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### Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD3195, IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAGHDAD3195 | 2009-12-14 09:09 | 2010-12-05 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Baghdad

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHGB #3195/01 3480957
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 140957Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5706
    INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PECON PREL IR IZ
    SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

    Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf's social,
    economic, political and military circles discussed with
    Post's Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of
    Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia
    clerical establishment (Marja'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah
    Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province's
    farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized
    produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
    premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an
    influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi
    political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary
    of Sistani's social and political clout among Shias, notably
    in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah's rejection of the Iranian
    regime's adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END
    SUMMARY

    ¶2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf, local interlocutors,
    including the province's head of military intelligence; the
    chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected Shia
    businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief
    judge of the province; and a representative of the local
    Chamber of Commerce shared their views on the state of
    political and economic development in the province and Iran's
    role.

    Provincial Council Chairman
    ---------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Sheikh Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chairman of Najaf's
    Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned politician and
    member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that
    Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly
    frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq's
    neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the
    biggest culprits, but noted that a "mental revolution" was
    underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to
    undermine the country's stability, pointing to such trends in
    Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and
    Mosul against the Turks.

    ¶4. (C) Al-Shimerri echoed other interlocutors' concerns
    about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a
    political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed
    the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
    comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and
    the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI's
    image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.

    ¶5. (C) Al-Shimerri expressed concerns about rumors
    circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist
    conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless
    rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.
    (NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also
    mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held
    in Washington in February. END NOTE).

    Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
    ----------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Major Uday, a provincial military intelligence
    officer and Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to
    Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government's
    (IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order
    to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for
    its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq's
    potential influence in the region, and will continue to
    support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine
    Iraq. "Iran does not offer its support for free," Uday
    noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in
    exchange for Iranian support.

    ¶7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
    Q7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
    least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is
    dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining
    the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security
    institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill
    key security positions with their own supporters, many of
    whom are unprofessional and sectarian, Uday cautioned. The
    Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to
    maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to
    Uday. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
    against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran's hit
    list (NOTE: According to Uday, Iran had already assassinated
    180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).

    ¶8. (C) Uday also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements
    often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of
    supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism
    unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He
    asserted that Najaf's police chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu
    Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious
    loyalties. Najaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroon, a
    well-respected judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were
    responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
    November. "He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is
    still part of the militia (Badr)," Judge Faroon asserted.

    Sistani: "What Do the Americans Want?"
    ----QDI>RpQd%'MkQQto pulse the cleric on
    his views about matters of political consequence. Kelanter
    explained that Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the
    main conduit of information between his father whenever a
    religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
    imams in the country.

    ¶12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll
    in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG
    infiltration, Kelanter asserted. Kelanter himself is
    suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams
    of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs
    Karbal'aie and Safi, were "in the pocket of the Iranians",
    despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.

    The Sadrists
    ------------

    ¶13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, Kelanter recalled fondly his
    time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada
    Al-Sadr's father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,
    the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
    Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
    criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
    father's legacy. Al-Shimmeri also praised the efforts of
    Sadr's father and sought to distinguish between "good" and
    "bad" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr's father.
    Major Uday believes the Sadrists are politically weak and
    continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own
    groups. (NOTE: Major Uday believes Al-Shimmari is a closet
    Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki's coalition.
    Al-Shimmari commented that the Iranians had told the wayward
    Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).

    Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶14. (C) Jabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farmers' Union
    commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
    increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in
    improving security. However, he complained that Iran and
    Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by
    flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce
    that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.

    ¶15. (C) Iraq's neighbors were pursuing such measures in
    order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling
    the continued success of Iraq's new democracy, Al-Garawi
    alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water
    shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,
    outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted.
    Al-Garawi confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had
    recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into
    Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60
    percent of Najaf's labor force works in agriculture. The
    sector is the province's most important revenue generating
    industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).

    ¶16. (C) Samira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the
    Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a
    USG-sponsored visitors program in the U.S., railed against
    Iran's pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that
    many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
    the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians.
    She also criticized Iraqi politicians "for being ignorant
    and overly-reliant on clerics" for their political welfare.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries
    significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to
    expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The
    city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
    profit spiritually and financially from the city's religious
    and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and
    acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran's influence,
    albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
    mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran
    will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order
    to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of
    its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'iyyah are more
    limited, particularly during Sistani's tenure, given the
    clerical establishment's unrivaled theocratic and geographic
    prominence when compared to its "sister city" Qom.
    HILL

`