Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12522 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05 2011/05/06 2011/05/07 2011/05/08 2011/05/09 2011/05/10

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown Consulate Fukuoka
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sapporo Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AR AORC AF ASEC APER AS AMED AE AEMR AFIN AG AMGT APECO AU AJ AA ADM AGAO ABLD AL ASUP AID AADP ACOA ANET AY ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ARF ATRN APEC ASEAN AMBASSADOR AO ACS AM AZ ACABQ AGMT ABUD APCS AINF AORL AFFAIRS AFSI AFSN ACBAQ AFGHANISTAN ADANA AMCHAMS AIT ADPM AX ADCO AECL AMEX ACAO AODE ASCH AORG AGR AROC ASIG AND ARM AQ ATFN AC AUC ASEX AER AVERY AGRICULTURE AMG AFU AN ALOW
BR BO BM BA BK BU BB BL BY BF BEXP BTIO BD BE BH BG BRUSSELS BP BIDEN BT BC BX BILAT BN BBSR BTIU BWC BMGT
CASC CJAN CA CU CO CS CE CVIS CPAS CDG CI CH CBW CWC CMGT CD CM CDC CIA CG CNARC CN CONS CW CLINTON COE CT CIDA CR COUNTER CTR CSW CONDOLEEZZA CARICOM CB CY CL COM CICTE CFED COUNTRY CIS CROS CJUS CBSA CEUDA CLMT CAC CODEL COPUOS CIC CBE CHR CTM CVR CF COUNTERTERRORISM CITEL CLEARANCE CACS CAN CITT CARSON CACM CDB CV CAPC CKGR CBC
DR DEA DJ DA DHS DAO DCM DTRA DOD DOMESTIC DO DK DISENGAGEMENT DPRK DEPT DOE DS DE DEFENSE DEAX
ECON ELAB ETRD EINV EPET EAIR EIND ETTC EUR EUN ENRG EK EG ECPS EFIN EC EAID EUMEM EWWT ECIN ELTN EFIS EAGR EU EMIN ET ER ENIV ES EINT EZ EI EPA ERNG ENGR ENGY EXTERNAL ENERG EUREM ELN ENNP EFINECONCS ENVR ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ELECTIONS ECA ETC EFTA EINVEFIN EN ECINECONCS EEPET ERD ENVI ETRC EXIM EURN ETRDEINVTINTCS ETRO EDU ETRN EAIG ECONCS ECONOMICS EAP ECONOMY ESA EINN ECONOMIC EIAR EXBS ECUN EINDETRD EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN ECIP EFIM EAIDS ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVETC EINVECONSENVCSJA ETRA
FR FI FDA FTAA FJ FBI FAC FARC FAO FTA FREEDOM FISO FOR FM FOREIGN FOI FAS FINR FINANCE FMLN FO
GG GM GV GR GAERC GA GE GOI GT GOV GH GTMO GY GANGS GAZA GERARD GL GF GCC GZ GTIP GLOBAL
HURI HR HEBRON HK HO HA HILLARY HSTC HU HUMAN HI HYMPSK HUMOR
IC IT IR IN ICAO IS ID ICRC IZ IAEA IMO IL IQ IRS INRA INRO IV ICJ IBRD IEFIN IACI INTELSAT IO ILC ICTY ITRA IDA ITU IRAQI ILO ITALY IIP INRB IRC IMF IAHRC IA IWC IPR ISRAELI INMARSAT INTERPOL INTERNAL ISLAMISTS INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IBET INR IEA IZPREL IRAJ ITF IF ISRAEL ICTR IDP IGAD
JA JO JM JOHN JOSEPH JP JUS JAMES JOHNNIE
KDEM KCOR KCRM KMDR KPAO KWMN KNEI KNNP KJUS KISL KOMC KSUM KGHG KCRS KMCA KPKO KHLS KSCA KICC KIRF KPAL KWBG KN KIPR KPOA KV KDRG KBIO KTFN KBTR KFRD KCFE KE KPLS KSTC KTIP KTIA KS KHDP KHIV KCIP KTDB KZ KGIC KOLY KSEO KRVC KFLO KVPR KIRC KU KAWC KPRP KSEP KFLU KTER KBCT KSCI KUNR KRIM KWAC KG KMPI KOMS KSPR KFIN KCRCM KR KBTS KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KREC KLIG KSAF KACT KCOM KAID KPWR KNPP KDEMAF KSTH KOCI KNUP KIDE KPRV KWMM KX KMIG KAWK KRCM KVRP KPAONZ KNUC KNAR KRAD KNNPMNUC KERG KTBT KCFC KVIR KTEX KGIT KPAI KTLA KFSC KCSY KSAC KTRD KID KMRS KOM KMOC KJUST KGCC KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KO KNSD KHUM KSEC KCMR KCHG KICA KPIN KESS KDEV KCGC KWWMN KPAK KWNM KWMNCS KRFD KDDG KIFR KHSA KRGY
LY LG LH LE LO LI LTTE LU LA LAB LOG LT LABOR
MARR MASS MCAP MOPS MT MNUC MX MO MAR MTCRE MASSMNUC MARAD ML MY MAPP MEPN MD MZ MRCRE MI MA MAS MU MR MC MTCR MEETINGS MK MCC MG MIL MASC MV MIK MP MUCN MEDIA MPOS MERCOSUR MW MOPPS MTS MLS MILI MTRE MEPI MQADHAFI MAPS MEPP MILITARY MDC
NO NATO NZ NL NPT NI NU NSF NA NP NPG NSG NSFO NS NSC NE NK NPA NG NSSP NATIONAL NDP NASA NGO NR NIPP NAFTA NRR NEW NH NZUS NC NT NAR NV NORAD NATOPREL NW
OPRC OSCE OIIP OTRA OEXC OVIP OREP OPCW OPIC OECD OPDC OFDP OSCI OMIG ODIP OPAD OAS OVP OIE OFDA OCS OHUM OFFICIALS OBSP OTR OSAC ON OCII OES OIC
PGOV PREL PTER PK PHUM PINS PINR PL PREF PARM PM PBTS PO PE PEL PHSA PA PAO PBIO PAS POL PNAT PAK PSI PU PARMS POLITICS PHUMBA PROP PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PREO PMIL POGOV POV PNR PRL PG PINL PRGOV PALESTINIAN PAHO PROG PREFA PORG PTBS PUNE POLICY PDOV PCI PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PP PS PY PTERE PGOF PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PSEPC PGOVE PINF PNG PGOC PFOR PCUL PLN POLINT PGGV PHALANAGE PARTY PGOVLO PHUS PDEM PECON PROV PHUMPREL PGIV PRAM PHUH PSA PHUMPGOV PF
QA
RS RU RP RW RO ROOD RSO RICE RM RUPREL RCMP REACTION REPORT REGION RIGHTS RF RFE RSP RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT RELATIONS
SOCI SCUL SW SZ SP SNAR SENV SY SR SMIG SU SF SO SA SARS SL SN SH SYR SC SG SNARN SEVN SCRS SAARC SI SHI SENVKGHG SHUM SPCE SYRIA SWE STEINBERG SIPRS ST SNARIZ SSA SK SPCVIS SOFA SIPDIS SAN SANC SEN SNARCS
TRGY TU TBIO TPHY TX TNGD TH TSPL TS TSPA TW TIP TZ TF TR TP TO TT TFIN TI TERRORISM TN THPY TD TL TV TC TINT TK TRSY TURKEY TBID TAGS
UK UNGA UP UN UNSC UNICEF UNESCO UY UNEP UV UNPUOS USTR US UNHRC UNAUS UZ UNMIK UNCSD USUN UNCHR UNDC UNHCR USNC UNO UG USEU USOAS UE UNDP UNC USPS USAID UNVIE UAE UNFICYP UNODC UNCHS UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNCHC UNCND
VE VC VT VZ VM VTIZ VTEG VN VTPREL VI VAT
WHTI WHO WBG WTRO WI WIPO WTO WHA WITH WS WTRQ WZ WFP WWARD WB WMO WEU WMD WA
XZ XV XF XA XW XQ XY XM XL XG XT XR XK XTAG XS XB XE XU XC XX XD XH XI
YM YI YE YMCS
ZB ZI ZP ZR ZO ZL ZF ZU ZJ ZEALAND ZK ZN ZA ZOELLICK ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09MEXICO283, THE U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP: MEETING CHALLENGES,

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MEXICO283.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO283 | 2009-02-04 17:08 | 2011-03-02 12:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/la-relacion-eu-mexico-mas-fuerte-que-nunca

`

    VZCZCXRO3019
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #0283/01 0351708
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 041708Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

` `

    190450
    2009-02-04 17:08:00
    09MEXICO283
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL

    VZCZCXRO3019
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #0283/01 0351708
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 041708Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000283

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR KJUS PINR MX
    SUBJECT: THE U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP: MEETING CHALLENGES,
    TAPPING OPPORTUNITIES IN 2009--SECURITY AND REFORM

    Classified By: POLCOUNS CHARLES V. BARCLAY. REASONS 1.4(b)
    and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Mexico's drug cartels are responsible for
    60-80 percent of the cocaine and a significant percentage of
    other drugs entering the U.S., their activities corrupt
    Mexican institutions, foment insecurity throughout Mexico,
    and instigate rising violence on the U.S.-Mexico border.
    Disrupting and ultimately dismantling these groups represents
    one of our Mission's highest priorities. To achieve that
    objective, we need to help Mexico build stronger law
    enforcement institutions committed to working together not
    only to attack the cartels from without but corruption from
    within. We also must help Mexico improve its ability to
    collect and then act expeditiously on intelligence. Mexico
    is looking for much from us in terms of combating U.S. drug
    demand, trafficking of arms from the U.S. into Mexico, and
    money laundering in the U.S. and we need to step up our
    efforts across the board. Last, but not least, we need to
    assist Mexico in implementing justice reform that will enable
    Mexico to turn the page on corruption and establish the rule
    of law. The Merida Initiative provides a platform for
    achieving these objectives provided it remains flexible yet
    focused. This cable is the first in a series of five cables
    that aim to define the issues that will shape the U.S.-Mexico
    relationship in the coming year. End Summary.

    Reinforce President Calderon's Commitment to Law Enforcement
    Development

    ¶2. (SBU) The Mexican public correctly perceives Mexican law
    enforcement institutions as widely inept and corrupt.
    Calderon's own security chief highlighted a recent federal
    review in which 56,000 police officers failed to meet minimum
    professional standards. We must ensure that the Merida
    Initiative's focus on police training and vetting not only
    professionalizes and sanitizes Mexico's police forces, but
    reinforces Calderon's goal of ending impunity. As Merida
    moves forward, we need to encourage the GOM to establish
    aggressive internal affairs units to better identify and
    sanction bad cops, as well as map out a career path for law
    enforcement officials that rewards good ones with advancement
    and better pay.

    Encourage Better Inter-Institutional Cooperation

    ¶3. (U) The major institutions engaged in Mexico's war on
    drugs -- the military, public security, the Attorney
    General's office, and the national security intelligence arm,
    on down to the state and municipal law enforcement community
    -- don't trust each other. In principle, the GOM aims to
    promote greater interoperability through its
    information-sharing initiative Plataforma Mexico; so far,
    however, each agency has continued to pursue leads and
    conduct investigations independent of, if not at odds with,
    its counterparts. On an institutional level, the Attorney
    General's Office (PGR) is resisting the Secretariat of Public
    Security's (SSP) efforts to integrate the Federal
    Investigative Agency (AFI) officials into its forces and
    opposition parties in Congress have raised their own
    objections to legislation that would call for the merging of
    SSP and AFI into a single unitary federal police force.

    ¶4. (SBU) Ongoing U.S. funded vetting programs have
    facilitated the creation of trusted units within several of
    Mexico's law enforcement entities. The Merida Initiative
    will fund vetting programs on a far more extensive level.
    Recently adopted legislation calls for the creation of a
    National Council for Public Security which the president will
    head and will include the ministries of government, public
    security, national defense and the navy. However, it would
    be a mistake to regard this council as the panacea for the
    deep-seated distrust that presently characterizes relations.
    The Merida planning process was instrumental in bringing
    Mexico's poorly coordinated law enforcement elements to the
    same table. We must continue to use it as a way to promote
    greater trust and interoperability among Mexico's federal law
    enforcement elements; at the same time, we must ensure that
    future Merida programs are designed to undermine reflexive
    parochialism here and maximize cooperation and
    interoperability.

    Enhance Intelligence Collection and Sharing

    ¶5. (C) Mexico's current intelligence collection
    capabilities are limited. CISEN is primarily focused on
    terrorist threats and domestic subversion issues. The
    military remains largely concentrated on collecting against
    the EPR and other domestic threats. Mexico's intelligence
    organs are only beginning to develop expertise in targeting
    Mexico's cartels. As our trust in vetted units has grown
    over the past ten years our law enforcement community has
    begun to share compartmentalized intelligence with Mexican
    counterparts and helped them take down key targets. In
    September 2008, SEMAR signed a General Security of Military
    Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and in October 2008, NORTHCOM
    J2 visited SEMAR for an unprecedented intelligence sharing
    conference centering on counter narcotics and
    counterterrorism.

    ¶6. (C) We now want to capitalize on the Secretariat of
    National Defense's (SEDENA) expressed interest in securing a
    similar agreement and hope to sign one in Summer 2009. A
    high priority, however, will be to implement and
    operationalize both agreements by bringing Mexico's fledgling
    collection efforts up to speed through training and best
    practice sharing, ensuring that shared intelligence is
    properly handled and ensuring as well that actionable
    intelligence results in action.

    Engage the Enemy on Our Side of the Border

    ¶7. (SBU) The U.S.- Mexico law enforcement partnership has
    already accelerated success in terms of high level captures
    and extraditions of major drug traffickers in Mexico. The
    GOM and Mexican public appreciate the helping hand we are
    extending through the Merida Initiative, but expect us to
    take actions on our side of the border. The U.S. is putting
    considerable efforts into targeting money launderers in the
    U.S., curbing our drug demand, and more effectively impeding
    the flow of weapons into Mexico. ICE and ATF are looking at
    a "surge" in personnel and resources to respond to rising
    concerns about criminal activities in the border region. We
    need to explore ways to build on these initiatives with
    sufficient funding and resources to ensure our efforts match
    those of the GOM.

    Broaden Judicial Reform Effort

    ¶8. (SBU) Putting in place genuine judicial reform is one of
    the single most important pre-requisites to Mexico's long
    term ability to gain the upper hand over organized crime,
    turn the page on corruption and establish the rule of law.
    The Merida Initiative's significant funding for judicial
    reform here offers us leverage not only to encourage passage
    of appropriate legislation, but provide necessary training to
    fully implement laws once they are passed.

    ¶9. (C) The judicial reform bill passed last June mandating
    Mexico's shift to an accusatory system over the next eight
    years is welcome. However, before this and other reforms of
    Mexico's antiquated judicial system can take effect, the
    Mexican Congress needs to overhaul the federal procedural and
    penal codes, among other laws. We are discreetly working
    with some members of Congress on a draft and have offered to
    assist PGR with Calderon administration's proposals, which
    for the most part continue to be drafted internally with
    minimal input from non-GOM entities.

    ¶10. (SBU) Legislative efforts to date provide an excellent
    start, but Mexican prosecutors need additional tools to
    alleviate a massive case overload in the courts and allow
    authorities to gain the cooperation of lower level defendants
    to build cases against organized crime leaders. While not a
    panacea, plea bargaining and other arrangements and other
    mechanisms for pre-trial disposition of cases will go a long
    way to alleviating over-crowded judicial dockets and giving
    prosecutors the tools they need to get criminal defendants to
    help identify, investigate and prosecute their associates and
    bosses. Once these reforms are passed, we will help the PGR
    develop and implement these mechanisms through our training
    programs.

    ¶11. (SBU) A robust asset forfeiture regime will also be
    crucial to hitting Mexico's cartels where it hurts, but it
    remains to be seen whether Mexico can pass and implement
    legislation that is up to the task. The Calderon
    administration has presented to Congress a strong asset
    forfeiture bill (based on Colombia's "Extincion de Dominio"
    law, which the USG helped draft and implement), but general
    distrust of government may result in a weakened version. The
    bill will be taken up during an abbreviated legislative
    session this winter. Working closely with Attorney General's
    office, we will use what may be a short-window to encourage a
    law with sufficient teeth.

    ¶12. (C) Comment: Failure to successfully implement
    Calderon's broad reform agenda will undercut Mexico's long
    term efforts to transform the judicial system and give its
    law enforcement community more effective tools for its
    campaign against organized crime. The Merida Initiative
    provides funding to promote such reforms, mostly through
    training, and the Mission country team is well-positioned to
    influence both their design and implementation. To be sure,
    the weight of responsibility for adopting new reforms and
    ensuring existing ones take effect falls on the Mexican
    government. For its part, Washington can support this
    process by ensuring our resource base remains robust in
    coming years -- and by devoting greater resources and focus
    to areas of outstanding Mexican concern, such as illegal arms
    trafficking and bulk cash smuggling.

    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

    BASSETT

`