Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12433 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AF AR ASEC AEMR AMGT AE ABLD AL AJ AU AO AFIN ASUP AUC APECO AM AG APER AGMT AMED ADCO AS AID AND AMBASSADOR ARM ABUD AODE AMG ASCH ARF ASEAN ADPM ACABQ AFFAIRS ATRN ASIG AA AC ACOA ANET APEC AQ AY ASEX ATFN AFU AER ALOW AZ APCS AVERY ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AN AGRICULTURE AMCHAMS AINF AGAO AIT AORL ACS AFSI AFSN ACBAQ AFGHANISTAN ADANA AX AECL AADP AMEX ACAO AORG ADM AGR AROC
BL BR BO BE BK BY BA BILAT BU BM BEXP BF BTIO BC BBSR BMGT BTIU BG BD BWC BH BIDEN BB BT BRUSSELS BP BX BN
CD CH CM CU CBW CS CVIS CF CIA CLINTON CASC CE CR CG CO CJAN CY CMGT CA CI CN CPAS CAN CDG CW CONDOLEEZZA CT CIC CIDA CSW CACM CB CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM CTR COUNTER CWC CONS CITEL CV CFED CBSA CITT CDC COM COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CDB CKGR CACS CARSON CROS CAPC CHR CL CICTE CIS CNARC CJUS CEUDA CLMT CAC COPUOS CBC CBE CARICOM CTM CVR
DR DPRK DEPT DA DJ DEA DTRA DOMESTIC DHS DAO DCM DO DE DEAX DOE DK DS DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEFENSE
EAGR EAIR ECON ECPS ETRD EUN ENRG EINV EMIN EU EFIN EREL EG EPET ENGY ETTC EIND ECIN EAID ELAB EC EZ ENVR ELTN ELECTIONS ER EINT ES EWWT ENIV EAP EFIS ERD ENERG EAIDS ECUN EI EINVEFIN EN EUC EINVETC ENGR ET ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECONOMY EUMEM ESA EXTERNAL EINVECONSENVCSJA EINN EEPET ENVI EFTA ESENV ECINECONCS EPA ECONOMIC ETRA EIAR EUREM ETRC EXBS ELN ECA EK ECONEFIN ETC ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH ECIP EINDETRD EUR ENNP EXIM ERNG EFINECONCS ETRDEINVTINTCS ETRO EDU ETRN EFIM EAIG EURN ECONCS ECONOMICS
FR FREEDOM FTA FI FOR FJ FTAA FARC FINANCE FDA FAC FBI FAO FM FMLN FO FISO FOREIGN FOI FAS FINR
GM GE GG GZ GOV GT GR GAERC GV GH GA GY GOI GTIP GCC GERARD GAZA GTMO GL GLOBAL GANGS GF
HO HA HILLARY HUMAN HR HURI HEBRON HU HK HUMOR HSTC HI HYMPSK
IS ICRC IN IR IZ IT INRB IAEA ICAO ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IC IL ID IV IMO INMARSAT IQ IRAJ IO ICTY IPR IWC ILC INTELSAT IBRD IMF IRC IRS ILO ITU IDA IAHRC ICJ ITRA ISRAELI ITF IACI IDP ICTR IIP IA IF IZPREL IGAD INTERPOL INTERNAL ISRAEL ISLAMISTS INDO ITPHUM ITPGOV IBET IEFIN INR INRA INRO IEA
JA JAMES JO JM JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE JOHN JUS
KSCA KUNR KHLS KAWK KISL KPAO KSPR KGHG KPKO KDEM KNNP KN KS KPAL KACT KCRM KDRG KJUS KGIC KRAD KU KTFN KV KMDR KWBG KSUM KSEP KCOR KHIV KG KGCC KTIP KIRF KE KIPR KMCA KCIP KTIA KAWC KBCT KVPR KPLS KREL KCFE KOMC KFRD KWMN KTDB KPRP KMFO KZ KVIR KOCI KMPI KFLU KSTH KCRS KTBT KIRC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFLO KSTC KFSC KFTFN KIDE KOLY KMRS KICA KCGC KSAF KRVC KVRP KCOM KAID KTEX KICC KNSD KBIO KOMS KGIT KHDP KNEI KTRD KWNM KRIM KSEO KR KWAC KMIG KIFR KBTR KTER KDDG KPRV KPAK KO KRFD KHUM KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KREC KCFC KLIG KWMNCS KSEC KPIN KPOA KWWMN KX KCMR KPWR KCHG KRGY KSCI KNAR KFIN KBTS KPAONZ KNUC KNPP KDEMAF KNUP KNNPMNUC KERG KCRCM KWMM KPAI KHSA KTLA KRCM KCSY KSAC KID KOM KMOC KESS KDEV KJUST
LE LY LI LH LAB LU LG LOG LTTE LA LO LABOR LT
MARR MOPS MX MASS MNUC MCAP MO MU ML MA MTCRE MY MOPPS MASC MIL MR MTS MLS MILI MK MEPP MD MAR MP MTRE MCC MZ MDC MRCRE MV MI MEPN MAPP MEETINGS MAS MTCR MG MEPI MT MEDIA MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MPOS MAPS MARAD MC MIK MUCN MILITARY MERCOSUR MW
NZ NL NATO NO NI NU NATIONAL NG NP NPT NPG NS NA NSG NAFTA NC NH NE NSF NSSP NDP NORAD NK NEW NR NASA NT NIPP NAR NGO NW NV NATOPREL NPA NRR NSC NSFO NZUS
OTRA OVIP OEXC OIIP OSAC OPRC OVP OFFICIALS OAS OREP OPIC OSCE OECD OSCI OFDP OPDC OIC OFDA ODIP OBSP ON OCII OES OPCW OPAD OIE OHUM OCS OMIG OTR
PGOV PREL PARM PHUM PREF PTER PINS PK PINR PROP PBTS PKFK PL PE PSOE PEPR PM PAK POLITICS POL PHSA PPA PA PBIO PINT PF PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PNAT POLINT PRAM PMAR PG PAO PROG PRELP PCUL PSEPC PGIV PO PREFA PALESTINIAN PGOVLO PGOVE PLN PINF PAS PDEM PHUMPGOV PNG PHUH PMIL POGOV PHUMPREL PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PGGV PROV PHUMBA PEL PECON POV PSA PREO PAHO PP PSI PINL PU PARMS PRGOV PAIGH POLITICAL PARTIES POSTS PTBS PORG PUNE POLICY PDOV PCI PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PS PY PTERE PGOF
QA
RS RO RU RW REGION RIGHTS RSP ROBERT RP RICE REACTION RCMP RFE RM RIGHTSPOLMIL RF ROOD RUPREL RSO RELATIONS REPORT
SENV SZ SOCI SNAR SP SCUL SU SY SA SO SF SMIG SW STEINBERG SG SIPRS SR SI SPCE SN SYRIA SL SC SHI SNARIZ SIPDIS SPCVIS SH SOFA SK ST SEVN SYR SHUM SAN SNARCS SAARC SARS SEN SANC SCRS SENVKGHG SNARN SWE SSA
TPHY TW TS TU TX TRGY TIP TSPA TSPL TBIO TNGD TI TFIN TC TRSY TZ TINT TT TF TN TERRORISM TP TURKEY TD TH TBID TL TV TAGS TK TR THPY TO
UNGA UNSC UNCHR UK US UP UNEP UNMIK UN UAE UZ UG UNESCO UNHRC USTR UNHCR UY USOAS UNDC UNCHC UNO UNFICYP USEU UNDP UNODC UNCND UNAUS UNCHS UV USUN USNC UNIDROIT UNCSD UNICEF UE UNC USPS UNDESCO UNPUOS USAID UNVIE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VM VN VTIZ VAT VC VTEG VI
WMO WTRQ WB WI WWARD WA WBG WITH WHA WTO WMD WTRO WIPO WHO WS WHTI WEU WZ WFP
XB XG XT XH XA XM XF XE XR XK XL XW XY XS XX XV XD XTAG XQ XU XZ XC XI
YM YE YI YMCS
ZI ZP ZR ZO ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZU ZL ZEALAND ZN ZB ZA ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09BRASILIA1076, WHA DAS MCMULLEN,S CLEARS THE AIR ON THE U.S.-COLOMBIA DCA, OPENS DIALOG ON REGIONAL ISSUES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09BRASILIA1076.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BRASILIA1076 | 2009-08-27 20:08 | 2011-01-04 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    VZCZCXRO2817
    OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
    RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBR #1076/01 2392003
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 272003Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4944
    INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
    RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE IMMEDIATE 9850
    RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE 8110
    RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE 4455
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001076

    SIPDIS

    WHA FOR A/S SHANNON, DAS MCMULLEN, AND, AND BSC

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2019
    TAGS: PREL MARR BR CO
    SUBJECT: WHA DAS MCMULLEN,S CLEARS THE AIR ON THE U.S.-COLOMBIA DCA, OPENS DIALOG ON REGIONAL ISSUES

    BRASILIA 00001076 001.2 OF 003

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske. Reason: 1.4 (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: WHA Deputy Assistant Secretary Christopher McMullen,s visit to Brazil and briefings to GOB officials on the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) helped ease Brazilian concerns over the issue and spurred new dialog aimed at greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the United States. McMullen,s conversations with Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty) officials and a senior presidency foreign policy advisor clarified U.S. intentions with the CDA as preparing part of a long-term strategy to decrease the U.S. military presence in South America. GOB officials expressed interest in greater dialog with the United States on security and regional issues and highlighted several opportunities for better cooperation and communication in the future. It appears that the jarring public criticism of the DCA represents an effort to curry favor with Venezuela in advance of the UNASUL summit in Bariloche, with the goal of lowering tensions there and preserving UNASUL. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (SBU) Charge hosted a lunch for DAS McMullen August 25 with seven senior Itamaraty officials: Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador Vera Machado, Under Secretary for Latin America Ambassador Enio Cordeiro, Pol/Mil Advisor to Deputy Foreign Minister Guimaraes Ambassador Marcos Pinta Gama, Policy Planning Director Ambassador Hermano Telles Ribeiro, US/Canada/Inter-American Affairs Department Head (Assistant Secretary equivalent) Carlos Abreu, Transnational Illicit Activities Department Head Virginia Toniatti, and South America II Department Head Clemente Baena Soares. Separately, McMullen met with presidency foreign policy advisor Ambassador Marcel Biato. McMullen also met with Colombian Ambassador Tony Jozame, who conveyed GOB officials, positive reception to the clarifications he had made on the DCA and to his assurances that Brazilian borders and sovereignty would continue to be respected.

    ¶3. (C) In his conversations with GOB officials, McMullen explained the origins of the U.S.-Colombia DCA and emphasized that the DCA was meant to lay the foundation for a continued decrease in U.S. military presence in Colombia. McMullen highlighted the routine nature of the agreement and the explicit provisions requiring respect for Colombia,s and other nations, sovereignty. McMullen explained that the DCA does not expand the scope of U.S. presence in Colombia, and made clear that the U.S. goal is to civilianize its presence in Latin America, in particular because we understand the history and sensitivity of U.S. presence in the region. McMullen stressed that the USG and GOC did not want to discuss the DCA prior to concluding negotiations, and only did so after the details were leaked to the Colombian press. He noted that such agreements are so common that they should not raise suspicion. McMullen acknowledged, however, that lack of information had raised concerns, which is why he was visiting Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina.

    NATIONAL, REGIONAL SENSITIVITIES ON FULL DISPLAY --------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Itamaraty officials and Biato showed a great deal of interest in the details of the DCA. Machado said the GOB was surprised to find out about the agreement through the media and emphasized that part of Brazil,s concern stems in large measure from the lack of information available on the DCA. Machado identified security of the Brazilian Amazon and regional stability as important and sensitive issues for Brazil. She explained that there is a perception among Brazilians, especially those in the north, that the Amazon is a region coveted by foreigners searching for biodiversity and natural resources who have a hidden interest in taking it over. Therefore, any foreign presence near the Amazon region can become an explosive issue. Machado also highlighted that news of the DCA came out at a time of significant regional tensions and as Brazil was in the process of consolidating UNASUL as a mechanism for addressing those tensions. While respecting Colombia,s sovereign right to negotiate the DCA, Brazil could not ignore the serious implications for stability in the region. Biato explained that, as long as the United States maintains a presence in the region, it will be a difficult and neuralgic issue that will periodically resurface and require constant management. While Brazil understands the reasons for a U.S. presence in Colombia,

    BRASILIA 00001076 002.2 OF 003

    Biato said, the GOB,s goal is to work to remove the conditions that make this presence necessary.

    ¶5. (C) Both Biato and Machado requested greater information sharing and guarantees. Machado requested written assurances that equipment at the Colombian bases would not be used to violate the sovereignty of neighboring countries and that the U.S. presence would not expand beyond Colombia,s borders. (Colombian Ambassador Jozame told McMullen that GOB officials had asked the GOC to add a clause to the DCA specifying that actions are only to be undertaken within Colombian borders.) Machado also suggested that the DCA document be made available before the next UNASUL meeting, scheduled for August 28 in Bariloche, as she believed the provisions for respect of other nations, sovereignty would help allay concerns.

    TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK GREATER BILATERAL DIALOG ------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Biato stressed that, because of the history of U.S. presence in the region, the United States and Brazil need to have a more fluid dialog that allows Brazil to develop a level of trust regarding U.S. actions in the region. The goal is not to agree on everything, but to discuss sensitive issues so that Brazil can demonstrate to its South American neighbors that it has a full understanding of what the United States is doing in the region. Itamaraty officials expressed interest in restarting Pol/Mil talks, both on a formal and informal level, as a way to increase dialogue and smooth discussions on sensitive issues like the Colombian bases. GOB officials also raised the possibility of increased intelligence sharing between the United States and Colombia and other UNASUL countries. McMullen said such increased cooperation is worth exploring.

    PRESSING FOR INTERVENTION IN HONDURAS --------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) GOB officials pushed for greater U.S. response and intervention in Honduras. Biato said Brazilian President Lula was pleased to hear from President Obama that the USG would consider addition measures in Honduras. He compared the pressure the United States is receiving on Honduras and Venezuela to the heat the GOB has taken for its stance with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay. "It is the price you pay for doing the right thing." With Biato and Itamaraty officials, McMullen said the U.S. was prepared to ratchet up the pressure on the Micheletti de facto government. However, he said that many in the United States perceive a contradiction in applying the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) to Honduras without also raising IADC-related issues in Venezuela. Biato responded it is the GOB,s assessment that Venezuela is "not on the path toward" and "nowhere near" an authoritarian regime, and that they do not believe public criticism of Chavez is helpful. Biato and Itamaraty officials suggested that it would be important for the United States and Brazil to discuss implementation of the IADC, as a common understanding of its provisions and requirements is essential to implementing it.

    POTENTIAL OPENING FOR TRILATERAL COOPERATION WITH BOLIVIA ------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Itamaraty officials highlighted their interest and an opening for possible trilateral cooperation on counternarcotics issues with Bolivia and the United States. Cordeiro said Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim recently raised the possibility of joint cooperation with the United States in a meeting with the Bolivian Foreign Minister, who agreed it would be beneficial. Cordeiro asked for concrete ways in which the United States and Brazil could engage Bolivia. He noted that Bolivian sensitivities with regard to DEA and, more broadly, U.S. respect for Bolivian sovereignty are substantial, and will need to be taken into account. But he added that the Bolivians are waiting for a signal from the United States to increase engagement. Machado and Cordeiro stressed the importance of reinstating ATPDEA privileges. They said Brazil will replace USD 21 million of lost ATPDEA market in Bolivia, and Argentina USD 9 million. McMullen explained the U.S. efforts at bilateral dialogue with Bolivia and the complexities of certification and the ATPDEA process. He agreed that a discussion on how our two countries could

    BRASILIA 00001076 003.2 OF 003

    engage Bolivia on counternarcotics cooperation would be useful.

    MEANWHILE, OUT IN THE MEDIA ------------------------

    ¶9. (U) During McMullen,s discussions with GOB officials, media outlets were highlighting comments by FM Amorim regarding Brazil,s deep concern over the DCA and demanding that the United States answer to the region,s concerns. Amorim this week has publicly demanded transparency and guarantees with the U.S.-Colombia DCA, insisting that language be included in the agreement limiting the use of the equipment at the bases to combating narcotrafficking and the FARC. Following the phone call between President Lula and President Obama, Amorim told the press that President Obama is considering a request to meet with UNASUL countries in the near future. And even after various USG efforts to explain the nature of the DCA, Amorim continued to refer to the bases as "foreign bases" and claimed that the agreement and the "foreign presence" could bring to South America "problems that are not from the region."

    COMMENT: WHAT BRAZIL IS UP TO ------------------------------

    ¶10. (C) DAS McMullen,s visit to explain the DCA was well received by the GOB as fulfillment of promises by General Jones during his visit and, we understand, President Obama during his phone call with President Lula, to provide greater detail on the DCA. The openings on Pol-Mil talks, CN cooperation with Bolivia, and discussions of the IADC are all indications of a new posture toward the United States that suggest the GOB heard, internalized, and wants to respond to the expressed interest in broader and more transparent communication brought by National Security Advisor Jones and other senior Administration officials over the last few weeks. We believe there is a genuine desire on the part of the GOB to explore greater options for bilateral cooperation.

    ¶11. (C) In light of the private overtures made to McMullen, Amorim,s continued outbursts to the press are jarring. In explaining these press statements to Charge and PolCouns, Biato has both suggested, in the first instance, that the press has an axe to grind and cannot be trusted to accurately convey the GOB,s position. There is some truth to this, as Brazil,s major newspapers have consistently expressed disagreement with the GOB,s regional foreign policy, but it does not account for what are clearly accurate quotes from Amorim. In this regard, Biato has explained that, as Brazil tries to maintain its role as mediator among its bickering neighbors, the GOB has to stay in the center of the regional debate. In this instance, this has required the GOB to shift its public rhetoric toward Venezuela. In other words, although Amorim,s comments seem to be heightening emotions rather than lowering them, the GOB has assessed that Venezuela is the more problematic neighbor to deal with, and sees public statements supportive of its position as helpful in gaining support from President Chavez for taking a less confrontational tone at the upcoming UNASUL summit in Bariloche.

    ¶12. (C) It is entirely plausible that Amorim,s antics are aimed at making things easier for Brazil in Bariloche. Biato has told us that Lula was initially reluctant to agree to the meeting, as they saw the potential for it to add to the uproar over the DCA. Brazil,s main goal for Bariloche is to prevent it from destroying the still-shaky UNASUL or relations with a U.S. Administration with which it is desperate to cultivate a deeper dialogue.

    ¶13. (U) DAS McMullen has cleared this message.

    KUBISKE

`