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### Viewing cable 10AMMAN459, JORDAN: SCENESETTER FOR VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10AMMAN459 | 2010-02-25 14:41 | 2011-01-31 00:00 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Amman

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHAM #0459/01 0561441
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 251441Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
    TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
    INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0068
    RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2078
    RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5807
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 0441
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6975

` `

    S E C R E T AMMAN 000459

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2020
    TAGS: OVIP EAID PGOV PREL JO
    SUBJECT: JORDAN: SCENESETTER FOR VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN

    Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
    d).

    ¶1. (S//NF) Summary: Mr. Vice President, Embassy Amman warmly
    welcomes you to Jordan.  As you arrive, Jordan continues to
    face some of the most troubling challenges of King Abdullah's
    10-year reign.  Jordan has been hit hard by the global
    economic slowdown and is heavily aid-dependent.  The
    pared-down 2010 national budget, which still includes a USD
    1.43 billion deficit before grants, has imposed painful cuts
    across the board, including a 20 percent cut in capital
    expenditures.  Jordan's domestic political scene remains
    unsettled, and the government is constitutionally ruling by
    decree following the King's late November 2009 dissolution of
    parliament, a body considered by many Jordanians to have been
    selected through government-manipulated elections.  Samir
    Rifai, the new Prime Minister, is currently overseeing an
    inter-ministerial committee drafting amendments to the
    electoral law and has promised to unveil the amended law in
    May, with elections currently scheduled to take place during
    the last quarter of 2010.

    ¶2. (S//NF) Regional tensions also continue to capture the
    attention of the Jordanian leadership.  Amman is particularly
    focused on the perceived stalled peace negotiations between
    the Palestinians and Israelis and Iran's evolving nuclear
    program and growing regional influence, which Jordanian
    officials view as distinct issues.  The solution to both is
    seen as linked by Jordanian interlocutors.  At the same time,
    Jordan has made significant contributions in Afghanistan and
    has worked to improve regional security by encouraging Syria
    to seek a moderate Arab alternative to Iranian influence and
    strengthening ties to Baghdad. End Summary.

    Budget Challenges and Impact on USG
    -----------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Your visit comes as Jordan faces a difficult budget
    environment.  The 2010 budget includes USD 6.74 billion in
    projected revenues and USD 7.71 billion in expenditures (83
    percent of which is accounted for by Jordan's bloated civil
    service and military patronage system) and has a USD 1.4
    billion deficit before grants, which is 5.8 percent of
    Jordan's GDP (estimated at USD 24.7 billion for 2010).  The
    2010 budget features 20 percent cuts to capital expenditures
    and 1.4 percent cuts to current expenditures and will impact
    GOJ agencies by curtailing their ability to hire new
    employees and forcing additional cuts in overtime, official
    travel, and purchases of vehicles and furniture.  Existing
    reform and development projects requiring new staff and/or
    construction will also face financial constraints.  Weak
    growth in 2009 will translate to lower income and sales tax
    revenues this year (taxes on 2009 income will be paid in
    2010).  This along with a downward trend for the collection
    of land sale and other fees by the GOJ in 2010 portends an
    even more precarious budget situation during the second half
    of 2010.  This budget environment has already resulted in
    requests from the GOJ for additional USG financial and
    technical assistance.

    Assistance MOU
    --------------

    ¶4. (C) On September 22, 2008, Jordan and the U.S. signed a
    memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to development,
    economic, and military assistance. The agreement laid out a
    five-year non-binding annual commitment of economic support
    funds (ESF) USD 360 million) and foreign military funds (FMF)
    USD 300 million). (Note: The FY 2011 OMB budget submission
    includes $360 million in ESF and USD 300 million in FMF for
    Jordan. End note.)  In turn, a side letter spelled out the
    joint intent to expand cooperation in the political and
    economic arenas.  The side letter draws on the 2006 Jordanian
    "National Agenda" reform plan and identifies areas of mutual
    cooperation to be discussed in separate economic and
    political bilateral dialogues.  A bilateral political
    dialogue meeting focused on equality for women under the law,
    media freedom, religious tolerance and freedom, prison
    conditions and inmate treatment, good governance, and a
    strong civil society was held in Amman in January 2010 with
    senior State Department officials.  GOJ officials have
    proposed that the bilateral economic dialogue take place in
    April in Washington.

    Political Changes
    -----------------

    ¶5. (S//NF) The King constitutionally dissolved the Parliament
    in late November 2009.  The public supported the King's
    decision because parliament was widely perceived to have been
    elected in manipulated elections and was seen as corrupt and
    ineffective.  Cooperation between the then-cabinet and
    parliament had deteriorated to such an extent by late summer
    2009 that only a minimal amount of legislation was offered
    for parliamentary consideration, most of which was stymied
    or, if approved, mangled in the process, according to
    parliamentary observers.

    ¶6. (SBU) Following the King's dissolution of the parliament,
    he exercised a constitutional clause which allowed him to
    extend the normal constitutionally required four-month window
    for new elections.  Palace statements indicate that this was
    done to reform the election law, which strongly favors rural,
    East Bank communities over urban communities with large
    Palestinian-origin populations.  The King has established a
    ministerial-level committee, overseen by Prime Minister
    Rifai, to draft electoral law reforms and announced that
    parliamentary elections will be held in the last quarter of
    ¶2010.  However, there have been no meaningful consultations
    with electoral reform advocates to date and few believe that
    the new law will produce any significant changes.

    ¶7. (SBU) In early December, the King requested the
    resignation of then-Prime Minister Nader Dahabi and appointed
    to replace him Samir Rifai, who is a former official and
    advisor to the King in the Royal Court, Foreign Minister
    Nasser Judeh's cousin, and the son of former Prime Minister
    and Upper House Speaker Zayd Rifai.  In his designation
    letter to Rifai, the King emphasized, among various reform
    efforts, the need to fight corruption.

    ¶8. (SBU) Along with the new Prime Minister, a new 29-member
    cabinet was named and officially sworn in on December 14.
    Local commentators note a lack of new faces in the cabinet,
    with 13 returning ministers and seven who served in previous
    governments.  Analysts believe that the government, as a
    whole, will ultimately turn out to be conservative rather
    than reform-oriented in its decision-making.  In the absence
    of a sitting parliament, the new government has begun to pass
    so-called "temporary laws" or legislation enacted without
    parliamentary approval, which will theoretically be subject
    to parliamentary re-evaluation once new members are elected
    and seated.  Some commentators see this as a way for the
    government to pass legislation which otherwise would not have
    made it through a sitting parliament.  For example, much
    needed tax reform laws, which the previous parliament
    opposed, were recently enacted as well as a law on renewable
    energy.

    Middle East Peace
    ------------------

    ¶9. (S//NF) During your visit, you will hear from GOJ
    interlocutors their concern on the lack of progress in Middle
    East Peace negotiations.  The King remains a resolute
    advocate of a two-state solution and has responded positively
    to his engagements with SEMEP Mitchell.  Jordanian officials
    consistently express concern that Jordan will be asked to
    assume some form of responsibility for the West Bank, a
    proposition that King Abdullah consistently resists, as does
    an overwhelming percentage of the Jordanian public.

    ¶10. (S//NF) King Abdullah has said publicly that the lack of
    progress is the greatest threat to stability in the region
    and hurts U.S. credibility in the region.  King Abdullah
    further asserts that the lack of meaningful progress hurts
    the ability of the United States to advance its interests on
    multiple issues in the region, including on Iran.  Jordan
    considers settlement activities, home demolitions, and
    evictions in Jerusalem to be particularly destabilizing and
    unhelpful in restarting negotiations.  The King also has a
    keen interest in preserving Jordan's role in administering
    the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount complex in Jerusalem and in
    overseeing other Islamic and Christian holy sites in
    Jerusalem.

    ¶11. (S//NF) Recently, the King has adopted a new approach,
    pressing PM Netanyahu and President Abbas to initiate
    immediate proximity talks as a means to work towards direct
    negotiations.  Positive progress at the negotiating table,
    however meager, could provide crucial political cover for
    President Abbas, affording him a measure of maneuverability.
    Given his public backing of U.S. efforts, the King also views
    the lack of progress as damaging to his own credibility and
    limiting his ability to play a constructive role in the
    future.

    Iran
    ----

    ¶12. (S//NF) Jordan is concerned about Iranian influence in
    the region, particularly the potentially destabilizing effect
    of an Iranian nuclear program, support for Hizballah and
    Hamas, support for the Huthi and other armed groups in Yemen,
    and Iran's role in Iraq and links with Syria.  The King
    believes that the recent post-election violence in Iran
    exposes deep fissures in the Iranian polity that "makes the
    Supreme Leader look a bit less supreme," forcing Iran's
    leadership to turn inward on domestic issues and limiting
    their freedom and resources to act internationally.
    Especially with the recent buildup of U.S. military assets in
    the Persian Gulf, GOJ contacts fear that Iran will try to
    counter these perceptions with a dramatic act.

    ¶13. (S//NF) Jordan's senior leadership draws a direct link
    between the willingness of Arab states to counter Iran, and
    progress on Middle East peace, saying that Israeli and
    Sunni-Arab interests are perfectly aligned with respect to
    Iran.  Jordan will quietly support new UNSC sanctions against
    Iran, but will be loath to enforce those sanctions in the
    absence of progress in the Middle East peace negotiations.
    Without a material improvement in the negotiations, any
    confrontation with Iran risks backlash from regional publics
    and Palestinian groups who cast Tehran as their protector.
    Realization of the two-state solution would consolidate the
    regional consensus against Iran, Jordan believes.

    Afghanistan
    -----------

    ¶14. (C) Jordan makes significant contributions to U.S.
    regional security priorities.  In July 2009, Jordan deployed
    a 712-soldier Ranger Battalion to Afghanistan to provide
    election security.  The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) has
    deployed two battalions in rotation in support of OEF as of
    January 2010, despite the cost (pay entitlements) and risk to
    their soldiers' safety.  JAF leaders have intimated that they
    would advocate even larger-scale deployments (a brigade), if
    the pay/entitlement expense were not so burdensome.  In fact,
    during the Joint Military Commission in November 2009, MG
    Mash'al Al Zaben, Chief of Staff for Strategy, stated that
    Jordan would stay in Afghanistan until the last U.S. soldier
    came home.

    ¶15. (S/NF) Following the December 30 suicide bombing by a
    Jordanian national in Khost, Afghanistan, Jordan has
    experienced increased calls by opposition groups and
    non-governmental figures to explain its Afghanistan
    assistance and end its security cooperation with the United
    States.  So far, such calls and commentary in the press have
    received no traction with the government, which has
    vigorously and publicly defended its efforts to combat
    terrorism.  Jordanian government officials have privately
    reiterated a commitment to maintaining their relationship
    with us, highlighting their deployments in Afghanistan and
    elsewhere.

    Syria
    -----

    ¶16. (S/NF) Jordan increased its engagement with Syria in the
    last half of 2009, attempting to draw Damascus toward an
    alignment with moderate Arab states and away from Iranian
    influence.  The King and Syrian President Bashar Al Assad met
    at least four times in 2009, which resulted in agreements on
    a number of initiatives, including border demarcation,
    customs procedures, and commercial transport. Despite recent
    agreements, Jordanian officials continue to be skeptical of
    Syrian intentions to follow through.

    Iraq
    --------------

    ¶17. (C) Jordan has been a leader in engaging with Iraq,
    reaching out to promote bilateral trade and encouraging Iraq
    to build stronger ties with Arab states rather than with
    Iran.  The King became the first Arab Head of State to visit
    Baghdad, in July 2008, subsequently named an Ambassador to
    Iraq, and has promised to name a Defense Attach.  The King
    supports Prime Minister Maliki and sees progress as slow, but
    moving in the right direction. Senior Jordanian leaders have
    become concerned that increasing tensions between the central
    government and the Kurdistan Region will erupt in violent
    conflict and are skeptical that Iraq can maintain stability
    as U.S. forces withdraw.

    ¶18. (SBU) Jordan hosts numerous Iraqi "guests" who have fled
    the conflict and its after-effects and has provided them with
    access to some social services.  The GOJ does not formally
    classify the Iraqis as refugees, because of concerns that a
    new permanent refugee populace in Jordan, in addition to the
    already sizable Palestinian refugee population, would further
    erode the demographic position of East Bankers.  The GOJ
    emphasizes that hosting the Iraqis has been a burden on the
    budget, and Jordan has received significant amounts of
    international aid to ease their already tight fiscal
    situation.  Jordanian officials have previously placed the
    number of Iraqi refugees between 450,000 and 500,000, but
    have now backed away from specific numbers of late in the
    face of estimates from most international organizations and
    NGOs that are significantly lower, perhaps in the 100,000 to
    200,000 range.  The real numbers are uncertain in the absence
    of a needs assessment study on Iraqis in Jordan, which the
    U.S. and others have been urging. Displaced Iraqis in Jordan
    are integrated and live within Jordanian communities, not in
    refugee camps.
    Beecroft

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