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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2534, TFLE01: ISRAELI ATTACKS ON NORTH COAST BRIDGE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2534 | 2006-08-04 13:38 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    VZCZCXRO0793
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2534/01 2161338
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 041338Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4899
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/USCENTCOM SPECIAL HANDLIN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0016

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002534

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2026
    TAGS: PREL MOPS PTER PROG CASC LE IS
    SUBJECT: TFLE01: ISRAELI ATTACKS ON NORTH COAST BRIDGE
    HURT EMBASSY OPERATIONS, OUR IMAGE AND EFFORTS TO ISOLATE
    HIZBALLAH

    Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4(b) and (d).

    SUMMARY AND COMMENT
    -------------------

    ¶1. (C) No doubt the Israelis can provide military
    justification for their attacks on three bridges going north
    starting from the Christian port city of Jounieh this morning
    (8/04) and cutting off the &corridor8 that the GOI told the
    world would remain open to Syria. But whatever the Israeli
    rationale, the severing of the main road linking Beirut with
    the Christian heartland of Lebanon is psychologically
    devastating, isolating Christian communities from one another
    and impeding travel to Maronite Patriarch Sfeir (in his
    summer residence) and Samir Ja,ja,. Moreover, the attacks
    deal a severe blow to Embassy operations -- many of our staff
    (including security staff) cannot get to work, and the
    resupply we had anticipated to our dwindling gasoline
    reserves is now difficult, with impassable roads from the
    north and fears of further Israeli air strikes. There is a
    new s粑ike in Amcits wanting our help in departure. Given
    that all of our assumptions about what is safe have been
    proven wrong, the EAC has judged that none of us can leave
    this compound without having coordinated all of our moves
    with the IDF via Embassy Tel Aviv -- a time-consuming process
    that prevents us from any timely, cutting-edge diplomatic
    efforts.

    ¶2. (C) None of our Lebanese contacts believe that these
    highway bridges were Hizballah targets (even if the Israelis
    can make that argument). For the sake of our own credibility
    in Lebanon, we strongly recommend that the USG use this
    example to put distance between us and some of the Israeli
    tactics in Lebanon. For the sake of our operations, we also
    urge an understanding with the Israelis that the greater
    Beirut area, through Awkar (where the Embassy is located) and
    Jounieh, is generally off limits to IDF strikes, with the
    exception of obvious Hizballah strongholds like the southern
    suburbs. We also urge that we get behind a high-profile
    initiative now *- perhaps opening a ferry link between
    Cyprus and Jounieh, or a limited airport link to Amman or
    somewhere else -) to change our image and provide
    psychological relief to the beleaguered Lebanese. End
    summary and comment.

    ISRAEL TARGETS THREE COSTAL BRIDGES
    IN HEART OF CHRISTIAN LEBANON
    ----------------------------------

    ¶3. (SBU) Just as the morning rush hour was coming into full
    swing, Israel bombed three bridges on the coastal highway
    (Lebanon,s only north-south major thoroughfare), starting on
    the northern side of the Christian port of Jounieh (about 10
    kilometers from the Embassy) and running up through Batroun.
    News reports indicate that several commuters were killed and
    others injured. But, while the death toll is probably fairly
    low, the psychological blow is enormous: this was the
    highway that the Israelis had promised to keep open (and had
    highlighted in a power point distributed widely) as the
    lifeline through Tripoli and the Arida checkpoint to Syria.
    This was the road the Israelis assured people would remain
    open. Representatives of humanitarian relief organizations
    had relied on this road for getting many humanitarian
    supplies into Lebanon, so today,s land deliveries have been
    halted.

    ¶4. (C) The Christian community is particular is in shock,
    as the Christian coastal towns of Tabarjah, Mamaltein,
    Ajaltoun, Jbeil (Byblos), Batroun, etc. are no longer within
    commuting distance of Jounieh and Beirut. Mount Lebanon no
    longer "feels safe," one Christian told us. Even though we
    believe that there are complicated, circuitous routes through
    wadis and ravines, and via minor side bridges, by which
    people can still travel between the heart of what is jokingly
    referred to as "Maronistan" and Beirut, people are frightened
    to do so, worried about when the Israelis will take out the
    remaining bridges. (Over the last two days, the Israelis
    have destroyed even historic Ottoman bridges in the Akkar
    region of north Lebanon, no doubt to interrupt possible
    resupply routes between Syria and Hizballah.) Moreover,
    these side roads are hardly conducive to the type of
    humanitarian convoys that had been using the highway.

    PATRIARCH SFEIR, SAMIR JA'JA' ISOLATED;
    CHRISTIAN SOLIDARITY WITH HIZBALLAH ON THE RISE

    BEIRUT 00002534 002 OF 003

    ------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Travel between Beirut and Tripoli, Lebanon,s
    "second city" (and a major Sunni stronghold) is now difficult
    and time-consuming (and possible only via the minor side
    bridges people are now afraid to use). Residing in his Diman
    summer residence, Maronite Patriarch Sfeir ) who has played
    a leadership role in getting Lebanon,s diverse religious
    clerics behind the Siniora cabinet and behind the idea of
    "equality of citizens" (euphemism for disarmament of
    Hizballah) ) is now essentially cut off from much of his
    flock and from Lebanon,s political leadership. Ditto for
    Lebanese Forces leaders Samir Ja'ja', who plays a key role in
    the March 14 movement. Dismissing the logic that these
    essential traffic links for Christians and Sunnis could be
    Hizballah targets (even though, as we note, the Israelis
    probably can give reasons), the Christians and Sunnis who
    have been calling us all see this as an attack on their
    communities. One moderate Christian told the Ambassador that
    "we are all 'resistance' now."

    EMBASSY OPERATIONS SERIOUSLY AFFECTED
    -------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) The Embassy has been adversely affected by these
    Israeli attacks in several ways. First, much of our staff --
    including security staff (both ESF and bodyguards) -- cannot
    get to work, hindering our operations. Second, we had worked
    out resupply of our dwindling gasoline stocks from the north,
    via the now impassable road. (Ambassador Jones in Tel Aviv
    has agreed to help us coordinate travel along side roads, and
    we are exploring possibilities now. Our fuel situation is
    dire. We do not yet know if the tanker truck that would
    deliver our gasoline can travel through the narrow and
    winding but still passable second roads.) Third, hundreds of
    American citizens who heretofore had felt safe in Mount
    Lebanon have now decamped to our gates and have deluged our
    phone lines with queries about possible evacuation
    assistance.

    ¶7. (C) Our diplomatic initiatives are also more difficult
    to accomplish. While we have greatly hardened our compound
    and limited our moves because of possible Hizballah attacks,
    we operated under the assumption that the Israelis would not
    target the areas in which we tend to live and work )
    basically from West Beirut through the Maronite Christian
    heartland. Those assumptions were proven wrong this morning.
    Thus, the EAC has determined that no one can leave this
    compound unless we have coordinated the moves with the
    Israelis, a time-consuming and labor-intensive process in
    which we depend entirely on Embassy Tel Aviv (which has done
    an exemplary job of supporting our needs but probably at
    considerably cost to Tel Aviv,s own priorities). We are
    deeply concerned that no one had provided any forewarning of
    these unexpected attacks, nor in their aftermaths any
    projections about future attacks, including in Central
    Beirut, that could affect our operations ) and our lives.

    COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
    -----------------------------

    ¶8. (C) We emphasize that we expect that Israel will give
    military justification for its actions this morning, and we
    look forward to explanations of what seems to our military
    experts in the Embassy to be a pre-arranged &strike
    package.8 But, whatever the rationale, the costs for our
    goals in Lebanon are quite high. Based on the hysteric
    reactions of our contacts and staff who suddenly feel more
    affected than ever by the conflict, we do not think it is an
    exaggeration to say that these attacks have accelerated an
    already losing PR battle for us here.

    ¶9. (C) These attacks in the Christian heartland serve to
    increase Christian and Sunni (because of the impact on
    Tripoli) sense of victimhood and have the potential to build
    solidarity between the Christians, Sunnis, and Hizballah.
    There is a certain understanding of, and even -- in some
    quarters *- some (quiet and, unfortunately, diminishing)
    enthusiasm for, Israel,s efforts in the south to root out
    Hizballah infrastructure. These three bridges are a whole
    different matter. Given that the psychological and
    operational blows to our goals in Lebanon are so great, we
    recommend that we use the bridge attacks to highlight, even
    if in a subtle, way, that we do not concur with all of

    BEIRUT 00002534 003 OF 003

    Israel,s tactics. The destruction of the bridges may
    provide a good opportunity for us to distinguish our policy
    from that of Israel, which, while sharing many similar goals,
    are not identical. This would help our credibility here.

    ¶10. (C) In light of the fact that the Israelis can
    probably come up with many post-facto military explanations
    for whatever action they deem necessary, we also hope
    Washington would be willing to press the Israelis on the idea
    of having greater Beirut (through Jounieh) being generally
    off limits, except for obvious Hizballah targets like the
    southern suburbs. This will help check dwindling Christian
    support for us and bolster GOL credibility. It will also
    allow us to focus our security concerns on Hizballah and
    other terrorists and enable us to continue our diplomatic
    initiatives without fear of being caught on the wrong side of
    a bridge by an Israeli strike (or an the bridge at the wrong
    time). For trips out of Beirut, we will continue to turn to
    Tel Aviv for help in coordination (and offer again our deep,
    sincere appreciation to Ambassador Jones and all of Embassy
    Tel Aviv for their ongoing efforts on our behalf). But,
    after this morning,s attacks, we are completely at the mercy
    of Embassy Tel Aviv,s ability to get some kind of green
    lights from the IDF, which prevents any time of quick action.

    ¶11. (C) Given the Israeli targeting of these bridges
    today, it may also be worth exploring with the GOI some of
    our understandings regarding potential Israeli military
    action. We hope, for example, that the Israeli assurances
    about not hitting the power plants and other essential
    infrastructure remain current. We hope that Washington would
    be willing to underscore the importance of avoiding hitting
    the power plants and other similar installations.

    ¶12. (C) Finally, we would like to make a pitch for some
    high-profile initiative that could be announced as soon as
    possible to provide psychological relief to compensate for
    the attacks on the bridges. Perhaps we could get behind some
    kind of ferry link between Jounieh port and Cyprus, or a
    limited airport shuttle to Amman or another city where the
    Israelis would have reasonable security assurances (to
    prevent smuggling of weapons or persons).
    FELTMAN

`