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### Viewing cable 09QUITO177, ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09QUITO177 | 2009-03-11 23:43 | 2011-04-11 20:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Quito
Appears in these articles: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/04/11/1/1355/cable-196401.html

`

    VZCZCXYZ0009
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHQT #0177/01 0702343
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD3E4B70 MSI2349-632)
    O 112343Z MAR 09        ZDS ZDS
    FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8032
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4103
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3451
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3097
    RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4187
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0430
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177

    C O R R E C T E D    C O P Y  (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
    TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO
    SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS
    UNYIELD...

    id: 196401
    date: 3/11/2009 23:43
    refid: 09QUITO177
    origin: Embassy Quito
    classification: CONFIDENTIAL
    destination: 08QUITO783|09QUITO103
    header:
    VZCZCXYZ0009
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHQT #0177/01 0702343
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY AD3E4B70 MSI2349-632)
    O 112343Z MAR 09        ZDS ZDS
    FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0163
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8032
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4103
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3451
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3097
    RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4187
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0430
    RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000177

    C O R R E C T E D    C O P Y  (PARAGRAPH 10) NOTE ADDED

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
    TAGS: PREL PTER PREF SNAR OAS EC CO
    SUBJECT: ONE YEAR AFTER BREAK WITH COLOMBIA, GOE REMAINS
    UNYIELDING

    REF: A. 08 QUITO 783
         ¶B. QUITO 103

    Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (D)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Correa government ramped up its
    rhetoric against Colombia in recent weeks, spurred by a
    desire to defend itself against accusations of
    narco-politics, the first anniversary of the March 2008
    Colombian attack on a FARC camp in Ecuador, and Colombian
    remarks.  The GOE was delighted by OAS SYG Insulza's
    statement that there was no basis for accusations of GOE ties
    with the FARC.  To reinforce that perception, the Correa
    administration agreed to an opposition proposal for an
    investigative commission.  End Summary.

    CONDITIONS FOR RESTORING TIES

    ¶2.  (SBU) A January 23 MFA press release listed five
    conditions Colombia must meet before Ecuador would
    re-establish diplomatic relations, which were broken
    following the March 1, 2008, Colombian attack on a
    Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) camp near the
    town of Angostura in northern Ecuador:

    -- Ending the "information campaign" that charged the GOE
    with ties to the FARC,
    -- Committing to an effective military presence in the border
    area,
    -- Providing the information the GOE requested regarding the
    March 2008 attack,
    -- Proceeding with the handover of information from the
    computers found at the site of the attack, and
    -- Supporting UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
    efforts to assist Colombian refugees in Ecuador.

    ¶3.  (C) These conditions are consistent with the GOE's past
    position.  President Correa had set forth three conditions,
    which effectively covered the first four above, when he met
    with OAS Secretary General Insulza on July 30, 2008 (Ref A).
    GOE officials have mentioned the demand for Colombian support
    of UNHCR on other occasions.

    ¶4.  (C) The third condition above, the demand that Colombia
    provide information on the attack, is based on GOE suspicion
    of U.S. involvement.  Correa alluded to this when he
    discussed the conditions vis-a-vis Colombia in his February
    28 TV/radio address, "We do not know what planes dropped
    those bombs, which were North American bombs."  In a press
    interview published March 10, FM Fander Falconi was more
    explicit, saying that the reason for setting this condition
    was to establish whether there was involvement of a third
    country (read the U.S.).  He did not reject the idea that the
    GOE would have to break relations if a third country were
    involved, depending on the extent of the involvement.

    GOE RHETORIC SPIKES AGAIN

    ¶5.  (SBU) The allegations over GOE officials' and former
    officials' ties to the FARC (Ref B), which some of the
    Ecuadorian media and opposition are referring to as
    narco-politics, prompted President Correa in mid-February to
    defend the GOE by casting dispersion on Colombia.  Implicitly
    recalling Colombian accusations last year that the GOE was
    linked to the FARC, Correa said those Ecuadorians who speak
    of narco-politics in Ecuador harmed the country and weakened
    its dignified position against the abuses of an aggressor
    neighbor country, where there was narco-politics.

    ¶6.  (SBU) As the one-year anniversary of the attack in
    Angostura approached, President Correa emphasized the GOE
    conditions for re-establishing relations with Colombia.  In
    his February 28 TV/radio address, he said that Ecuador "wants
    to renew relations (with Colombia), but only on a foundation
    of dignity and respect."  Correa added one more condition:
    that Colombia pay compensation to the family of Ecuadorian
    Franklin Aisalla, who was killed in the attack.

    ¶7.  (SBU) The GOE tone hardened further after Colombian
    Defense Minister Santos on March 1 defended attacks on
    terrorists in other countries as a legitimate act of
    self-defense, and a Colombian radio station reported that two
    FARC leaders lived in northern Ecuador.  During a March 2

    press conference with three cabinet ministers defending the
    GOE position, Coordinating Minister for Internal and External
    Security Miguel Carvajal condemned Santos' comment and blamed
    problems between the two countries on the GOC's reliance on
    "the Bush doctrine."  Also on March 2, Correa reportedly
    stated that if Colombia continued with the policies voiced by
    its defense minister, that this time it would find Ecuador
    prepared; he told Colombia not to mess with Ecuador, saying
    the GOC should start in its own country if it wanted to
    pursue and attack terrorists.  The MFA sent a diplomatic note
    to the OAS March 3 asking that Insulza express to the GOC the
    necessity of providing Ecuador precise information about the
    location of the FARC high command members allegedly enjoying
    safe haven in Ecuador.  (Note:  Reportedly without the
    benefit of specific Colombian information, the Ecuadorian
    National Police on March 11 announced a major success, the
    detention of FARC leader Sixto Cabanas, alias Domingo Biojo,
    in Esmeraldas province.  End Note.)  The GOE seemed somewhat
    mollified by the fact that President Uribe did not back
    Santos' statements, with Carvajal calling Uribe's move a
    positive gesture.

    ECUADOR PLAYS UP INSULZA STATEMENT

    ¶8.  (C) Meeting separately on February 26 with President
    Correa and FM Falconi, OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel
    Insulza sought to find a way to maintain a channel of
    dialogue between the GOE and GOC, but apparently made no
    progress.  During an event the evening of February 27 with
    OAS ambassadors, Insulza called the mediation effort
    complicated, noted that the "cartilla de seguridad"
    (guidelines for cooperation between the two militaries) was
    still functioning at certain levels, and suggested a bigger
    power (apparently referring to the U.S.) bring the GOE and
    GOC together.  He told the Ambassador privately that he
    judged the two countries could get past some of the GOE's
    conditions, but not others, and that the GOE still insisted
    that the bombs used last March had to have come from another
    country (meaning the U.S.).

    ¶9.  (C) Insulza appeared to side with the GOE earlier on
    February 27 at a press conference during a visit to
    Esmeraldas province in northern Ecuador, accompanied by FM
    Falconi and Minister Carvajal.  According to MFA press
    statements, Insulza told the press he did not believe the GOE
    was, or had been, linked to an irregular armed group, be it
    the FARC or any other, and that everything that had happened
    since the March 2008 attack had only served to confirm that
    conclusion.  The MFA press statements quote Insulza as
    stating, "This is a subject that should not be in discussion.
     Unfortunately, I see in this country those who still put
    this in doubt, but I believe it is an error.  President
    Correa has given clear signs of his attitude and point of
    view with respect to the FARC and all of this type of
    subversive organization."  According to the MFA, Insulza also
    credited Ecuador with making a very significant security
    effort in its northern border area.  During the trip to the
    border, Insulza received a military briefing, met with a
    group of refugees, and overflew the region in a helicopter.

    ¶10.  (C) The GOE sought to highlight the refuge it provided
    Colombian refugees during the February 19-20 visit of U.N.
    Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Craig Johnstone, who
    met with the GOE and traveled to the northern border region.
    According to an MFA press bulletin, Johnstone announced that
    UNHCR would provide $22 million in assistance in 2009 for relief
    programs for Colombian refugees in Ecuador. (Note: This appears
    to be an MFA error, since the UNHCR Ecuador budget is significantly
    less.  We have asked UNHCR to clarify funding levels for the MFA.
    End Note.) Johnstone also noted that between 2000 and 2008, Ecuador
    received over 56,000 requests for refugee status,
    primarily from Colombians, of which 20,956 have been approved.
    Johnstone expressed appreciation for USG contributions during
     a February 19 meeting with the Ambassador.

    NEW INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSION AND NEW CONTROLS

    ¶11.  (C) In an effort to reduce further its political
    vulnerability in light of the alleged narco-political
    scandal, the GOE has agreed to form a new investigative
    commission.  The idea was proposed by Cesar Montufar of the
    opposition National Democratic Agreement movement, who
    recommended formation of an independent commission of
    nonpartisan citizens who would investigate the March 2008
    Colombian attack and alleged ties of government officials and
    former government officials to illegal armed groups.

    Candidates are to be presented by universities, the media,
    the Roman Catholic Church, indigenous organization, retired
    military, etc.  President Correa will then appoint the
    citizens commission from among these candidates.

    ¶12.  (C) Meanwhile, the GOE has announced steps to reinforce
    security in the northern border area.  Minister Carvajal said
    March 6 that carrying arms in the five northern provinces
    would be forbidden until new licenses were issued, with
    tougher criteria to qualify.  In addition, fifteen new
    security posts (five military and ten police) are to be
    established, and the number of military in the region
    increased significantly.  The worst security situation,
    according to Carvajal, is in Esmeraldas province.  In making
    this announcement, Carvajal blamed the region's security
    problems on individuals linked to Colombian paramilitary
    groups and criminal gangs, not the FARC.  (Comment:  The GOE
    likely lacks the resources to carry out the plan Carvajal
    announced.  End Comment.)

    ¶13.  (C) Some Ecuadorians, even those on the left, have urged
    a change in policy toward Colombia.  One is former FM
    Francisco Carrion, who supported the GOE position on Colombia
    violating its sovereignty, but now calls for direct dialogue
    between the two governments.  Another is Socialist Party
    member and Andean Simon Bolivar University professor Enrique
    Ayala Mora, who argues that the break in relations has been
    prolonged too long and that it threatens to irreversibly ruin
    relations with a neighbor and historical partner in the
    Andean Community.  But these voices are few and easily
    ignored by the GOE.

    COMMENT

    ¶14.  (C) The animosity President Correa and his ministers
    exhibit toward Colombia underlines how intractable this
    diplomatic conflict remains.  The renewed allegations of FARC
    ties to the Correa government are adding more fuel to the
    fire.  We doubt that the Correa government will make any
    effort to achieve reconciliation while it is campaigning for
    the April 26 election, and see appointment of the
    investigative commission as only another attempt to convince
    voters that the GOE is not hiding anything.  Given that the
    two governments have largely isolated trade (which continues
    unimpeded) from other problems, Correa appears to believe he
    has more to gain by drawing out the dispute than seeking a
    meaningful resolution.

    HODGES

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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