Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12553 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11 2011/05/12

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR ASEC AF AMBASSADOR AS AJ AM AORC AEMR ASEAN AFFAIRS AFIN AMGT AODE APEC AE ABLD ACBAQ APECO AFSI AFSN AY AO ABUD AG AC APER AU AMED ATRN ADPM ADCO ASIG AL ASUP ARF AUC ASEX AGAO AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AIT AADP ASCH AA ANET AROC AFU AN AID ALOW ACOA AINF AMG AMCHAMS AORL ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ACS APCS ADANA AECL ACAO AORG AGR ACABQ AGMT AX AMEX ADM AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN
BR BK BL BA BO BRUSSELS BM BEXP BU BG BB BTIO BF BD BBSR BIDEN BX BP BE BH BT BY BMGT BWC BTIU BN BILAT BC
CO CI CU CS CVIS CA CJAN CARICOM CB CASC CE CH CN CONDOLEEZZA CMGT CWC CW CG CACS CY CPAS CFED CSW CIDA CIC CITT CBW CONS CD CLINTON CHR CACM CDB COE CDG CDC CR CAN CF CODEL CJUS CTM CM CLMT CBC CT CL CBSA COUNTERTERRORISM CEUDA COM CTR CROS CAPC CAC COUNTER CV CIA CARSON COPUOS CNARC CICTE COUNTRY CBE CIS CKGR CVR CITEL CLEARANCE
DR DISENGAGEMENT DE DJ DA DOMESTIC DEA DOD DOE DTRA DS DEFENSE DHS DEAX DO DAO DCM DK DPRK DEPT
ECA EU ENRG EPET ETTC ETRD ELN ELAB EC EFIN ECON EFIS ELTN EAGR EIND EWWT EMIN EINV EAID EG EUN ECPS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENIV ENGR ECIN EAIR EI ECUN EFTA ENGY ECONOMICS ES ELECTIONS EN EIAR ET EINDETRD EUR EZ EREL ER EINT ECONEFIN EURN EDU ETRDEINVTINTCS ECIP EFIM EAIDS EK EPA ENVR ETRDECONWTOCS EINVETC ECONCS ECONOMIC EUC ENERG EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA EXTERNAL EUNCH ESA ECINECONCS EUREM ESENV ETRC ENVI EAIG EXIM ETRO ETRN ENNP EFINECONCS EEPET ERNG EINVEFIN ERD ETC EAP ECONOMY EINN EXBS
FR FI FTAA FAC FOI FREEDOM FJ FMLN FARC FDA FTA FBI FAO FM FO FOREIGN FISO FOR FAS FINR FINANCE
GM GG GZ GAZA GR GOI GANGS GV GCC GY GT GA GAERC GOV GE GH GLOBAL GTIP GERARD GTMO GL GF
HK HR HA HURI HO HU HILLARY HUMAN HSTC HUMOR HEBRON HYMPSK HI
IIP IC IR IN IAEA IS IT IMF IBRD IZ IWC ISRAELI INTERPOL IO ISLAMISTS ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI ILO IPR IQ IV IRS INRB ICAO IMO ID IAHRC IZPREL IRAJ ICTY ICRC ILC ITF ICJ ITU IF ITPHUM IL ISRAEL IACI ITRA INMARSAT IA ICTR IBET INR IGAD INRA INRO IRC IDP IDA INDO IEFIN INTELSAT INTERNAL ITPGOV IEA
JA JP JO JAMES JOSEPH JM JOHN JUS JOHNNIE
KPAO KCRM KNNP KCOR KIRF KISL KSCA KDEM KDEMAF KZ KMDR KRVC KPAL KTIA KV KJUS KOMC KTFN KWBG KTIP KMPI KSUM KIRC KE KIPR KWMN KFRD KSEP KN KOLY KCFE KPKO KIDE KMRS KFLU KSAF KGIC KRAD KU KHLS KOCI KSTH KUNR KS KGHG KAWC KBTR KICC KG KPLS KSPR KPRP KDRG KNSD KGIT KVPR KGCC KSEO KMCA KSTC KFSC KBIO KHIV KBCT KPAI KICA KTDB KACT KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHUM KFLO KREC KSEC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPIN KCOM KESS KDEV KNAR KNUC KPWR KAWK KWWMN KWMNCS KCIP KPRV KHDP KOM KBTS KCRS KNPP KWNM KRFD KVIR KLIG KTEX KDDG KRGY KR KMOC KPAONZ KCMR KO KIFR KHSA KAID KSCI KPAK KCGC KID KPOA KMFO KFIN KTBT KWMM KX KSAC KVRP KRIM KENV KNEI KTER KWAC KOMS KCRCM KNUP KMIG KNNPMNUC KERG KTLA KCSY KTRD KJUST KRCM KCFC KCHG KREL KFTFN
LY LTTE LE LH LO LI LG LT LU LABOR LA LAB LOG
MARR MX MNUC MOPS MZ MASS MEETINGS MG MW MIL MTCRE MCAP MAS MO MTCR MD MK MP MY MR MT MCC MIK MU ML MARAD MAR MA MV MERCOSUR MPOS MILITARY MDC MQADHAFI MEPP MAPP MASC MTRE MUCN MRCRE MAPS MEDIA MASSMNUC MEPN MI MC MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPI
NATO NL NZ NI NU NO NPT NRR NA NATIONAL NIPP NAFTA NT NS NE NASA NSF NP NAR NV NORAD NG NSSP NK NDP NR NPA NATOPREL NSG NW NGO NSC NEW NH NPG NSFO NZUS NC
OFDA OTRA OPRC OIIP OAS OPDC OVIP OEXC OPIC OSCE OPCW OREP OFFICIALS ODIP OECD OMIG OFDP OSCI OES OBSP OHUM OVP ON OIE OIC OPAD OCII OCS OTR OSAC
PREL PGOV PINR PTER PARM PHUM PA PBTS PM PREF PHSA PK POL PINS PL PE PFOR PALESTINIAN PUNE PGOVLO PAO POLITICS PO PHUMBA PSEPC PROP PNAT PNR POLINT PGOVE PROG PHALANAGE PARTY PDEM PECON PROV PSOE PHUMPREL PGOC PY PMIL PLN PDOV PMAR PGIV PHUH PBIO PF PRL PG PRAM PHUS PAK PTBS PCI PU POGOV PINL POV POLICY PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGGV PP PREFA PHUMPGOV PBT POLITICAL PARTIES PAS PCUL PSA PREO PAHO PEL PSI PAIGH POSTS PARMS PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PEPR PPA PINT PRELP PINF PNG
QA
RU RS RICE RW RCMP RO RFE RP RIGHTS RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RUPREL RF RELATIONS RM ROOD REGION REACTION RSO REPORT RSP
SNAR SENV SOCI SCUL SY SR SU SO SP SA SZ SF SMIG SW SIPDIS STEINBERG SN SNARIZ SG SNARN SSA SK SI SPCVIS SOFA SC SL SEVN SIPRS SARS SANC SWE SHI SHUM SEN SNARCS SPCE SYR SYRIA SAARC SH SCRS SENVKGHG SAN ST
TW TRGY TU TPHY TBIO TX TN TSPL TC TZ TSPA TS TF TI TIP TH TINT TNGD TD TP TFIN TAGS TK TL TV TT TERRORISM TR THPY TO TRSY TURKEY TBID
UK UP US UNSC UNHCR USEU UNGA UG UY UNESCO UN USTR USOAS UZ UV UNODC UNCHS UNFICYP UNEP UNIDROIT UNHRC UNDESCO UNMIK UNDP UNC UNO UNAUS USUN UNCHC UNCND UNPUOS UNCHR UNICEF UNCSD UNDC USNC USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE
VM VE VZ VT VTPREL VTIZ VAT VN VC VTEG VI
WITH WI WHO WTRO WIPO WTO WS WTRQ WWARD WHA WHTI WEU WZ WMD WA WMO WFP WBG WB
XF XG XT XK XM XR XZ XA XV XL XH XE XB XU XX XW XQ XS XC XD XI XY XTAG
YM YI YMCS YE
ZP ZR ZB ZI ZA ZK ZU ZOELLICK ZF ZO ZANU ZEALAND ZL ZJ ZN

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05WELLINGTON663, MAORI PARTY PROSPECTS DIMINISH IN SEPTEMBER

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05WELLINGTON663.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05WELLINGTON663 | 2005-08-30 04:48 | 2011-04-28 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Wellington

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 WELLINGTON 000663

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EAP/ANP, EAP/RSP, EAP/EP, INR/EAP
    NSC FOR VICTOR CHA AND MICHAEL GREEN
    SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU
    PACOM FOR J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2010
    TAGS: PGOV PREL NZ
    SUBJECT: MAORI PARTY PROSPECTS DIMINISH IN SEPTEMBER
    ELECTION

    REF: A. 04 WELLINGTON 601
         ¶B. 04 WELLINGTON 909
         ¶C. WELLINGTON 134

    Classified By: Siria Lopez, Auckland Consul General,
    for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    (U) This cable originated from AmConGen Auckland.  It
    replaces and updates Wellington 661.

    ¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Although the Maori Party has made
    impressive gains in membership and general support in its
    one year of existence, it is unlikely to capture all seven
    Maori constituency seats in the September 17 election.  Its
    probable 3-5 constituency
    seats would still make the Maori Party a potential
    coalition partner, however.  Maori leaders had been
    insisting that it would be up to their followers to decide
    on a coalition partner.  But following an August 29 speech
    by National Party leader Don Brash that called for an end
    to separate Maori-oriented Government ministries, the Maori
    party announced it had definitively ruled out a coalition
    with National.

    ¶2.  (C) Given that either Labour or National is likely to
    need coalition partners to form a government, National's
    announcement carries some risks.  It seems more and more
    that National has no natural coalition partner other that
    NZ First, and a previous coalition with that party in the
    1990s was not a success.  But the Nats probably figure they
    gain more from tapping into "middle New Zealand's"
    unhappiness with Labour's preferential treatment of Maori
    and other groups than it does from holding out for the
    unlikely chance that Maori voters would choose a National-
    Maori party coalition.  As Labour has also tried to
    distance itself from Maori party leadership, the Nats may
    also be trying to play on some voters' fears that a Labour
    victory would mean a leftist, Labour-Greens-Progressives-
    Maori coalition.  End Summary.

    Background:  Maori Party Makes Electoral Registration
    Inroads
    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    --

    ¶3.  (SBU)  Maori anger over a perceived Labour Government
    turnaround on Maori claims to New Zealand's foreshore and
    seabed led to the creation of the Maori Party in July 2004
    (reftel A).  Since then the Maori Party has sought to
    become the Maori voice in New Zealand's parliament.  For
    the September 2005 election, the Party will contest all
    seven exclusively Maori constituency seats, as well as
    other general electorate and list seats for a current total
    of 51 candidates.  Dr. Whatarangi Winiata is Maori Party
    President but the party's most popular and visible figure
    is co-leader (and former Labour Party member) MP Tariana
    Turia.  Turia will run against her Labour Party nephew for
    the Te Tai Hauauru seat.  Pita Sharples, an educator, is
    the other party co-leader and is taking on the charismatic
    but politically wounded Labour MP John Tamihere in Tamaki-
    Makaurau.

    ¶4.  (SBU)  Despite the odds against its survival -- and
    Tamihere's predictions of its stillborn birth -- the Maori
    Party has evolved into a real Maori political alternative
    to Labour.  Since its inception, the Party has managed to
    sign up more than 19,000 new members through "flaxroots"
    efforts, an impressive achievement.  Notwithstanding, voter
    numbers are more important than total card-carrying party
    members.  Under New Zealand's political system, Maori
    citizens have the option of signing up for either the
    general roll or the Maori electoral roll, which votes on
    the seven Maori constituency seats (seats the National
    Party has long pledged to abolish).  Currently, 204,519
    persons
    have enrolled on the Maori roll; 166,822 on the general
    roll.  This is a nearly 9% increase over 2002 figures for
    both rolls.  Of first-time enrollments, mainly younger
    voters, 55 per cent are opting for the Maori roll.  The
    latter represents the fruits of the Maori Party's strategy
    to focus registration efforts on first-time, younger voters
    who lack a history of voting for Labour (reftel B).

    ¶5.  (SBU)  But what makes the Maori Party worth watching is
    its potential as a coalition partner. It is widely assumed
    that Turia will win her electorate seat.  The Party is also
    expected to capture other Maori constituency seats.  Each
    MP gained increases the party's legislative influence.
    (NB: The Maori party would be allocated additional list
    parliamentary seats if it gains more of a percentage of the
    party vote than it meets with its electorate seats alone.
    If the Party gets more electorate seats than party vote
    share, it will keep those "overhang" seats until the next
    election.  This will affect the number of seats the major
    parties would need to form a coalition.) Since neither
    Labour nor National are expected to win clear majorities,
    they will need parliamentary partners to form workable
    governments.  National Party's Don Brash's speech of August
    29 in which he promised to review Maori-based government
    agencies, however, have incited Turia and Sharples to spurn
    National as a coalition partner.  Despite the Maori Party's
    birth as a
    protest against Labour's foreshore and seabed legislation,
    now that it has ruled out a coalition with National, Labour
    is its only potential coalition partner.

    Policies:  Difficult to Assess
    ------------------------------

    ¶6.  (C)  From the start, the Maori Party has been
    criticized for its lack of policy pronouncements.  This
    situation is little better in the immediate lead-up to the
    September polls -- that is if a voter desires articulated
    party platforms in the conventional, Euro-American sense.
    In May, the Party did publicize the centerpiece of its
    policies or "tikanga" but it actually consisted of
    sweeping, idealistic guiding principles firmly based on
    Maori socio-cultural values.  One searches the "tikianga"
    document in vain for the Party's position on taxes or
    health care.  For that, one must often rely on the ad hoc
    emergence of specifics as uttered by party politicians on
    the campaign trail.  For example, we now know that the
    Maori Party wants to lower the retirement age of Maori to
    60, make tertiary education free for everyone and eliminate
    tax for those earning under $25,000.  It has also slowly
    filtered out that the Party wants to make Maori language
    compulsory for all civil servants, affirm Maori authority
    on the national resource review process and reinstate New
    Zealand's moratorium on genetically-modified plants.

    ¶7.  (SBU)  In terms of foreign policy, a Maori Party
    representative, Charles Joe, spoke to a University of
    Auckland audience mostly in the idealistic generalities of
    the "tikanga" document.  Perhaps because the audience was
    non-Maori and the other party politicians present offered
    specifics, Joe also confirmed that the party wanted NZ's
    nuclear-free stance maintained, supported NZ's
    international peacekeeping role and had a "no first-strike
    policy."  The Party also placed priority on the UN draft on
    indigenous people and wanted an international treaty for
    indigenous nations.  As Turia has said in the past, Joe
    added that his party would oppose any international
    treaties or agreements that breached the principles
    enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi.  That is to say its
    foreign and trade policies would be driven by adherence to
    Maori values.   (Note:  The Maori Party has been accused of
    refusing to criticize Robert Mugabe's regime simply because
    he is a black African leader.  The Party also opposed a
    recent bill to strengthen NZ's anti-terrorism finance laws.
    Still, it did support the rightist Federated Farmers in the
    farmers' land access battle with Labour.  End Note)

    Election Prospects
    ------------------

    ¶8.  (C)  The Maori Party has been challenged from its
    inception by the poverty of its core constituency.
    Financially disadvantaged, the party has focused instead on
    harnessing "people power" by drafting volunteers to go
    door-to-door to drum up support.  Labour's John Tamihere
    told Auckland Consul General that the Maori Party's real
    strength lies in the seductive, emotional appeal of its
    message of grievance to relatively well-off, middle-class
    Maori.  As a result, it enjoys strong support from
    influential Maori institutions such as Maori radio
    stations, TV, university, language schools and health and
    welfare organizations.  This Maori infrastructure provides
    the Party with its transport and information resource needs
    and thus makes up for any ostensible lack of cash.  Another
    Maori political observer agreed that Maori institutions,
    although funded under Labour governments, are "hotbeds" of
    Maori Party support.  She and Tamihere both observed that a
    large Maori turnout in September will hurt Labour.
    ¶9.  (SBU)  Before the election date was announced, many
    observers were predicting that the Maori Party would obtain
    at least five constituency seats.   In several polls, Maori
    party candidates such as Pita Sharples and Hone Harawira
    (for Te Tai Tokerau) were pulling way ahead of their Labour
    rivals.  Since then, however, some leads have narrowed;
    Sharples is now running neck-to-neck with Tamihere (who
    probably now prefers Labour Party money over Maori
    institutional support).  Harawira's lead over Labour's
    Dover Samuels has almost halved.  The Maori Party (and
    Labour) is losing some votes with the entry of independent
    candidates and those of Destiny New Zealand, a party allied
    with a conservative Maori Christian church.  (Destiny also
    appeals to socially conservative Pacific Islanders, also
    being courted by the Maori Party, who were upset by
    Labour's prostitution and civil union bills.)

    ¶10.  (SBU)  Perhaps more influential than election rivals,
    however, is the Labour tactic of scaring Maori by claiming
    a vote for the Maori Party is a vote for National.   This
    message is being drummed into Maori and other left-leaning
    voters.  The Labour tactic is particularly effective on
    those Maori concerned about National's threat to reduce
    welfare benefits.  Some Maori voters may try to reconcile
    their divided loyalties by voting for the Maori Party for
    constituency seats and ticking Labour for the party/ "list"
    vote.

    ¶11.  (SBU)  Although it is also contesting 35 general
    electorate seats in an effort to appeal to non-Maori, the
    Party is not expected to win many, if any, of these seats.
    The small size of the Maori electorate vote in general
    means it will not obtain many list seats.  A more realistic
    scenario is that the Maori Party will win 3-5 Maori
    constituency seats--but not 7. This result would still make
    the Party a potential coalition partner for Labour or
    National, notwithstanding the major parties' avowed
    distaste for such an arrangement.  In an August TV debate
    with National's Don Brash, when asked about possible
    Labour-Maori Party talks, PM Clark swatted the party off by
    replying it was the "last cab in the rank." Brash more
    tactfully said that he couldn't see cooperation happening.
    Earlier, at a July Diplomatic Club lunch in Wellington,
    Turia noted that the Maori Party had not offered itself as
    a coalition partner, nor would it.  But, she added, if
    approached by one or more parties, it would put the issue
    of which party to vote for and under what terms (e.g.
    confidence and supply or a full coalition) to its voters.
    As noted earlier, however, Brash's August 29 speech has
    squashed, for now, speculation about  National-Maori Party
    cooperation.

    Long-Term Goals:  More Maori Constituency Seats and More
    List Seats
    --------------------------------------------- --------------
    --------

    ¶12.  (C)  Echoing Turia, co-leader Pita Sharples told
    Consul General that the Maori Party was not going "hell for
    bent" to be in the Government right now.  The question of
    coalitions does not loom large for the party.  For the
    September election, it was trying to get the Maori voice
    heard in Parliament and to stand staunch on the Treaty of
    Waitangi.  If it succeeded in getting seven MPs in, this
    would have the desired impact and momentum.  Then, the
    following year, the Party would undertake a national
    campaign to move every Maori from the general to the Maori
    rolls in order to increase the number of Maori constituency
    seats.   Thus, in a subsequent election, the Party could
    enjoy, for example, fourteen seats in addition to general
    electorate and list seats.  It was with this long-term goal
    in mind that the Party had decided to contest the general
    electorates, go for the list vote and choose several non-
    Maori election candidates of European and Pacific Island
    descent.  There is, Sharples declared, not much of a long-
    term future for the Maori Party "if we are not inclusive
    and if we have just Maori sitting there-we must go for all
    of New Zealand."
    Burnett

`