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### Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS1186, REGIME SENSES SYRIA POLICY AT IMPASSE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06DAMASCUS1186 | 2006-03-19 13:24 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Damascus

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10402
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10403
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10404
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10405
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/10406
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11322
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11323
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11324
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11325
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11326
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11327
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11328
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11329
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11330
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11331
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11332
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11333
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11336
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11337
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11338
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11339
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11340
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11341
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11342
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11343
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11344
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11345
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11346
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11348
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/11349

`

    VZCZCXYZ0006
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHDM #1186/01 0781324
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 191324Z MAR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7765
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0702
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 001186

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SY LE
    SUBJECT: REGIME SENSES SYRIA POLICY AT IMPASSE

    REF: DAMASCUS 1158

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  In separate meetings with Syria desk
    officer March 13, two key contacts noted that the SARG
    believes that U.S. policy towards Syria has reached an
    impasse, and that the U.S. is in the process of changing its
    approach.  That shift will take six months, in their view,
    during which the regime will likely continue to crack down
    hard on any internal opposition and maintain its
    confrontational posture regionally in ways likely to
    exacerbate anti-American sentiment.  Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and
    XXXXXXXXXXXX, mavericks with assorted, sometimes
    combative, ties to leadership figures, described the regime
    as confident and relaxed.  XXXXXXXXXXXX criticized U.S. policy
    towards Syria and the region, noting that instead of
    isolating the Islamists, the U.S. has created conditions that
    have united Islamist nationalists and secular Arab
    nationalists.  On other issues, XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed the regime
    may be considering an opening to the Syrian Muslim
    Brotherhood and described a new think tank he will head.  End
    Summary.

    ¶2.  (C) CONTACTS SEE U.S. POLICY SHIFT COMING:  XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX told visiting Syria desk officer
    and Emboffs that they believe the U.S. policy shift has
    already begun.  In coming months, they expect the U.S. to
    abandon its Syria policy of "no carrots/only demands," as
    well as its larger regional policy of trying to roll back
    Arab nationalism by establishing a pro-U.S. regime in Iraq.
    During this period, the regime will feel free to crack down
    internally and will flex its muscles regionally to
    demonstrate its confidence.  In this "vacuum between U.S.
    policies," the SARG will seek to set in place a variety of
    anti-American currents.  Both men pointed to an emboldened
    regime that, in XXXXXXXXXXXX 's words, "can burn down European
    embassies," close the EU-sponsored human rights center, and
    then welcome Spanish FM Moratinos to Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX  also
    pointed to the widely publicized "new redlines" (reftel) as a
    troubling sign that the regime is planning for a repressive
    period with no reforms.

    ¶3.  (C) REGIME SEEN AS CONFIDENT, RELAXED:  XXXXXXXXXXXX described
    the regime as very confident and relaxed, as it savors what
    it feels is a string of triumphs:  Hamas' electoral victory;
    rising influence in Lebanon (for example among the Sunnis in
    the Sidon area, where he asserted that Sa'ad Hariri's
    influence was waning); containing Brammertz and the UNIIIC
    investigation; and successful diplomatic efforts with the
    Saudis and Egyptians.  On the Hamas victory, XXXXXXXXXXXX
    elaborated that Syria will not play a major direct role but
    will stay "in the shadows," seeking to benefit from the
    rising Islamist influence in the territories and the downfall
    of its nemesis, the Fatah-supported PA.

    ¶4.  (C) U.S POLICY CRITICIZED AS SELF-DEFEATING:  Speaking
    more critically of U.S. foreign policy than he has in the
    past, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed disappointment that the U.S. has
    driven Syria in a direction not good for the country, but
    very good for the regime.  The regime senses that the U.S.
    has played its hand very badly, using its war on terror in a
    counterproductive way.  Instead of isolating the Islamists
    and creating the kind of dynamic social ferment and gradual
    upheaval that was evident in the USSR and Eastern Europe in
    the mid- and late-1980's, the U.S. has created conditions
    that have united, in Syria at least, Islamist nationalists
    and secular Arab nationalists.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX , the
    U.S. has succeeded in making Syria a hero in the Islamic
    world.  U.S. support for the opposition has not been
    effective  The fact that Ba'ath Party thugs, with some
    security services support, could beat up a group of
    opposition activists, intellectuals, and cultural figures
    peacefully protesting the continuation of Emergency Law was a
    far more important signal than the USD five million that the
    U.S. set aside to support the opposition, noted XXXXXXXXXXXX .

    ¶5.  (C) A REGIME OPENING TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD?  Touching
    on other subjects, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the imposition of
    Section 311 sanctions is having no impact and they are not
    being taken seriously.  He said the regime is wagering "at
    much higher levels," placing strategic bets on Hamas,
    Hizballah, and Iran.  On a much more speculative note, he
    said he had picked up signals that the regime may be
    considering an opening to the Muslim Brotherhood, as a way to
    transform a potential threat to the regime into a tool to
    shore it up and encourage greater anti-Americanism.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    reported that emissaries from the MB came to Damascus from
    London a few weeks ago, including a relative of MB
    leader-in-exile Bayanouni.  XXXXXXXXXXXX reiterated that U.S.
    policies had created ripe conditions for such an opening.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed that some consideration was being given to
    canceling Law 49, the provision making membership in the MB a
    capital offense.  (Comment:  While we have heard occasional
    reports of such a SARG initiative in the past, they have not
    proceeded very far, primarily because of deep-seated regime
    hostility to what it views as its most serious potential
    threat.)  On a related note, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the
    regime, with its carefully modulated policies supporting
    Hamas, PIJ, and Sunni groups in Iraq, as well as Hizballah in
    Lebanon, has made sure that the Islamists in Syria "have no
    case" to make against the regime.

    ¶6.  (C) A NEW THINK TANK AND MU'ALLIM'S PROSPECTS:  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    noted that he has launched a new think tank that will include
    "all political currents in Syria."  He described FM (then
    Deputy FM) Walid Mu'allim  as the driving force behind the
    center.  In previous conversations, XXXXXXXXXXXX characterized the
    project as designed to counter some of the hard-line advice
    being provided to the President by Hisham Ikhtiyar and a
    center he launched while head of the General Intelligence
    Directorate (and apparently continues to oversee).  On a
    related note, XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Bashar al-Asad has become
    much more ideological and less pragmatic in orientation.
    Regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX mentor Mu'allim's promotion to Foreign
    Minister, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed doubt that it would have much
    impact on policy.  While Mu'allim is savvy enough to get
    control over the MFA bureaucracy relatively soon, he "will be
    sandwiched in by the two Hourani spies," VP Farouk a-Shara'a
    and DFM Faisal Mikdad.  More importantly, the MFA has never
    been in charge of key policies, primarily the purview of the
    security services.  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted the particularly important
    role that Mohammed Nassif Khairbek had played in the past
    over policies involving Hamas, Hizballah, Lebanon, and Iran,
    often shored up by the selective use of money, corrupt
    influence, and violence.  XXXXXXXXXXXX offered a very ambivalent
    view of Nassif's current status, claiming he still wielded
    influence but suffered from occasional bouts of "dementia."

    ¶7.  (C) Comment:  Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX are secular
    intellectuals with ties of various shadings with the regime.
    Both have consistently spoken to us about the need for U.S.
    engagement with the SARG.  XXXXXXXXXXXX exceptionally critical
    view of U.S. foreign policy is new and likely represents a
    reaction to the success of hard-line Syrian policies that he
    and his friend Mu'allim have consistently struggled to
    counter over the past several years.  The increasing
    sharpness in tone may reflect his frustration that his views
    have fallen into disfavor for the time being and that
    hard-line advocates seem to be crowing that their views are
    paying big dividends for Syria.  XXXXXXXXXXXX most salient point
    is that those hard-line policies could pay dividends for the
    regime and still lead Syria down a dead-end path of no
    reform, no engagement with the West, and increasingly
    dangerous engagement with Islamist political currents likely
    to erode further Syria's embattled secular identity.   End
    Comment.

    SECHE

`