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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2542, TFLE01: SINIORA SOUNDS AN OMINOUS NOTE ON DRAFT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2542 | 2006-08-06 13:37 | 2011-03-15 18:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

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    VZCZCXRO1764
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2542/01 2181337
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 061337Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4917
    INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0903
    RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0023
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002542

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2015
    TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER SY IS LE
    SUBJECT: TFLE01: SINIORA SOUNDS AN OMINOUS NOTE ON DRAFT
    RESOLUTION

    Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
    ).

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C) Prime Minister Siniora called UNSC member nations'
    ambassadors to the Grand Serail on the morning of August 6
    for a two hour "chat" during which he outlined the GOL's main
    concerns with the draft UN resolution currently being
    discussed in New York. During the meeting, which was also
    attended by Foreign Minister Fawzi Salloukh and
    representatives from the P5 and Japan, Greece, Argentina, and
    Qatar, Siniora said that there are two issues which make the
    current resolution "unworkable." First, it fails to call for
    an immediate Israeli withdrawal, and second, it does not
    provide a concrete plan for the disposition of the Sheba'a
    Farms. Siniora pleaded with the attendees to "go the extra
    mile" in order to get a resolution which will empower the
    Lebanese government. He added that if the resolution is
    passed in its current form, he expects the Lebanese
    government will be "in trouble" and hinted at an increase in
    Sunni-Shia tensions. In a cryptic remark, Siniora said that
    if the resolution were to pass as is, "the Lebanese
    government will be in a position where it cannot do anything
    because there will be something more furious than it can
    handle," and he suggested also that this resolution would put
    Lebanon "back under the Syrian knife." (Comment: These frank
    remarks from Siniora came after the early departure from the
    meeting of FM Salloukh - a Shiite with the tacit backing of
    Hizballah - to receive visiting Syrian FM Walid Moallem. End
    Comment.) During a side conversation with Ambassador Feltman
    and UK Ambassador Watt after the meeting, Siniora said that a
    single resolution - rather than the two resolutions favored
    by the French - was by far the better approach, since it
    would include the Israeli withdrawal he sees as essential to
    winning cabinet backing. End Summary.

    A Chat Among Friends
    --------------------

    ¶2. (C) Siniora began by thanking all the UNSC members,
    especially the U.S. and France, for their efforts to get the
    current draft resolution calling for a ceasefire. But he
    then argued that the current resolution is unrealistic in
    that it would freeze the situation on the ground, leaving
    Israel in occupation of Lebanese territory taken in the
    current conflict until the adoption of a second resolution.
    The situation in the South would be untenable, with the
    likelihood of hostilities re-erupting. "You're leaving the
    gasoline and the fire next to each other." Siniora added
    that the current draft resolution also does not go far enough
    in proposing a fix for the Sheba'a Farms issue, specifically
    in not calling for the handover of the area to the United
    Nations for ultimate disposition.

    ¶3. (C) Noting that, "these points have been coordinated
    with the Speaker of the Parliament, who is in contact with
    Hizballah," Siniora laid out his plan calling for an
    "immediate, comprehensive, and unconditional ceasefire along
    with an immediate Israeli withdrawal." The LAF would
    simultaneously deploy 15,000 soldiers to the South and would
    assume all Hizballah "weapons, stores, and positions" south
    of the Litani. Siniora suggested that UNIFIL donor nations
    provide an additional 2,000 troops to assist in the LAF
    redeployment, and that after a month these troops would
    depart or be folded into a newly-mandated international
    force. On the Sheba'a issue, Siniora reiterated his position
    that the Israelis hand Sheba'a over to the UN, which would
    then re-examine whether the territory is Syrian or Lebanese.
    Towards the end of the meeting, Siniora's staff provided
    attendees with a GOL-edited version of the draft resolution,
    which Siniora suggested would be acceptable to all Lebanese
    parties. (Note: This GOL draft has been forwarded separately
    by email. End Note.)

    ¶4. (C) Siniora urged that his plan be given consideration
    as a means to empower the Lebanese government and also to
    bring "statehood" to the South. Reiterating that "there is
    complete harmony between myself and Mr. Berri," Siniora said
    that he needs a ceasefire deal that is marketable to
    extremely skeptical Arab and Muslim public opinion. "Help us
    to retrieve the country and put it in the hands of the
    moderates, not the extremists."

    BEIRUT 00002542 002 OF 003

    ¶5. (C) While Siniora did not state that the GOL would
    definitely reject the current draft if passed, he hinted at
    growing disagreement within the Cabinet over the terms of a
    ceasefire deal, and that his government could collapse over
    it. While he will not rule out taking a "creative look" at
    the proposal in order to make it work, he stated clearly that
    "Hizballah is not going to comply" with the resolution if
    passed as is, and that this would increase Sunni-Shia
    tensions while providing the pretext for continued Hizballah
    militancy and Syrian meddling in Lebanon. However, if a text
    is adopted by the UNSC in something close to its current
    form, Siniora said he would take it to the Cabinet for a
    "democratic" decision.

    ¶6. (C) Siniora invited comments from the assembled
    ambassadors. In addition to Ambassador Feltman, only the
    French, British, and Russian ambassadors spoke up, with all
    showing support for the current draft resolution, saying it
    is the best available option and already reflects many
    Lebanese concerns. A rejection of this resolution would play
    into the hands of hostile parties and lead Lebanon further
    down the path to chaos. All four ambassadors emphasized the
    need to bridge the gap and shorten the time span between the
    first and second resolutions.

    ¶7. (C) In a side conversation after the other ambassadors
    had departed, Siniora expressed to Ambassador Feltman and UK
    Ambassador Watt his disapproval of the dual resolution
    approach. "Why have two resolutions? Why not just one?"
    Siniora sees the logic of a single resolution creating an
    international force to deploy in southern Lebanon, thereby
    satisfying an Israeli precondition allowing for a ceasefire
    with a simultaneous Israeli withdrawal. In private at least,
    Siniora does not seem concerned that this option would
    require more time for negotiations and deployment, and would
    therefore delay a ceasefire. Both ambassadors noted that
    France was the main objector to a single resolution, which is
    why the international community is now behind the two-phase
    concept.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶8. (C) Siniora's "chat" with the ambassadors -- in which he
    hinted but never explicitly said that the cabinet could not
    accept the current draft -- concluded just an hour before
    Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri's press conference. Citing
    the unacceptability of blessing something that left Israeli
    troops in place inside Lebanon, Berri rejected the current
    draft. This is ominous. If this resolution has any chance
    of success in being formally accepted by the Lebanese
    cabinet, Siniora needs Shia support. Without Berri's
    backing, Siniora faces difficult choices (assuming the
    resolution passes in something approaching its current
    wording). If he brings the resolution to the cabinet for
    acceptance, the cabinet will either split, which will
    increase sectarian tensions and perhaps trigger a cabinet
    collapse. The cabinet might reject it altogether, to avoid
    giving legitimacy to Israeli troops inside Lebanon. Yet if
    Siniora chooses not to bring the resolution to the cabinet,
    he gives tacit approval to the Israelis to continue to pound
    Lebanon and perhaps expand their targetting to GOL
    facilities. Put starkly, Siniora is being asked to choose
    between the international community and his own Shia
    population. It is not out of the question that Siniora might
    be assassinated if he is seen as selling out the Shia south
    to Israeli occupation.

    ¶9. (C) The French and British ambassadors, along with UN
    rep Geir Pedersen, are working with us to try to help Siniora
    find a way to accept this text. If we had more to show on
    the second resolution, for example, and could compress the
    time between the resolutions, that might help. (Indeed, we
    are telling Siniora to push for the second resolution as
    quickly as possible, to build momentum.) Maybe there are
    certain assurances that could be provided to him that he
    could share with the cabinet both on Israeli withdrawal and
    Sheba'a, to provide some useful content. We will also see if
    he can criticize the resolution in comments for public
    consumption, while telling the cabinet that, for the sake of
    Lebanese civilians, there is no choice but to accept it. It
    will be hard enough to convince Siniora -- a Sunni worried
    about problems with the Shia -- to put an official acceptance

    BEIRUT 00002542 003 OF 003

    stamp on Israeli troops in south Lebanon. Speaker Berri will
    be an even greater problem.
    FELTMAN

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