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### Viewing cable 06DAMASCUS1848, SARG CONTINUES TO PLAY WITH ISLAMIC FIRE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06DAMASCUS1848 | 2006-04-24 10:10 | 2010-12-27 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Damascus

`

    VZCZCXRO2270
    OO RUEHAG
    DE RUEHDM #1848/01 1141021
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 241021Z APR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8496
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0020
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0089
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 001848

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    PARIS FOR ZEYA; LONDON FOR TSOU

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2015
    TAGS: PGOV KISL SY
    SUBJECT: SARG CONTINUES TO PLAY WITH ISLAMIC FIRE

    REF: A. DAMASCUS 1157

    ¶B. DAMASCUS 0531
    ¶C. 05 DAMASCUS 1231
    ¶D. 05 DAMASCUS 1377

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stephen A. Seche, per 1.4 b,d.

    ¶1. (C) Summary: The SARG continues to play with the issue
    of Islam -- in the wake of its February use of mob violence
    against several European embassies -- in ways designed to
    shore up support for the regime. In the past month there
    have been numerous reports about regime outreach to the
    Islamic community, including presidential approval of a
    Sharia law faculty at Aleppo University, the licensing of
    three Islamic banks, and allowing for the first time a
    prominent Islamic figure to lecture at the Higher Military
    Academy in Damascus. While there were also SARG efforts
    during this period that pointed towards stepped-up measures
    to counter rising Islamist influence, including restrictions
    on activities permitted at mosques (announced and then
    quickly walked back) , the basic thrust of the policy was to
    manipulate Islamic elements to shore up the regime, as well
    as prevent former VP Abdul Halim Khaddam and Muslim
    Brotherhood leader Sadreddine Bayanouni from developing any
    traction in the Sunni community. Although some contacts
    believe the regime is playing with fire, they assess that it
    sees itself under threat and is willing to take serious
    risks. While alarmist scenarios about the rising tide of
    Islamism may be true, the SARG seems for the time being to be
    successfully manipulating this Islam issue. End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) After an initial appeal to Syrian nationalism in the
    period between the release of the two Mehlis reports, the
    SARG gradually shifted to Islamic themes to mobilize support
    for the regime and counter the pressure created by the UNIIIC
    investigation. The SARG's February decision to manipulate
    the Danish cartoons controversy by permitting large
    demonstrations in front of European embassies led to rioting
    crowds that heavily damaged four embassies. That result
    offered Syria the opportunity to portray itself, internally
    and regionally, as the leading defender of Islam's dignity.

    ¶3. (C) RECENT SARG ISLAMIC OUTREACH: In the past month
    there has been a spate of reports about regime activity that
    seems designed to follow up in a quieter manner on this
    effort. Asad in mid-April signed a decree permitting the
    establishment of a Sharia (Islamic law) faculty at Aleppo
    University, a step the SARG reportedly avoided in the past
    over fears about powerful (Sunni) Islamist influence in
    Aleppo. The government also announced a decision, the first
    of its kind, to license three private Islamic banks (ref A).

    ¶4. (C) Also in early April, in an unprecedented move, the
    regime allowed a sheikh, moderate Islamist MP Mohammed
    Habash, to address the officers at the Higher Military
    Academy in Damascus, with the attendance of the Minister of
    Defense, as well as the Grand Mufti and other religious
    figures. In Habash's widely publicized remarks, he stated
    that (secular) Arab nationalism and Islam are consistent and
    should be used to form a common front to face the challenges
    of defending the country and the Arab homeland. He also
    called for a new political parties law that would permit the
    formation of Islamic parties. In the run-up to the mid-April
    celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the SARG and its
    proxies re-decorated the city of Damascus with a new set of
    official-looking banners accentuating religious themes, the
    first time in recent memory that such an organized display
    has taken place on this holiday. According to contacts, SARG
    officials pressured businessman and shopkeepers to put up the
    banners, which were also displayed at mosques and government
    buildings. (Note: Two weeks later, the banners remain
    prominently on display in the city's central market.)

    ¶5. (C) ALSO SOME SARG REPRESSION: It should be noted that
    there were also SARG efforts during this period that pointed,
    at least to some degree, in the opposite direction, towards
    stepped-up SARG efforts to counter rising Islamist influence.
    In March, for example, the head of the Damascus section of
    the Ministry of the Islamic Endowments (Awqaaf) issued a list
    of ten restrictions on activities at mosques, limiting the
    hours of operation to times of prayer, preventing any
    unauthorized speakers or activities, including the collection
    of donations, and requiring the lowering of the volume of
    loudspeakers used in the calls to prayer at dawn and in the
    afternoon. Most of this list was reportedly cobbled together

    DAMASCUS 00001848 002 OF 003

    from previous restrictions the SARG had issued over the
    years, through the Awqaaf Ministry, that had not been
    uniformly enforced.

    ¶6. (C) ISLAMIC LEADERS PROTEST: In reaction to this
    measure, the regime-tolerant Sunni Islamic establishment
    protested angrily to their friends inside the regime --
    including senior officials in the security services -- at
    what they viewed as an unnecessary, clumsy effort to rein
    them in. Sheikh Salah Kuftaro, head of the influential Abu
    Noor Institute, told Polchief that he had protested against
    the newly issued restrictions, which he dubbed the "Ten
    Commandments," to the Damascus chief of Syrian Military
    Intelligence after the Minister of the Awqaaf indicated
    reluctance to rescind the directive. Kuftaro told Polchief
    he had received a commitment from his contacts in the
    intelligence services that the directive "had been frozen,"
    but not rescinded. (Comment: Some conspiratorial-minded
    observers insist the regime deliberately had the Awqaaf put
    out the list of restrictions so that it could then show its
    good will towards the Islamic community by agreeing to
    disregard its own rules. The evidence, however, points to
    the somewhat messier process detailed above.)

    ¶7. (C) A COMPLICATED DYNAMIC: This push-pull dynamic, with
    the regime encouraging "moderate" Islamists on the one hand,
    while repressing what it perceives to be a threatening
    Islamist minority (and threatening Islamic aspects in
    general) on the other, is not new (refs B, C, and D). The
    Asad regime has practiced some version of it since the early
    1980's -- after it violently suppressed the Muslim
    Brotherhood -- as a way to woo back the Sunni community,
    while preventing the development of any Islamist political
    competition. This dynamic has always been reflected in a
    messy process on the ground, with sometimes overzealous SARG
    officials repressing too much or in the wrong places,
    followed by push-back from the Islamic establishment, and an
    adjustment by the regime. According to astute regime
    observer Ayman Abdul Noor, a Ba'athist reformer, this has
    occurred at key junctures like the present moment, when
    senior regime figures "who are in the picture," know and
    understand the policy of manipulating and using the Islamists
    to shore up the regime, while the mass of lower-level
    officials continue with enforcing the standard policy of
    "reining in the Islamic crowd."

    ¶8. (C) REGIME PLAYING WITH FIRE: Overall, despite some
    contradictions, it seems evident that the regime is reaching
    out once again to the Sunni Islamic community with various
    initiatives and adopting some elements of an Islamic populism
    to shore up support. According to gadfly economist and
    former deputy minister of planning Riad Abrash, the regime
    has calculated now that Arab nationalist interests "are
    identical" with the Islamic population's desire, both in
    Syria and the region, to oppose the U.S. In his view, the
    regime "is getting closer to the view of people on the
    street" in order to retain its popularity. The regime
    recognizes the powerful hold that Islam has on the masses,
    said Abrash. He acknowledged that the regime "is playing
    with fire," but noted "they want to survive. They feel
    threatened, so it makes sense to take dangerous steps."

    ¶9. (C) ONLY WEAK FELLOW PLAYERS ALLOWED: Despite the
    willingness to take risks with Islam now, the regime wants to
    ensure that it controls the game and manipulates all the
    players, for its own interests. For that reason, the Asad
    regime is not willing to make any deal with the Muslim
    Brothers even if it might bring more Sunni support for the
    regime. "They want to play with the religious issue
    themselves. They don't want to cede it to potential
    competitors," explained Abrash.

    ¶10. (C) REGIME MOTIVATIONS: Other observers agree that
    international pressure on the regime over the past year has
    put it on the defensive. According to dissident Yassin Haj
    Saleh, the regime is "relatively relaxed" in the short term
    (prior to the June release of Brammertz's second report), but
    in the longer term, "sees itself in a life-threatening
    struggle with the U.S.," which makes it willing to ally
    itself closely with Iran, for example, and to curry favor
    with Islamists in Syria. The regime has made sure to
    champion the Palestinian cause (through its support of
    Hamas), as well as that of Hizballah, and has been
    sufficiently supportive of the insurgency in Iraq over the
    past few years, all to ensure, according to Abdul Noor, that

    DAMASCUS 00001848 003 OF 003

    Islamists "have no political case to take to the street and
    attack the regime." The SARG also seems motivated by the
    desire to prevent former VP Khaddam and Muslim Brotherhood
    leader Bayanouni, with their National Salvation Front, from
    developing any traction in the Sunni community. Finally,
    unidentified Ba'ath Party officials, echoing Habash's
    moderate Islamist view, have noted in the press recently that
    there is room for dialogue between secular Ba'athists and
    moderate Islamists, while such dialogue with Islamic radicals
    is impossible.

    ¶11. (C) WEAKNESSES OF THE APPROACH: Saleh and others
    identify several weaknesses in the SARG approach. According
    to Saleh, Syria needs a moderate Islamic political party,
    which would force the Islamists to deal responsibly with
    political issues. "It can't be avoided, but the regime wants
    to jump over this step." The regime prefers an Islamic
    establishment dependent on it for favors and subservient to
    its politics, rather than "a free-thinking, independent
    group." Consequently the SARG is willing to accept -- its
    policies in fact actually end up encouraging -- close-minded,
    very conservative Islamic institutions, as long as they are
    subservient to the regime. This phenomenon, however, causes
    some Islamic elements to become more radical and extreme in
    the longer term, as a way to attack the co-optation, insisted
    Saleh.

    ¶12. (C) In addition, the overall "street power" of Islam is
    increasing by the day in Syria, according to Damascus-based
    al-Hayat correspondent Ibrahim Hamidi. In his view, the
    regime's tactics already betray a nervousness and
    defensiveness in the way it addresses Islamic issues.
    According to Hamidi, the rising tide of Islamism in Syria is
    likely eventually to overwhelm the regime and its secular
    orientation. As an example of the rising tide of Islamic
    religious fervor which the regime is nervously observing and
    trying to control, he pointed to relatively new women's
    Islamic movement in Syria, the Qubasyat, with thousands of
    adherents (see septel).

    ¶13. (C) COMMENT: While alarmist scenarios about the future
    rising tide of Islamism may be true, the SARG seems for the
    time being to be successfully manipulating this Islam issue,
    occasionally blending in some populist aspects. The regime
    is well-positioned politically because of its championing of
    Islamic political causes such as those of Hamas, Hizballah,
    and Iran, and has adopted a sufficiently nuanced policy on
    Iraq to immunize it against criticism that it is helping
    suppress an Islamic insurgency. Nevertheless, some Sunni
    leaders tell us that the regime's attempts to manipulate the
    Islam issue are not credible and that people are not taken in
    by it. Where the SARG has been effective is in keeping
    Islamic leaders in Syria under its wing, supported and
    politically muzzled. The more populist touches seem designed
    to drown out the unwelcome noise coming from the Brammertz
    investigation and -- in tandem with appeals to Syrian
    nationalism -- to persuade Syrians that it is not the regime
    (and Asad family) under attack but the country and the
    Islamic nation.
    SECHE

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