Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12433 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AF AR ASEC AEMR AMGT AE ABLD AL AJ AU AO AFIN ASUP AUC APECO AM AG APER AGMT AMED ADCO AS AID AND AMBASSADOR ARM ABUD AODE AMG ASCH ARF ASEAN ADPM ACABQ AFFAIRS ATRN ASIG AA AC ACOA ANET APEC AQ AY ASEX ATFN AFU AER ALOW AZ APCS AVERY ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AN AGRICULTURE AMCHAMS AINF AGAO AIT AORL ACS AFSI AFSN ACBAQ AFGHANISTAN ADANA AX AECL AADP AMEX ACAO AORG ADM AGR AROC
BL BR BO BE BK BY BA BILAT BU BM BEXP BF BTIO BC BBSR BMGT BTIU BG BD BWC BH BIDEN BB BT BRUSSELS BP BX BN
CD CH CM CU CBW CS CVIS CF CIA CLINTON CASC CE CR CG CO CJAN CY CMGT CA CI CN CPAS CAN CDG CW CONDOLEEZZA CT CIC CIDA CSW CACM CB CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM CTR COUNTER CWC CONS CITEL CV CFED CBSA CITT CDC COM COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CDB CKGR CACS CARSON CROS CAPC CHR CL CICTE CIS CNARC CJUS CEUDA CLMT CAC COPUOS CBC CBE CARICOM CTM CVR
DR DPRK DEPT DA DJ DEA DTRA DOMESTIC DHS DAO DCM DO DE DEAX DOE DK DS DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEFENSE
EAGR EAIR ECON ECPS ETRD EUN ENRG EINV EMIN EU EFIN EREL EG EPET ENGY ETTC EIND ECIN EAID ELAB EC EZ ENVR ELTN ELECTIONS ER EINT ES EWWT ENIV EAP EFIS ERD ENERG EAIDS ECUN EI EINVEFIN EN EUC EINVETC ENGR ET ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECONOMY EUMEM ESA EXTERNAL EINVECONSENVCSJA EINN EEPET ENVI EFTA ESENV ECINECONCS EPA ECONOMIC ETRA EIAR EUREM ETRC EXBS ELN ECA EK ECONEFIN ETC ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH ECIP EINDETRD EUR ENNP EXIM ERNG EFINECONCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ETRO EDU ETRN EFIM EAIG EURN ECONCS ECONOMICS
FR FREEDOM FTA FI FOR FJ FTAA FARC FINANCE FDA FAC FBI FAO FM FMLN FO FISO FOREIGN FOI FAS FINR
GM GE GG GZ GOV GT GR GAERC GV GH GA GY GOI GTIP GCC GERARD GAZA GTMO GL GLOBAL GANGS GF
HO HA HILLARY HUMAN HR HURI HEBRON HU HK HUMOR HSTC HI HYMPSK
IS ICRC IN IR IZ IT INRB IAEA ICAO ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IC IL ID IV IMO INMARSAT IQ IRAJ IO ICTY IPR IWC ILC INTELSAT IBRD IMF IRC IRS ILO ITU IDA IAHRC ICJ ITRA ISRAELI ITF IACI IDP ICTR IIP IA IF IZPREL IGAD INTERPOL INTERNAL ISRAEL ISLAMISTS INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV IBET IEFIN INR INRA INRO IEA
JA JAMES JO JM JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JOHN JUS
KSCA KUNR KHLS KAWK KISL KPAO KSPR KGHG KPKO KDEM KNNP KN KS KPAL KACT KCRM KDRG KJUS KGIC KRAD KU KTFN KV KMDR KWBG KSUM KSEP KCOR KHIV KG KGCC KTIP KIRF KE KIPR KMCA KCIP KTIA KAWC KBCT KVPR KPLS KREL KCFE KOMC KFRD KWMN KTDB KPRP KMFO KZ KVIR KOCI KMPI KFLU KSTH KCRS KTBT KIRC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFLO KSTC KFSC KFTFN KIDE KOLY KMRS KICA KCGC KSAF KRVC KVRP KCOM KAID KTEX KICC KNSD KBIO KOMS KGIT KHDP KNEI KTRD KWNM KRIM KSEO KR KWAC KMIG KIFR KBTR KTER KDDG KPRV KPAK KO KRFD KHUM KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KREC KCFC KLIG KWMNCS KSEC KPIN KPOA KWWMN KX KCMR KPWR KCHG KRGY KSCI KNAR KFIN KBTS KPAONZ KNUC KNPP KDEMAF KNUP KNNPMNUC KERG KCRCM KWMM KPAI KHSA KTLA KRCM KCSY KSAC KID KOM KMOC KESS KDEV KJUST
LE LY LI LH LAB LU LG LOG LTTE LA LO LABOR LT
MARR MOPS MX MASS MNUC MCAP MO MU ML MA MTCRE MY MOPPS MASC MIL MR MTS MLS MILI MK MEPP MD MAR MP MTRE MCC MZ MDC MRCRE MV MI MEPN MAPP MEETINGS MAS MTCR MG MEPI MT MEDIA MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MPOS MAPS MARAD MC MIK MUCN MILITARY MERCOSUR MW
NZ NL NATO NO NI NU NATIONAL NG NP NPT NPG NS NA NSG NAFTA NC NH NE NSF NSSP NDP NORAD NK NEW NR NASA NT NIPP NAR NGO NW NV NATOPREL NPA NRR NSC NSFO NZUS
OTRA OVIP OEXC OIIP OSAC OPRC OVP OFFICIALS OAS OREP OPIC OSCE OECD OSCI OFDP OPDC OIC OFDA ODIP OBSP ON OCII OES OPCW OPAD OIE OHUM OCS OMIG OTR
PGOV PREL PARM PHUM PREF PTER PINS PK PINR PROP PBTS PKFK PL PE PSOE PEPR PM PAK POLITICS POL PHSA PPA PA PBIO PINT PF PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT POLINT PRAM PMAR PG PAO PROG PRELP PCUL PSEPC PGIV PO PREFA PALESTINIAN PGOVLO PGOVE PLN PINF PAS PDEM PHUMPGOV PNG PHUH PMIL POGOV PHUMPREL PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PGGV PROV PHUMBA PEL PECON POV PSA PREO PAHO PP PSI PINL PU PARMS PRGOV PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PTBS PORG PUNE POLICY PDOV PCI PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PS PY PTERE PGOF
QA
RS RO RU RW REGION RIGHTS RSP ROBERT RP RICE REACTION RCMP RFE RM RIGHTSPOLMIL RF ROOD RUPREL RSO RELATIONS REPORT
SENV SZ SOCI SNAR SP SCUL SU SY SA SO SF SMIG SW STEINBERG SG SIPRS SR SI SPCE SN SYRIA SL SC SHI SNARIZ SIPDIS SPCVIS SH SOFA SK ST SEVN SYR SHUM SAN SNARCS SAARC SARS SEN SANC SCRS SENVKGHG SNARN SWE SSA
TPHY TW TS TU TX TRGY TIP TSPA TSPL TBIO TNGD TI TFIN TC TRSY TZ TINT TT TF TN TERRORISM TP TURKEY TD TH TBID TL TV TAGS TK TR THPY TO
UNGA UNSC UNCHR UK US UP UNEP UNMIK UN UAE UZ UG UNESCO UNHRC USTR UNHCR UY USOAS UNDC UNCHC UNO UNFICYP USEU UNDP UNODC UNCND UNAUS UNCHS UV USUN USNC UNIDROIT UNCSD UNICEF UE UNC USPS UNDESCO UNPUOS USAID UNVIE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VM VN VTIZ VAT VC VTEG VI
WMO WTRQ WB WI WWARD WA WBG WITH WHA WTO WMD WTRO WIPO WHO WS WHTI WEU WZ WFP
XB XG XT XH XA XM XF XE XR XK XL XW XY XS XX XV XD XTAG XQ XU XZ XC XI
YM YE YI YMCS
ZI ZP ZR ZO ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZU ZL ZEALAND ZN ZB ZA ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08NEWDELHI1847, SAMAJWADI PARTY SUPPORTS NUCLEAR DEAL, GOVERNMENT STRIVING FOR EARLY IAEA ANNOUNCEMENT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08NEWDELHI1847.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08NEWDELHI1847 | 2008-07-04 16:04 | 2011-04-23 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy New Delhi
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/article1718475.ece

`

    VZCZCXRO0080
    OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
    DE RUEHNE #1847/01 1861616
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 041616Z JUL 08
    FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2506
    INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
    RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1531
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 6601

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 001847

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018
    TAGS: PREL PARM TSPL KNNP ETTC ENRG TRGY IN
    SUBJECT: SAMAJWADI PARTY SUPPORTS NUCLEAR DEAL, GOVERNMENT STRIVING FOR EARLY IAEA ANNOUNCEMENT

    REF: KOLKATA 198

    Classified By: Ambassador David Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B and D)

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  A flurry of political activity over the past two days has culminated in the Samajwadi Party (SP) expressing public support for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative following a meeting with Prime Minister Singh and negotiations with Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi on July 4.  While the Samajwadi leadership expressed clear support for the nuclear initiative and satisfaction with the private deal worked out with the Congress Party, the party has not yet pledged publicly to support the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, possibly in the hopes of wooing its reluctant allies.  Samajwadi support alone is not sufficient to protect the UPA government from a confidence vote, but senior Congress Party officials -- including Prime Minister Singh -- expressed confidence in securing sufficient votes from a variety of smaller parties to constitute a parliamentary majority.  Faced with the increasing likelihood of losing his de facto veto, Left Front leader Prakash Karat said he planned "to act" if the government does not make public by July 7 its plans to move forward with the IAEA.

    ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED.  On the margins of visiting CODEL Ackerman's meeting with Prime Minister Singh on July 4, the Ambassador urged the Government of India not to wait for the G-8 to announce its intention to move forward with the IAEA safeguards agreement, and conveyed U.S. willingness to seek language in the G-8 chairman's statement if India announced by July 6 that it will proceed with the initiative.  Foreign Secretary Menon told the Ambassador at the Embassy July 4 celebration that the GOI understood the advantages of an earlier announcement and was working to arrive at some conclusion prior to the Prime Minister's departure.  Menon said he would keep the Ambassador informed over the weekend of any developments.  END SUMMARY.

    Inconclusive UNPA Meeting Paves Way for Samajwadi Support
    - - -
     ¶3. (SBU) Prime Minister Singh's determination to announce to President Bush during their meeting at the July 7-9 G-8 Summit the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's plan to submit the safeguards agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors prompted the Congress Party to seek the support of the regional Samajwadi Party (SP) to retain a parliamentary majority in the event the Left withdraws support.  The Samajwadi leadership seemed ready to support the government, but its partners in the United National Progressive Alliance (UNPA), a disparate group of third front parties of which SP is the leading member, were reluctant to support the Congress Party, their regional electoral rival.  After a marathon four-hour meeting on July 3, the UNPA leaders announced that "the UNPA is united on all issues, but will hold more discussions on the nuclear issue."  The UNPA scheduled its next meeting for July 6, presumably to seek agreement prior to Prime Minister Singh's departure for the G-8.

    ¶4. (SBU) Some UNPA partners reportedly indicated they were not yet satisfied with clarifications about the nuclear deal issued on July 2 by the Office of the Prime Minister following a briefing by National Security Advisor Narayanan, and agreed to seek the counsel of eminent scientists.  Later that same evening on July 3, SP chief Mulayam Singh Yadav and party general secretary Amar Singh drove to the residence of former president and an architect of India's nuclear and ballistic missile programs A.P.J. Kalam, who reiterated his support for the nuclear deal.  Mulayam Singh reported Kalam's message that the initiative is in India's national interest, saying "the country needs clean nuclear energy."  (It is not clear whether the UNPA collectively agreed on July 3 to consult Kalam or whether the move is a unilateral attempt by the SP leadership to provide cover for its decision to support the government.)

    SP Outlines "Deal For The Deal" With PM, Sonia Gandhi
    - - -
     ¶5. (SBU) On July 4, Samajwadi leaders Mulayam Singh Yadav and Amar Singh met sequentially with Prime Minister Singh and Congress Party leader Sonia Gandhi to discuss the broad

    NEW DELHI 00001847  002 OF 003

     outlines of a political alliance between the previously rival parties.  (A Congress Party core group meeting at Sonia Gandhi's residence preceded the meeting, with Foreign Minister Mukherjee, Defense Minister Antony, Political Secretary Ahamad Patel, and others in attendance.)  Saying the Narayanan briefing and Kalam's position helped "clear their doubts," the Samajwadi leaders announced their support for the nuclear initiative after the meeting, but stopped short of pledging support to the UPA government.  Amar Sing said he hoped the SP's partners would agree, suggesting the deal did not include the other UNPA parties.

    ¶6. (SBU) Media speculated that the inconclusive UNPA meeting on July 3 could have been a tactical move to wring out more concessions from the Congress Party and to ensure that Samajwadi and UNPA support would not be taken for granted. Although the details of the "deal for the deal" have not been made public, media have suggested that the price the government may pay for Samajwadi support could be high, including possibly the ouster of Finance Minister Chidambaram, Oil Minister Murali Deora, and the Reserve Bank of India Governor, as well as to secure positions for eleven UNPA members of parliament in the Council of Ministers.

    ¶7. (C) In a meeting with PolCouns on July 4, Amar Singh insisted he did not require positions for his party members, but had told the Prime Minister and Sonia Gandhi that Chidambaram and Deora should be sacked.  He outlined his grievances against Ambassador Ronen Sen, but dismissed Sen as "too small a fish" to warrant his attention.  He said the Samajwadi Party would support the government on an issue-by-issue basis.  Singh declared that the civil nuclear initiative was "neither Hindu nor Muslim," and that its implementation would be in India's long-term interest.

    Left Reeling, Reassessing Strategy
    - - -
     ¶8. (SBU) The Left had threatened to withdraw support if PM Singh departed for Japan, but it softened its rhetoric as the likelihood of SP support for the government grew in recent days.  Senior officials of Left parties met with Communist Party (CPI-M) leader Prakash Karat on July 2, according to some reports, to express their displeasure over the approaching failure of his strategy (reftel).  Following a meeting of the Left Front parties on July 4, Karat announced that they planned to send a letter to Foreign Minister Mukherjee seeking clarification on when the government planned to move forward with the IAEA and pledging "to act" absent a response by July 7.  (This is milder verson of his prior threat that Prime Minister Singh's departure for Japan would trigger a withdrawal of support.)  He also announced a campaign beginning July 14 against the nuclear deal and rising prices.

    ¶9. (SBU) In a bid to attract disgruntled UNPA parties to the Left's position, Karat announced the Left would continue working for the unity of "secular forces" to prevent "communal forces" from taking advantage of the situation. (The UNPA is united by little more than a vague opposition to "communalism," an umbrella term encompassing the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party and its National Democratic Alliance supporters.)  Upon hearing the UNPA's denouncement of communalism at its July 3 press conference, BJP leader Venkaiah Naidu reportedly dismissed the UNPA as the "Union of Non-Performing Assets," referring to the fact that the UNPA leaders are mostly out-of-power former Chief Ministers struggling in their home states.

    Electoral Arithmetic:  Toward a Slim Majority
    - - -
     ¶10. (C) The support of the Samajwati Party's 39 Lok Sabha seats is necessary but not sufficient to prevent a confidence vote that could be triggered by the loss of the Left's 59 seats, but the Congress Party appears likely to cobble together a majority.  The 545-member Lok Sabha currently has two vacancies, so 272 votes are necessary for a majority. Core UPA member parties hold 224 seats.  With the addition of 39 seats from the Samajwadi Party (SP), three seats from the Janata Dal Secular (JD-S), and three seats from the Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD), the UPA commands a total of 269 votes, three short of the 272 majority it needs.  Though the government

    NEW DELHI 00001847  003 OF 003

     has yet to comment on the pending deal, Embassy contacts believe the UPA has secured eight more votes:  one each from the National Loktantrik Party (NLP), the Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF), an Independent UPA supporter from Kerala, an Independent UPA supporter from Assam, and four votes from other previously undeclared Independents.  This brings the total support for the UPA government to 277 votes, providing it with a slim majority.

    ¶11. (C) The Congress Party is exploring additional options to bolster this majority.  Contacts report that the UPA is in discussions with two other small parties:  the Marumalarchi Dravida Mummetra Kazhagam (MDMK) with four seats, and the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) with two seats.  Contacts also report that the UPA has approached the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), a NDA constituent with eight seats, to abstain in the event of a confidence vote.  The SAD is in the opposition, but supports the nuclear deal.  Any abstentions on a confidence vote would reduce the number of votes necessary to ensure the UPA's survival.  The outcome of these talks are not yet clear.

    Ambassador Urges Early IAEA Announcement
    - - -
     ¶12. (C) Prime Minister Singh told CODEL Ackerman during their meeting on July 4 that "things are moving in the right direction" politically, and that he expected to "clear the issues" within a few days so that India could move forward with the nuclear initiative.  On the margins of the meeting, the Ambassador conveyed U.S. willingness to seek language in the G-8 chairman's statement if India announced by July 6 that it will proceed with the initiative.  Foreign Secretary Menon replied that the GOI understood the advantages of an earlier announcement and was working to arrive at some conclusion prior to the Prime Minister's departure.  Menon told the Ambassador at the Embassy July 4 celebration he would keep him informed over the weekend of any developments.  Also on the margins of the CODEL Ackerman visit on July 3, the PolCouns pressed Foreign Secretary Menon and the Prime Minister's envoy on the nuclear deal Shayam Saran to make the announcement before the G-8, or at least to begin work quietly with the IAEA to arrange a special Board of Governors meeting to consider the draft safeguards agreement.

    Comment:  Nuclear Initiative Produces Electoral Realignment
    - - -
     ¶13. (C) The Savvy political power-brokers of the Samajwadi Party are unlikely to have expressed such public support for the nuclear initiative without prior guarantees from Congress Party leadership that they have sewn up sufficient votes from other parties to constitute a majority.  Prime Minister Singh's confidence as expressed to Representative Ackerman reinforces this conclusion.  The SP's reticence to outright support the government may be linked to its ongoing efforts to woo other UNPA members, possibly through a half-measure such as pledging to support the government only in the event of a confidence vote.  Comments from SP leaders also suggest an interest in a more durable electoral alliance with the Congress Party -- with which it shares a secular, socialist ideology -- but first it must overcome a bitter legacy of rivalry based on ego and competition for a similar vote base.  The Congress Party's Muslim support could bolster the SP in its local power base of Uttar Pradesh where it is struggling against Mayawati's Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).  All of the relevant players -- the Congress Party, Samajwadi Party, the Left -- seem to be operating under the assumption that the political drama over advancing the nuclear initiative will reach its climax before the G-8 summit.

    MULFORD
    DAVISON

`