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### Viewing cable 08PORTAUPRINCE1381, WHY WE NEED CONTINUING MINUSTAH PRESENCE IN HAITI

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PORTAUPRINCE1381 | 2008-10-01 15:48 | 2011-01-28 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Port Au Prince

`

    VZCZCXRO6232
    OO RUEHQU
    DE RUEHPU #1381/01 2751548
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 011548Z OCT 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8914
    INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2071
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 0242
    RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1844
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2426
    RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL 0332
    RUEHQU/AMCONSUL QUEBEC 1267
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL
    RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM J2 MIAMI FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PORT AU PRINCE 001381

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA/CAR, DRL, S/CRS, INR/IAA
    SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
    STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CAR
    TREASURY FOR MAUREEN WAFER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL HA
    SUBJECT: WHY WE NEED CONTINUING MINUSTAH PRESENCE IN HAITI

    PORT AU PR 00001381 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Ambassador Janet A. Sanderson. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4
    (b), (d)

    ¶1. (U) This report responds to recommendation number 2 of the
    Embassy Port au Prince OIG inspection report.

    Summary
    --------

    ¶2. (C) The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an
    indispensable tool in realizing core USG policy interests in
    Haiti. Security vulnerabilities and fundamental
    institutional weaknesses mean that Haiti will require a
    continuing - albeit eventually shrinking - MINUSTAH presence
    for at least three and more likely five years. Haiti needs
    the UN presence to fill the security gap caused by Haiti's
    fledgling police force's lack of numbers and capabilities.
    It needs MINUSTAH to partner with the USG and other donors in
    institution-building. A premature departure of MINUSTAH
    would leave the Preval government or his successor vulnerable
    to resurgent kidnapping and international drug trafficking,
    revived gangs, greater political violence, an exodus of
    seaborne migrants, a sharp drop in foreign and domestic
    investment, and resurgent populist and anti-market economy
    political forces - reversing gains of the last two years.

    ¶3. (C) Summary Continued: MINUSTAH is a remarkable product
    and symbol of hemispheric cooperation in a country with
    little going for it. There is no feasible substitute for
    this UN presence. It is a financial and regional security
    bargain for the USG. USG civilian and military assistance
    under current domestic and international conditions, alone or
    in combination with our closest partners, could never fill
    the gap left by a premature MINUSTAH pullout. The U.S. will
    reap benefits from this hemispheric security cooperation for
    years to come - but only if its success is not endangered by
    early withdrawal. We must work to preserve MINUSTAH by
    continuing to partner with it at all levels in coordination
    with other major donor and MINUSTAH contributor countries
    from the hemisphere. That partnering will also help counter
    perceptions in Latin contributing countries that Haitians see
    their presence in Haiti as unwanted. The Department and
    Embassies in Latin countries contributing troops should work
    to ensure th
    ese countries' continuing support for MINUSTAH. End summary.

    Haiti Needs MINUSTAH to Become Viable State
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The fundamental USG policy goal in Haiti is to make
    it a viable state that does not post a threat to the region
    through domestic political turmoil or an exodus of illegal
    migrants. To reach that point, Haiti must be able to assure
    its own domestic security, govern itself with stable
    democratic institutions, and create a business climate that
    will get the economy moving. Haiti has made progress but is
    still a long way from these goals. The United Nations
    Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is the largest and
    most effective external institution pursuing them. Haiti's
    progress toward viability hinges on a large international
    security presence and continued injections of assistance to
    consolidate its institutions and ease human misery. MINUSTAH
    is the implementing instrument of the security goal, and
    MINUSTAH elements are key players in the goal of
    consolidating institutions and providing critical disaster
    relief.

    MINUSTAH a Security Linchpin
    ----------------------------

    ¶5. (C) MINUSTAH's core stabilization function is security:
    filling the gap left by inadequate force levels and
    capabilities of the Haitian National Police (HNP). The HNP
    currently has approximately 9,000 officers. MINUSTAH in 2006
    set a five-year target of training and fielding 14,000
    officers - although the police reform report to the UN
    Security Council says 20,000 are needed to adequately police
    the country. At current training and vetting rates, Haiti

    PORT AU PR 00001381 002.2 OF 004

    will reach this goal by 2012 at the earliest, provided the
    GOH is willing to fund and staff this level. (Note: This
    projection rests on HNP plans to expand the capacity of the
    Police Academy beginning with the summer class of 2008. End
    note.) This gain in force will be reduced if the HNP acts
    on the results of the ongoing UN vetting process and weeds
    out officers found to be linked to crime, corruption, and
    other misconduct. Normal attrition will also push the 2012
    target date further out. Deficient capabilities - in
    experience, investigative skills, and management, all
    exacerbated by corruption -- limit the HNP's security clout.

    ¶6. (C) Given HNP's lack of capability, MINUSTAH's backup
    security and police training functions are needed to fill the
    resulting gap in security. MINUSTAH troops continue to
    provide security in areas such as the Cite Soleil slum,
    liberated from overt gang rule in early 2007. They are also
    the country's ultimate riot control force which in times of
    unrest protects strategic government installations, including
    the National Palace and the airport. In MINUSTAH's UN police
    operations pillar, Formed Police Units (FPU -
    gendarmerie-type police units from individual contributor
    countries) aid the HNP with security operations, such as
    helping put down the mutiny at the national penitentiary last
    November, and performing riot control during the April
    disturbances. UNPOL officers provide support to HNP
    operations, down to helping the anti-kidnapping unit and
    beginning to assist the HNP's counter narcotics unit. The
    UNPOL development pillar works with the HNP to develop its
    capabilities. UNPOL officers guide and monitor the training
    of the HNP at the Police Academy and in the field. The
    MINUSTAH apparatus is also conducting the vetting of the
    entire HNP, an essential aspect of HNP reform.

    ¶7. (C) The April food riots threw into stark relief
    MINUSTAH's role as a security force of last resort. MIUSTAH
    troops, FPU's and UNPOL provided the criticl extra security
    capability that prevented riotes from overrunning the
    Presidential Palace and pobably chasing President Preval
    from office.

    INUSTAH Role in Institution Building
    ------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) MINUSTAH contibutes to building up Haiti's
    political and judiial institutions and supporting them
    day-to-day n the ground. It has a civilian presence
    througout the country: its civil affairs division has tams
    of advisers deployed in larger towns in all tn departments.
    These units advise and train oficials at a level of
    government that is just getting off the ground. At the
    national level, MINUSTAH is a key partner of the U.S. and
    other donor countries in building up and reforming Haiti's
    judicial system. The dimensions of the UN's civilian
    technical assistance and training for Haiti's national and
    local institutions exceed that of all other diplomatic
    missions in Haiti put together.

    MINUSTAH Post-Hurricane Role
    ----------------------------

    ¶9. (C) The August-September series of hurricanes and floods
    have put MINUSTAH's disaster relief role in the spotlight.
    Cut roads and fallen bridges meant that Prime Minister
    Michele Pierre-Louis' visits to flooded regions were possible
    only in MINUSTAH helicopters. Their rotary wing aircraft
    have also flown emergency aid to areas cut off from ground
    transport, supplementing the air assets of the USS Kearsarge
    and the World Food Program. MINUSTAH troops rescued flood
    victims trapped in their homes, and continue to provide
    security for food convoys and distribution points, assuring
    that emergency aid commodities reach their destination and
    are distributed in an orderly manner. MINUSTAH serves as the
    coordinating body among donors and between donors and the
    Government of Haiti.

    Bottom Line on Continuing MINUSTAH Presence
    -------------------------------------------

    PORT AU PR 00001381 003.2 OF 004

    ¶10. (C) The U.S. has a strong interest in maintaining
    MINUSTAH's presence in Haiti until Haiti's security, judicial
    and political institutions are can maintain a minimal level
    of domestic security and political stability on their own.
    Embassy therefore believes that MINUSTAH's presence here is
    needed until the HNP reaches at least 14,000 officers and
    Haiti has installed a new President after the 2011
    Presidential transition. A UN civilian advisory presence
    will be needed for an additional period after the MINUSTAH
    military and police are drawn down to help along Haiti's
    institution-building. MINUSTAH already envisions gradually
    transitioning the current force structure from predominantly
    infantry to more military police and engineering units,
    provided the UNSC agrees. It will reduce its civilian
    presence as Haiti's institutions become more solid. However,
    a significant withdrawal of the MINUSTAH security forces and
    civilian advisers is not advisable for a minimum of three
    years, and we believe that a fu
    ll withdrawal of MINUSTAH should not be considered before
    five years.

    Scenario of a Premature MINUSTAH Departure
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) A precipitous withdrawal of or premature drawdown
    of MINUSTAH's security component could open the door to
    elements that threaten Haiti's political stability and the
    consolidation of its democratic institutions. These are
    goals which we and our hemispheric and European allies since
    2004 have devoted over two billion USD in resources to
    achieve. Increased security and other assistance from the
    U.S. and other large donors individually could not
    immediately make up for the loss of MINUSTAH boots on the
    ground.

    ¶12. (C) We could see a rollback of stabilization and
    security gains made since MINUSTAH began to serious confront
    security problems in 2006. Kidnappings, now reduced through
    effective police work, might spike upward again. Drug
    trafficking networks, a large threat even with the current
    MINUSTAH presence, could ramp up shipments through Haiti and
    further their penetration of police, the judiciary,
    parliament -- where we estimate perhaps a score of deputies
    and senators are linked to the drug trade. Gang structures,
    weakened but not eliminated from Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien
    and Gonaives, could flex their muscles again. If gangs
    resurface, we could see the revival of politically-linked
    armed groups that during the Aristide era engaged in targeted
    violence including murder against regime critics. If these
    factors produced greater general instability, larger numbers
    of Haitians would likely to take to the boats and attempt to
    reach the U.S., as they did in the unstable 1990s. An upward
    trend of the above factors would cause a deterioration of the
    economic environment and a drop in domestic and foreign
    investment.

    MINUSTAH a Good Deal for the U.S.
    ---------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) MINUSTAH's presence produces real regional security
    dividends for the U.S. Paying one-quarter of MINUSTAH's
    budget through our DPKO assessment, the U.S. reaps the
    security and stabilization benefits of a 9,000-person
    international military and civilian stabilization mission in
    the hemisphere's most troubled country. The security
    dividend the U.S. reaps from this hemispheric cooperation not
    only benefits the immediate Caribbean, but also is developing
    habits of security cooperation in the hemisphere that will
    serve our interests for years to come. In the current
    context of our military commitments elsewhere, the U.S. alone
    could not replace this mission. This regionally-coordinated
    Latin American commitment to Haiti would not be possible
    without the UN umbrella. That same umbrella helps other
    major donors -- led by Canada and followed up by the EU,
    France, Spain, Japan and others -- justify their bilateral
    assistance domestically. Without a UN-sanctioned
    peacekeeping and stabilization force, we

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    would be getting far less help from our hemispheric and
    European partners in managing Haiti.

    But We Must Short Up Support
    ----------------------------

    ¶14. (C) The U.S. will continue to reap these security
    benefits only if MINUSTAH's mission succeeds and enables
    Haiti to carry itself as a country. The USG thus has a
    strong interest that contributing countries continue their
    commitment until Haiti's stability is self-sustained. The
    USG should work to shore up support for MINUSTAH in Haiti and
    in hemispheric troop-contributing countries. We should take
    emphasize in UN venues and bilaterally to our Latin partners
    that the Haitian people and their legitimate government
    support MINUSTAH's presence, and that the UN is here at the
    express request of the Government of Haiti. We must be
    sensitive to Latin fears that any Haitian opposition to the
    UN presence undermines their domestic support for deployments
    in Haiti. During the April riots, the Brazilian MINUSTAH
    Force Commander told Ambassador and others that his greatest
    fear was that his troops would be forced to fire on
    demonstrators. He understood that this could ignite
    opposition in Haiti, Brazil, and other contributing countries
    to his troops' presence in Haiti. The Brazilian Embassy's
    national day celebration in Port au Prince September 8 was an
    exercise aimed at the Brazilian domestic audience. Attended
    by several Brazilian senators, it featured slide paels
    extolling the humanitarian work of Brazil's army at home and
    in Haiti, and a pathos-filled speech by the Ambassador about
    the history and culture Brazil shares with Haiti.

    ¶15. (C) The Port au Prince embassies of Latin countries
    contributing to MINUSTAH look to the strength of the U.S.
    commitment to the UN presence as a bellwether. Any slippage
    of U.S. commitment would embolden domestic elements who
    oppose these countries' participation in in the UN mission
    here. We sense that the strong U.S. embrace of the UN
    presence in Haiti helps their case at home for continuing
    deployments in Haiti. The Embassy uses every opportunity to
    partner publicly with and support MINUSTAH. The current
    post-hurricane relief effort, however disordered, is proving
    an opportunity for U.S., Canadian, and other bilateral donors
    to partner with MINUSTAH in disaster assistance and
    reconstruction. We sense that the humanitarian focus of
    these crisis-response efforts -- in contrast to riot-control
    efforts in April -- is helping the case in Latin countries
    for continuing their peacekeeping contributions in Haiti.

    ¶16. (C) The USG in Washington, New York, and in Latin
    capitals must also do their part to buck up support for
    MINUSTAH. In UN Security Council discussions of
    Haiti-related items, U.S. rhetorical appreciation for the UN
    presence here helps reassure contributor countries that their
    deployments are justified. Similar expressions of support to
    Latin representatives in Washington and Latin capitals are
    also helpful.

    ¶17. (C) In the end, what will maintain MINISTAH
    participants' support for deployments in Haiti is progress
    toward Haitian stabilization and state viability. Continuing
    the UN presence at projected levels for three to five years
    will not guarantee that result, but abruptly downsizing or
    prematurely withdrawing it will make more likely a result in
    Haiti we do not want, and would make future hemispheric
    peacekeeping efforts more difficult to justify.
    SANDERSON

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