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### Viewing cable 09MEXICO283, THE U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP: MEETING CHALLENGES,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO283 | 2009-02-04 17:05 | 2011-03-02 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/la-relacion-eu-mexico-mas-fuerte-que-nunca

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    VZCZCXRO3019
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #0283/01 0351708
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 041708Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

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    190450
    2009-02-04 17:08:00
    09MEXICO283
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL

    VZCZCXRO3019
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #0283/01 0351708
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 041708Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4895
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 000283

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/15/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM SNAR KJUS PINR MX
    SUBJECT: THE U.S.-MEXICAN RELATIONSHIP: MEETING CHALLENGES,
    TAPPING OPPORTUNITIES IN 2009--SECURITY AND REFORM

    Classified By: POLCOUNS CHARLES V. BARCLAY. REASONS 1.4(b)
    and (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Mexico's drug cartels are responsible for
    60-80 percent of the cocaine and a significant percentage of
    other drugs entering the U.S., their activities corrupt
    Mexican institutions, foment insecurity throughout Mexico,
    and instigate rising violence on the U.S.-Mexico border.
    Disrupting and ultimately dismantling these groups represents
    one of our Mission's highest priorities. To achieve that
    objective, we need to help Mexico build stronger law
    enforcement institutions committed to working together not
    only to attack the cartels from without but corruption from
    within. We also must help Mexico improve its ability to
    collect and then act expeditiously on intelligence. Mexico
    is looking for much from us in terms of combating U.S. drug
    demand, trafficking of arms from the U.S. into Mexico, and
    money laundering in the U.S. and we need to step up our
    efforts across the board. Last, but not least, we need to
    assist Mexico in implementing justice reform that will enable
    Mexico to turn the page on corruption and establish the rule
    of law. The Merida Initiative provides a platform for
    achieving these objectives provided it remains flexible yet
    focused. This cable is the first in a series of five cables
    that aim to define the issues that will shape the U.S.-Mexico
    relationship in the coming year. End Summary.

    Reinforce President Calderon's Commitment to Law Enforcement
    Development

    ¶2. (SBU) The Mexican public correctly perceives Mexican law
    enforcement institutions as widely inept and corrupt.
    Calderon's own security chief highlighted a recent federal
    review in which 56,000 police officers failed to meet minimum
    professional standards. We must ensure that the Merida
    Initiative's focus on police training and vetting not only
    professionalizes and sanitizes Mexico's police forces, but
    reinforces Calderon's goal of ending impunity. As Merida
    moves forward, we need to encourage the GOM to establish
    aggressive internal affairs units to better identify and
    sanction bad cops, as well as map out a career path for law
    enforcement officials that rewards good ones with advancement
    and better pay.

    Encourage Better Inter-Institutional Cooperation

    ¶3. (U) The major institutions engaged in Mexico's war on
    drugs -- the military, public security, the Attorney
    General's office, and the national security intelligence arm,
    on down to the state and municipal law enforcement community
    -- don't trust each other. In principle, the GOM aims to
    promote greater interoperability through its
    information-sharing initiative Plataforma Mexico; so far,
    however, each agency has continued to pursue leads and
    conduct investigations independent of, if not at odds with,
    its counterparts. On an institutional level, the Attorney
    General's Office (PGR) is resisting the Secretariat of Public
    Security's (SSP) efforts to integrate the Federal
    Investigative Agency (AFI) officials into its forces and
    opposition parties in Congress have raised their own
    objections to legislation that would call for the merging of
    SSP and AFI into a single unitary federal police force.

    ¶4. (SBU) Ongoing U.S. funded vetting programs have
    facilitated the creation of trusted units within several of
    Mexico's law enforcement entities. The Merida Initiative
    will fund vetting programs on a far more extensive level.
    Recently adopted legislation calls for the creation of a
    National Council for Public Security which the president will
    head and will include the ministries of government, public
    security, national defense and the navy. However, it would
    be a mistake to regard this council as the panacea for the
    deep-seated distrust that presently characterizes relations.
    The Merida planning process was instrumental in bringing
    Mexico's poorly coordinated law enforcement elements to the
    same table. We must continue to use it as a way to promote
    greater trust and interoperability among Mexico's federal law
    enforcement elements; at the same time, we must ensure that
    future Merida programs are designed to undermine reflexive
    parochialism here and maximize cooperation and
    interoperability.

    Enhance Intelligence Collection and Sharing

    ¶5. (C) Mexico's current intelligence collection
    capabilities are limited. CISEN is primarily focused on
    terrorist threats and domestic subversion issues. The
    military remains largely concentrated on collecting against
    the EPR and other domestic threats. Mexico's intelligence
    organs are only beginning to develop expertise in targeting
    Mexico's cartels. As our trust in vetted units has grown
    over the past ten years our law enforcement community has
    begun to share compartmentalized intelligence with Mexican
    counterparts and helped them take down key targets. In
    September 2008, SEMAR signed a General Security of Military
    Information Agreement (GSOMIA) and in October 2008, NORTHCOM
    J2 visited SEMAR for an unprecedented intelligence sharing
    conference centering on counter narcotics and
    counterterrorism.

    ¶6. (C) We now want to capitalize on the Secretariat of
    National Defense's (SEDENA) expressed interest in securing a
    similar agreement and hope to sign one in Summer 2009. A
    high priority, however, will be to implement and
    operationalize both agreements by bringing Mexico's fledgling
    collection efforts up to speed through training and best
    practice sharing, ensuring that shared intelligence is
    properly handled and ensuring as well that actionable
    intelligence results in action.

    Engage the Enemy on Our Side of the Border

    ¶7. (SBU) The U.S.- Mexico law enforcement partnership has
    already accelerated success in terms of high level captures
    and extraditions of major drug traffickers in Mexico. The
    GOM and Mexican public appreciate the helping hand we are
    extending through the Merida Initiative, but expect us to
    take actions on our side of the border. The U.S. is putting
    considerable efforts into targeting money launderers in the
    U.S., curbing our drug demand, and more effectively impeding
    the flow of weapons into Mexico. ICE and ATF are looking at
    a "surge" in personnel and resources to respond to rising
    concerns about criminal activities in the border region. We
    need to explore ways to build on these initiatives with
    sufficient funding and resources to ensure our efforts match
    those of the GOM.

    Broaden Judicial Reform Effort

    ¶8. (SBU) Putting in place genuine judicial reform is one of
    the single most important pre-requisites to Mexico's long
    term ability to gain the upper hand over organized crime,
    turn the page on corruption and establish the rule of law.
    The Merida Initiative's significant funding for judicial
    reform here offers us leverage not only to encourage passage
    of appropriate legislation, but provide necessary training to
    fully implement laws once they are passed.

    ¶9. (C) The judicial reform bill passed last June mandating
    Mexico's shift to an accusatory system over the next eight
    years is welcome. However, before this and other reforms of
    Mexico's antiquated judicial system can take effect, the
    Mexican Congress needs to overhaul the federal procedural and
    penal codes, among other laws. We are discreetly working
    with some members of Congress on a draft and have offered to
    assist PGR with Calderon administration's proposals, which
    for the most part continue to be drafted internally with
    minimal input from non-GOM entities.

    ¶10. (SBU) Legislative efforts to date provide an excellent
    start, but Mexican prosecutors need additional tools to
    alleviate a massive case overload in the courts and allow
    authorities to gain the cooperation of lower level defendants
    to build cases against organized crime leaders. While not a
    panacea, plea bargaining and other arrangements and other
    mechanisms for pre-trial disposition of cases will go a long
    way to alleviating over-crowded judicial dockets and giving
    prosecutors the tools they need to get criminal defendants to
    help identify, investigate and prosecute their associates and
    bosses. Once these reforms are passed, we will help the PGR
    develop and implement these mechanisms through our training
    programs.

    ¶11. (SBU) A robust asset forfeiture regime will also be
    crucial to hitting Mexico's cartels where it hurts, but it
    remains to be seen whether Mexico can pass and implement
    legislation that is up to the task. The Calderon
    administration has presented to Congress a strong asset
    forfeiture bill (based on Colombia's "Extincion de Dominio"
    law, which the USG helped draft and implement), but general
    distrust of government may result in a weakened version. The
    bill will be taken up during an abbreviated legislative
    session this winter. Working closely with Attorney General's
    office, we will use what may be a short-window to encourage a
    law with sufficient teeth.

    ¶12. (C) Comment: Failure to successfully implement
    Calderon's broad reform agenda will undercut Mexico's long
    term efforts to transform the judicial system and give its
    law enforcement community more effective tools for its
    campaign against organized crime. The Merida Initiative
    provides funding to promote such reforms, mostly through
    training, and the Mission country team is well-positioned to
    influence both their design and implementation. To be sure,
    the weight of responsibility for adopting new reforms and
    ensuring existing ones take effect falls on the Mexican
    government. For its part, Washington can support this
    process by ensuring our resource base remains robust in
    coming years -- and by devoting greater resources and focus
    to areas of outstanding Mexican concern, such as illegal arms
    trafficking and bulk cash smuggling.

    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

    BASSETT

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