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### Viewing cable 09ABUDHABI862, SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHAYKH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09ABUDHABI862 | 2009-08-31 10:05 | 2010-11-28 18:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Abu Dhabi

`

    INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AF-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  A-00     CIAE-00
          INL-00   DOTE-00  PERC-00  DS-00    DHSE-00  FAAE-00  VCI-00
          OBO-00   H-00     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     MOFM-00
          MOF-00   M-00     VCIE-00  NEA-00   DCP-00   NSAE-00  DOHS-00
          FMPC-00  IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    NCTC-00  CRYE-00  DSCC-00
          PRM-00   SAS-00   FA-00    GSWA-00  SWCI-00  PESU-00  SRND-00
          MEPP-00  SANA-00    /000W

    O 311005Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
    TO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2881
    INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000862

    NOFORN

    DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR SRAP, S/SEMEP AND NEA.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2018
    TAGS: PREL AE
    SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SHAYKH
    MOHAMMED BIN ZAYED

    Classified by Ambassador Richard Olson, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Mr President:  Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed is looking forward
    to renewing your acquaintanceship, established during his 2006 call
    on you.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    MbZ - The Man
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶2.  (C) Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, or MbZ in USG speak, is
    the man who runs the United Arab Emirates.  Officially he is the
    Crown Prince of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (the most important
    principality of the seven emirate confederation) and his only federal
    title is Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; in fact he is
    the key decision maker on national security issues.  He will make
    deferential noises about his "boss" (elder half-brother President
    Khalifa, a distant and uncharismatic personage), but we assess that
    he has authority in all matters except for final decisions on oil
    policy and major state expenditures.

    ¶3.  (C) Aged 47, MbZ is a leader not just in the UAE, but more
    broadly in the Middle East, where he is seen as a particularly
    dynamic member of the generation succeeding the geriatric cases who
    have dominated the region for decades.  He is a reformer, actively
    seeking to improve the life of his citizens and the UAE's future
    through better education and health care, and through economic
    diversification, including investments in clean energy to prepare his
    citizenry for a post-hydrocarbon future.  He is proud of the fact
    that despite having had the option of life of privilege, he rose
    through the ranks of the UAE Armed Forces, earning his wings as a
    helicopter pilot and retains a common touch that appeals to Emiratis.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    MbZ and the Bilateral Relationship
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶4.  (C) MbZ has staked his reputation, and his country's future, on
    its relationship with the United States, especially since 1990, when
    the UAE leadership saw that the United States was prepared to shed
    blood in the interests of preserving international order and
    stability in the Gulf.  Since that formative experience, MbZ has
    built armed forces (especially his Air Force) that are closely
    aligned with the US.  He is also a proponent of close economic,
    commercial, and where possible political ties with the US.  He has
    generally tried to support us where he thinks we have been right
    (Afghanistan), but also where he thinks we have pursued misguided
    policies (Iraq).  MbZ recognizes that partnership with the US is
    fundamental to the UAE's continued success, but he also knows that
    the relationship is controversial among his people, and that if the
    US is perceived as an unreliable protector, his own power base will
    erode.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    Iran
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶5.  (C) MbZ sees Iran as the primary external threat to the UAE and
    his regime.  To his eyes, Tehran's threatening rhetoric, dominance by
    proxy, and pursuit of nuclear weapons is reminiscent of Saddam in
    ¶1990.  Moreover, the confrontations with Iran during the late 1980s
    tanker wars, long forgotten in the West, are vividly remembered here.
     MbZ is probably the most passionately anti-Iran of the Arab leaders,
    and the UAE's position is solidly with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan
    in seeing the principal threat to the region as coming from Iran.
    MbZ is particularly concerned at the divisions among the Gulf Arabs,
    and sees Qatar's and Oman's decision to accommodate, rather than
    challenge, Iranian power as troubling.

    ¶6.  (S/NF) While MbZ is a hard liner on Iran, there are
    accommodationists within his own system, especially in Dubai, where
    the Ruler, Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (Prime Minister of the UAE)
    takes a position that is much closer to Qatar's.  For this reason,
    and because of the basic disparity in size and power between the UAE
    and Iran, the Emiratis prefer to be seen as quietly supporting a
    hard-line US position, rather than staking out their own views.  MbZ
    is skeptical that US engagement with Iran will be successful in
    reversing Iranian positions on nuclear program, and believes that a
    policy of engagement puts him in an awkward position, both
    domestically and internationally.  He will welcome thinking on next
    steps on sanctions.

    ¶7.  (S/NF) Regarding the nuclear issue, MbZ believes that the logic
    of war now dominates the region.  He regularly expresses his belief
    that Israel will launch a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear
    facilities, most likely within next six months.  This reflects his
    own assessment of the Netanyahu Government, but also, probably, what
    Israelis are telling UAE in their private exchanges.  For this
    reason, one of MbZ's highest priorities is to finalize his integrated
    air defense system (including THAAD and Patriots) and advance
    bilateral contingency planning with the US.  Because of Qatari and
    Omani wobbliness, he is uncomfortable with multilateral (GCC)
    military solutions.  MbZ may float the idea of extending the US
    nuclear umbrella to the Gulf as a way of shoring up an anti-Iran
    coalition, and preventing a regional arms race.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    Israel and the Arabs
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶8.  (S/NF) MbZ's pre-occupation with Iran (and his secondary concern
    about Islamic fundamentalism) lead him to have a strategic view of
    the region that is curiously close to the Israeli one.  But domestic
    politics flow the other way, and he feels constrained in what he can
    say publicly.  Also, for reasons that are not entirely clear, the UAE
    still feels a need to hide behind Arab League and GCC consensus, and
    in particular behind Saudi Arabia (even when, as is now the case,
    bilateral relations with the Kingdom are rocky).

    ¶9.  (S/NF)  We should press MbZ to expend political capital in
    resolving the century old Arab-Israeli conflict.  The issue cries out
    for leadership in the Arab world, not least so that the common
    interests of moderate Arabs and Israelis in containing Iran can find
    a political expression.  So far, MbZ has not been prepared to run
    real risks in this area, but we should press him to.  He appreciates
    the bold steps you have taken, and expects to be asked for help in
    this area.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    Afghanistan-Pakistan
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶10.  (C) The discussion on Afghanistan and Pakistan should be an easy
    one.  The UAE has played a useful role since 2001, having deployed
    Special Forces there since 2003, and recently sending a Battalion
    sized task force during the elections.  MbZ tried to organize a
    pan-Arab force, but could not overcome the resistance of Moroccans
    and Tunisians to send troops.  In Pakistan, the UAE has been
    supportive of Zardari and played a very useful role both as donor and
    politically as one of the key members of the friends of Pakistan
    grouping.  MbZ agrees on the need to curtail Taliban financing, but
    is frustrated by our seeming inability to generate actionable
    intelligence.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    CT/CP Cooperation
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶11. (C) The UAE has emerged as one of our principal partners in CT
    Cooperation through intelligence channels, having rounded up a number
    of cells over the past few years, and is moving toward cooperation
    externally as well.  In the counterproliferation area, the UAE has
    interdicted 20 shipments over the past two years, including within
    the past few days, seizing North Korean systems bound for Iran.
    Domestic Export Controls have lagged somewhat, but the UAEG's
    bureaucratic structure for implementing its export control laws is
    finally emerging.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    Conclusion
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶12.  (C) MbZ views himself as one our closest partners in the Middle
    East, and is keen to build on what has been an important aspect of
    his life's work, a good relationship with the US.  From my
    perspective, our relationship with the UAE is one the most promising
    and productive in the region.

    OLSON

`