Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12530 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10 2011/05/11

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC ASEC AF AR AM AS AEMR ASEAN AJ AFFAIRS AFIN AMGT AODE APEC AE ABLD ACBAQ APECO AFSI AFSN AY AO AU ABUD ADPM AG ACOA ANET AINF AC APER AMED ATRN ADCO ARF AL ASIG ASCH AID ASUP AADP AMCHAMS AGAO AIT AMBASSADOR AUC AA ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN ALOW ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ACS APCS ADANA AECL ACAO AORG AGR AROC ACABQ AGMT AORL AX AMEX ADM AFGHANISTAN AZ AND ARM AQ ATFN
BR BK BL BA BO BRUSSELS BM BEXP BU BD BG BP BB BF BTIO BBSR BY BH BIDEN BX BE BTIU BT BWC BMGT BC BN BILAT
CA CVIS CO CS CJAN CU CARICOM CI CB CASC CE CH CN CONDOLEEZZA CMGT CW CODEL CWC CT CBW CPAS CFED CG CACS CY CAN CSW CIDA CIC CITT CONS CM CD CLINTON CDG COM CDC CROS CLMT CAPC COPUOS CTR CF CJUS CL CR CARSON CHR CACM CDB COE CV CBC COUNTERTERRORISM CIA CNARC COUNTER CICTE COUNTRY CBSA CEUDA CAC CBE CTM CIS CKGR CVR CITEL CLEARANCE
DR DISENGAGEMENT DE DJ DA DOMESTIC DEA DOD DTRA DOE DS DEFENSE DO DHS DAO DCM DEAX DK DPRK DEPT
ETTC ECON EWWT EC EMIN ETRD EINV EAID EG EFIN EAGR ENRG EIND EPET EUN ECPS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENIV ENGR ECIN ELTN EAIR EI EFIS ECUN EU ELAB EN EFTA ENGY ECONOMICS ET ES ETRDEINVTINTCS EFINECONCS ELECTIONS EIAR EZ EINDETRD EINT EUR EREL EUC ER ESENV ELN ECONEFIN EK EPA EURN EAIG ECONCS EEPET ESA ENNP EDU EUREM ENVR ECA ENVI EXIM ECIP ENERG EFIM EAIDS ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC ECONOMIC EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA EXTERNAL ERNG ETRC ETRO ETRN EINVEFIN ECINECONCS ERD ETC EAP ECONOMY EINN EXBS
FI FR FTAA FAC FOI FJ FM FREEDOM FMLN FAO FTA FDA FARC FBI FO FISO FOR FOREIGN FAS FINR FINANCE
GG GM GZ GAZA GH GR GOI GANGS GV GCC GY GT GAERC GERARD GA GE GOV GTIP GLOBAL GTMO GL GF
HK HR HA HURI HO HUMAN HU HSTC HILLARY HYMPSK HUMOR HEBRON HI
IN IAEA IR IS IT IMF IBRD IZ IC IWC ISRAELI INTERPOL ICAO IO ITRA ILO ISLAMISTS ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IPR IQ IV IRS IAHRC IACI ID INRB ICTY IL ICRC IMO ICJ ITU ILC IIP IRC IDP IDA IZPREL IRAJ IA ITF IF INMARSAT ISRAEL ICTR IGAD INRA INRO IEFIN INTELSAT INTERNAL INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV IBET INR IEA
JA JP JM JO JAMES JOSEPH JOHN JOHNNIE JUS
KPAO KMDR KISL KNNP KRVC KDEM KCRM KPAL KTIA KV KCOR KJUS KOMC KTFN KWBG KTIP KSCA KMPI KSUM KIRF KIRC KE KZ KIPR KWMN KFRD KSEP KN KAWC KOLY KCFE KPKO KIDE KMRS KFLU KSAF KS KGIC KRAD KU KHLS KCIP KOCI KSTH KG KGHG KUNR KR KVPR KBTR KRIM KREC KTDB KDRG KSPR KICC KAWK KMCA KPLS KCOM KAID KGCC KPRP KSTC KNSD KBIO KGIT KSEO KFLO KPAONZ KFSC KOM KRGY KPOA KACT KHIV KTEX KLIG KBCT KWMM KPAI KICA KNAR KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KHDP KHUM KBTS KCRS KHSA KO KVIR KX KVRP KMOC KNUC KSEC KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCMR KPWR KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KWWMN KPRV KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KSCI KDDG KIFR KMFO KFIN KNEI KTER KWAC KOMS KCRCM KNUP KMIG KNNPMNUC KNPP KERG KTLA KCSY KTRD KID KSAC KJUST KRCM KTBT KCFC KCHG KREL KFTFN KDEMAF
LY LTTE LE LH LU LO LI LG LA LT LABOR LAB LOG
MARR MOPS MG MASS MW MIL MX MNUC MTCRE MCAP MAS MO MTCR MU MRCRE MY MD MK MP MAPP MR MT MCC MZ MIK MTRE ML MDC MAR MA MQADHAFI MASC MV MAPS MARAD MEETINGS MEDIA MEPP MPOS MILITARY MASSMNUC MEPN MI MC MUCN MERCOSUR MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MEPI
NZ NL NI NU NATO NO NPT NE NRR NA NR NATIONAL NIPP NDP NPA NG NAFTA NT NS NK NGO NP NASA NAR NSF NV NORAD NSSP NH NATOPREL NSG NW NPG NSFO NEW NZUS NSC NC
OTRA OPRC OIIP OAS OPDC OVIP OEXC OPIC OECD OSCE OPCW OREP OFFICIALS ODIP OES OSCI OHUM OMIG OFDP OVP OCII OPAD OIC OIE OCS OBSP OTR OSAC ON OFDA
PHUM PREL PINR PARM PGOV PM PTER PREF PA PHSA PK POL PINS PBTS PL PE PFOR PALESTINIAN PUNE PDOV PGOVLO PAO POLITICS PO PHUMBA PSEPC PAK PTBS PCUL PLN PROP PRL PBIO PGOC PNAT PREO PAHO PINL POGOV PU PF PY POV PNR PGOVE PG PROG PCI PREFA PP PMIL POLINT PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PSOE PAS PHUMPREL PMAR PGIV PRAM PHUH PSA PHUMPGOV PEL PSI PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PARMS POLICY PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PTERE PRGOV PORG PS PGOF PKFK PEPR PPA PINT PRELP PINF PNG
QA
RS RU RICE RW RM RCMP RO RIGHTS RUPREL RFE RF ROOD RP REACTION RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS RSO REPORT REGION RSP
SCUL SOCI SNAR SENV SY SR SU SO SP SA SZ SF SMIG SPCE SW SIPDIS SYR SHI STEINBERG SN SL SNARIZ SG SNARN SEVN SARS SSA SC SIPRS SYRIA SNARCS SAARC SHUM SK SI SPCVIS SOFA SANC SEN SH SCRS SENVKGHG SWE SAN ST
TPHY TW TU TBIO TRGY TSPA TX TN TSPL TL TV TC TZ TS TF TNGD TI TIP TH TINT TT TFIN TD TP TAGS TK TR TERRORISM THPY TO TRSY TURKEY TBID
UK UP US UNSC UNHCR USEU UNGA UG UNESCO UY UN UNMIK USTR USOAS UNHRC UZ USUN UV UNEP UNODC UNCHS UNDP UNCHR UNFICYP UNAUS UNO UNPUOS UNC UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNCND UNICEF UNCSD UNDC USNC USPS USAID UE UNVIE UAE
VT VM VE VZ VN VTPREL VTIZ VAT VC VTEG VI
WI WMD WHO WTRO WIPO WHA WTO WFP WS WTRQ WWARD WBG WITH WMO WEU WZ WHTI WA WB
XM XR XZ XF XA XB XV XL XG XC XTAG XK XY XH XT XE XU XX XD XW XI XQ XS
YM YI YE YMCS
ZB ZI ZA ZK ZF ZU ZR ZP ZANU ZO ZOELLICK ZL ZJ ZEALAND ZN

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09SANAA1402, S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION TO REDUCE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANAA1402.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANAA1402 | 2009-08-04 11:58 | 2010-12-03 21:30 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Sanaa

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHYN #1402/01 2161158
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 041158Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2444
    INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0236
    RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0458
    RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1652
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T SANAA 001402

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND PM/WRA SPICO AND
    SCOSTNER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019
    TAGS: PARM PREL PTER MASS YM
    SUBJECT: (S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION TO REDUCE
    MANPADS THREAT

    Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY.  On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation
    visited Yemen to discuss MANPADS threat reduction efforts
    with ROYG officials.  Since 2004, US-ROYG cooperation has
    dramatically reduced the availability of MANPADS on the black
    market in Yemen. Although the program has likely recovered
    the bulk of the illicit MANPADS available on the black
    market, several more will likely be collected in the coming
    years.  MOD insists that there are no official MANPADS
    stocks, and that they have already implemented necessary
    stockpile security and inventory controls, but the
    intelligence community and the National Security Bureau (NSB)
    believe that is not the case.  The USG will offer the MOD,
    through NSB interlocutors, payment for destruction of MOD
    MANPADS and stockpile security upgrades.  ROYG officials seem
    more receptive to a TSA-sponsored MANPADS Assist Visit.  END
    SUMMARY.

    BACKGROUND
    ----------

    ¶2. (S/NF) After years of uncontrolled weapons imports and the
    chaos of the 1994 civil war, MANPADS were widely available on
    the illicit arms market in Yemen, making these systems a
    critical proliferation threat.  MANPADS that leaked from
    official Yemeni stocks were used in al-Qaeda (AQ) operations
    in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in 2001 and 2002.  In 2003,
    the ROYG began collecting MANPADS from weapons souks
    throughout the country, and in 2004 the USG agreed to
    compensate the ROYG for the acquisition and destruction of
    these and other black market MANPADS.  In February 2005,
    US-ROYG cooperation resulted in the destruction of 1,161
    MANPADS.

    MEETINGS READOUT
    ----------------

    ¶3. (S/NF) On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation consisting of
    Dennis Hadrick, PM/WRA Program Manager; Santo Polizzi, DHS
    liaison; Nils Talbot, PM/WRA technical expert; and Laurie
    Freeman, PM/WRA Foreign Affairs Officer, visited Yemen to
    discuss US-ROYG cooperation to reduce the threat of MANPADS.
    The delegation began with a June 20 meeting at the NSB with
    Col. Hefed Al-Jamrah, the NSB official in charge of airport
    security in Sana'a.  Polizzi briefed Jamrah on the MANPADS
    threat to civilian aviation.  He also offered a MANPADS
    Assist Visit (MAV), in which experts from the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) identify airport
    vulnerabilities to MANPADS attacks and recommend ways to
    mitigate them.  Following the meeting, the delegation toured
    the current airport and the site of the new airport.  During
    the tour, several lapses in airport security practices were
    observed regarding passenger screening, cargo security, and
    Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge and access
    procedures.  Polizzi recommended that the TSA Representative
    (TSAR) in Amman, Jordan be contacted for follow-on
    discussions with airport officials.  NSB officials seemed
    receptive to the MAV offer.

    ¶4. (S/NF) On June 21, the delegation met with NSB Deputy
    Director Ammar Saleh to discuss ongoing efforts to acquire
    MANPADS from the black market in Yemen.  Since the program's
    inception in August 2004, this program had resulted in the
    destruction of 1,161 black market MANPADS in 2005.  Hadrick
    thanked the ROYG for its efforts, expressed the USG's
    continued interest in supporting the program, and pressed the
    ROYG to destroy an additional 102 MANPADS they had collected
    since 2005.

    ¶5. (S/NF) Ammar Saleh agreed with USG assessments that the
    majority of black market MANPADS had been collected in Yemen,
    and said that a few more might trickle in with the increase
    in price.  (Note: In July 2008, the price for first
    generation systems was increased from $7,700 to $15,000. End
    Note.)  The small quantity of illicit MANPADS that still
    exist outside of state control in Yemen are in the hands of
    tribal leaders or AQAP, neither of which is likely to part
    with them at any price.  He could not estimate how many
    MANPADS Yemeni tribal leaders possess, but he believes that
    AQAP has six MANPADS (NFI).  Finally, he expressed skepticism
    that the MOD would accept U.S. assistance to destroy its

    official MANPADS stocks (an offer on the table since 2005).
    He believes MOD would want a more modern air defense system
    in return, not cash payment or stockpile security upgrades.
    He offered to attempt to broker a cash-for-destruction deal.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Accompanied by NSB official Akram al-Qassmi, the
    delegation visited a warehouse to view 96 MANPADS collected
    between 2005 and May 2009 that were awaiting destruction.
    (Note: These systems had already been verified by U.S.
    personnel and disabled. End Note.)  The delegation verified
    an additional six SA-7s, four SA-7 gripstocks, and six
    batteries collected by the NSB since May 2009.  The
    delegation disabled the six MANPADS and expended the six
    batteries.

    ¶7. (S/NF) On their last day, June 22, the delegation
    accompanied the Ambassador to a meeting with Minister of
    Defense Mohammed Nasser Ahmed.  Ahmed denied that the MOD has
    any MANPADS in its official stocks, saying that they had
    already been handed over to NSB and destroyed.  (Note: This
    is in direct contradiction to NSB,s June 21 assertion that
    the MOD had excess stocks of MANPADS, but would part with
    them only in exchange for a more modern air defense system.
    End Note.) The Minister described the MOD's progress on SA/LW
    issues since S/E Bloomfield's July 2008 visit.  He noted that
    more than 250 weapons souks had been closed and more than 140
    weapons dealers prosecuted.  Furthermore, he remarked that
    the MOD has established an inventory system for all Armed
    Forces and MOD weapons, all of which are now marked.  He
    invited U.S. officials to visit the warehouses to see how the
    system works.  Finally, the Minister shared the delegation,s
    concerns about the airport,s MANPADS vulnerability, and said
    that as a member of the Supreme Security Committee, he would
    support a MAV.

    NEXT STEPS
    ----------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Post worked with NSB to ensure that all 102
    collected MANPADS were destroyed on July 27 (septel).  Post
    has requested a meeting with the MOD Chief of Staff to
    observe the stockpile security and inventory control system
    reportedly in place.  Post will follow up with NSB to find
    out whether it will accept a MAV and, if so, identify
    possible dates for the assessment.  (Note: Despite
    ministerial-level support, the final decision on the MAV will
    be made by President Saleh.  End Note.)  Finally, Post will
    work with the Department to present a specific offer to the
    Yemeni government for assistance with physical security and
    stockpile management (PSSM) and destruction and marking of
    Yemeni SA/LW.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶9. (S/NF) It is hard to know what to believe regarding the
    presence or absence of MOD MANPADS.  In a subsequent meeting
    on June 27, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs that the MOD does indeed have
    MANPADS, but would never speak of them because they are
    considered a state secret.  While MOD realizes their MANPADS
    are of little military value, they consider them better than
    nothing and would turn them over for destruction only if they
    were able to get a modern air defense system in return,
    according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.  PolOffs agreed to continue negotiating
    the destruction of MOD MANPADS through NSB interlocutors,
    since the MOD appears unwilling to discuss the issue with USG
    officials directly.  END COMMENT.
    SECHE

`