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### Viewing cable 07STATE60637, OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07STATE60637 | 2007-05-04 17:05 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHC #0637 1242255
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    P 041750Z MAY 07
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
    INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
    RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

` `

    UNCLAS STATE 060637

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS - NSC FOR MAHAYWARD AND CLEDDY
    DOE/NNSA FOR JCONNERY AND GSTACEY
    OSD/CTR FOR AWEBER AND JREID
    BERLIN FOR RICHARD CRANDELL

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC KNNP CBW TRGY GM JA RS CA UK FR
    SUBJECT: OUTREACH REQUEST ON U.S. PROPOSAL  TO EXPAND AND

    EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: GERMANY

    REF: A. BERLIN 000845

    ¶1.  (U) ACTION REQUEST: See Para 7 below.

    ¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY: At the April 3 Political
    Directors, meeting, the U.S. rolled out a proposal
    (coordinated through NSC with strong
    interagency support) to expand and extend the G8
    Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of
    Mass Destruction (GP) for another 10 years
    (2022)/$20 billion (U.S. $10 billion; other
    GP donors $10 billion) to address new and emerging
    global weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats.
    This proposal was also raised at the April 26-27
    Sherpas meeting and more extensively in the April
    23 Global Partnership Working Group meeting (GPWG)
    (reftel).  All GP members recognize the evolving
    global WMD threat, but most have been resistant to
    our proposal ) largely due to worries about cost
    and potential for dilution of ongoing efforts in
    Russia and the former Soviet Union (FSU).  Canada
    and the UK are the most supportive.  Russia poses the
    strongest opposition and has expressed that the
    original Kananaskis priorities must be completed
    before moving forward.  Germany has expressed
    similar concerns.  Therefore the U.S. is increasing
    senior diplomatic outreach to G8 partners on this
    proposal, emphasizing that this commitment will help
    address critical global proliferation challenges,
    including the requirements of United Nations Security
    Council Resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to
    Combat Nuclear Terrorism (Global Initiative),
    and other G8 priorities.  END SUMMARY.

    ----------------
    BACKGROUND
    ----------------

    ¶3.  (SBU) The Global Partnership (GP) is a G8
    initiative that was created at Kananaskis in 2002
    to address the spread of WMD, and now includes
    the G8 plus 13 additional donor nations and the
    EU.  2007 marks the halfway point for the Global
    Partnership,s initial 10-year, $20 billion
    commitment.  GP donor pledges to date come
    in at over $17 billion (including $10 billion
    from the U.S.), plus an additional $6 billion
    from Russia, which was not included in the initial
    $20 billion commitment. The current GP scope
    addresses WMD threats only within Russia and
    other former Soviet states (the U.S. recognizes
    all former Soviet nations as GP recipients, but
    so far only Russia and Ukraine are officially
    recognized as recipient states by the entire
    Partnership).  The Kananaskis document anticipated
    an expansion by mandating that GP programs begin
    &initially in Russia8 but not be limited to
    Russia. In the context of the G8, the GP is
    handled by the GPWG, which reports to the
    Nonproliferation Directors Group (NPDG).
    The GP is a unique model of multilateral
    cooperation to combat WMD and missile threats
    and has made great progress in its first five
    years to reduce the proliferation threat,
    including chemical weapons destruction; redirection
    of former WMD scientists, technicians and
    engineers; improving security for fissile
    nuclear materials, chemical weapons stocks
    and biological agents; and dismantlement
    of decommissioned nuclear submarines.

    ¶4.  (SBU) The U.S. proposal to expand and extend
    the GP to combat new and emerging global WMD
    threats includes four components: 1) Immediate
    expansion of geographic scope outside of Russia
    and the former Soviet Union (to include the
    broadest possible participation of new recipient
    states worldwide); 2) Immediate inclusion of
    broadest possible functional scope to include
    all chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
    and missile threats; 3) Extension of time
    commitment for an additional 10 years (2012-2022);
    and 4) Increased financial commitment of an
    additional $20 billion for 2012-2022 with the
    same parameters as original commitment (U.S.
    $10 billion; $10 billion from other donors).
    The proposal builds on a Leaders' statement at
    the 2004 Sea Island Summit, in which the G8
    committed to coordinate activities to reduce
    the global WMD threat through the GP.  Note
    that the U.S. and other G8 donors (notably
    Canada and the UK) believe that the Kananaskis
    Guidelines and Principles, on which the GP was
    formed, already include a broad interpretation
    of threats (chemical, biological, radiological,
    nuclear and missile); however Russia has strongly
    argued to limit scope to Russia,s most important
    priorities of chemical weapons destruction and
    nuclear submarine dismantlement.

    ¶5.  (SBU) After working this proposal at the
    level of the GPWG and Political Directors, the
    U.S. has gained some support from most G8 members
    for the first two objectives (geographic and
    programmatic expansion), with limited to no
    support for the 10-year extension and additional
    financial contribution at this time.  Russia
    objects to the entire proposal.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    GERMANY POSITION ON U.S. PROPOSAL TO EXPAND AND
    EXTEND THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶6.  (SBU) Germany has virtually ignored the
    proposal in every nonproliferation or
    GP-related statement they have drafted
    for the G8 Leaders to date, despite several
    months of discussion on this topic in the
    GPWG.  During the April 23 GPWG, German
    MFA expressed appreciation for our
    proposal, but did not agree to include our
    language in their draft GP five-year midpoint
    review document, which is a Summit deliverable.
    Germany specifically stated that the proposal
    can/should only be considered at the highest
    levels and did not support the U.S. assertion
    that the GP has the responsibility to recommend
    its views on the future of the GP to G8 Leaders
    (emphasizing their view that the GP cannot
    &decide8 such things).  In particular, the
    Germans seem most concerned with the additional
    financial support requested and the inclusion
    of the broadest possible number of potential GP
    recipients upon geographic expansion, rather
    than the current formal approach to GP accession,
    which (largely by Russian design) has hampered
    the GP,s ability to expand even within the FSU.

    ¶7. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post is requested to
    reach out, at the highest appropriate level,
    to Germany to garner support for this proposal.
    The Draft G8 Leaders' language proposed by the
    U.S. for inclusion in the Nonproliferation
    statement (as mentioned in the points below)
    will follow as an attachment by email to Post.

    Recommended talking points are included in Para 8.

    ¶8. (U) TALKING POINTS FOR USE AS NEEDED AND
    APPROPRIATE:

    --We remain committed to meeting or exceeding the
    Global Partnership goals laid out at Kananaskis,
    completing the priority tasks in Russia and the
    former Soviet states.

    --In addition to our current commitments, the
    global WMD threat we face is urgent and evolving,
    and our collective peace and security depends on
    our response and leadership.  Therefore, we must
    act immediately and provide that leadership to
    address the threats that all our nations face.

    --Despite a longstanding discussion on the GP,s
    future within the Global Partnership Working Group
    and general support for the ideas we are proposing,
    our proposal to expand and extend the GP is not
    reflected in the circulated drafts of the GPWG,s
    midpoint five-year review document (or the NPDG,s
    broader nonproliferation statement).

    --We understand that the financial commitment we
    are asking for - another $10 billion from other
    GP donors - is substantial.  We recognize that it
    will not be easy and will take time for many GP
    members to develop mechanisms to fund projects
    to combat the global threat.

    --This is precisely why we must act now to begin
    the expansion and extension process.  The
    global threat we face is too important to
    delay, and we have a chance to
    show important leadership.

    --All G8 nations face the threat of WMD proliferation,
    including WMD terrorism, and should not stop working on
    halting the spread of WMD, related materials and
    delivery systems after the Kananaskis documents'
    terms expire in 2012.

    --The original Kananaskis document stated a vision
    for the future, and we are asking Leaders
    to reaffirm a commitment for a vision of the future
    beyond 2012.

    --Global security demands that we help to
    eliminate chemical weapons worldwide, reduce
    dangerous nuclear, radiological, chemical,
    and biological materials, and secure those
    which remain.  In doing so, we will greatly
    reduce the dangerous of WMD proliferation
    and terrorism.  Even as we do so, we will
    also facilitate access worldwide to the economic
    and social benefits of the peaceful use of
    nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological
    materials.

    ----We have also committed to help the nations of the
    world implement United Nations Security Council Resolution
    1540, thereby filling critical gaps in proliferation
    prevention around the world.  Expansion and
    extension of the GP would provide us with a
    way to help fill these gaps.

    --The GP has been successful and effective despite
    numerous obstacles to implementation, most of which
    have been overcome.  The Partnership works without
    any bureaucracy or institutional infrastructure and
    is a positive model of cooperation for combating
    global proliferation threats.  This makes the GP
    an effective mechanism for providing assistance to
    reduce global proliferation threats, including by
    meeting our 1540 obligations in addition to other
    critical G8 commitments, such as the Global Initiative.

    --At Sea Island, our Leaders committed to coordinate
    activities to reduce the global WMD threat through
    the GP.  It is time now to take the next step to
    continue and expand the GP.

    --We have drafted Leaders, language for your
    consideration as part of the G8 Nonproliferation
    statement and we hope you will support us.

    --The U.S. is prepared to commit an additional
    $10 billion for 2013-2022, and we hope that other GP
    donors will also be able agree to contribute in total
    an additional $10 billion.

    IF THE INTERLOCUTOR INDICATES PREFERENCE FOR THE
    CURRENT FORMAL MECHANISM OF ADMITTING NEW RECIPIENT
    STATES:

    --We feel that the current mechanism for admitting
    new GP recipient states is cumbersome and does not
    serve the G8,s need to broadly combat the WMD threat.
    Five years into the Partnership, Russia has only
    allowed itself and one other nation (Ukraine) to
    formally benefit from the GP.

    --When countries ask us for assistance in combating
    terrorist threats they face, or when we identify an
    important threat, we do not have the luxury of waiting
    for a formal process before we act.

    --Therefore, we urge you to consider the broadest
    possible participation of states when the geographic
    scope of the GP is expanded.

    END POINTS

    ¶9. (U) Department requests that reporting on this
    action request be slugged for ISN (Andrew Semmel),
    NSC (Mary Alice Hayward, Carolyn Leddy, and Stephen
    Newhouse), ISN/CTR (Andrew Goodman, Phil Dolliff,
    Elizabeth Cameron, David Evans), E (John Duncan and
    Benedict Wolf), P (Maren Brooks), T (Susan Koch and
    Jim Timbie), S/P (Ed Lacey), EUR/PRA (Anita Friedt,
    Lisa Benthien), DoE/NNSA (Joyce Connery and Gerald Stacey),
    and DoD/CTR (Jim Reid, Monette Melanson, Andy Weber).
    RICE

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