Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12522 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AMED AF ASEC AMGT AFIN AG ABLD AJ AL ASUP AR AID AORC AS AE APER ACOA ANET AU ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ARF APECO AEMR ATRN AA AADP ACS AM AZ APCS AFFAIRS ADANA ADPM ADCO AECL ACAO AY APEC AORG ASEAN ABUD AGAO AINF AFSI AFSN AGR AROC AO AODE AMBASSADOR ACABQ AGMT AORL AX AMEX ADM ASIG AFGHANISTAN ASCH AMCHAMS ACBAQ AIT AND ARM AQ ATFN AC AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN ALOW
BR BA BL BTIO BH BEXP BO BE BG BU BK BRUSSELS BD BM BT BC BX BIDEN BY BBSR BB BF BP BN BILAT BTIU BWC BMGT
CS CO CASC CA CU CH CN CONS CBW CI CE CVIS CW CLINTON CG COE CMGT CJAN CR CWC CD CPAS CT CONDOLEEZZA COUNTER CDG CIDA CM CICTE COUNTRY CJUS CY CBSA CEUDA CLMT CAC CODEL CBE CHR CTM CDC CSW CFED CARICOM CB CL COM CIS CKGR CROS CIC CAPC COPUOS CTR CVR CF CIA COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CACS CAN CITT CARSON CACM CDB CV CBC CNARC
DHS DAO DCM DR DOD DOMESTIC DO DA DK DTRA DJ DEA DISENGAGEMENT DE DPRK DEPT DOE DS DEFENSE DEAX
ES EC ECON EFIN EAID ETRD EAGR ENRG EINV EIND ETTC ECIN EG ELTN EPET ELAB EU ECPS EUREM ET EWWT ELN EAIR EUN EFIS ER EINT ENVR EMIN ENERG ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ELECTIONS EFTA EZ EN ECA EPA ENGR ETRC EXTERNAL ENNP EI ENVI ETRO ETRN EK ENIV EINVEFIN ECINECONCS ERD EUR EURN EDU EAIG ECONCS ENGY ECONOMICS ETRDEINVTINTCS ETC EFINECONCS EEPET EXIM EAP ECONOMY ESA EINN ECONOMIC EIAR EXBS ECUN EINDETRD EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN ECIP EFIM EAIDS ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA ERNG
FR FBI FI FAC FARC FDA FAO FJ FTA FTAA FREEDOM FISO FOR FOREIGN FAS FM FOI FINR FINANCE FMLN FO
GG GM GV GT GOV GTMO GANGS GH GOI GL GA GY GAERC GR GF GCC GAZA GZ GERARD GE GTIP GLOBAL
HO HK HILLARY HA HR HU HUMAN HURI HSTC HI HYMPSK HUMOR HEBRON
IR IN IS IZ IT IC IAEA IEFIN ICAO IACI ID IRS INTELSAT IO ILC ITU IMO IRAQI IV ILO ITALY IBRD ICRC IPR ISRAELI IIP INMARSAT IAHRC IWC INTERNAL ICTY ITRA INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IQ IBET INR ICJ INRB IRC IMF IA INTERPOL IDA ISLAMISTS IEA IL IZPREL IRAJ ITF IF ISRAEL ICTR IDP IGAD INRA INRO
JO JA JUS JM JP JOSEPH JAMES JOHN JOHNNIE
KNNP KTFN KFLU KPAO KMDR KWBG KTER KBCT KPAL KDEM KTIA KOLY KJUS KCRM KV KSUM KWMN KS KRVC KGHG KE KGIC KPRP KTIP KUNR KPKO KRIM KSCA KOMC KHLS KCOR KWAC KISL KZ KG KIRF KMPI KVPR KIPR KOMS KSPR KN KIRC KFRD KCIP KAWC KFIN KCRCM KR KBTS KSEP KFLO KSEO KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTC KICC KMCA KHDP KSAF KACT KSTH KOCI KNUP KPRV KTDB KMIG KIDE KU KPAONZ KNUC KNNPMNUC KNPP KERG KSCI KBIO KDRG KGIT KCFE KTLA KTEX KPLS KHIV KCSY KTRD KID KSAC KNAR KMRS KBTR KJUST KREC KLIG KCOM KAID KPWR KDEMAF KCRS KWMM KRCM KRAD KAWK KNEI KTBT KCFC KPAI KFSC KOM KMOC KICA KRGY KO KVIR KX KPOA KCHG KVRP KGCC KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KNSD KHUM KSEC KCMR KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KWWMN KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KDDG KIFR KHSA
LY LE LG LI LH LTTE LU LO LA LAB LOG LT LABOR
MOPS MARR MCAP MEPN MNUC MO MASS MX MD MZ MRCRE MI MTCRE MAS MU MR MC MY MTCR MAPP MUCN MIL ML MEDIA MA MPOS MP MERCOSUR MG MK MEETINGS MCC MASC MV MIK MW MT MDC MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MAR MTRE MEPI MQADHAFI MAPS MARAD MEPP MILITARY MASSMNUC
NATO NZ NSF NPG NSG NA NL NU NPT NSFO NS NSC NE NO NK NI NSSP NATIONAL NDP NP NASA NPA NAFTA NG NIPP NEW NZUS NR NRR NH NGO NC NT NAR NV NORAD NATOPREL NW
OTRA OIIP OPRC OREP OVIP ODIP OPDC OPAD OAS OVP OSCE OIE OECD OPCW OEXC OCS OPIC OFDP OSCI OMIG OBSP OFDA OHUM OTR OFFICIALS OSAC ON OCII OES OIC
PGOV PREL PINR PINS PM PO PHUM PK PTER PREF PARM PBTS PE PAS POL PHSA PNAT PL PAK PA PSI POLITICS PROP PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PMIL POV PALESTINIAN PARMS PROG PU PBIO PTBS POLICY PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PG PY PTERE PHUMBA POGOV PNR PRL PINL PRGOV PORG PUNE PDOV PCI PP PS PGOF PGOVLO PF PAO PREO PAHO PREFA PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PSEPC PGOVE PINF PNG PGOC PFOR PCUL PLN POLINT PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PHUMPREL PGIV PRAM PHUH PSA PHUMPGOV PEL
QA
RU RS RP RSO RICE REACTION REPORT RO RW RIGHTS RCMP ROOD RM RUPREL RFE RF REGION RSP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS
SY SMIG SNAR SENV SCUL SW SA SOCI SO SP SN SU SR SH SYR SZ SCRS SC SF SHI SL SENVKGHG SYRIA SI SWE SARS STEINBERG SG SNARN SEVN SHUM SPCE SIPDIS SAN SNARCS SAARC SIPRS ST SNARIZ SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SANC SEN
TR TRGY TBIO TPHY TSPA TP TW TU TSPL TS TT TX TZ TI TN TF TERRORISM TD TK TH TIP TC TO TFIN TNGD THPY TL TV TINT TRSY TURKEY TBID TAGS
UK UZ UP US UN UNMIK USTR UNCSD UNHRC UNGA USUN UNSC UNCHR UNESCO UNDC USNC UNO UY UG USEU UV UNEP USPS USAID UNHCR UNAUS UNDP UNC UE UNPUOS USOAS UNVIE UAE UNFICYP UNODC UNCHS UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNCND UNICEF
VE VZ VT VTIZ VTEG VTPREL VM VI VN VAT VC
WBG WTRO WHO WIPO WTO WHTI WS WTRQ WI WZ WWARD WHA WITH WFP WMD WB WMO WEU WA
XL XM XW XF XG XT XK XTAG XS XB XE XR XA XZ XY XX XV XU XH XD XI XC XQ
YM YI YE YMCS
ZI ZP ZR ZO ZL ZF ZB ZU ZJ ZEALAND ZK ZANU ZN ZA ZOELLICK

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09SANJOSE364, COSTA RICAN PORTS: ANOTHER CAFTA SAGA IN THE MAKING?

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09SANJOSE364.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANJOSE364 | 2009-04-30 21:52 | 2011-03-21 16:30 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose

`

    VZCZCXYZ0007
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0364/01 1202152
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 302152Z APR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0800
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 0174
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

` `

    UNCLAS SAN JOSE 000364

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EEB/IFD/ODF:MSIEMER
    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN AND WHA/EPSC:AWONG
    TREASURY FOR SSENICH

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ETRD ECON EWWT ELAB PGOV PREL CS
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICAN PORTS:  ANOTHER CAFTA SAGA IN THE MAKING?

    REF:  2008 Sao Paulo 612

    ¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  Stakeholders in the operation of Costa Rica's
    major port, the Limon-Moin complex on the Caribbean, struggle to
    find a solution to the competing interests of delivering
    international port services, developing the impoverished Limon
    region, upgrading long-neglected port plant and capacity, and
    introducing flexible rules to the stubborn work force.  With
    CAFTA-DR's entry into force on January 1, 2009, free trade
    agreements under negotiation with the EU, China, and Singapore, and
    the US Container Security Initiative deadline of July 2012 looming,
    Costa Rica faces the complex, interrelated challenges of meeting
    rising demand for exporting and importing goods, handling cargo in a
    safe and efficient manner, addressing regional development needs,
    and dealing with the powerful local union.  This fight may be as
    tough as passing CAFTA.  END SUMMARY.

    ----------------
    MEET THE PLAYERS
    ----------------

    ¶2.  (U) There are three major players in this drama.  One is the
    port authority for Limon and Moin, the Junta de Administracisn
    Portuaria y Desarrollo Econsmica de la Vertiente Atlntica
    (JAPDEVA).  Part port operator and part redevelopment authority,
    JAPDEVA relies on equipment that is only 40 percent operational to
    move 80 percent of Costa Rica's port traffic.  The second player is
    the GOCR, which is pushing for a concession solution which would
    modernize existing facilities plus build a new port near Moin (a USD
    600 million package).  The third player is the Sindicato de
    Trabadores de JAPDEVA (SINTRAJAP), the dock workers' union, which
    supports port modernization but adamantly opposes a private
    concession which would replace JAPDEVA.

    ---------------------------------------------
    JAPDEVA MODEL: THE PORT PAYS FOR THE PROVINCE
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (U) The Caribbean coastal province of Limon is Costa Rica's most
    backward, by all socioeconomic measures.  Long disconnected from the
    Central Valley due to poor transportation links and cultural and
    racial differences, the region's economic development continuously
    lagged behind other parts of the country.  In 1973, the GOCR backed
    the idea of port development in the provincial capital of Limon in
    order to jump start regional development.  With the creation of
    JAPDEVA, a reasonable solution seemed to be in hand (at the time).
    JAPDEVA's operating principle was and still is founded on the
    following model:  port operations produce revenue which funds
    economic development for the Limon region.  Though the model
    initially delivered a modicum of social services to the area, today,
    one in three Limon residents live in poverty and unemployment is
    pushing upwards of seven percent.  Also, a homicide rate of 19 per
    100,000 (nationally, the average is 10 per 100,000) highlights
    growing criminality in Limon.  Limon is the poorest and most violent
    part of Costa Rica.

    ------------------------------------
    THE CHALLENGE OF "JAP" VERSUS "DEVA"
    ------------------------------------

    ¶4.  (U) The JAPDEVA model functioned well enough for decades as the
    port operations -- "JAP" -- provided funds for the government-like
    assistance agency -- "DEVA."  Nonetheless, the acceleration of
    global trade increasingly illuminated the operating deficiencies at
    the Limon-Moin port complex, and begged the question about JAPDEVA's
    core mission:  is it a logistical operation or a development
    assistance agency?  This has become the key issue of the Limon port
    conflict (and perhaps the greatest obstacle to its modern success).
    Late last year officials at JAP emphasized to us that port
    operations were primary.

    ¶5.  (U) SINTRAJAP officials stress the benefits that JAPDEVA, re:
    "DEVA," produces for Limon:  roads, schools, community centers, and
    social programs, which they say are key to Limon's vitality.  From
    the SINTRAJAP point of view, no JAPDEVA means no more development
    assistance for Limon; they are not confident the central government
    in San Jose would pick up the slack.  While claiming full support
    for the modernization of the Limon-Moin port facilities, SINTRAJAP
    opposes a private concession tender as it would supplant the union's
    beloved "DEVA."  Economics, Industry, and Coordination Minister
    Marco Vargas acknowledged to us that the different objectives of JAP
    and DEVA lie at the core of the port problem.

    --------------------------------------------
    THE ARIAS ADMINISTRATION CHARTS A NEW COURSE
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶6.  (SBU) The relationship between JAPDEVA and the GOCR changed with
    the election of President Oscar Arias in 2006.  Early on, the Arias
    administration indicated its interest in tendering Limon-Moin port
    operations to a private concessionaire.  At the much smaller port of
    Caldera on the Pacific, the GOCR completed a successful concession
    with a Colombian company in 2006.  But, on the Caribbean, SINTRAJAP
    pressed the Arias administration to modernize port operations by
    maintaining the JAPDEVA management/ local development structure and
    to halt the concessionaire strategy.  From 2006-2007, the GOCR and
    SINTRAJAP engaged in a series of negotiations aimed to settle past
    disagreements through cash payments to SINTRAJAP.  Talks were
    complicated by the backdrop of the CAFTA debate.  SINTRAJAP was
    egged on by their public sector union brothers, who were among the
    most vocal opponents of CAFTA.  GOCR toughness with the port workers
    waxed and waned, linked to how well (or not) the CAFTA debate was
    proceeding in the national legislature and around the country.

    ---------------------------
    THE FORCEFUL VOICE OF LABOR
    ---------------------------

    ¶7.  (SBU) In mid-2007, during a dispute over work schedules, the
    GOCR paid SINTRAJAP USD 7 million to accept a work schedule of three
    eight-hour shifts and no overtime, displacing the prevailing union
    system of four six-hour shifts plus overtime.  (The dispute and
    apparent resolution helped the GOCR put out one political "fire" as
    the CAFTA question headed for a contentious national referendum.)
    However, SINTRAJAP continued its work slowdown, delaying export and
    import services.  With the CAFTA fight on its mind, the GOCR then
    reversed its position and agreed to the union work schedule demands
    in order to avoid further stoppages or slowdowns.  However, Costa
    Rica's Constitutional Court ruled in favor of eight-hour shifts and
    the GOCR's Controller demanded that JAPDEVA stop paying permanent
    overtime.  (COMMENT: This confusing mix of government, union, court,
    and Controller is typical of the "governability" challenges facing
    Costa Rica.  END COMMENT.)

    ¶8.  (U) With the Controller's decision, and the Court's ruling
    (neither of which JAPDEVA could easily challenge), negotiations on
    pay stopped.  The GOCR reverted to its original position, insisting
    on eight-hour shifts, plus the addition of 100 new positions.  In
    October 2008 (with CAFTA finally ratified and headed for
    implementation), the GOCR proceeded with its private concession
    strategy by proposing a USD 80 million severance payment to
    SINTRAJAP's work force (a USD 57,100 per person proposition).
    SINTRAJAP countered the offer by opposing a private concession
    (again) and demanded a USD 500 million payment (i.e. USD 357,100 per
    person).  Minister Vargas described the counter offer as "absurd."

    ¶9.  (U) Earlier this year, SINTRAP threatened to "strike
    indefinitely" if the GOCR were to tender a modernization/
    development concession to a private operator.  The union's most
    recent demands consist of:  refusal of any private concession,
    investment by the (GOCR) of USD 80 million to upgrade the Limon-Moin
    port facilities (in lieu of severance), and loosen JAPDEVA's legal/
    budgetary restrictions so that it can compete (i.e., with the new
    port).

    --------------------------------------------- -----
    PORT OPERATIONS: SLOW, COSTLY AND BEHIND-THE-TIMES
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶10. (U) Ports officials at JAPDEVA and an official at the shipping
    company Maersk have described to us the following problems hampering
    operations at Limon and Moin:

    -- The typical waiting time per vessel is 42 hours.  Through better
    management and efficiencies, the wait time can be reduced to 22
    hours;

    -- At Limon, only one of two heavy lift cranes function;

    -- There are no such cranes in Moin (vessel-based cranes move
    containers to/from the dock);

    -- On average, only 40 percent of all equipment is functional;

    -- More automatic operations are desperately needed.  This would
    eliminate on-site payment of services and streamline documentation
    processing;

    -- Inflexible work force rules degrade port services;

    -- Shippers need space for container yards adjacent to the docks;
    these do not exist at either Limon or Moin; and

    -- JAPDEVA is limited by its internal cash flow.  With annual
    revenue of USD 28 million, only USD 9 million remain after expenses
    for investment in modernization.  At a projected cost of at least
    USD 500 million, financing such a sum with annual debt payments of
    USD 9 million would take over 50 years.

    ¶11.  (U) A comparison to Brazil's Santos port illustrates the
    challenges facing Limon-Moin.  The current Limon-Moin workforce of
    1,300 full time workers handled 2 million tons of container cargo or
    1,430 tons per employee in 2007.  At Santos, the port's 1,400
    workers handled 57,250 tons per employee in 2007, up from 4,000 tons
    per employee in 1993 (Reftel).  Over the past fourteen years,
    Santo's work force decreased by over tenfold while the tons per
    employee increased by over fourteen-fold.  And, Santos plans to
    modernize further as demand continues to outpace capacity.  Already
    at a disadvantage, and nearly 40 times less productive than Santos,
    Limon-Moin is only falling further behind in comparison to a major
    international port.

    -------------------------------------
    SO, BUY THEM OFF OR BUILD AROUND THEM
    -------------------------------------

    ¶12.  (U) A private concession represents the first step forward for
    the GOCR with its vision of Caribbean port services.  On January 27,
    the GOCR hosted thirteen candidate concessionaires -- representing
    operators from Asia, Europe, and the Americas -- for a presentation
    of the potential of the Limon-Moin operation.  The GOCR presented
    the concession as a three-part package:  (1) port operations, (2)
    the design/build development of the new port north of Moin, and (3)
    towing services.  Interest was cautiously optimistic; however,
    concession interest would dramatically increase if there were a
    severance agreement between the GOCR and SINTRAJAP.

    ¶13.  (U) The current SINTRAJAP labor agreement extends to 2012,
    which creates a dilemma for the GOCR.  If the GOCR does not push for
    a severance agreement, any action on a private concession may be
    difficult at best, as candidate concessionaires likely will steer
    clear of working with SINTRAJAP under current terms.   If the GOCR
    pushes too hard for a severance settlement (to get SINTRAJAP out of
    the way of a new concession), the union has proven it can make
    trouble by more work slowdowns or stoppages, which would then
    jeopardize 80 percent of the country's cargo.

    ¶14.  (U) With the 2010 national elections less than one year away,
    the Arias administration is likely loathe to stir up a high-profile
    labor dispute.  However, the GOCR clearly looks to the new port
    north of Moin as a longer-term strategy to avoid labor problems in
    the future.  Planned to be operational in 2016, the new port would
    commence operations with or without union support since the new port
    is not part of the current JAPDEVA complex.

    ----------------------
    THE GOCR'S PORT DREAMS
    ----------------------

    ¶15.  (U) The GOCR's long range plan for the Limon-Moin complex
    entails revising the function of the facilities of Limon and Moin.
    (The port plan is based on a study by the Dutch firm of Royal
    Haskoning, which was 75 percent paid for by the Netherlands.)  At an
    approximate cost of USD 600 million, the development plan prepares
    Costa Rica for an estimated twofold increase in container traffic by
    2030 -- from a 2007 volume of 2 million tons to a projected volume
    of over 4 million tons in 2030, as follows:

    -- Limon, which today caters to both container and cruise ship
    traffic, would convert to a 100 percent cruise ship operation by
    ¶2016.  In the meantime, the addition of two new mobile cranes and
    eight straddle carriers would increase capacity;

    -- Moin would modernize through the addition of four mobile cranes,
    and expand through the construction of new docks to accommodate
    larger cargo vessels; and

    -- The new port north of Moin would commence operations in 2016
    (replacing Limon) with six portable cranes, fifteen rubber-tire
    gantry cranes, and space for 36 tractor trailers.  By 2030, the new
    port would add additional equipment, doubling capacity to twelve
    portable cranes, 30 rubber-tire gantry cranes and space for 72
    tractor trailers.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶16.  (SBU) Costa Rica hopes to resolve its "port problem" without
    another painfully protracted CAFTA-like struggle.  Several aspects
    of the port conflict mirror the CAFTA-DR debate:  long-standing and
    stubborn union opposition to the Arias Administration, political
    opposition in the form of partisanship in the national assembly, and
    weariness with the issue by those not directly affected (until a
    work slowdown alters the flow of goods).  With only eight months of
    effective governing time remaining, the Arias Administration will be
    hard pressed to produce a creative but consensus-oriented,
    Tico-style solution that delivers port operations and development
    rights to a private concessionaire.  Significant port reform is
    needed, however, whether completed by Arias or his successor.  In
    the meantime, the "port problem" remains a significant obstacle to
    Costa Rican development.

    CIANCHETTE

`