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### Viewing cable 04MANAMA1885, DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04MANAMA1885 | 2004-12-15 12:12 | 2011-05-04 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Manama

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9115
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9116
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9117
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9118
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9119
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9120
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9121
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9122
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9123
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9124
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9125
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9126
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9127
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9128
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9122
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9129
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9131
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9562
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9952
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9950
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9951
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9954
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/9953

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001885

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014
    TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC ETRD ECON MU IR BA
    SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER
    5 MEETING WITH OMANI MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN
    AFFAIRS YUSUF BIN ALAWI BIN ABDULLA

    Classified by A/DCM Hallie H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and
    (d).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (S) Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with
    Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin
    Alawi bin Abdulla December 5 on the margins of the IISS Gulf
    Security Dialogue conference in Manama. Bin Alawi said that
    Oman is looking forward to negotiating a free trade agreement
    with the United States during 2005 and foresees no problems.
    DNSA Hadley noted that bilateral counter terrorism
    cooperation was going well, and bin Alawi said that Oman
    would like closer coordination with the U.S. military and
    intelligence services. Bin Alawi stated that the next
    Iranian president would be a conservative loyal to Khamenei,
    who does not want to repeat the Khatemi experience. Khatemi
    told Omani officials during a November visit that if Iran
    does not conclude a agreement on the nuclear issue during his
    presidency, it will not happen. Bin Alawi suggested that the
    international community could use Iran's interest in joining
    the WTO and other organizations to apply pressure for
    reforms. He noted that Oman's contacts with Israel had never
    stopped and he hoped that Israel would help Abu Mazen build a
    better life for Palestinians. Bin Alawi agreed to assist the
    U.S. in working with Qatar to improve Al Jazirah's coverage.
    End Summary.

    --------------------------------------
    FTA Priority in Bilateral Relationship
    --------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf
    bin Alawi bin Abdulla told Deputy National Security Advisor
    Hadley December 5 that the bilateral relationship is very
    strong and improving. He noted that the two countries would
    negotiate a free trade agreement in 2005, and he foresees no
    problems in completing the negotiations. DNSA Hadley said
    that the FTA is a priority and the administration will work
    closely with Congress to ensure its ratification. The
    administration has a good track record in getting FTAs
    through Congress. Bin Alawi said that discussions so far are
    going well.

    --------------------------------
    Seeking Improved CT Coordination
    --------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) DNSA Hadley stated that counter terrorism cooperation
    is going very well. The U.S. recognizes that Oman is taking
    some difficult steps, and we want to support Oman in a
    discreet way. Bin Alawi responded that the purpose of the
    cooperation is to achieve operational success, and Oman is
    working hard on all aspects of CT cooperation. He suggested
    that CT efforts would be more effective if friendly countries
    developed a network to use against the terrorist networks.
    Joint efforts would be particularly useful in combating
    terrorism financing. DNSA Hadley agreed, saying that
    cooperating countries often develop operational level
    intelligence that can be used to interdict shipments of
    weapons and WMD precursors. He promised to take bin Alawi's
    suggestion back to Washington to encourage joint CT efforts
    in the Gulf region.

    ¶4. (C) Bin Alawi said that GCC-level CT cooperation was not
    very good. Because of strained relations between some
    countries, in particular Qatari and Emirati relations with
    Saudi Arabia, the U.S. may want to consider a regional
    approach other than the GCC. Oman's greatest CT challenge is
    controlling the movement of ships in the Gulf of Oman between
    Oman and Iran. Oman is trying to enhance is capabilities in
    this area, and there are discussions between the Omani and
    U.S. military and intelligence services. Improved
    coordination would be beneficial for the U.S. and the region.

    ---------------------------------------
    No Repeat of Khatemi Experience in Iran
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶5. (S) In response to DNSA Hadley's question, bin Alawi said
    that Iran is now under the control of the conservatives.
    Both of the main presidential candidates - Rouhani and
    Velayati - are close to Khamenei. Rafsanjani is another
    possible candidate. Khamenei does not want to repeat the
    experience of Khatemi and will bring in someone who is loyal
    to him. A council will screen all candidates and those with
    credibility in the streets will be thrown out. The years of
    a liberal president are over. Khamenei's main motivation is
    domestic, not international. The moderates want to abolish
    the "velayat-e faghih," "government by the jurisprudent,"
    which is the main source of Islamic ruling legitimacy in
    Khomeini's vision of the Islamic Republic in Iran. A
    foundation associated with this office controls 20 percent of
    Iran's oil revenue and places representatives into every
    significant organization in the country. Bin Alawi said that
    the moderates would face tremendous opposition if they tried
    to abolish the velayat-e faghih because of the people and
    resources it controls. A military revolution would be
    necessary to change the system, and this is not possible at
    the current time. A new generation would be required to
    abolish the old system, and this will not happen for perhaps
    another twenty years. Bin Alawi stated that Iran's
    leadership would find a way to buy off student leaders.

    ---------------------------------------
    Time is Now for Deal on Nuclear Program
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶6. (S) Bin Alawi noted that Khatemi visited Oman in November
    and discussed Iran's nuclear program. He told the Omanis
    that if Iran does not conclude an agreement on the nuclear
    issue during his presidency, it will not happen. Without an
    agreement, Iran might withdraw from international
    organizations that limit its flexibility. Khatemi recognizes
    the dangers and so is pushing for a deal with the Europeans.
    He wants the international community to recognize Iran's
    right to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and
    Iran plans to build a 7,000 MW nuclear reactor over the
    coming years. Bin Alawi said that Oman could accept a
    reactor, but because of Iran's military ambitions, could not
    rule out Tehran's possible development of nuclear weapons.

    ¶7. (S) Bin Alawi said that Khatemi believes the west let him
    down; he received praise, but nothing substantial. Bin Alawi
    suggested that the international community could use Iran's
    interest in joining the WTO and other organizations to apply
    pressure for reforms. DNSA Hadley acknowledged that using
    the accession process could be a way to pressure Iran.

    ---------------------
    Support for Abu Mazen
    ---------------------

    ¶8. (C) DNSA Hadley stated that the President is focused on
    the Middle East and sees some opportunities, particularly in
    the peace process. PM Sharon recognizes that there is no
    shortcut from Palestinian elections to final status
    negotiations and wants to walk through the roadmap, if
    conditions permit. He noted that Palestinian Finance
    Minister Fayyad has to beg for money to pay his budget each
    month. The international community should do more to help
    him. Bin Alawi said that Oman would do so, and hopes that
    Abu Mazen is elected president of the Palestinian Authority.
    Israel should help Abu Mazen build a better life for his
    people.

    ¶9. (C) DNSA Hadley suggested that Oman should allow the
    Israeli trade mission to return to the country once progress
    is made on a peace settlement. Bin Alawi said that Oman's
    contacts with Israel had never stopped. A GOI official is
    present in Oman as part of the Middle East Desalinization
    Resource Center - a holdover from the days of the Track Two
    peace process. Bin Alawi met with Israeli Foreign Minister
    Shalom in New York and they discussed the future of the peace
    process. DNSA Hadley proposed that Oman raise the visibility
    of these contacts when a process is underway between the
    Israelis and Palestinians.

    -----------------------------
    Work Al Jazirah Issue Quietly
    -----------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Bin Alawi mentioned that Oman shares U.S. concerns
    about Al Jazirah. He said there is no point in speaking
    publicly about the problem; this should be done quietly. He
    offered to work with us and the Qataris. DNSA Hadley said
    that Al Jazirah is very troublesome. Americans die in Iraq
    because of Al Jazirah coverage. He said we would try to work
    this issue quietly and along with the Omanis.

    ¶11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

    ¶12. (C) The NSC cleared this message.

    MONROE

`