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### Viewing cable 09TELAVIV2365, AMBASSADOR RICE,S OCTOBER 21ST MEETING WITH

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09TELAVIV2365 | 2009-10-27 11:11 | 2011-04-18 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv

`

    VZCZCXRO1127
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTV #2365/01 3001137
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 271137Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3996
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2092
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 9294
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0646

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002365
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2029
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KWBG IR IS CY AF PK
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RICE,S OCTOBER 21ST MEETING WITH
    ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER LIEBERMAN
    Classified By: Ambassador James Cunningham. Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d).
    ¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
    Nations Susan E. Rice met with Israeli Foreign Minister
    Avigdor Lieberman on October 21. Ambassador Rice emphasized
    that it is in both U.S. and Israeli national interests that
    serious negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians must
    begin ) and conclude ) to achieve a comprehensive
    agreement. Lieberman made clear that, while he is in favor
    of starting direct talks with the Palestinians, he does not
    believe that a comprehensive peace is possible. Rice and
    Lieberman discussed the Goldstone Report and Israel,s
    response to it, as well as likely next steps in New York.
    Lieberman stressed that Israel has a strong commitment to
    human rights and condemned the hypocrisy of those Human
    Rights Council members that criticize Israel. Iran,s nuclear
    ambitions and the current state of play in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan were also raised. End Summary.
    2.(C) Ambassador Susan Rice and Israeli Foreign Minister
    Avigdor Lieberman discussed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
    the Goldstone report and Iran on October 21. The
    conversation also touched on the current situation in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. FM Lieberman was accompanied by
    Deputy FM Daniel Ayalon, Deputy Director General for North
    America Barukh Bina, Director General Yossi Gal, Chief of
    Policy Staff Yitzhak Bachman, Chief of Staff Sharon Shalom,
    and Deputy Director General for UN and International
    Organizations Evietar Manor. Ambassador Rice was accompanied
    by Ambassador James Cunningham, NSC Middle East Senior
    Director Dan Shapiro, USUN staffers Amy Schedlbauer, Warren
    Bass and Mark Kornblau, and an Embassy notetaker.
    Lieberman: &Comprehensive Solution Impossible8
    --------------------------------------------- --
    3.(C) Ambassador Rice opened the meeting by stressing that a
    comprehensive agreement between Israel and the Palestinians
    was in the U.S. national interest, as well as in the interest
    of Israel and Palestinians. It was important to promptly
    begin ) and to conclude ) negotiations to achieve a
    comprehensive settlement.
    ¶4. (C) Lieberman said relations between Israelis and
    Palestinians were generally misunderstood, and that he had
    tried to explain this point to Senator Mitchell. Israel
    worked closely with the Palestinian Authority, with General
    Dayton, and with the Palestinian security forces. The
    biggest problem for all responsible governments was
    extremists. The biggest problem of PM Fayyad and President
    Abbas (Abu Mazen) wasn,t Israel but Hamas. Hizbullah was
    the biggest problem for the Lebanese government, just as
    Mubarak,s biggest problem was the Muslim Brotherhood and the
    Taliban was the biggest problem in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    ¶5. (C) Lieberman assessed that Abu Mazen was trying to have
    it both ways, a strategy that could never work. He was
    trying to continue to work with Israel while trying to be
    tougher and more radical than Hamas. Lieberman urged that
    there should be no illusions, and that the parties must
    acknowledge the limits of the possible. Israel had been
    trying to negotiate with the Palestinians for 16 years, under
    a broad range of leaders, but there was still a deadlock.
    The issue was not logical, but emotional ) and in part about
    symbols. Israel and the U.S. had a responsibility not to
    foster illusions, he said. A comprehensive peace agreement
    was impossible, as it was in such conflicts as Cyprus and
    Nagorno Karabakh. The first steps should be stability and
    prosperity, he argued. There was just too much distrust
    between the two sides to address final status issues. Both
    sides would be obligated not to support violence and
    incitement. Lieberman cited Cyprus as an example that Israel
    might emulate, claiming that no comprehensive solution was
    possible, but security, stability and prosperity were.
    ¶6. (C) Lieberman complained that the Palestinians were too
    focused on elections and asked that the U.S. also convey this
    message to them. Israel was surprised to hear Abbas talking
    about voters, constituencies and slogans, instead of talking
    about peace. NSC Senior Director Shapiro noted that Abbas
    was required by the Basic Law to make a declaration of an
    election by October 25. Lieberman was undeterred, noting
    that the last PA elections had been problematic and that not
    all elections would have a positive outcome. Palestinian
    incitement, and continuous attacks against Israel in
    international fora, undermined the possibility of continued
    dialogue with Israel. Shapiro-Rice stressed the short-term
    importance of restarting talks.
    TEL AVIV 00002365 002 OF 003
    Goldstone
    ---------
    ¶7. (C) Lieberman thanked Ambassador Rice for the U.S.
    position on the Goldstone report in the Human Rights Council.
    Ambassador Rice highlighted positive U.S. engagement with
    the Israeli Missions in New York and Geneva to blunt the
    effects of the Goldstone report in those fora. She noted
    that we had the potential in the Security Council to build a
    blocking coalition that agrees that the Security Council is
    not the appropriate forum to consider the report. The USG
    statement in Geneva had emphasized that a credible domestic
    Israeli investigation would facilitate this effort.
    ¶8. (C) Lieberman said that if the Palestinians continue
    steps in the ICC and elsewhere, it could end the peace
    process. Lieberman said that Israel has a strong commitment
    to human rights, but lamented that Cuba, Bangladesh, Pakistan
    and Venezuela control majorities at the Human Rights Council
    and could pass any resolution that they wanted to. The
    hypocrisy of such countries blaming Israel for violence and
    war crimes, and filing a law suit at the International
    Criminal Court, was intolerable. All countries who have
    friction with their minority groups should take note, because
    after such human-rights abusers finished with Israel, they
    would go after others. This drive to criticize Israel had
    spilled over into technical fora that were supposed to
    address issues like the environment, energy and education,
    and all were being tainted by automatic majorities.
    Israel,s justice system was very strong ) it could monitor
    its own behavior better than anyone else.
    ¶9. (C) Israeli Director General Yossi Gal asked about next
    steps on Goldstone in New York. Ambassador Rice explained
    that the Arab Group in New York was consulting amongst
    themselves and that there seem to be some fissures in the
    Arab Group. The Arab Group is approaching the P5 to
    &take their temperature.8 It was likely that something
    would evolve first in the General Assembly that neither
    Israel nor the U.S. would like. The numbers were not in
    Israel,s favor, and this was a fact of life. The U.S. would
    try to rally opposition to any problematic GA text. It was
    hard to know at this time what outcome the Goldstone
    report,s supporters might seek at the UNSC.
    ¶10. (C) Gal noted that the Palestinian Minister of Justice,
    accompanied by international law experts, had met October 16
    with the ICC prosecutor and that Palestinian representatives
    continued to be active in New York and Geneva. Lieberman
    emphasized that across the Israeli political spectrum,
    including Kadima, there was consensus that if the
    Palestinians continued to pursue action against Israel at the
    International Criminal Court and the International Court of
    Justice, it would end the peace process. The Palestinians
    had urged Israel to topple Hamas during the December-January
    Gaza operation, Lieberman noted, and then in January had
    filed suit against Israel at the ICC. As of October 21, Gal
    added, the Palestinians and Syrians were still pushing for
    UNSC action, while the Egyptians preferred action at the
    UNGA. Shapiro noted that we had told the Palestinians that
    we did not support an ICC referral as it was not a
    constructive path. Abu Mazen had agreed, but the Palestinian
    political calculus had changed after the negative reaction to
    the original Palestinian agreement to defer action at the
    regular session of the Human Rights Council. Ambassador Rice
    underlined again that it would be very helpful in New York if
    Israeli domestic investigative processes were underway and
    urged that those be grounded in Israel,s democratic
    traditions.
    Iran
    ----
    ¶11. (C) FM Lieberman said that Israel wanted to believe that
    the U.S. could achieve a positive outcome in countering the
    Iranian nuclear threat, but that in the Israeli experience,
    Iran only wanted to buy and waste time. Ambassador Rice
    outlined the U.S. two-track approach. The U.S. expected to
    have a clearer picture of Iranian intentions within weeks,
    but in the meantime would continue to plan for the prospect
    that more pressure might be needed. The Geneva meetings had
    been a constructive beginning, but we would need to see what
    emerged from the Vienna negotiations.
    Afghanistan/Pakistan
    --------------------
    ¶12. (C) FM Lieberman asked for Ambassador Rice,s views on
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ambassador Rice noted that this
    TEL AVIV 00002365 003 OF 003
    was a delicate moment in Afghanistan, and that President
    Karzai,s acceptance of a second electoral round was welcome.
    There had been some high-stakes diplomatic brinkmanship to
    make it happen. There were big logistical challenges in
    preparing for the November 2 run-off elections.
    ¶13. (C) On Pakistan, Ambassador Rice highlighted the
    potential for a humanitarian crisis in South Waziristan with
    the approach of winter. The pace of attacks in Pakistan had
    quickened, and the political fallout on the government of
    Pakistan was still unclear.
    CUNNINGHAM

`