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### Viewing cable 08HELSINKI562, FINLAND TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08HELSINKI562 | 2008-12-11 14:02 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Helsinki

`

    VZCZCXYZ0015
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHHE #0562/01 3461418
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 111418Z DEC 08
    FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4702
    INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0078
    RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8666

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000562

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2018
    TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL
    SUBJECT: FINLAND TO INCREASE ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

    Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  According to Finnish officials, the revised
    Afghanistan policy to be presented to the Finnish Parliament
    in February 2009 will call for increased civilian and
    military personnel, as well as greater development
    assistance. Debate within the government (GOF) about
    increasing support or maintaining current levels appears to
    have resulted in the broad consensus to increase, deferring
    until a later date specifics - and possibly renewed debate
    with skeptics - about the timing and extent of increases. The
    top priorities for the GOF will be (1) civilian personnel;
    (2) support for the 2010 elections; and (3) Operational
    Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) contributions.  The focus on
    civilian personnel will be on police trainers.  The GOF
    foresees an increase in the OMLT contribution from 10 to 30
    (with some possibly at the battalion level).  Assuming
    leadership of the Mazar-i-Sharif PRT from the Swedish
    government appears unlikely, though the GOF remains
    interested in leading a PRT.  The GOF offers few specifics on
    increased development assistance; they have pursued training
    opportunities in Finland and welcome suggestions on future
    opportunities, e.g., utilizing their expertise on
    (re)forestation matters.  A clearer picture of the situation
    in Afghanistan might allay concerns among skeptics about the
    utility of pursuing development in the current security
    environment, and assist the GOF in more clearly articulating
    and implementing increased assistance.  To that end, S/CA
    intends to send experts to brief key Finnish officials in
    early 2009 on the situation in Afghanistan.  END SUMMARY.

    GOF to support greater involvement in Afghanistan
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶2. (C) In a December 6 meeting with Deputy Assistant
    Secretary Krol and Ambassador Barrett, Foreign Ministry
    Director General Elina Kalkku (Department of Asia and the
    Americas) and Political Department Deputy Director Anu
    Laamanen shared the GOF,s "decision in principle" to
    increase its civilian, military and development assistance in
    Afghanistan.  The decision, part of the GOF's
    Parliament-mandated review of its Afghanistan policy, follows
    a debate within the government between those who wish to
    increase support and those who believe current levels are
    sufficient. According to Kalkku, those in the latter group
    point to deteriorating security in Afghanistan and assert
    that the situation is "almost lost," so why spend more. After
    her visit to Afghanistan last October, Kalkku issued an
    internal report noting the grim security situation but
    advocating that the GOF do more, a report that appears to be
    the basis of the decision in principle.  As the GOF looks to
    increase engagement, its top priorities will be (1)
    increasing civilian personnel; (2) support for the 2010
    presidential elections; and (3) increasing contributions to
    an OMLT. The GOF also will examine more funding to the Afghan
    Trust Fund and border police training.

    ¶3. (C) While the GOF will present to Parliament a revised
    Afghanistan policy advocating increased engagement, doubts
    linger within the government regarding the security situation
    in Afghanistan and the ability to effectively carry out
    development projects.  Such doubts also exist in the
    Parliament.  Kalkku welcomed DAS Krol's offer of information
    from U.S. interlocutors regarding the security situation in
    Afghanistan, hoping that such information would help ease
    concerns amongst those who have advocated maintaining the
    current level of engagement. (NOTE: S/CA has decided that an
    expert team headed to Moscow in January will also visit
    Helsinki in order to brief Finnish officials on the situation
    in Afghanistan.  END NOTE.)

    Increasing civilian contribution a challenge
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Laamanen said the GOF has encountered difficulties in
    recruiting civilians to work in Afghanistan (in a prior
    meeting Laamanen pointed to competition with recruitment for
    police trainers in a (considerably safer) Kosovo as part of
    the problem).  Given concerns about the security environment
    in Afghanistan, and the difficulties in recruiting, Laamanen
    emphasized that the GOF will carefully consider what roles to
    fill before they send more personnel.  Generally, they are
    looking to increase police trainers, but will consider other
    roles.

    OMLT increase; renewed PRT leadership discussions
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶5. (C) Kalkku said Finland's OMLT contribution would increase
    from 10 to 30 (Laamanen acknowledged that the original
    commitment for 10 has not been filled yet, with only 2
    currently on the ground).  While there is no firm decision
    yet, Kalkku said the intention is that part of this
    additional contribution be at the battalion level, not just
    garrison.

    ¶6. (C) Regarding the possibility of Finland assuming
    leadership of the currently Swedish-led PRT in
    Mazar-e-Sharif, Kalkku said the topic had arisen again within
    the GOF, after having faded when Finnish-Swedish discussions
    earlier in the year led nowhere.  According to Kalkku, the
    "Swedes won,t give up" the Mazar PRT, which "is a
    comfortable place to be."  She emphasized Finnish interest in
    leading a PRT, adding that if Lithuania can run a PRT then
    Finland could.  Regarding troop requirements for a PRT,
    Laamanen said that the GOF anticipates withdrawing
    approximately 60 troops from Operation Althea in Bosnia, and
    that in Kosovo they expect to go down to 350 from 450.
    (NOTE: Staff of the Parliamentary Defense committee
    subsequently told PolChief that the number in Kosovo could
    decrease to 250 over the next two years.  END NOTE.)

    Increase in overall development assistance
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Kalkku, noting that Finland lags behind the other
    Nordic countries in overall development assistance, said that
    the GOF supports a doubling of its assistance, albeit "over
    the long term."  With the "funding curve going up" and not a
    flat line, assistance to Afghanistan would also increase,
    though again Kalkku offered no specifics.  As funding levels
    increase, Kalkku said they will consider how they deliver
    assistance: typically the GOF works through trust funds, as
    limited resources require that they try to avoid "cumbersome
    bilateral programs," but they will consider bilateral
    funding, given that there are a number of good organizations
    in Afghanistan with whom they could partner.

    ¶8. (C) DAS Krol raised the possibility of training
    opportunities for Afghans in Finland, for example, training
    that capitalizes on Finnish expertise in (re)forestation.
    Kalkku mentioned a planned "pilot project" for rule-of-law
    training to court officials and police, and good governance
    and human rights training offered to Afghan parliamentarians.
     They look to repeat the training to parliamentarians.
    Kalkku welcomes any suggestions regarding training in
    Finland, as the government has funding available.  Regarding
    forestry-related assistance, Kalkku stated that currently the
    ministry of trade and development is focusing on water
    sanitation and renewable energy projects, but that they could
    consider forestry projects.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶9. (C) Whether flowing from Nordic Cooperation or Nordic
    Rivalry, the Finns have seen their neighbors commit to
    increased troops or development assistance to Afghanistan,
    and it seems that they have concluded that they too must do
    more.  (The Finns also seek a seat on the UN Security Council
    in 2013-14, and realize that actions taken now and over the
    next few years will impact that candidacy.)  According to
    Kalkku, this revised policy will be more streamlined than
    last year's, described by her as too cumbersome, a decision
    that might also allow a broad consensus within the governing
    coalition on increased support while still deferring
    disagreements and debate about the timing and substance of
    increases to a later time. Our engagement, e.g., through
    briefings to key officials and parliamentarians that provide
    a clearer picture of the situation in Afghanistan, can help
    allay concerns and assist the GOF in articulating the extent
    and pace of its increased assistance.  END COMMENT.

    BARRETT

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