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### Viewing cable 09SANAA2117, SA'ADA CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANAA2117 | 2009-11-23 15:15 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Sanaa

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9133
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9134
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9133
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9143
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9144
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9145
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10273
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10271
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10274
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10271
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10276
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10276
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10275
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10276
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10272

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHYN #2117/01 3271515
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 231515Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3269
    INFO RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1706
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T SANAA 002117

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
    SUBJECT: SA'ADA CEASEFIRE DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY

    Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY.  Well-informed sources, including one
    involved directly in preliminary talks, report that both the
    ROYG and the Houthis are looking for a way to stop the
    fighting in northern Yemen.  While the Houthis apparently
    have accepted the RQG's five ceasefire conditions, there is
    an impasse as to whether these conditions must be implemented
    before a ceasefire is announced or immediately after.  The
    matter is further complicated by Saudi Arabia's involvement
    in the war: Saleh cannot reach a ceasefire with the Houthis
    if the SAG is still fighting them, nor will he have much
    incentive to do so if the SAG continues to support the war
    effort militarily and financially.  It is hard to say how far
    these ceasefire talks will go, but they are the first serious
    effort that we know of to bring the Sixth War to an end
    politically rather than militarily.  END SUMMARY.

    SALEH MEETINGS WITH HOUTHI ENVOY
    --------------------------------

    ¶2.  (S/NF) Well-informed sources, including some involved
    directly in preliminary talks, report that both the ROYG and
    the Houthis are looking for a way to stop the fighting in
    northern Yemen.  Presidential advisor Abdul Karim al-Iryani
    told the Ambassador on November 22 that efforts were indeed
    underway to agree on terms for a ceasefire.  The Houthis have
    chosen Hassan Zaid, chairman of the opposition Joint Meeting
    Parties (JMP) and native of Sa'ada, to act as their
    intermediary with President Saleh.  Zaid told PolOff on
    November 21 that he met with Saleh on November 19 to discuss
    conditions for a ceasefire.  According to Zaid, Saleh
    insisted that once the Houthis accept the ROYG's five
    ceasefire conditions, he would form a commission to woQ out
    details regarding implementation of the ceasefire.  (Note:
    The ROYG's five ceasefire conditions required of the Houthis
    are: 1) withdraw from the mountains, remove mines, open
    roads, and commit to a ceasefire; 2) withdraw from districts
    and refrain from interfering with local authorities; 3)
    return seized and stolen military and civilian equipment; 4)
    release detainees; and 5) respect the law and the
    constitution.  End Note.)  Iryani confirmed that a mediation
    committee is now being formed in the event that hostilities
    cease.  According to Zaid, Saleh proposed the ceasefire
    commission consist of Northwest Regional Commander Ali
    Muhsin, Ali al-Jayfi, head of the Giants brigade, and Faisal
    Rajab, a southern military commander, while the Houthis
    proposed they be represented by Abdulkarim Amir Adim
    al-Houthi, Saleh Ahmed Habra, and Saleh al-Samaad.

    ¶3.  (S/NF) Zaid held a subsequent meeting with the President
    on November 22 to deliver a letter from Houthi spokesman
    Mohammed Abdulsalam agreeing to the five conditions,
    clarifying their objectives (such as denying that they want
    to re-establish the imamate), and shaming Saleh for "staying
    idle while children and women are killed by missiles and
    airplanes of the Saudi regime."  Zaid told PolOff on November
    23 that he emerged from the meeting very disappointed, as
    there was no progress or tangible outcome.  He reported that,
    on one hand, Saleh appeared to indicate that he wanted to
    stop the war but could not, because he complained that
    Hussein and Hamid al-Ahmar, leaders of the Hashid tribal
    confederation, want to keep the war going.  Zaid also had the
    impression Saleh would not end the war as long as the Saudis
    continued funding and supporting it.

    CEASEFIRE SEQUENCING UNCLEAR
    ----------------------------

    ¶4.  (S/NF) One of the elements that remains unclear,
    according to Zaid, is the sequencing of the implementation of
    the ceasefire relative to the implementation of the five
    ceasefire conditions.  The Houthis have pledged to implement
    the five conditions within a day of the cessation of military
    operations.  During that time, both parties would open roads,
    begin to clear the area of mines, come down from the
    mountains, and stop interfering with local authorities.
    Iryani told the Ambassador that he believes the essential
    first step is for Abdul Malik al-Houthi to publicly announce
    the rebels, acceptance of the ROYG's five points.  He said
    this is the only way Saleh will move forward, since it has
    become the government's bottom line for a settlement.  A
    public statement by the Houthis would enable Saleh to say to
    the families of the soldiers who have died and the Yemeni
    people in general that the sacrifices they made were not in
    vain.  (Note:  While the Houthis have communicated their
    acceptance of the five conditions to the President, they have
    not yet made it public.  End Note.)

    SOLVING THE PROBLEM AT ITS ROOTS
    --------------------------------

    ¶5.  (S/NF) Through their intermediary, the Houthis also
    presented the President with a list of their conditions for
    "guaranteeing a final resolution" to the conflict.  (Note:
    Iryani confirmed that the Houthis were presenting conditions
    of their own for the ceasefire to hold.  End Note.)
    According to a document Zaid gave PolOff on November 21,
    these conditions are:

    -- The formal announcement of a ceasefire, the cessation of
    all mobilization of ground troops, and allowing IDPs to
    return to their homes;

    -- The release of all prisoners of war and the clarification
    of the fates of the disappeared;

    -- Actions to address the impact of the war through
    reconstructing destroyed infrastructure and compensating
    civilians for looted properties;

    -- The "normalization of life in Sa,ada" through the
    following steps:  1) The army's withdrawal from villages and
    farms in order to demilitarize public and private properties
    in Sa,ada.  (Comment:  It is not clear if the Houthis will
    allow the military to remain in their posts on mountaintops.
    End Comment.); 2) Genuine economic development and delivery
    of basic services; 3) Ending cultural and political
    discrimination against the Zaydi population; and 4) Allowing
    civil servants to return to their jobs and giving them
    back-pay for the time they were separated from their posts.

    SIMULTANEOUS SAUDI ARABIA TRACK
    -------------------------------

    ¶6.  (S/NF) According to NDI Deputy Director Murad Zafir,
    reaching a ceasefire has been complicated by the SAG,s
    involvement: Saleh cannot announce a ceasefire if the Saudis
    are still fighting the Houthis, nor will he have any
    incentive to do so if the SAG continues providing cash and
    weapons for the war.  Zafir told PolOff that the Saudis had
    approached Hussein al-Ahmar to serve as a mediator with the
    Houthis.  Zaid confirmed this, saying Ahmar then called him
    to consult about possible terms the Houthis might accept.
    (Note: Hussein al-Ahmar has mobilized hundreds of Hashid
    tribesmen to fight alongside the ROYG army against the
    Houthis.  End Note.)  Zafir told PolOff on November 19 that
    Ahmar had consulted with the Houthis to see if they would
    withdraw from Jebel Dukhan in exchange for a Saudi commitment
    not to allow the ROYG to attack the Houthis from Saudi
    territory.  The Houthis reportedly agreed to these
    conditions, and Ahmar went to Riyadh to deliver the message.
    Zaid said, however, that the Saudis were not willing to give
    the Houthis anything in exchange for their commitment to
    withdraw from Jebel Dukhan and stop attacking Saudi forces.
    (Comment:  Post has not been able to confirm these reports
    with Ahmar directly.  End Comment.)  Zafir reported that the
    Houthis also chose Rabaea Amin al-Okaimi, a sheikh from Al
    Jawf, to serve as a mediator with the SAG.  Okaimi is
    reportedly in Saudi Arabia at the moment.

    ¶7. (S/NF) Zafir told PolOff that the Houthis are asking the
    SAG to stop military action in Jebel Dukhan, to cease attacks
    against the Houthis, and to refrain from allowing the ROYG to
    launch attacks against the Houthis from Saudi territory.  If
    the SAG were to agree, he said Houthis wanted the Zaydi
    sheikhs on the Saudi side of the border to guarantee the
    terms; they are reportedly very warrior-like tribes that will
    keep the Saudi army out of their territories if they have
    given their word to do so.  Zafir reported that the SAG
    agreed to these conditions in principle, but nothing is
    official yet.

    ¶8.  (S/NF) Iryani claimed to have no information about a
    separate line of communication between the Houthis and the
    SAG.  He did agree, however, that any ceasefire agreement
    between the ROYG and the Houthis would have to be agreed to
    in advance by the Saudis and coordinated with their forces so
    all hostilities could cease at the same time.

    HOPE FROM THE HAJJ
    ------------------

    ¶9.  (S/NF) Zafir believes that the November 25 beginning of
    the Hajj could encourage the Saudis to at least stop their
    direct military involvement in the war, as they do not want
    to be accused of killing Muslims during that holy time, as
    Iran will surely do.  Zafir also argues that the Saudis will
    have difficulty achieving their goal of clearing a 10
    kilometer buffer zone on the Yemeni side of the border -- as
    the SAG appears to be attempting to do -- without killing
    civilians and inciting anti-Saudi sentiment.

    HOW SERIOUS IS SALEH?
    ---------------------

    ¶10.  (S/NF) Zaid thinks Saleh may just be feigning an
    interest in a ceasefire agreement.  One reason he believes so
    is the people Saleh recommended for the ceasefire commission
    )- including Northwest Region Commander Muhsin -- are people
    he is rumored to want to get rid of in order to clear the way
    for his son Ahmed to become president.  (Comment:  Since the
    beginning of the Sixth War, many analysts have expressed the
    opinion that it is an internal proxy war aimed at weakening
    potential rivals to the president's son.  End Comment.)
    According to Zaid, Saleh will get serious about the ceasefire
    if he feels the war directly threatens his presidency or his
    son's prospects to succeed him, or if the Saudis stop
    financing his war.  Even if Saleh wanted to stop the war,
    however, Zaid is not sure he would be able to, given the
    Saudis' involvement and the desire of certain factions with
    the SAG to keep it going.  "The decision to stop the war is
    not in Saleh,s hands.  It,s in Riyadh," he said.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11.  (S/NF) The ceasefire discussions underway are incipient
    but promising nonetheless, if only because they are the first
    such discussions since the war began in August.  Many Yemeni
    analysts believe that Saudi Arabia will make or break them, a
    view that would seem to ignore the disinterest each of the
    warring parties has shown to date in anything other than a
    military solution.  END COMMENT.
    SECHE

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