Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12453 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04 2011/05/05

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy Niamey Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AORC AMGT APER AU AF AS ACBAQ AFGHANISTAN AFIN AR AE AJ ADANA AEMR AG ATRN ADPM APECO AGAO AMED AX AM AL ADCO AA AECL AADP ABUD AMEX ACAO ANET AODE ASCH AY APEC AID AORG ASEAN AFSI AFSN AINF AGR AROC AO AMBASSADOR AFFAIRS ASIG ABLD ASUP AND ARM ARF AQ ATFN AC ACOA AORL ADM AUC AGMT ACABQ ASEX AFU ALOW AZ APCS AVERY ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AER AN AIT AMG AGRICULTURE AMCHAMS ACS
BR BA BD BL BO BF BU BILAT BEXP BRUSSELS BK BN BM BT BY BX BTIO BIDEN BG BE BP BBSR BC BTIU BWC BB BH BMGT
CH CY CA CU CS CO CVIS CPAS CMGT CE COUNTER CASC COUNTRY CJAN COUNTERTERRORISM CG CI CD CIDA CJUS CDG CBSA CEUDA CR CM CLMT CAC CBW CODEL COPUOS CWC CIC CW CBE CHR CFED CT CONS CIA CTM CDC CVR CF CLINTON CITEL CLEARANCE COE CN CACS CAN CONDOLEEZZA CB CSW CITT CARSON CNARC CACM CDB CARICOM COM CROS CAPC CTR CV CKGR CBC CL CICTE CIS
DR DHS DA DJ DEA DPRK DEPT DOMESTIC DEAX DOE DS DAO DCM DO DE DK DEFENSE DTRA DISENGAGEMENT DOD
ECON EFIN ELAB ETRD EIND EC EINV EAGR ENRG ETTC EAID EPET ELTN EWWT EAIR EFIS EMIN EG EU ER EUN EPA ENVI EXTERNAL ECPS ENGR ETRC ECIN EN EI ELN ET EINT ETRDEINVTINTCS ES ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EZ ETRO EDU ETRN EFTA EAIG EK EUREM EURN ECONCS ECONOMICS ENVR ELECTIONS EAP ENIV ECONOMY ESA EINN ECONOMIC EIAR EXBS ECA ECUN EINDETRD EUR EREL EUC ESENV ECONEFIN ECIP ENERG ENNP EFINECONCS EFIM ENGY EAIDS EINVEFIN EINVETC EUMEM ETRA ETC ERNG ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH ECINECONCS EINVECONSENVCSJA EXIM ERD EEPET
FR FREEDOM FTA FJ FARC FI FTAA FAC FBI FOREIGN FOI FDA FM FAO FAS FINR FOR FINANCE FMLN FO FISO
GM GV GOI GOV GL GAERC GH GT GG GA GY GR GF GCC GE GZ GTIP GERARD GLOBAL GANGS GAZA GTMO
HA HR HUMAN HO HK HU HILLARY HUMOR HI HSTC HURI HYMPSK HEBRON
IR IS IZ IAEA IO IAHRC ID IC IT IRAQI IWC IN IL ISLAMISTS IV ICAO INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IPR ICRC INTERPOL IQ IBET IMO INR ITRA INTERNAL ICJ ICTY IRS ILO INRA INRO ISRAELI IEA INRB ITALY ITU IBRD IIP ILC INTELSAT IZPREL IMF INMARSAT IRAJ IDA ICTR IA IGAD IF IDP ITF ISRAEL IEFIN IRC IACI
JA JUS JO JP JOSEPH JM JAMES JOHNNIE JOHN
KN KCRM KOMC KNNPMNUC KIPR KPAL KWBG KSCA KFRD KNNP KUNR KTIP KWMN KSTC KFLU KOLY KISL KPAO KMDR KJUS KSTH KDEM KCOR KIRF KAWC KU KTFN KWAC KNPP KERG KSEO KACT KHLS KZ KGHG KTIA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCRCM KE KPKO KCIP KDRG KVPR KV KIDE KICC KPRP KBIO KSUM KGIT KCFE KG KBTS KFLO KMPI KS KGIC KPAI KHSA KTLA KSEP KTEX KFSC KOCI KHDP KPLS KTDB KHIV KCSY KSAC KTRD KID KMRS KOM KSAF KRVC KR KMOC KNAR KIRC KBCT KSPR KFIN KBTR KJUST KNEI KAWK KGCC KMCA KREL KMFO KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFTFN KVRP KCOM KO KLIG KAID KVIR KNSD KHUM KSEC KRAD KPRV KCMR KPWR KCHG KIFR KCFC KICA KPIN KSCI KESS KDEV KTBT KCRS KCGC KOMS KRIM KTER KREC KPOA KWWMN KRGY KPAK KWNM KMIG KDDG KRFD KWMM KWMNCS KX KRCM KPAONZ KNUC KDEMAF KNUP
LY LE LO LG LH LI LTTE LAB LOG LA LT LU LABOR
MARR MOPS MASS MCAP MTCRE MNUC MIL MX MEDIA MO MPOS MU ML MA MP MY MERCOSUR MG MD MW MK MAS MEETINGS MR MT MI MOPPS MASC MTS MLS MILI MAR MTRE MEPN MAPP MTCR MEPI MQADHAFI MAPS MARAD MASSMNUC MEPP MCC MZ MILITARY MDC MRCRE MC MV MIK MUCN
NATO NL NZ NPT NI NAFTA NU NDP NIPP NP NPA NG NRR NO NSC NEW NE NH NR NA NS NSF NZUS NATIONAL NSG NC NT NAR NK NGO NV NSFO NSSP NASA NW NPG NORAD NATOPREL
OTRA OAS OPRC OIIP OVIP OREP OPDC OEXC OSCE OFFICIALS OMIG ODIP OFDP OECD OPIC OBSP OPCW OFDA OTR OSAC OSCI ON OCII OES OVP OIC OPAD OIE OHUM OCS
PREL PGOV PK PHUM PINS PARM PA PTER PINR PREF PHSA PBTS PBIO PO POL PE PARMS PM PROG PL PAK POLITICS PORG PTBS PNAT PUNE POLICY PDOV PCI PROP PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PP PS PAO PG PY PTERE PGOF PALESTINIAN PKFK PSOE PEPR PPA PINT PMAR PRELP PSEPC PREFA PGOVE PINF PHUMPGOV PNG PMIL PGOC PFOR PCUL PLN PSA PGIV POLINT PAS POGOV PHUMPREL PHUMBA PEL PGGV PNR PHALANAGE PARTY PGOVLO PRAM PHUS PDEM PECON PF POV PROV PRL PREO PAHO PHUH PSI PINL PU PRGOV PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS
QA
RS RU REACTION REPORT REGION RIGHTS RO RW RCMP RF RM RFE RSP RP RICE ROBERT ROOD RELATIONS RIGHTSPOLMIL RUPREL RSO
SU SNAR SO SOCI SW SENV SMIG SCUL SP SZ SENVKGHG SR SY SA SYRIA SF SI SC SWE SARS STEINBERG SN SG SIPRS ST SEVN SL SPCE SNARIZ SSA SNARCS SYR SK SPCVIS SHUM SIPDIS SHI SH SOFA SEN SNARN SAARC SAN SANC SCRS
TRGY TBIO TU TF TERRORISM TI TSPL TPHY TH TIP TSPA TC TO TW TX TZ TNGD TT TL TV TFIN TS TRSY TINT TN TURKEY TBID TD TK TR THPY TP TAGS
UNGA UN UK US UNC UNSC USUN UG UP UY USEU UNESCO USPS USTR UZ UNHRC UNO UNMIK UNAUS UNHCR UNCHR USAID UNVIE UAE USOAS UNFICYP UV UNEP UNODC UNCHS UNIDROIT UNDESCO UNDC UNCHC UNDP UNCND USNC UNPUOS UNICEF UNCSD UE
VT VE VTPREL VM VZ VI VTIZ VAT VN VC VTEG
WS WTO WTRO WTRQ WI WZ WHO WFP WBG WITH WWARD WHA WB WIPO WA WMO WMD WHTI WEU
XA XF XM XL XW XV XR XB XU XY XH XG XE XK XX XD XI XS XT XTAG XQ XZ XC
YE YM YI YMCS
ZI ZO ZU ZEALAND ZK ZR ZF ZP ZN ZA ZB ZOELLICK ZL ZJ ZANU

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09CAIRO290, SMUGGLING TUNNEL DETECTED AND DESTROYED, SECURITY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CAIRO290.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09CAIRO290 | 2009-02-18 09:09 | 2011-02-16 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

`

    VZCZCXRO5203
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHEG #0290/01 0490950
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 180950Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1661
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000290

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
    TAGS: PREL PARM MASS MOPS PTER ASEC KPAL IS EG
    SUBJECT: SMUGGLING TUNNEL DETECTED AND DESTROYED, SECURITY
    CONCERNS RAISED

    REF: A. CAIRO 181|09CAIRO257 VZCZCXRO5203OO RUEHROVDE RUEHEG #0290/01 0490950ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 180950Z FEB 09FM AMEMBASSY CAIROTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1661INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITYRHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000290 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019 TAGS: PREL PARM MASS MOPS PTER ASEC KPAL IS EG

    SUBJECT:

    SMUGGLING TUNNEL DETECTED AND DESTROYED, SECURITY CONCERNS RAISED REF: A. CAIRO 181 B. CAIRO 257 C. CAIRO 161 D. 2008 CAIRO 2480 Classified By: DCM Matt Tueller per 1.4 (b) and (d).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: On January 28, Egypt re-started the implementation of a $23 million FMF-funded tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border, put on hold during Israel's incursion into Gaza. A new 24-man Tunnel Detection Unit (TDU) completed training on January 26 and is working alongside the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to accelerate the installation of seismic-acoustic tunnel detection equipment along the border. On February 3, ACE and Egyptian personnel inadvertently discovered a main tunnel after noticing that some installation equipment had been damaged. The ACE used the accidental discovery to train the TDU using FMF-provided equipment to map the tunnel, uncover five entrances, and eventually destroy the majority of the tunnel. This marked the first time Egypt has ever collapsed a main tunnel, a crucial step in deterring smuggling.

    ¶2. (C) Summary continued: Reports indicate that Egypt's increased efforts to combat smuggling (ref A) are bearing fruit. We have seen reports of frustrated smugglers and limited availability in Gaza of previously smuggled consumer products like fuel. Success comes with a price, however, and we remain concerned that angry smugglers could target American and Egyptian personnel along the Rafah border. We are taking steps to mitigate those potential threats. Continued Israeli air attacks along the Philadelpi corridor have also raised security concerns, especially among the Egyptian sub-contractors. On the larger political front, increased media attention on the tunnel detection program and Egyptian efforts to combat smuggling could heighten domestic and regional criticism that Egypt is complicit in Israel's blockade of Gaza, thereby endangering Egyptian diplomatic efforts to find a political solution in Gaza. Because of the potential security and political impacts associated with increased publicity of the tunnel detection program, we are advising USG visitors, including upcoming CODEL and STAFFDEL delegations, not to visit the Rafah border (ref B). End Summary. ------------------------------- Main Tunnel Detected, Destroyed -------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) On February 1, ACE personnel noticed that a previously installed 10-meter long piece of plastic piping and been cut, leading the team to discover a main tunnel approximately 4 meters below the ground and 440 meters from the Rafah border crossing on the Egyptian side of the border. ACE personnel used the accidental discovery as a hands-on training opportunity in exploitation tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The TDU used FMF-provided infrared sensors and electromagnetic induction (EMI) units to explore and map the tunnel, discovering five entrances in an open field. On February 3, the Egyptian military used explosives to collapse 75 percent of the tunnel, marking the first time Egypt has ever collapsed one of the unknown number of main tunnels running beneath the Egypt-Gaza border (Comment: Egyptian destruction techniques must be improved to ensure that tunnels are 100 percent destroyed to prevent them from becoming operational again. End Comment.). Previously, security forces would destroy entrances to the many feeder tunnels discovered, leaving the main tunnels intact and easily accessible through construction of a new feeder tunnel.

    ¶4. (SBU) In January 2009, MOD agreed to accelerate installation, condensing into one phase three previously planned phases along the 9 kilometers of the 14 kilometer border deemed suitable for tunneling (ref C). On February 15, the tunnel detection equipment began operating to a limited degree along a 1600 meter section. ACE experts expect full operational capability along the entire 9 kilometer stretch by early October 2009. --------------------------------------------- ------ Initial Success Breeds Security, Political Concerns --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶5. (C) Initial reports indicate that increased Egyptian efforts to curb smuggling have already been successful. According to ConGen Jerusalem, Gaza contacts report that the flow of smuggled goods into Gaza has been significantly reduced since the beginning of February, including the CAIRO 00000290 002 OF 002 cessation of smuggled fuel imports since February 6 due to Egypt's increased counter smuggling efforts. Increased Egyptian efforts and numerous press reports of U.S. assistance have also raised more worrisome attention. One extremist blog encouraged supporters to kill American, German, and French experts helping the Egyptians install border surveillance equipment (Note: The German and French governments have only offered technical assistance but have not deployed any full-time personnel along the border. End Note). On February 8, a group of Egyptian teenagers threw rocks at an Egyptian armored personnel carrier providing security to the ACE project. Increased media attention could also jeopardize Egyptian diplomatic efforts on Palestinian reconciliation by intensifying heightened domestic and regional criticism that Egypt is supporting Israeli's siege of Gaza by refusing to open the Rafah border crossing.

    ¶6. (C) Continued Israeli air strikes aimed at destroying tunnels long the Philadelphi corridor between Egypt and Gaza has also raised security concerns, especially with the Egyptian contractors supporting the installation of tunnel detection equipment. On February 16, installation personnel were only given a 17 minute warning ahead of air strikes. The sixty ACE and Egyptian personnel working along the border had just enough time to seek shelter. The Egyptian sub-contractors are especially concerned that future warnings may not come in time. ---------------------------- Mitigating Security Concerns ----------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Post has no specific threats against Americans at this time. Potential threats to ACE and Egyptian installation personnel, however, will likely grow if Egyptian security forces continue to clamp down on lucrative smuggling activities. Post addressed security concerns related to maintaining American personnel at the Rafah terminal before installation began (ref D) and we continue to take a number of steps to mitigate threats including minimizing U.S. personnel at border, billeting U.S. personnel inside a Egyptian Border Guard Force (BGF) facility, and intelligence monitoring. At our request, BGF forces have also increased security at the installation site.

    ¶8. (C) Comment: The serendipitous discovery and consequent destruction of a main tunnel is a significant step forward for Egypt's efforts to combat counter smuggling. The tunnel detection program and Egyptian expertise is only nascent, however, and the project's full implementation - and more significantly its sustainment - will be challenging, especially as smugglers on both sides of the Egypt-Gaza border see their livelihoods being threatened. The potential for violent backlash by Bedouins involved in smuggling against Egyptians and Americans installing the equipment remains. We will continue to closely monitor the security situation and take steps to mitigate potential threats. End Comment. SCOBEY

`