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### Viewing cable 09TOKYO2329, PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA'S FOCUS ON CHINA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09TOKYO2329 | 2009-10-07 09:01 | 2011-05-04 00:00 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tokyo

`

    VZCZCXRO4172
    RR RUEHDT RUEHPB
    DE RUEHKO #2329/01 2800901
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 070901Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6662
    INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
    RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 7311
    RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 9142
    RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0615
    RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 6798
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC
    RHMFISS/USFJ
    RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 002329

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EAP/J

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2019
    TAGS: PREL CH JA
    SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER HATOYAMA'S FOCUS ON CHINA

    REF: A. TOKYO 600
         ¶B. TOKYO 984

    TOKYO 00002329  001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: CDA James P. Zumwalt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

     ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Prime Minister (PM) Yukio Hatoyama has
    made Sino-Japanese ties a foreign policy priority as he seeks
    to establish political footing abroad.  A key policy
    challenge facing his new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led
    coalition government is maintaining the current political
    goodwill between Japan and China and advancing the still
    somewhat amorphous concept of a ""mutually beneficial
    relationship based on common strategic interests.""  The PM
    set the policy tone early when, in the run-up to the August
    30 general election, he publicly declared his longstanding
    opposition to official visits to Yasukuni Shrine.  Press
    statements and recent speeches suggest that Hatoyama sees
    regional mechanisms, mainly his much-publicized ""East Asia
    Community"" (EAC) concept, as a way to realize his China
    policy objectives and to enhance ties beyond traditional
    bilateral frameworks.  The PM, however, must weigh the
    diverse set of views within his party as well as those of DPJ
    Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, whose perspective on China in
    the past has shaped the party's public position on the issue.
     Potential limits to cooperation with Beijing exist, despite
    Hatoyama's outreach efforts.  Japan continues to search for
    ways to hold frank discussions on key concerns such as
    Chinese military modernization and longstanding maritime and
    territorial disputes.  END SUMMARY

    ¶2. (C) One of the key policy challenges facing the new
    DPJ-led coalition government is advancing the policy
    initiated by Prime Minister Hatoyama's immediate predecessors
    to improve relations with China.  Tokyo Embassy interlocutors
    agree that Sino-Japanese ties have improved markedly since
    the tension-filled years of former Prime Minister Junichiro
    Koizumi.  Since 2006, Japan and China have held several
    high-level meetings at bilateral, trilateral, and
    multilateral venues, deepened trade ties and economic
    interdependence, and accelerated military confidence-building
    discussions on issues such as disaster relief and antipiracy.
     Japan's China observers, however, cite longstanding maritime
    and territorial disputes, divergent interpretations of
    Japan's wartime past, China's poor food and product safety
    record, and the country's growing military, economic, and
    political regional and global influence as underlying strains
    that continue to bedevil overall ties and test Prime Minister
    Hatoyama and his government.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    Adopting Finer Points of Previous Administrations
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶3. (C) Keenly cognizant of China's increasing economic and
    political importance and mindful of the sensitivities
    inherent in the relationship, Hatoyama has made Sino-Japanese
    ties a foreign policy priority as he seeks to establish
    political footing domestically and abroad.  He appears to be
    following a somewhat reliable blueprint mapped out by his
    immediate predecessors, Taro Aso, Yasuo Fukuda, and Shinzo
    Abe.  Although universally panned for their leadership
    limitations, the troika of former prime ministers maintained
    smooth ties by stressing the importance of high-level
    dialogue and visits, and by avoiding visits to the
    controversial Yasukuni Shrine--the commemorative resting
    place of Japan's war dead, including 14 class A war
    criminals.  Aso himself met Chinese leadership multiple times
    during his short tenure.  In this way, Hatoyama's approach to
    China can be considered an area of policy continuity with the
    Aso government.

    ¶4. (C) Hatoyama set the policy tone early when, in the run-up
    to the August 30 general election, he publicly declared his
    longstanding opposition to official visits to Yasukuni
    Shrine.  In August, during the Shrine's fall festival, the
    DPJ leader publicly stated his intention not to visit the
    Shrine and underscored his preference for all Cabinet members
    to do the same.  Hatoyama's decision to appoint Katsuya Okada

    TOKYO 00002329  002.2 OF 004

    as Foreign Minister (FM) also resonated positively with
    China, given Okada's stance on Japan's wartime
    responsibility, MOFA officials told U.S. Embassy Tokyo.
    ""Japan must properly assess the fact that it embarked on that
    wretched, foolish war,"" Okada has declared in the past.

    ¶5. (C) Hatoyama has sustained his policy focus on China since
    becoming prime minister.  In his first press conference as
    the nation's leader on September 17, Hatoyama called for
    building a ""relationship of trust"" with China.  He expounded
    on this ideal during the September 21 meeting with Chinese
    President Hu on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New
    York.  The two leaders agreed to deepen bilateral ties and
    make the relationship ""more substantive,"" according to press
    readouts and Embassy MOFA contacts.  Hatoyama underscored the
    importance of acknowledging and overcoming differences.  On
    history-related issues, for example, he conveyed support for
    then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's 1995 statement of
    ""regret and remorse"" over past Japanese militarism.  On
    disputed offshore gas fields in the East China Sea (ECS),
    Hatoyama proposed creating a ""Sea of Fraternity,"" to which Hu
    responded by raising his own calls for a sea of ""peace,
    friendship, and cooperation"" as well as the advent of
    long-awaited bilateral negotiations, postponed since both
    sides signed a joint development agreement in June 2008.
    Hatoyama will continue these efforts to improve relations
    during his October 10 trip to Beijing, where he is scheduled
    to meet Hu again on the margins of the second trilateral
    Japan-China-South Korea Summit (septel).

    ¶6. (C) Embassy sources tell us that Chinese officials are
    responding positively to Hatoyama's gestures.  Beijing
    invited Hatoyama to visit China in September, MOFA officials
    told Embassy Tokyo.  Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao sent a
    congratulatory message to Hatoyama on September 16 calling
    for stronger bilateral relations ""starting from a new
    historic threshold.""  Wen expressed hope the two countries
    could work together to push for ""fresh developments.""  ""As
    neighbors, efforts to deepen the mutual trust and cooperation
    between China and Japan are in keeping with the fundamental
    interests of both nations and their people,"" the Chinese
    Premier stated.

    --------------------------------------------
    East Asia Community as Means to Manage China
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Press statements and recent overseas speeches suggest
    that Hatoyama sees regional mechanisms, including his
    much-publicized ""East Asia Community"" (EAC) concept, as a way
    to realize his China policy objectives and to enhance ties
    beyond traditional bilateral frameworks.  Although his EAC
    vision lacks granularity at this early stage and has been the
    subject of much media criticism for being ""unrealistic"" and
    ""outdated,"" Hatoyama is still pitching the idea to regional
    counterparts, most notably to Hu during their meeting on
    September 21.  He told Hu that the ""Community"" would be based
    on a ""fraternity spirit"" in Asia.  The PM sees China as the
    key to jump-starting the EAC ideal and appears more sanguine
    than other leaders about tackling political issues as they
    relate to a potential Community.  Hatoyama told Hu that
    resolving the countries' prolonged disputes could be the
    starting point, according to MOFA China Division officials.
    Hatoyama's ""Sea of Fraternity"" vision and efforts to
    strengthen existing partnerships, to China and ASEAN member
    countries for example, could serve as the foundation for the
    broader Community idea, other MOFA officials add.  Tsuyoshi
    Yamaguchi, a DPJ lawmaker and member of Deputy Prime Minister
    Naoto Kan's National Strategy Bureau (NSB), has told us that
    he (Yamaguchi) is working on building momentum and fleshing
    out the EAC idea by focusing on a few concrete cooperative
    initiatives with China and Korea.  For example, Yamaguchi is
    considering pursuing ECS development as an ""Asian project.""

    ¶8. (C) Speculation abounds about the content and overall
    composition of the framework as well as Chinese receptivity
    to the EAC, but one consistent message from our interlocutors

    TOKYO 00002329  003.2 OF 004

    has been that the EAC is a long term vision and that the
    concept does not necessarily exclude the United States.
    Hatoyama stressed this point during his first press
    conference as prime minister.  The specifics are still
    developing, but the EAC would ""not lessen the importance of
    U.S.-Japan relations,"" senior DPJ member Kozo Watanabe told
    us.  MOFA Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Director General
    Akitaka Saiki has downplayed U.S. concerns about the idea as
    well.  Having briefed Hatoyama multiple times on Asia policy,
    he assured Embassy Tokyo that the new administration wants
    the United States to play a major regional role.

    ¶9. (C) In his remarks October 7 at the Foreign
    Correspondent's Club, Okada reiterated that a strong alliance
    with the United States and better relations with Japan's
    neighbors can be pursued simultaneously.  Okada outlined his
    vision of the EAC as comprising ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea,
    Australia, New Zealand, and India.  The United States is not
    excluded in the same way Japan does not feel excluded from
    the EU or NAFTA, he said.  The upcoming Japan-China-Korea
    Summit in Beijing provides a chance to expound on the EAC
    concept, Okada added.  Initially, the focus should be on
    deepening economic interdependence and cooperation on energy,
    environment, and public heath.  Some MOFA officials reiterate
    Okada's point that only energy-, health-, and
    environment-related issues will fill the main agenda to
    start.  During his September 28 meeting with Chinese Foreign
    Minister Yang Jiechi in Shanghai, FM Okada mentioned that
    policy coordination should begin in these three areas before
    gradually transitioning to more politically sensitive issues,
    according to MOFA's China managers.  However, some Embassy
    contacts, such as DPJ foreign policy expert and Vice Minister
    for Internal Affairs and Communication Shu Watanabe, describe
    the EAC concept as nothing more than an effort to increase
    people-to-people contact.  Economic integration and other
    hard topics will not move forward, Shu Watanabe insists.

    ¶10. (C) Although idealistic in tone, Hatoyama's vision subtly
    mirrors a general view shared by several Embassy
    interlocutors who take a more hardline approach to China.
    They stress the importance of using multilateral mechanisms
    to ""lock"" China in, encourage Beijing to abide by
    international standards and norms, and encircle the country
    by strengthening ties to third country neighbors, such as
    South Korea and ASEAN.  Japan's China observers regularly
    cite Beijing's preference to deal with countries bilaterally
    often in contravention of global concerns regarding human
    rights, rule of law, and democratic processes.  They see
    Chinese membership in mechanisms such as APEC, the East Asia
    Summit, and ASEAN-related groupings as a way, in part, to
    compel Beijing to play responsibly and by the rules.

    ----------------------
    Japan as Regional Link
    ----------------------

    ¶11. (C) Hatoyama probably envisions his objectives in Asia as
    serving the additional purpose of enhancing Japan's role as
    link between the region and the United States.  Japan can
    serve as a ""connector"" between Asia and the United States,
    Okada reportedly told Chinese Foreign Minister Yang in
    Shanghai on September 28.  Hatoyama has sought to assure
    concerned parties that an EAC and robust Sino-Japanese ties
    do not come at the expense of relations with Japan's most
    important ally, despite his much-publicized desire to
    reevaluate the parameters of the Alliance.  The PM also has
    said that improvement in Sino-Japanese ties is a plus for the
    United States, just as improvement in U.S.-China ties is a
    plus for Japan.

    --------------------------------------------- -
    Potential Room for Policy Unity Within the DPJ
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶12. (C) Some Embassy interlocutors argue that policy cohesion
    on issues such as China is more possible than before as the
    DPJ matures from a party of sundry political transplants to a
    party comprising original DPJ members, starting with the 143

    TOKYO 00002329  004.2 OF 004

    first-term DPJ Diet members elected on August 30.  Absent
    concrete policy details, members agree on the importance of
    Sino-Japanese ties as part of an overall foreign policy
    approach to Asia.  Hatoyama's and Okada's inaugural press
    conference statements reinforced the main points outlined in
    pre-election party Manifesto calls for ""proactive foreign
    relations"" and a more ""Asia-centered"" foreign policy.

    --------------------------------------
    Internal and External Challenges Exist
    --------------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) That said, Hatoyama must still manage ideological
    diversity within his party on issues related to China.  DPJ
    members differ on the extent to which they see China as a
    threat, and on the extent to which they view bilateral and
    multilateral engagement as a means to curb Chinese influence
    in Asia.  DPJ members who downplay Chinese military and
    political intentions view engagement with China and other
    regional neighbors primarily as tool to strengthen ties
    within the region.  Party centrists and more right-of-center
    conservatives see engagement as a way to check and counter
    China's growing regional influence (Ref A).  There also
    exists the preference of some members within Hatoyama's
    party, and within the ruling coalition more broadly, to take
    a hardline stance against China's human rights record,
    particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, and to support Taiwan
    membership in international organizations--a view held by DPJ
    member and Defense Ministry Parliamentary Secretary Akihisa
    Nagashima and by Deputy Prime Minister Naoto Kan, among
    others.

    ¶14. (C) Hatoyama also must weigh the views of DPJ Secretary
    General Ichiro Ozawa, whose perspective on China has, in the
    past, helped shape the party's public position on the issue.
    Ozawa enjoys ties to China--he meets annually with Chinese
    leadership--while at the same time is a large Taiwan
    supporter, MOFA officials told Embassy Tokyo.  Ozawa was
    instrumental in recruiting the newest crop of DPJ Diet
    members and is thus in position to infuse his own policy
    preferences into China-related issues.

    ¶15. (C) There are potential limits to cooperation with
    Beijing as well, despite Hatoyama's outreach efforts.  Japan
    continues to call for frank discussions on key concerns such
    as Chinese military modernization and longstanding maritime
    and territorial disputes (Ref B).  The East China Sea and
    disputes over the Senkaku Islands remain a ""big problem,""
    MOFA's China Division regularly notes.  Japanese public
    opinion on such sovereignty-related issues, and ongoing
    concerns about China's food and product safety record, among
    other issues, could further constrain Hatoyama's efforts.
    ZUMWALT

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