  Papadimitriu had not paid close attention to
    the bases controversy but nor was he alarmed, as his internal
    polling showed most Panamanians were not greatly concerned about
    the bases.  He agreed with the Ambassador and DCM that the GOP
    needed to have a credible spokesperson on security issues, and
    coordinate its messaging both internally and (where appropriate)
    with the Embassy.

    Global CST and Israeli Involvement

    -----------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) The Ambassador expressed concerns about the proposals made
    by Israeli security company Global CST, citing negative experiences
    in Colombia and the difficulty of working with Israeli presence in
    GOP ministries (ref C and D).  Varela said the GOP could solve its
    own problems without relying on contractors.  Papadimitriu
    expressed surprise at the reports from Colombia, as he believed CST
    had been hired with Plan Colombia funds with the USG's blessing.
    He said he did not want to do anything to harm Panama's
    relationship with the U.S. and would ask CST president Ziv to stand
    down, though he later admitted it would be difficult since CST had
    spent its own money sending a large team to Panama to complete a
    survey.  In particular, Papadimitriu was receptive to the argument
    that Panama did not need to buy expensive coastal radars or other
    hardware recommended by CST.  However, he liked CST's ideas about
    creating a ministry of security and reorganizing the GOP security
    structure, as well as their suggestion to recruit management talent
    from the private sector.  To sum up, Papadimitriu said he was
    shocked by the conversation, and would not let Israeli influence
    damage the U.S.-Panama relationship.  Martinelli was similarly
    taken aback, and emphasized that he did not want to endanger
    relations with the USG, saying "We don't want to change friends."
    He said he would call Colombian President Uribe to get the straight
    scoop on CST.

    Matador Judicialized Wiretap Program

    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶8. (C) Martinelli asked for additional wiretap assistance, saying
    the GOP needed to catch ordinary criminals in addition to drug
    trafficking organizations.  The Ambassador and DCM suggested that
    our judicialized wiretap program could be expanded, but it must
    still be moved out from under the control of Consejo to preserve
    the judicial quality of the evidence collected.  Given the
    President's opposition to putting it under the control of the
    Attorney General, the Ambassador referred to the agreement VP/FM
    Varela had worked out to move the Matador program under Panamanian
    National Police Director Gustavo Perez.  Martinelli confirmed his
    agreement with that plan.

    Moving Forward

    -------------------

    ¶9. (C) The GOP and Embassy agreed to continue this on-going
    dialogue through a bi-weekly security meeting including Varela,
    Papadimitriu, and Mulino on one side and the Ambassador, DCM, and
    political-security officer on the other.  Martinelli said that he,
    Varela, and Papadimitriu were the "circle zero" of the GOP, and
    that no important decisions were taken unless the three of them had
    discussed it and agreed on a course of action.

    Bio notes

    -----------

    ¶10. (C) In general, Martinelli seemed more relaxed overall and less
    aggressive than we have seen him in previous meetings.  His general
    tone was respectful and positive, in contrast with his previous
    argumentative, drive-a-hard-bargain manner.

    ¶11. (C) Regarding the recent arrest of his cousin Ramon Martinelli
    in Mexico on money laundering charges, Martinelli said he was
    satisfied.  If the Mexicans had not arrested him, the GOP had plans
    to arrest him.  He said Ramon had always been a "black sheep" and
    was sullying the good Martinelli family name.
    STEPHENSON

`