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### Viewing cable 08SANJOSE763, COSTA RICA: AUGUST 28 UNSC BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08SANJOSE763 | 2008-09-23 13:23 | 2011-03-10 17:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-10/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2707705.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-10/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2707712.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-10/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2707716.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0763/01 2671323
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231323Z SEP 08
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0118
    INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0802

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000763

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/CEN, NEA, IO/UNP JMARIZ, AND USUN
    JDELAURENTIS.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018
    TAGS: EFIN IZ PGOV PINR PREL UNSC UN CS
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: AUGUST 28 UNSC BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

    REF: A. SAN JOSE 707
         ¶B. SAN JOSE 730
         ¶C. SAN JOSE 594
         ¶D. SAN JOSE 129

    Classified By: Political/Economic Counselor David E. Henifin for reason
    1.4(d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  IO Acting A/S Brian Hook's August 28
    bilateral consultations with the MFA on UNSC matters were
    successful in bringing the U.S. and the GOCR to mutual
    understanding - if not agreement - on a range of UNSC issues.
     A/S Hook lobbied the MFA for greater cooperation on speed in
    the UNSC, better voting coincidence, and not automatically
    voting in favor of UN Human Rights Council reports.  The MFA:

    -- shared U.S. concerns and views on Georgia;
    -- boxed itself in on its support of the ICJ, making it
    unfeasible for the GOCR to be critical of Serbia's decision
    to bring the case of Kosovo independence to the ICJ;
    -- was appalled by the lack of any UNSC action and "complete
    silence" regarding Pakistan in relation to non-proliferation,
    in contrast to strong UNSC pressure on Iran;
    -- would "not acquiesce" in its resistance to closing down
    Oil-for-Food without assurances that goods were delivered
    in accordance with contracts (Ref A);
    -- seemed to have a well-reasoned rationale for recognizing
    "State" of Palestine, taking into account Costa Rica's "yes"
    vote on UN Resolution 181 and the GOCR desire to give a
    strong show of support to Abbas, in the face of Hamas;
    -- had a clear position against adding more UNSC permanent
    members and preferred to focus on working methods reform;
    -- said it would re-examine its voting in favor of Human
    Rights Council reports and would consider Costa Rica's 14
    percent Overall voting coincidence with the U.S.; and
    -- planned two thematic debates for its UNSC presidency in
    November:  the first on regional security agreements under
    Chapter 8 of the UN Charter presided by President Arias (Ref
    B), and the second on peace and security issues under Chapter
    16 presided by FonMin Stagno.  A/S Hook did not clear this
    cable.  END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    WITH THE FONMIN: OF GEORGIA, KOSOVO AND THE ICJ
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶2. (SBU) Acting A/S Brian Hook's August 27-28 visit was an
    excellent opportunity to engage in bilateral consultations
    with the MFA on UNSC matters.  The timely visit followed up
    on the March visit by PDAS Jim Warlick and IO and USUN staff
    (Ref B).  The consultations began with a small meeting
    between FonMin Stagno, the MFA's Antonio Alarcon (COS) and
    Christian Guillermet (P-equivalent Director for Foreign
    Policy); Ambassador Cianchette, Acting A/S Hook and IO SA
    Erin McLinn.  A larger meeting of both delegations followed.
    See para 21 for delegation lists.  The following, for the
    record, are the highlights of those consultations.

    ¶3. (SBU) In the principals meeting, IO Hook relayed to us
    that the GOCR was "with us on Georgia," but that pushing
    Costa Rica on the ICJ Serbia/Kosovo issue would be to no
    avail since the Costa Ricans had already "boxed themselves
    in" on support of the ICJ.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    WITH MFA TEAM:  NON-PRO ISSUES, IRAN AND PAKISTAN
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶4. (C) In the larger meeting, Stagno expressed dismay
    regarding the lack of any UNSC attention to Pakistani nuclear
    proliferation - either by state or non-state actors -
    including the A.Q. Khan case, for which Khan only received a
    "slap on the wrist."  Stagno supported UNSC and international
    community pressure on Iran and its challenge to the
    architecture of the international non-proliferation regime,
    but was "baffled" by the "complete silence" on Pakistan.  As
    chair of the 1540 Committee, Stagno said Costa Rica felt
    "uncomfortable" not raising the issue of Pakistan and the
    A.Q. Khan network, though he understood the political
    complications that raising the issue might have on the War on
    Terror, the Taliban, and the new Pakistani government.
    Stagno pointed out the "nightmare scenario" of non-state
    actors possessing nuclear technology or materials and decried
    Pakistan's visible "non-compliance" vis-Q-vis a non-state
    actor, as in the Khan case.  The MFA was worried that the
    UNSC was sending "distinct and incomprehensible messages" on
    non-proliferation and was "negligent" by ignoring Pakistan.
    The GOCR did not advocate lighter treatment of Iran, just
    appropriately heavier treatment of Pakistan.

    ¶5. (C) Hook agreed that Pakistan's reports were "cleansed of
    any truth."  He told the MFA that the Proliferation Security
    Initiative (PSI) was the Bush Administration's response to
    the A.Q. Khan case since Khan accomplished what he did
    through shipping activity and did not run a proliferation
    organization per se.  (NOTE: Costa Rica has not signed on
    to the PSI but did attend the May 29 PSI workshop in
    Washington organized by ISN/CPI. END NOTE.) Hook also pointed
    to UNSCRs 1540 and 1803 as steps that U.S. had taken to
    address proliferation issues.  Hook promised to review
    applicable non-proliferation language used for North Korea
    and to get back to Stagno with a possible approach.

    ------------
    OIL FOR FOOD
    ------------

    ¶6. (C) On the Oil-for-Food program (reported Ref A), Stagno
    recognized there was political pressure to close down OFF and
    that the remaining funds were "negligible" in the grand
    scheme of things.  However, he said the GOCR would "not
    acquiesce" unless it received assurances that goods had been
    delivered.  The MFA offered no solutions, but agreed to a SYG
    Briefing on the matter.  Hook told Stagno that the political
    reality of the P5's desire to close down the program was
    separate from principle, though both concerns were valid.  He
    urged that the "perfect not be the enemy of the done."  Hook
    said he would call Under-Secretary-General Chris Burnham for
    more background and see if there was a way through the issue.

    ----------------------------
    THEMATIC DEBATES IN NOVEMBER
    ----------------------------

    ¶7. (SBU) Stagno told us that Costa Rica planned two thematic
    debates for its November UNSC presidency.  The first, to be
    presided over by President Arias, would focus on how regional
    security arrangements (under Chapter 8 of the UN Charter)
    could reduce tensions and military spending.  (See invitation
    to POTUS, Ref B.) Stagno will preside over the second debate,
    which will deal with peace and justice issues under Chapter
    ¶16.  Regarding regional security arrangements, Stagno said
    that Latin America had never been more democratic, yet
    military spending continued to increase.  He noted that
    Venezuela was not the only concern; Chile, too, was
    re-building its military, even though it was a
    well-established democracy facing no serious regional threat.

    ¶8. (SBU) Thus, the MFA believed that regional security
    arrangements could generate significant confidence building
    measures which in turn would limit military spending which
    was unjustified because there were no interstate conflicts
    (or immediately foreseeable conflicts).  (NOTE: This proposal
    is in line with the a) GOCR's push in the UN for a
    conventional arms transfer treaty and overall arms control
    and b) GOCR's push for the "Costa Rica Consensus" to lower
    world weapons expenditure and beef up world foreign
    assistance to those who disarm. END NOTE.)

    --------------------------------------
    MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THE PALESTINIANS
    --------------------------------------

    ¶9. (C) Regarding the Middle East peace process, Stagno gave
    the most detailed rationale we had heard for the GOCR's
    recognition of the Palestinian "state" (Ref D).  The FonMin
    said that recognition was calculated to provide support for
    President Abbas and impetus for the ultimate creation of
    Palestine, as set forth in UN resolution 181, which Costa
    Rica supported.  Stagno appeared frustrated that mechanisms
    such as UN Resolution 181, the Oslo Accords, the Madrid Plan,
    and the Road Map - which all called for tiered processes to
    establish a Palestinian State within certain time frames -
    were always derailed by "spoilers" before they could get to
    fundamental issues such as the status of Jerusalem;
    settlements; borders; security arrangements; and the right of
    refugee return.  Stagno assured us that Palestinian
    recognition did "not prejudice" the GOCR's view on these
    fundamental issues.  Stagno cautioned that if the
    international community did not back Abbas and the moderates,
    then Hamas would be emboldened and the GOCR did not want to
    see a further Hamas victory.  Stagno, however, said that he
    was "uncomfortable" with the UN being put on par with member
    states in the Quartet.

    ¶10. (C) Hook stressed to Stagno that Middle East peace was a
    top priority of POTUS and the Secretary.  He said the Quartet
    was the current mechanism and the SYG's role is more one of
    "using his good offices" in negotiations.  Hook warned that
    UN and UNSC dialogue on Israel was a big problem for the
    U.S., given Libya's recent toxic remarks on the Council.  The
    UN had not been effective on Israel, he added, due to the
    bias of many member states, and Israel remained an issue for
    the U.S. image around the world.  Under these circumstances,
    Hook suggested  that in multilateral fora, USG goals should
    to be to "first, do no harm," to our Middle East objectives
    and work for breakthroughs outside the UN.  At Stagno's
    request, Hook said he would touch base with NEA PDAS David
    Welch to assess the status of the peace process and get back
    to Stagno.

    ¶11. (SBU) On a related issue, Stagno criticized Israel for
    not doing its own demarches while leaving the U.S. to do the
    brunt of Israeli lobbying around the world.  While he was UN
    Ambassador, Stagno remembered only being demarched twice.
    MFA Foreign Policy Director Guillermet said that during his
    six years in Geneva, he never received a demarche from
    Israel.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    COUNCIL REFORM/EXPANSION AND THE NEED FOR SPEED
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶12. (C) On UNSC reform, the FonMin reiterated GOCR opposition
    to expansion, for four reasons.  First, as a small
    country looking at an enlarged UNSC, Costa Rica's odds of
    holding a non-permanent seat again in the future would be
    reduced.  Second, Costa Rica did not approve of all the
    candidates nations and their respective credentials.  India
    was not yet a party to the NPT, for example; Brazil would be
    unfairly upgraded over Mexico when Mexico paid more UN dues;
    Japan's UN contributions were dwindling; and as part of the
    EU with a common foreign policy, a seat for Germany would be
    redundant with France and Britain already permanent members.
    Third, the MFA believed the UNSC would have more credibility
    via modification of its working methods (such as ending the
    silent veto).  Fourth, with a drawn-out process of elections,
    surprise members may get in due to "voter fatigue," as
    happened with Mexico and Panama after contentious UNSC
    elections in the past.  Stagno cautioned that "sometimes you
    don't get what you are expecting" and cited examples of an
    accidental election of a Nigeria or Libya, which would
    provide those countries with unmerited moral authority.

    ¶13. (C) Stagno claimed that the S5 shared views with GOCR on
    working methods - but not on enlargement - and that there
    would be insufficient value added by enlargement of the UNSC.
     Hook responded that the U.S. wanted a more efficient and
    effective Council, and that though the U.S. has been on the
    record with its support of Japan for some time, it was hard
    to imagine consensus-building being any easier in an enlarged
    Council; consensus was elusive enough with 15 members.

    ¶14. (C) Hook addressed the GOCR's action on Zimbabwe in July,
    where the GOCR UN Mission examined the Mugabe sanctions
    resolution text for more than a week (Ref C), thus giving
    Russia and China the "cover of time" to veto it.  Hook said
    it took the UNSC two weeks to "show up on the grid and take
    action," overtly hinting that Costa Rica's delays cost the
    opportunity for unified Council action; by the time of the
    veto, it was not front page news.  Hook told Stagno that
    speed was "very important in the UNSC or we lose momentum for
    action." Stagno defended the GOCR's desire for text-tweaking
    and said the resolution needed a well-defined start date for
    sanctions - and that date could not have been when Mugabe was
    born! He noted that the GOCR "eventually agreed" on the
    resolution.  The GOCR saw the resolution as a "wonderful
    opportunity" to send a clear message to standing Heads of
    State about violations committed during the electoral
    process.

    ------------------------
    BURMA AND SPECIAL ENVOYS
    ------------------------

    ¶15. (C) On Burma, Hook expressed U.S. dissatisfaction with
    special envoys in general, since they tend to take the place
    of or delay UNSC action and give a false sense of progress,
    while the regime exploited the talks to buy time.  Hook
    stressed that the U.S. was at the "end of its rope" with UN
    Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari.  Hook asked Stagno to help
    think of a face-saving way to get rid of Gambari, adding that
    Aung San Suu Kyi did not even want to meet with him anymore.
    Stagno did not have the best impressions of Gambari, either.

    ------------------------------
    VOTING COINCIDENCE WITH THE US
    ------------------------------

    ¶16. (SBU) On U.S. agenda items, Hook told Stagno of IO's new
    initiative to improve voting coincidence with 25 like-minded,
    democratic countries.  When asked to guess the percentage of
    GOCR's overall votes with the U.S., Stagno
    guessed "30 percent of the time."  Stagno seemed surprised
    when Hook told him that the real number was only 14 percent.
    Hook signaled that appropriators in Congress could see this
    with disapproval - especially for those who receive U.S.
    foreign assistance - and would not understand why there was
    such a gap.  Hook acknowledged the GOCR spoke with "moral
    clarity" on human rights issues, and he promised to send
    Stagno a recent Heritage Foundation study on the subject of
    voting coincidence.

    ¶17. (SBU) On voting coincidence, while Stagno made it clear
    that the GOCR did not have to be in "lock step" with the U.S.
    and should not be expected to be, he acknowledged that he had
    not seen voting coincidence reports since he was UN
    Ambassador in 2005.  (NOTE: We have passed Stagno's office
    the 2007 Department Report on UN Voting Practices.)  Stagno
    noted that when the GOCR examined voting records then, the
    differences were often due to U.S. votes on issues such as
    climate change and disarmament and not due to specific
    US-Costa Rica disagreements.  He evinced openness to further
    conversation on this topic.

    ----------------------------------------
    AND WHAT ABOUT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL?
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶18. (C) Finally, Hook asked why the GOCR voted in favor of
    the annual Human Rights Council Report when the body's work
    was not credible.  Stagno explained that the GOCR supported
    reform in 2005 and the creation of the Human Rights Council
    and the Peacebuilding Commission, though the international
    community got the worst results - the old Human Rights
    Commission with a new name.  Stagno felt that some elements
    of the annual reports were favorable, so they voted in favor.

    ¶19. (C) Hook argued that just because it is a human rights
    body the HR Council did not deserve automatic support, and
    that by voting in favor of the report, members -- especially
    with strong HR records like Costa Rica -- legitimized the HR
    Council's work.  Hook pointed out that HR Council reform
    would come faster if we sent the message that the HR Council
    was not serious about human rights and we let it "run off the
    road into a ditch" itself.  Hook suggested that the MFA
    consider a resolution calling on the UNGA to take action on
    the annual HR Council reports, with a positive vision (not
    just critical), for continued HRC operation but under two to
    three clear conditions.  Hook suggested that the U.S. and the
    GOCR touch base with each other - and with Panama - when the
    next report came out.  Stagno conceded that Hook had a "valid
    point," offered to study the issue further, and stated that
    the GOCR did not fear "major surgery in the
    HRC."

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶20. (C) It remains clear that the GOCR wants to make a
    difference in the Security Council. Though we did not agree
    on all points, the dialogue during these consultations was an
    important and timely opportunity to coordinate on important
    issues.  Stagno and his MFA team appreciated the chance to
    compare views as "equal members" of the Council, and he was,
    as always, impressively on top of his complex and
    comprehensive portfolio.  These consultations may not
    drastically alter GOCR behavior, however.  We expect the GOCR
    will continue to stand on principle and try to improve
    procedures at every opportunity in the UNSC, sometimes at the
    expense of speed and substance.  Being "courted" by the
    Department's top IO official in these consultations may help,
    however.  With Stagno clearly in charge of Costa Rica's UN
    policy (as reaffirmed to us on September 17 by COS Alarcon),
    calls to Stagno from A/S Hook from time to time may generate
    more GOCR cooperation on select issues.

    ¶21. (U) Participants:

    GOCR:

    -- Bruno Stagno, Foreign Minister
    -- Antonio Alarcon, FonMin's Chief of Staff
    -- Christian Guillermet, Director, Foreign Policy
    -- Adriana Murillo, Human Rights Officer and UNSC Team
    Leader
    -- Juan Salas, UNSC Desk Officer
    -- Deyanira Ramirez, UN Desk Officer
    -- Carlos Cordero, Disarmament and Organized Crime Officer,
    UNSC Team

    USG:

    -- Ambassador Cianchette (opening session)
    -- Brian Hook, IO Acting A/S
    -- Erin McLinn, IO Staff Assistant
    -- David Henifin, Pol-Econ Counselor
    -- Cheryl Neely, PolOff

    CIANCHETTE

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