Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12522 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AMED AF ASEC AMGT AFIN AG ABLD AJ AL ASUP AR AID AORC AS AE APER ACOA ANET AU ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ARF APECO AEMR ATRN AA AADP ACS AM AZ APCS AFFAIRS ADANA ADPM ADCO AECL ACAO AY APEC AORG ASEAN ABUD AGAO AINF AFSI AFSN AGR AROC AO AODE AMBASSADOR ACABQ AGMT AORL AX AMEX ADM ASIG AFGHANISTAN ASCH AMCHAMS ACBAQ AIT AND ARM AQ ATFN AC AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN ALOW
BR BA BL BTIO BH BEXP BO BE BG BU BK BRUSSELS BD BM BT BC BX BIDEN BY BBSR BB BF BP BN BILAT BTIU BWC BMGT
CS CO CASC CA CU CH CN CONS CBW CI CE CVIS CW CLINTON CG COE CMGT CJAN CR CWC CD CPAS CT CONDOLEEZZA COUNTER CDG CIDA CM CICTE COUNTRY CJUS CY CBSA CEUDA CLMT CAC CODEL CBE CHR CTM CDC CSW CFED CARICOM CB CL COM CIS CKGR CROS CIC CAPC COPUOS CTR CVR CF CIA COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CACS CAN CITT CARSON CACM CDB CV CBC CNARC
DHS DAO DCM DR DOD DOMESTIC DO DA DK DTRA DJ DEA DISENGAGEMENT DE DPRK DEPT DOE DS DEFENSE DEAX
ES EC ECON EFIN EAID ETRD EAGR ENRG EINV EIND ETTC ECIN EG ELTN EPET ELAB EU ECPS EUREM ET EWWT ELN EAIR EUN EFIS ER EINT ENVR EMIN ENERG ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ELECTIONS EFTA EZ EN ECA EPA ENGR ETRC EXTERNAL ENNP EI ENVI ETRO ETRN EK ENIV EINVEFIN ECINECONCS ERD EUR EURN EDU EAIG ECONCS ENGY ECONOMICS ETRDEINVTINTCS ETC EFINECONCS EEPET EXIM EAP ECONOMY ESA EINN ECONOMIC EIAR EXBS ECUN EINDETRD EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN ECIP EFIM EAIDS ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC EINVECONSENVCSJA EUMEM ETRA ERNG
FR FBI FI FAC FARC FDA FAO FJ FTA FTAA FREEDOM FISO FOR FOREIGN FAS FM FOI FINR FINANCE FMLN FO
GG GM GV GT GOV GTMO GANGS GH GOI GL GA GY GAERC GR GF GCC GAZA GZ GERARD GE GTIP GLOBAL
HO HK HILLARY HA HR HU HUMAN HURI HSTC HI HYMPSK HUMOR HEBRON
IR IN IS IZ IT IC IAEA IEFIN ICAO IACI ID IRS INTELSAT IO ILC ITU IMO IRAQI IV ILO ITALY IBRD ICRC IPR ISRAELI IIP INMARSAT IAHRC IWC INTERNAL ICTY ITRA INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IQ IBET INR ICJ INRB IRC IMF IA INTERPOL IDA ISLAMISTS IEA IL IZPREL IRAJ ITF IF ISRAEL ICTR IDP IGAD INRA INRO
JO JA JUS JM JP JOSEPH JAMES JOHN JOHNNIE
KNNP KTFN KFLU KPAO KMDR KWBG KTER KBCT KPAL KDEM KTIA KOLY KJUS KCRM KV KSUM KWMN KS KRVC KGHG KE KGIC KPRP KTIP KUNR KPKO KRIM KSCA KOMC KHLS KCOR KWAC KISL KZ KG KIRF KMPI KVPR KIPR KOMS KSPR KN KIRC KFRD KCIP KAWC KFIN KCRCM KR KBTS KSEP KFLO KSEO KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KSTC KICC KMCA KHDP KSAF KACT KSTH KOCI KNUP KPRV KTDB KMIG KIDE KU KPAONZ KNUC KNNPMNUC KNPP KERG KSCI KBIO KDRG KGIT KCFE KTLA KTEX KPLS KHIV KCSY KTRD KID KSAC KNAR KMRS KBTR KJUST KREC KLIG KCOM KAID KPWR KDEMAF KCRS KWMM KRCM KRAD KAWK KNEI KTBT KCFC KPAI KFSC KOM KMOC KICA KRGY KO KVIR KX KPOA KCHG KVRP KGCC KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KNSD KHUM KSEC KCMR KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KWWMN KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KDDG KIFR KHSA
LY LE LG LI LH LTTE LU LO LA LAB LOG LT LABOR
MOPS MARR MCAP MEPN MNUC MO MASS MX MD MZ MRCRE MI MTCRE MAS MU MR MC MY MTCR MAPP MUCN MIL ML MEDIA MA MPOS MP MERCOSUR MG MK MEETINGS MCC MASC MV MIK MW MT MDC MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MAR MTRE MEPI MQADHAFI MAPS MARAD MEPP MILITARY MASSMNUC
NATO NZ NSF NPG NSG NA NL NU NPT NSFO NS NSC NE NO NK NI NSSP NATIONAL NDP NP NASA NPA NAFTA NG NIPP NEW NZUS NR NRR NH NGO NC NT NAR NV NORAD NATOPREL NW
OTRA OIIP OPRC OREP OVIP ODIP OPDC OPAD OAS OVP OSCE OIE OECD OPCW OEXC OCS OPIC OFDP OSCI OMIG OBSP OFDA OHUM OTR OFFICIALS OSAC ON OCII OES OIC
PGOV PREL PINR PINS PM PO PHUM PK PTER PREF PARM PBTS PE PAS POL PHSA PNAT PL PAK PA PSI POLITICS PROP PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PMIL POV PALESTINIAN PARMS PROG PU PBIO PTBS POLICY PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PG PY PTERE PHUMBA POGOV PNR PRL PINL PRGOV PORG PUNE PDOV PCI PP PS PGOF PGOVLO PF PAO PREO PAHO PREFA PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PSEPC PGOVE PINF PNG PGOC PFOR PCUL PLN POLINT PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PHUMPREL PGIV PRAM PHUH PSA PHUMPGOV PEL
QA
RU RS RP RSO RICE REACTION REPORT RO RW RIGHTS RCMP ROOD RM RUPREL RFE RF REGION RSP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS
SY SMIG SNAR SENV SCUL SW SA SOCI SO SP SN SU SR SH SYR SZ SCRS SC SF SHI SL SENVKGHG SYRIA SI SWE SARS STEINBERG SG SNARN SEVN SHUM SPCE SIPDIS SAN SNARCS SAARC SIPRS ST SNARIZ SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SANC SEN
TR TRGY TBIO TPHY TSPA TP TW TU TSPL TS TT TX TZ TI TN TF TERRORISM TD TK TH TIP TC TO TFIN TNGD THPY TL TV TINT TRSY TURKEY TBID TAGS
UK UZ UP US UN UNMIK USTR UNCSD UNHRC UNGA USUN UNSC UNCHR UNESCO UNDC USNC UNO UY UG USEU UV UNEP USPS USAID UNHCR UNAUS UNDP UNC UE UNPUOS USOAS UNVIE UAE UNFICYP UNODC UNCHS UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNCND UNICEF
VE VZ VT VTIZ VTEG VTPREL VM VI VN VAT VC
WBG WTRO WHO WIPO WTO WHTI WS WTRQ WI WZ WWARD WHA WITH WFP WMD WB WMO WEU WA
XL XM XW XF XG XT XK XTAG XS XB XE XR XA XZ XY XX XV XU XH XD XI XC XQ
YM YI YE YMCS
ZI ZP ZR ZO ZL ZF ZB ZU ZJ ZEALAND ZK ZANU ZN ZA ZOELLICK

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2425, PRESS BIAS SHIFTS IN FAVOR OF MEDVEDEV, BUT PUTIN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW2425.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW2425 | 2008-08-15 10:49 | 2010-12-01 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0002
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #2425/01 2281049
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 151049Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9519
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002425

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PREL RS
    SUBJECT: PRESS BIAS SHIFTS IN FAVOR OF MEDVEDEV, BUT PUTIN
    STILL IN CONTROL

    Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Alice G. Wells for reason
    1.4(d).

    ¶1. Summary: xxxxx reported the results xxxxx in a recent meeting with PolOff. While
    Medvedev dominated Russian programming on four of five
    surveyed stations, his appearances were disproportionately
    ceremonial in contrast to Putin's hands on control of the
    Russian government. The virtual absence of airtime provided
    to most opposition parties continued to slow an already weak
    opposition, and experience and intuition told xxxxx that
    his study would fall on deaf ears, a prediction already
    supported by the empty auditorium at his press conference
    hours before our meeting. Russian Communist Party (KPRF)
    leader Gennadiy Zuganov publicly and privately praised
    xxxxx for his research as a boost to KPRF calls for
    greater press freedom. Medvedev's sagging standing in the
    polls, despite lavish T.V. coverage, is one indication of his
    difficulty in coming out from Putin's shadow. End Summary.

    Medvedev Main Headliner, but Putin Top Dog
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) On August 4, xxxxx told PolOff that while
    Medvedev received twice as much press coverage as Putin
    during the testing period, most of his meetings were largely
    ceremonial, while Putin's on-air performances continued to
    give the impression that he held the reins of power. xxxxx
    unabashedly called Medvedev a "no one" in Russian politics,
    claiming he was nothing more than a "pen in one's pocket" or
    "a glass on the table" as he raised a pen and glass from his
    desk. Medvedev continued to attract interest with his
    anti-corruption campaign, but Putin still called the shots
    that mattered.

    ¶3. (C) An August 7 poll from Levada Center indicated only 9%
    of Russians believe Medvedev controlled Russia's direction,
    while 36% believed Putin remained in sole power and almost
    50% saw a tandem presidency. A related Levada Center poll
    from July 18-22 showed that 82% of Russians believed, to some
    degree, that Medvedev merely continued Putin's policies,
    while only 11% saw Medvedev gradually changing the country's
    political course. Leading pollsters tended to agree with
    survey results. xxxxx hinted to
    PolOff on August 6 that Russians would probably see Medvedev
    as even less in control after Putin's recent Mechel comments
    and subsequent stock market scare. xxxxx told PolOff on
    August 8 that the then-emerging conflict in South Ossetia
    clearly painted Putin as the country's leader.

    Study Results: Winners Won, Losers Lost
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶4. (SBU) xxxxx detailed the results of his recent
    research project on propaganda in the press, done in
    conjunction with Memo 98 Media Monitoring. The project
    tracked primetime press coverage of major political figures
    and government departments from June 5-20 on three
    government-run television stations (Channel One, TV Rossiya,
    and TV Center) and two privately-owned channels (NTV and REN
    TV). xxxxx ascribed a positive, neutral, or negative
    connotation to each news item, then calculated the total
    amount of time devoted to each person or group.

    ¶5. (SBU) The study revealed that all channels, except for
    REN TV, dedicated a disproportionate amount of airtime to
    positive or neutral coverage of incumbent politicians and
    cabinet members, rarely casting them in a negative light. REN
    TV, however, distributed airtime more evenly to a greater
    number of political parties and levied negative commentary
    against the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Vladimir
    Zhirinovskiy-led Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR).
    Most of REN TV's remaining coverage was neutral and biased.
    Stations devoted remaining airtime to less important
    government figures including Duma Speaker and Chairman of the
    High Council of United Russia Party Boris Gryzlov, First
    Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov, Russian Minister for
    Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu, Vice Premier and Finance
    Minister Alexei Kudrin, Regional Development Minister Dmitriy
    Kozak, and Economic Development Ministry chief Elvira
    Naibullina. xxxxx produced the following
    results:

    Channel One (16.9% market share, formerly ORT,
    state-controlled network): Medvedev (48.9%), Putin (22.9%),
    United Russia (6.1%), Russian Deputy Premier Sergei Ivanov
    (3.0%), A Just Russia (1.4%), FSB (1.3%), KPRF (0.3%).

    TV Rossiya (15.8% market share, formerly RTR,
    state-controlled network): Medvedev (50%), Putin (26.8%),
    Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (2.7%), Ivanov (2.0%),
    United Russia (1.9%), FSB (0.9%), KPRF (0.9%), LDPR (0.8%), A
    Just Russia (0.1%).

    TV Center (4.2% market share, city of Moscow-owned national
    network): Medvedev (43.9%), United Russia (17.1%), Putin
    (16.9%), Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov (15.7%), Lavrov (4.8%),
    Ivanov (3.0%), A Just Russia (0.2%), FSB (0.1%).

    NTV (12.3% market share, Gazprom-owned national network):
    Medvedev (57.3%), Putin (17.6%), Ivanov (5.7%), United Russia
    (2.2%), Lavrov (2.0%), KPRF (1.1%), FSB (0.6%).

    REN TV (7.1% market share, Rossiya Bank majority ownership,
    independent network): Medvedev (28.6%), Zhirinovsky (12.2%),
    KPRF (12.0%), LDPR (12.0%), Yabloko (11.3%), United Russia
    (10.4%), Union of Right Forces (SPS) (6.7%), FSB (6.0%),
    Putin (2.1%), A Just Russia (0.8%).

    xxxxx and Communists: an Unexpected Alliance
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶6. (C) xxxxx showed PolOff a letter from Zuganov that
    lavished praise on xxxxx his outstanding
    contribution to political reform in Russia. xxxxx then
    recalled to PolOff that Zuganov approached him at the Embassy
    Independence Day celebration at Spaso House, joyously thanked
    him in front of numerous witnesses, hugged him, and named
    xxxxx a "friend of the Communist Party." xxxxx retorted
    to Zuganov saying "I did not do this research for you, I did
    it for my country's future." xxxxx shuddered as he relayed
    the story, sheepishly noting that his grandfather and father
    would turn in their graves had they heard he had helped the
    Communists. (Note: xxxxx grandfather was shot and killed
    by Communists, and his father spent time in the Gulag)

    ¶7. (U) On July 14, the Communist Party presented the results
    of the June 2008 Center for Research of Russian Political
    Culture's complementary study on press freedom and propaganda
    as it pertained to the KPRF. Zuganov noted that the study
    found 45% of all KPRF references to be decidedly negative and
    only 14% decidedly favorable. The Russian channel TVT
    provided the most negative coverage while NTV projected the
    KPRF most favorably. Considering xxxxx, however, NTV only dedicated about 1% of its
    programming to the KPRF; therefore, its resonance with and
    impact on the public remained minimal despite its positive
    tone.

    Opposition Hamstrung by Press Bias
    ----------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) xxxxx said data supported the opposition claim
    that they received less government-controlled airtime, but
    didn't address the GOR counter-charge that the classic
    "liberal" opposition is doing little to generate news. xxxxx agreed, charging that "Russians feed from the same
    information trough." xxxxx attributed much of the blame for
    the stagnation of Russia's political opposition to a lack of
    leadership; however, he claimed the lack of unbiased press
    coverage reinforced the Russian population's unwavering
    support of the current leadership.

    Press Research Lacks Public Influence
    -------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) xxxxx bemoaned the fact that no one showed up to
    the August 4 press conference at the House of Journalists
    organized to discuss the results of his research. (Note:
    PolOff was the only attendee present) While he admitted that
    both he and the organizers did a poor job of informing the
    press and publicizing the event, he felt that the public's
    general ennui about press freedom contributed to the lack of
    attendance. When asked about the projected influence of his
    research, xxxxx told PolOff that he hoped organizations
    such as the UN and OSCE would utilize his analysis to
    advocate for greater political transparency in Russia.
    Conversely, he claimed the largest influence of his
    organization sprung from its relations with foreign
    journalists at the Washington Post, Le Monde, and other
    western papers. While his center operated quietly, trying not
    to attract attention, it cooperated with foreign journalists
    by supplying opinions and information for more scathing
    articles. xxxxx told PolOff with obvious delight, "when
    western press articles have infuriated Kremlin officials in
    the past, xxxxx

    Comment
    -------

    ¶10. (C) xxxxx data strikingly demonstrates that despite
    Medevedev's lavish courage in the media, he has yet to come
    out from Putin's shadow and create a political identity that
    resonates with Russian viewers.
    Beyrle

`