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### Viewing cable 10TEGUCIGALPA2, AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS NEED

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10TEGUCIGALPA2 | 2010-01-05 17:49 | 2011-01-29 21:30 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Tegucigalpa

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHTG #0002/01 0051749
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 051749Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1409
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR JTF-BRAVO  PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/COMSOCSOUTH  PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000002

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2020
    TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MARR CVIS HO
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND PRESIDENT-ELECT LOBO DISCUSS NEED
    FOR MICHELETTI RESIGNATION, UNITY GOVERNMENT AND TRANSITION
    PLANS

    REF: A. 09 TEGUCIGALPA 1328
    ¶B. 09 TEGUCIGALPA 1315
    ¶C. 09 TEGUCIGALPA 1310

    Classified By: Ambassador Hugo Llorens, reason 1.4 (B and D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with President-elect
    Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo at the Embassy on January 4 and
    discussed the need for full implementation of the
    Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, and most importantly for de
    facto regime leader Micheletti to step aside immediately.
    Lobo sought the Ambassador's counsel on building
    international support for his administration, and reaffirmed
    his desire to build his own government of
    national unity to foster reconciliation in Honduran society
    and politics. They agreed a truth commission would aid in
    healing society's wounds following months of strife. The
    Ambassador also noted the importance of showing clear
    civilian authority over the Honduran Armed Forces (HOAF), and
    in particular the negative impact on both the country and the
    HOAF itself of appointing a Minister of Defense who was
    associated with the June 28 coup d'etat. End summary.

    ¶2. (C) The Ambassador and president-elect Lobo, who had just
    returned from a brief holiday visiting relatives in
    New Orleans, met January 4 in the Ambassador's office. Lobo
    thanked the Ambassador for notifying Diplomatic
    Security of his visit, which allowed him to forego some of
    his Honduran security package while on vacation. Lobo said
    he was somewhat uncomfortable with the large size and high
    profile of the Honduran armed forces (HOAF) security detail
    assigned to him immediately following his election, and the
    relative anonymity he enjoyed in New Orleans was a relief
    after the pressure of the campaign and the post-election
    political environment. Lobo appeared tanned, rested and
    ready to take on the many challenges that face him.

    ------------------------------------------
    Status of the Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Lobo that the United States
    remained fully committed to the full implementation of the
    Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord, noting that the USG saw the
    status of accord implementation as a compass for
    re-establishing the democratic and constitutional order in
    Honduras. He said the USG appreciated Lobo's parallel
    interest in resolving the political crisis following the June
    2009 coup d'etat. The Ambassador said time was
    running out, and de facto regime leader Micheletti needed to
    make a decision to step down immediately to allow
    creation of a national unity government in advance of the
    January 27 inauguration. He said the USG understood that at
    this late stage, a complete change in cabinet was not
    feasible, but that Micheletti's departure well before
    inauguration day and the replacement of at least the Minister
    of Government was necessary if Honduras was to draw
    international support for the inauguration and the
    normalization of relations with the Lobo administration.

    ¶4. (C) The Ambassador stated that U.S. insistence on
    Micheletti's departure was the reason for the January 5-6
    visit of Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Principal
    Deputy Assistant Secretary Craig Kelly. He said that
    Washington was not inclined to look favorably on Micheletti
    waiting until the last days before the
    inauguration to step aside; a mid-January departure was
    necessary in order to give Lobo the space to build some
    international support and hope for international
    participation in the inauguration. The Ambassador explained
    that PDAS Kelly would offer positive incentives for
    Micheletti and his team to step aside, but would also make
    clear that if Micheletti continued to thumb his nose at the
    United States and the rest of the international community,
    there would be repercussions. He said it would be very
    difficult for Micheletti and his supporters to ever get their

    U.S. visas back, for example.

    ¶5. (C) Lobo responded that he was totally committed to the
    full implementation of the accord and immediate resignation
    of Micheletti in favor of a national unity government. He
    said that -- as the Ambassador was aware, he had met with
    Micheletti twice to press him to step aside, and had also
    made frequent public statements in support of the accord.
    Lobo said he believed Micheletti was looking for a way out,
    but his hard line supporters were making this difficult for
    him. He noted Micheletti is isolated, and the hard liners
    are constantly telling him he is a great hero, loved by the
    Honduran public for saving democracy -- and that the
    Americans will not restore his visa even if he does step down
    now. Lobo added that he supported PDAS Kelly's visit, and
    confirmed that he and former Honduran president Ricardo
    Maduro would brief Kelly on Maduro's January 4 meeting with
    Salvadoran FM Martinez. Lobo said that he would follow up on
    Kelly's visit by meeting with Micheletti
    again to press him to step down immediately.

    ---------------------------------
    Transition and Building a Cabinet
    ---------------------------------

    ¶6. (C/NF) The Ambassador said he understood Lobo wanted to
    send his senior advisors, especially his economic team to
    Washington for consultations, but given the current efforts
    he thought it would be bad timing (Ref A). He noted that
    both sides of the U.S. political spectrum were placing
    pressure on the administration regarding Honduras, and the
    Democrats in Congress had placed a hold on millions of
    dollars of assistance money for Honduras. The Ambassador
    suggested Lobo wait and see how Kelly's visit went, and Lobo
    agreed.

    ¶7. (C) The Ambassador praised Lobo for his keen commitment to
    creating his own national unity government. He said he knew
    that Lobo had made offers to the leadership of the other
    political parties to join in the new administration. Lobo
    confirmed that he had offered the Minister of Culture
    position to center-left Social Democratic Innovation and
    Unity (PINU) Party presidential candidate Bernard Martinez
    and Minister of Labor to center-right Christian Democratic
    Party presidential candidate Felicito Avila, and both had
    accepted. Lobo said he had also offered positions to senior
    members of Liberal Party presidential candidate Elvin Santos'
    team, noting that Santos himself had stated he was not
    prepared to take a position himself in the next government.
    Lobo added that he had offered a cabinet position to
    left-of-center, (and anti-coup) Democratic Unification Party
    candidate Cesar Ham, but had not yet received a reply. Lobo
    asked the Ambassador for his help in encouraging Ham to
    accept a role in the government, noting he was aware the
    Ambassador had met with Ham in December. (Note: Ham met with
    the Ambassador December 17. Details reported Ref C. End
    note.)

    ¶8. (C) Lobo also sought the Ambassador's help in finding a
    counterbalance to his popular designee for Security Minister,
    Oscar Alvarez. Lobo noted that Alvarez, who received the
    most votes of any congressional candidate in the November
    2009 election, was an "empire builder," and therefore Lobo
    wanted to find a designee for Vice Minister who would not be
    "Alvarez's man." (Note: Alvarez, who was Security Minister
    in the Maduro administration, has already stated his intent
    to select his former Vice Minister Armando Caledonio.
    According to Honduran law, the Vice Minister position is
    nominated by the Minister, subject to approval by the
    President. End note.) Lobo noted security was not his area
    of expertise, and he hoped the Ambassador could suggest names
    of some qualified, clean candidates for the position who
    would not be beholden to Alvarez. He said on the matter of
    addressing the transnational threat of crime and trafficking,
    sovereignty was not an issue, and he welcomed U.S. inputs.
    The Ambassador said he would consult his security and law

    enforcement team on the matter.

    -----------------
    Truth Commission
    -----------------

    ¶9. (C) Lobo agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion to invite
    Tegucigalpa-San Jose Accord Verification Commission members
    Labor Secretary Solis and former Chilean president Lagos to
    come to Honduras in February and join their Honduran
    Verification Commission colleagues in launching a truth
    commission. The Ambassador stressed that a truth commission
    would be a critical element in achieving national
    reconciliation, along with a government of national unity.
    He acknowledged there was no cookie-cutter method to forming
    or conducting the work of a post-conflict truth commission,
    and that while there were certainly human rights violations
    committed during the political crisis that followed the June
    2009 coup, Honduras had not seen the levels of violence as
    other countries which had formed truth commissions, such as
    Chile, Guatemala or South Africa. Lobo agreed with the
    Ambassador that the truth commission should be a forum for
    all stories to be told surrounding the political crisis
    without indicting anyone, acknowledging that all sides of the
    political classes had failed Honduran society in the
    political collapse of 2009. They agreed that what had taken
    place was a failure of political leadership by President Jose
    Manuel "Mel" Zelaya in the months leading up to the June
    coup, as well as Micheletti and other institutions in
    supporting the coup. Lobo stated that while he believed
    Zelaya had largely created the environment that led to the
    coup, he also believed that what took place in June was
    wrong. Lobo said he felt the Organization of American States
    (OAS) would have a natural role to play in forming and
    supporting the truth commission.

    -----------------
    The Armed Forces
    -----------------

    ¶10. (C) The Ambassador said that another important element
    for restoring the international community's confidence in
    Honduras and Honduran democracy was for the new
    administration to demonstrate clearly that the HOAF was under
    civilian control. He said the HOAF had taken a major step
    backward in its role in the coup, though in fairness, it had
    been the civilian political factions on both sides which had
    dragged the HOAF into the political conflict. The Ambassador
    advised Lobo to take steps to establish to the international
    community that the HOAF was under strong civilian management,
    and that to do so would not only help Honduras, but also the
    HOAF itself by restoring its positive image internationally.
    He noted that he had heard Chief of Defense MG Vasquez
    Velasquez was lobbying hard to be appointed Minister of
    Defense, and that this would be seen very negatively by the
    international community, given Vasquez's role in the coup.
    The Ambassador stressed it was Lobo's decision to make, but
    that selection of any military figure closely associated with
    the coup would create a serious image problem in the
    international perspective.

    ¶11. (C) Lobo acknowledged that management of the HOAF would
    be a critical challenge for his administration. He said that
    Vasquez was on his short list for Defense Minister, and he
    had not considered the international implications of such an
    appointment, but saw the Ambassador's point clearly. Lobo
    said he would not appoint Vasquez to be his Defense Minister.
    He noted Vasquez was seeking a "soft landing" in the
    civilian political forum, but that he would encourage Vasquez
    to stay away from government for a while and revisit his
    prospects in six months or so.

    ¶12. (C) Comment: Despite showing a clear appreciation of the
    serious social and economic challenges before him, Lobo
    appeared relaxed and confident during the meeting -- a far
    cry from the pre-election Lobo, who had worn the stress of

    the campaign heavily. Lobo also made a point that "two
    thirds of Honduras's international portfolio is the United
    States" and he was eager to rebuild a strong relationship
    with the United States. Lobo has made every indication that
    he fully grasps the broader implications of the Honduran
    political crisis and is prepared to show the sort of
    leadership that has been sorely lacking in the persons of
    President Zelaya and de facto regime leader Micheletti. End
    comment.
    LLORENS

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