Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12522 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AORC AF ASEC APER AS AMED AE AEMR AFIN AG AMGT APECO AU AJ AA ADM AGAO ABLD AL ASUP AID AADP ACOA ANET AY ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ARF ATRN APEC ASEAN AMBASSADOR AO ACS AM AZ ACABQ AGMT ABUD APCS AINF AORL AFFAIRS AFSI AFSN ACBAQ AFGHANISTAN ADANA AMCHAMS AIT ADPM AX ADCO AECL AMEX ACAO AODE ASCH AORG AGR AROC ASIG AND ARM AQ ATFN AC AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN ALOW
BR BO BM BA BK BU BB BL BY BF BEXP BTIO BD BE BH BG BRUSSELS BP BIDEN BT BC BX BILAT BN BBSR BTIU BWC BMGT
CASC CJAN CA CU CO CS CE CVIS CPAS CDG CI CH CBW CWC CMGT CD CM CDC CIA CG CNARC CN CONS CW CLINTON COE CT CIDA CR COUNTER CTR CSW CONDOLEEZZA CARICOM CB CY CL COM CICTE CFED COUNTRY CIS CROS CJUS CBSA CEUDA CLMT CAC CODEL COPUOS CIC CBE CHR CTM CVR CF COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CACS CAN CITT CARSON CACM CDB CV CAPC CKGR CBC
DR DEA DJ DA DHS DAO DCM DTRA DOD DOMESTIC DO DK DISENGAGEMENT DPRK DEPT DOE DS DE DEFENSE DEAX
ECON ELAB ETRD EINV EPET EAIR EIND ETTC EUR EUN ENRG EK EG ECPS EFIN EC EAID EUMEM EWWT ECIN ELTN EFIS EAGR EU EMIN ET ER ENIV ES EINT EZ EI EPA ERNG ENGR ENGY EXTERNAL ENERG EUREM ELN ENNP EFINECONCS ENVR ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ELECTIONS ECA ETC EFTA EINVEFIN EN ECINECONCS EEPET ERD ENVI ETRC EXIM EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS ETRO EDU ETRN EAIG ECONCS ECONOMICS EAP ECONOMY ESA EINN ECONOMIC EIAR EXBS ECUN EINDETRD EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN ECIP EFIM EAIDS ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC EINVECONSENVCSJA ETRA
FR FI FDA FTAA FJ FBI FAC FARC FAO FTA FREEDOM FISO FOR FM FOREIGN FOI FAS FINR FINANCE FMLN FO
GG GM GV GR GAERC GA GE GOI GT GOV GH GTMO GY GANGS GAZA GERARD GL GF GCC GZ GTIP GLOBAL
HURI HR HEBRON HK HO HA HILLARY HSTC HU HUMAN HI HYMPSK HUMOR
IC IT IR IN ICAO IS ID ICRC IZ IAEA IMO IL IQ IRS INRA INRO IV ICJ IBRD IEFIN IACI INTELSAT IO ILC ICTY ITRA IDA ITU IRAQI ILO ITALY IIP INRB IRC IMF IAHRC IA IWC IPR ISRAELI INMARSAT INTERPOL INTERNAL ISLAMISTS INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IBET INR IEA IZPREL IRAJ ITF IF ISRAEL ICTR IDP IGAD
JA JO JM JOHN JOSEPH JP JUS JAMES JOHNNIE
KDEM KCOR KCRM KMDR KPAO KWMN KNEI KNNP KJUS KISL KOMC KSUM KGHG KCRS KMCA KPKO KHLS KSCA KICC KIRF KPAL KWBG KN KIPR KPOA KV KDRG KBIO KTFN KBTR KFRD KCFE KE KPLS KSTC KTIP KTIA KS KHDP KHIV KCIP KTDB KZ KGIC KOLY KSEO KRVC KFLO KVPR KIRC KU KAWC KPRP KSEP KFLU KTER KBCT KSCI KUNR KRIM KWAC KG KMPI KOMS KSPR KFIN KCRCM KR KBTS KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KREC KLIG KSAF KACT KCOM KAID KPWR KNPP KDEMAF KSTH KOCI KNUP KIDE KPRV KWMM KX KMIG KAWK KRCM KVRP KPAONZ KNUC KNAR KRAD KNNPMNUC KERG KTBT KCFC KVIR KTEX KGIT KPAI KTLA KFSC KCSY KSAC KTRD KID KMRS KOM KMOC KJUST KGCC KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KO KNSD KHUM KSEC KCMR KCHG KICA KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KWWMN KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KDDG KIFR KHSA KRGY
LY LG LH LE LO LI LTTE LU LA LAB LOG LT LABOR
MARR MASS MCAP MOPS MT MNUC MX MO MAR MTCRE MASSMNUC MARAD ML MY MAPP MEPN MD MZ MRCRE MI MA MAS MU MR MC MTCR MEETINGS MK MCC MG MIL MASC MV MIK MP MUCN MEDIA MPOS MERCOSUR MW MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MTRE MEPI MQADHAFI MAPS MEPP MILITARY MDC
NO NATO NZ NL NPT NI NU NSF NA NP NPG NSG NSFO NS NSC NE NK NPA NG NSSP NATIONAL NDP NASA NGO NR NIPP NAFTA NRR NEW NH NZUS NC NT NAR NV NORAD NATOPREL NW
OPRC OSCE OIIP OTRA OEXC OVIP OREP OPCW OPIC OECD OPDC OFDP OSCI OMIG ODIP OPAD OAS OVP OIE OFDA OCS OHUM OFFICIALS OBSP OTR OSAC ON OCII OES OIC
PGOV PREL PTER PK PHUM PINS PINR PL PREF PARM PM PBTS PO PE PEL PHSA PA PAO PBIO PAS POL PNAT PAK PSI PU PARMS POLITICS PHUMBA PROP PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PREO PMIL POGOV POV PNR PRL PG PINL PRGOV PALESTINIAN PAHO PROG PREFA PORG PTBS PUNE POLICY PDOV PCI PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PP PS PY PTERE PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PSEPC PGOVE PINF PNG PGOC PFOR PCUL PLN POLINT PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PGOVLO PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PHUMPREL PGIV PRAM PHUH PSA PHUMPGOV PF
QA
RS RU RP RW RO ROOD RSO RICE RM RUPREL RCMP REACTION REPORT REGION RIGHTS RF RFE RSP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS
SOCI SCUL SW SZ SP SNAR SENV SY SR SMIG SU SF SO SA SARS SL SN SH SYR SC SG SNARN SEVN SCRS SAARC SI SHI SENVKGHG SHUM SPCE SYRIA SWE STEINBERG SIPRS ST SNARIZ SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SIPDIS SAN SANC SEN SNARCS
TRGY TU TBIO TPHY TX TNGD TH TSPL TS TSPA TW TIP TZ TF TR TP TO TT TFIN TI TERRORISM TN THPY TD TL TV TC TINT TK TRSY TURKEY TBID TAGS
UK UNGA UP UN UNSC UNICEF UNESCO UY UNEP UV UNPUOS USTR US UNHRC UNAUS UZ UNMIK UNCSD USUN UNCHR UNDC UNHCR USNC UNO UG USEU USOAS UE UNDP UNC USPS USAID UNVIE UAE UNFICYP UNODC UNCHS UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNCND
VE VC VT VZ VM VTIZ VTEG VN VTPREL VI VAT
WHTI WHO WBG WTRO WI WIPO WTO WHA WITH WS WTRQ WZ WFP WWARD WB WMO WEU WMD WA
XZ XV XF XA XW XQ XY XM XL XG XT XR XK XTAG XS XB XE XU XC XX XD XH XI
YM YI YE YMCS
ZB ZI ZP ZR ZO ZL ZF ZU ZJ ZEALAND ZK ZN ZA ZOELLICK ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 06SAOPAULO862, LULA'S BALANCING ACT: PT LEADER OUTLINES PARTY'S ELECTORAL STRATEGY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06SAOPAULO862.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SAOPAULO862 | 2006-08-07 18:39 | 2011-03-05 00:00 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Consulate Sao Paulo

`

    VZCZCXRO3077
    PP RUEHRG
    DE RUEHSO #0862/01 2191839
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 071839Z AUG 06
    FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5556
    INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6631
    RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 2698
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2376
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2089
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1814
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2942
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 7334
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3058
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2528
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAO PAULO 000862

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    STATE PASS USTR FOR MSULLIVAN
    STATE PASS EXIMBANK
    STATE PASS OPIC FOR MORONESE, RIVERA, MERVENNE
    NSC FOR FEARS
    USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D
    USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA TREASURY FOR OASIA, DAS LEE AND DDOUGLASS DOL FOR ILAB MMITTELHAUSER SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD USAID/W FOR LAC/AA
    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ECON BR
    SUBJECT: LULA'S BALANCING ACT: PT LEADER OUTLINES PARTY'S ELECTORAL STRATEGY
    REF: BRASILIA 1136 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY
    ------- SUMMARY -------
    ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Sao Paulo State Legislator Renato Simoes outlined the strategy of Lula's Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT) for the October elections. Simoes indicated that the party believes the Sao Paulo state and national campaigns have to be integrated. PT gubernatorial candidate (and Senator) Aloysio Mercadante needs President Lula's coattails to have a chance to defeat former Sao Paulo Mayor Jose Serra, just as Lula needs a strong showing by Mercadante to improve his own electoral performance in Brazil's most populous state. The PT's ideal scenario would have Lula winning in the first round while Mercadante forces the gubernatorial race into a second round. On the national level, the PT will focus on the Lula administration's achievements while remaining vague and general about future programs and plans; in the state campaign, the PT believes that Serra has weaknesses that can be exploited despite his strong position in the polls. The message in both campaigns will be that Lula needs a strong ally in Sao Paulo's state government to ensure a successful second term. Simoes also indicated that the PT's campaign for the federal Chamber of Deputies will focus on the party list rather than individual candidates; he is optimistic that the "disaster" of lost seats predicted by many observers will not occur. He also expressed the view that although the popular and social movements that comprise the left wing of the PT will support Lula's re-election, they remain disappointed with Lula and will be more aggressive and demanding in a second term. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (SBU) Poloff and Political Assistant met July 31 with Renato Simoes, a leader of the PT in the Sao Paulo State Legislative Assembly. Simoes is also a member of the PT's National Directorate and is serving on its Executive Committee as acting National Secretary for Popular Movements, replacing Bruno Maranhao, who was SIPDIS suspended after leading the Landless Workers Liberation Movement (MLST) invasion of Congress in June (reftel).

    ---------------------------------

    LOOKING FOR A FIRST ROUND VICTORY ---------------------------------

    ¶3. (SBU) Simoes expressed confidence that Lula will win the election in the first round. The votes for Lula from the northeast - especially from the poor - are already solid, he said, so the President can afford to focus his campaign in the south and southeast, where his performance in recent polls is worrisome. In these areas, Simoes acknowledged, Lula is trailing his opponent, Geraldo Alckmin of the Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB). This part of the country comprises more than 35 percent of all voters, as well as the largest proportion of middle class families. Lula needs to retain the votes of the poor while regaining the trust of the middle class. Thus, in both his government programs and his campaign speeches, he is trying to appeal to both groups while alienating neither, a delicate balancing act. His government is distributing benefits both to the poor (e.g., the "Bolsa Familia program and the increase in the minimum wage) and to the medium class (e.g., a tax break for families that hire a maid formally). Likewise, his government program is intentionally vague. Lula is being careful to steer clear of controversy and specific commitments. The PT strategists believe he will be reelected if he can run on his image and his bond with poor voters and avoid making any mistakes during the campaign.

    SAO PAULO 00000862 002 OF 003

    ¶4. (SBU) Simoes thinks Heloisa Helena, presidential candidate of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) and a former PT member, probably has a ceiling of about 8 percent despite recent polls showing her higher. The PSOL, a new party created largely from PT defectors, has no organization at the national or state level to work for its candidates. Heloisa takes some votes from Lula, but really takes votes from everybody because some voters express support for her as a protest against the system. Simoes thinks she may fall to her natural level of about 5-6 percent; with Democratic Labor Party (PDT) candidate Cristovam Buarque at around 2 percent, Lula should thus be able, with his still sizeable lead over Alckmin, to win in a first round. 5. (SBU) Simoes recognizes that a second round would be hard on Lula. The President would have to campaign in a much more hostile political environment. The PT won't have gubernatorial candidates running in the second round in many important battleground states. (This is one reason the PT considers it critical for Mercadante to force Serra into a second round in Sao Paulo.) In addition, merely by making it to the second round, Alckmin will have shifted the momentum and will begin to look more like a winner. Many Brazilian political analysts argue that voters like to vote for winners.

    ---------------------------------

    THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING SAO PAULO

    ---------------------------------

    ¶6. (SBU) In discussing electoral strategy, Simoes stressed the importance of integrating the national campaign with the campaign in Sao Paulo state. The idea of winning the Sao Paulo government is more than just an electoral target. The PT believes the state, with a friendly government, could give support to the Lula administration as it did for President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (FHC) administration. Simoes remembered that some of FHC's programs were first implemented in Sao Paulo as a test or pilot and then enlarged to encompass the whole country. In addition, many things that happen in Sao Paulo tend to resonate quickly throughout the rest of the country.

    ¶7. (SBU) Simoes is convinced that Mercadante can force a second round with Serra in the gubernatorial race, despite poll numbers showing Serra with a commanding lead. Former Governor Orestes Quercia, candidate of the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and third on the polls, who has strong support in the state's interior, has a ceiling of about 12 percent. According to Simoes' electoral arithmetic, Mercadante should get around 25 percent of the votes and has a chance of reaching 30 as the PT's Jose Genoino did in 2002. At the same time, if PDT candidate Carlos Apolinario and PSOL candidate Plinio de Arruda Sampaio, of PSOL each get 2-3 percent, a second round is guaranteed.

    ¶8. (SBU) In the state campaign, the PT needs to focus on social issues and the disenchantment of some voters after twelve years of PSDB rule. Public security, health, and education are areas where the PSDB Covas-Alckmin governments made insufficient investment, Simoes said. Public security and the issue of the organized criminal gang First Capital Command (PCC) won't necessarily be a winning issue for the PT, however, because the public holds everyone responsible. The PCC attacks in May damaged Alckmin at the time and may continue to hurt him in some quarters, but many also held the federal government accountable. Under Brazil's federal system, municipalities also have a role to play. The Lula administration didn't provide enough federal security assistance to Sao Paulo state over its first three years, in part because state government was in the hands of the opposition. Thus, while the issue is important to the campaign, it's not a winner for any candidate or party.

    SAO PAULO 00000862 003 OF 003

    ¶9. (SBU) Simoes also outlined the PT strategy to fight for more seats in the Congress. Most observers expect that due to the "mensalao" corruption scandal, the PT will elect at most 60 (some say 50) members to the Chamber of Deputies after electing 90 in 2002. However, Simoes thinks the PT can repeat its 2002 performance. Its television campaign will focus on the party list as a whole instead of promoting individual candidates, and will attempt to remind voters of the party's historic role in Brazilian politics. Via this "voto de legenda," the party hopes to take advantage of the positive image it continues to enjoy with some segments of the electorate, and to avoid the public identification of certain candidates who became notorious during the scandals. In short, Simoes believes that "the anticipated disaster will not happen."

    ------------------

    LULA'S SECOND TERM

    ------------------

    ¶10. (SBU) The leftist popular and social movements will campaign for Lula, because they are afraid of losing ground under an Alckmin administration. However, Simoes said, these leftist movements have been disappointed with Lula's government and will continue to make their disappointment felt. They are frustrated with Lula's handling of social security reform, labor reform, and his failure to do more on land reform. Assuming a second Lula term, the social movements will be more active, more aggressive, and more confrontational. They will expect Lula, with more political maneuvering room, to do more for his leftist political base.

    ¶11. (SBU) Nevertheless, Simoes warned against expecting fundamental changes from a second Lula administration. Macroeconomic policy will continue on the same course. But there may be ways that Lula can open up some political space, work more closely with the leftist and the social/popular movements, and increase social participation. Simoes conceded that the MLST invasion of Congress (reftel) had gotten the PT and the movements some bad publicity, but didn't think it had done long-term damage to the party's electoral prospects. Everyone knows, he said with a shrug, that such demonstrations sometimes turn out well and sometimes end badly.

    ------- COMMENT -------

    ¶12. (SBU) Simoes' predictions combine optimism with apprehension. He thinks Lula can win in the first round but fears the consequences if he doesn't. He expects the PT at the national level to avoid the worst consequences of the corruption scandals but recognizes the need to improve the party's performance in key states like Sao Paulo. He seems aware that one or two prominent blunders could cost Lula dearly and stressed that the campaign is going to play it safe. He is aware that Lula has ignored the popular and social movements and probably cannot do so indefinitely. Despite Lula's comfortable lead in the polls, all is not well in the land of the PT. END COMMENT.

    ¶13. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia.

    MCMULLEN

`