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### Viewing cable 07TALLINN366, ESTONIA'S CYBER ATTACKS: WORLD'S FIRST VIRTUAL

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07TALLINN366 | 2007-06-04 14:02 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Tallinn

`

    VZCZCXRO4489
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
    DE RUEHTL #0366/01 1551427
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 041427Z JUN 07
    FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9880
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 2513
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1194
    RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE 0480
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TALLINN 000366

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EUR/NB

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD NATO RS EN
    SUBJECT: ESTONIA'S CYBER ATTACKS: WORLD'S FIRST VIRTUAL
    ATTACK AGAINST NATION STATE

    REF: A) TALLINN 276 B) TALLINN 280 C) TALLINN 347 D)
    LEE-GOLDSTEIN EMAIL 05/11/07

    Classified By: Ambassador S. Dave Phillips for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

    ¶1. (S) Summary. Since April 27, Estonia has been the
    victim of the world's first coordinated cyber attacks
    against a nation state and its political and economic
    infrastructure. The sensational nature of the story,
    combined with the highly technical details of the subject
    matter, has led to a good deal of misinformation in the
    public domain. Although GOE and international analysis
    is ongoing, these attacks have highlighted the
    vulnerability of both government and private sector
    internet infrastructure to attacks of this nature. For
    over a month, government, banking, media, and other
    Estonian websites, servers, and routers came under a
    barrage of cyber attacks. Defense against the attacks
    was extremely expensive for both GOE and the private
    sector. GOE and private cyber defense experts cite the
    nature and sophistication of the attacks as proof of
    Russian government complicity in the attacks. End
    Summary.

    Virtual Shots Heard Round the World
    -----------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Cyber attacks against Estonian websites began on
    April 27. They came in the wake of rioting in Tallinn
    triggered by the Government of Estonia's (GOE)
    preparations for relocating the so called "Bronze
    Soldier", a Soviet-era World War II monument (Refs A and
    B). The attacks initially targeted GOE websites
    including those of the Estonian President, Prime
    Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ministry of
    Justice (MOJ), and Parliament, among others. According
    to XXXXXXXXXXXX the initial attacks were
    technically unsophisticated and "seemed more like a cyber
    riot than a cyber war." However, all our Estonian
    interlocutors clearly recognized these attacks as
    political in nature. Russian-language internet chat
    forums held discussions exhorting people to attack
    Estonian sites and supplied downloadable software tools
    to carry out the attacks. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, these
    initial attacks were limited to spam (a barrage of
    unsolicited emails) and cyber vandalism (e.g., Prime
    Minister Andrus Ansip's photo was defaced on the Estonian
    Reform Party's website) and appeared to be nothing more
    than a virtual mob reaction to the Bronze Soldier issue.
    Estonian media and press commentators were quick to
    accuse Moscow of being responsible, interpreting these
    attacks as part of Russian retribution for moving the
    Bronze Soldier (Ref C).

    ¶3. (S) However, on April 30, a broader range of cyber
    attacks -- from simple spam postings to coordinated DDoS
    (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks -- began against
    GOE sites. (Note. A DDoS attack is when a flood of
    bogus queries are made to a specific server or network of
    computers in order to over-saturate the target and
    prevent access by legitimate users. End Note.) For
    example, the Presidential website, which normally has a 2
    million Mbps (megabits per second) capacity, was flooded
    with nearly 200 million Mbps of traffic. While none of
    the technology involved in the attacks was new, tactics
    and tools routinely shifted to prevent Estonian
    authorities from blocking the attacks. One of the most
    pernicious tools in these attacks was "bots." (Note.
    Bots are computers and/or servers under the control of a
    third party. End Note.) These bot attacks came from
    ISPs (internet service providers) around the world (e.g.,
    the United States, Canada, Russia, Turkey, Germany,
    Belgium, Egypt, Vietnam, etc.). Attacks routinely came
    from one set of bots, subsided and then resumed again
    using another set of bots with different ISPs. According
    to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the attacks ranged from a single
    minute to  many hours in length. The longest attacks lasted

    TALLINN 00000366 002 OF 004

    over  ten hours and unleashed a crushing 90 million Mbps of
    traffic on targeted endpoints. According to XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    the GOE's  assessment was that a small but unknown number
    of  individuals were behind these more sophisticated cyber
    attacks, which quickly dwarfed the traffic volume of the
    initial cyber rioters.

    ¶4. (S) On May 3, the cyber attacks expanded beyond GOE
    sites and servers to private sites. Hansabank and SEB,
    Estonia's two largest banks, faced the most significant
    problems. Swedish-owned Hansabank and SEB account for
    almost 75% of all online banking in Estonia. (Note:
    Approximately 90% of all money transfers and bill
    payments in Estonia are done online. End Note.)
    Hansabank was well prepared with powerful servers,
    alternate sites to mirror content (thus making it more
    difficult for DDoS attacks), and the ability to
    reallocate access lines from foreign to domestic
    customers. However, even though Hansabank's site
    remained online, XXXXXXXXXXXX estimated that it came
    at a cost -  - at least 10 million Euros ($13.4 million)
     Hansabank  also had to temporarily block access to its site by all
    foreign ISPs so that there was enough broadband capacity
    for its domestic clients. However, Hansabank was able to
    create alternate access mechanisms for its largest
    foreign customers. Correcting much of the press coverage
    in the early days of the attacks, XXXXXXXXXXXX
     said that  while the cyber attacks against Hansabank and SEB were a
    challenge, there was no serious danger of Estonia's
    banking sector being shut down.

    ¶5. (S) This second wave of cyber attacks also hit the
    websites of Postimees, Estonia's paper of record, and
    Eesti Paevaleht, a leading Estonian-language daily, which
    over two-thirds of Estonians regularly visit for their
    news. "Imagine if you can the psychological effect,"
    XXXXXXXXXXXX asked us, "when an Estonian tries to
    pay his bills but can't or get the news online but can't." As
    one of the most wired countries on the planet, GOE
    interlocutors viewed the evolution of the attacks as a
    frightening threat to key economic and societal
    infrastructure.

    ¶6. (S) The attacks reached their apex on May 9, the
    Russian anniversary of the end of World War II. To cope
    with the rising volume of attacks, the GOE increased its
    broadband capacity from two Gbps (Gigabites per second)
    to eight Gbps. Hansabank, SEB, Postimees, and others
    also added servers to increase broadband capacity. A
    EUCOM cyber defense expert described it as a "cyber arms
    race" where the Estonians repeatedly increased their
    broadband capacity to match the increasing volume of
    cyber attacks (Ref D). XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that XXXXXXXXXXXX
    increased the  "broadband pipe" for both government and private
    clients  at a frantic pace to keep up with the attacks.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX  told us that one GOE ministry increased
    its original  server capacity of 30 Mbps to 1 Gbps (1 Gbps
    equals 1000  Mbps). XXXXXXXXXXXX said that this defensive
    response by  the GOE and the private sector was ultimately
    successful,  but it was extremely expensive.

    ¶7. (S) The number of attacks steadily declined after May
    9 and 10, allowing GOE and private sites to reduce their
    broadband capacity. However, on May 15, there was an
    unexpected spike in attacks that focused on Hansabank and
    SEB. In two separate and coordinated 15 minute attacks,
    these two sites were hit with over 400 bot attacks
    (roughly half the number of bot attacks recorded on May
    10) from multiple ISPs. The attacks temporarily crashed
    SEB's site for 30 minutes. Since the May 15 spike, the
    number of attacks has declined and is now hovering
    slightly above pre-April 27 numbers.

    No Smoking Gun

    TALLINN 00000366 003 OF 004
    ¶8. (S) On May 2, Foreign Minister Urmas Paet released a
    statement that the MFA had proof that some of the attacks
    originated from GOR ISPs. The Estonian and international
    press carried Paet's claim, but  XXXXXXXXXXXX interlocutors
    distanced themselves from the accusation.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX  privately said to us that no "smoking gun"
    incriminating  Moscow has turned up and likely won't.
    The use of bots,  proxies, and spoofing tactics makes it
    extremely  difficult to determine with any certainty the origin
    of  the attacks. Press reports suggested that a million
    computers were involved in the attacks. However,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that due to Estonia's poor
    monitoring  capability, XXXXXXXXXXXX could only speculate on the
    number of computers and servers attacking Estonia, and had
    even less specific information on the origins of the attacks.
    (Note. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the one million figure
     used by  the press and the GOE was from a quote to the press
    taken out of context in which he tried to explain how he could
    only speculate a number ranging from a 1000 to a million
    computers. End Note.)

    ¶9. (S) The GOE believes it has enough circumstantial
    evidence to link Moscow with the attacks. As President
    Ilves told the Ambassador, renting the large number of
    bots used in these attacks is an expensive business.
    Moreover, as XXXXXXXXXXXX repeatedly asked us in
    conversations, "Who benefits from these attacks?" He
    speculated that the probing nature of the attacks on
    specific government and strategic private sector targets
    through the use of anonymous proxies fit the modus
    operandi of the Putin regime testing a new "weapon."
    XXXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the GOE now feels that their original
    assessment of a "cyber riot" may have been incorrect.
    "Looking at the patterns of the attacks, it is clear that
    there was a small, core of individuals who intended to
    launch their attack on May 9," XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, "but
    when the MOD announced its plans to move the Bronze
    Soldier on April 27, they moved up their plans to try to
    link the attacks with the monument's removal." Estonian
    analysis of these later sophisticated attacks and
    organization through Russian-language internet forums has
    led them to believe that the key individuals tried to
    disguise their initial attacks as a cyber riot. "You
    don't expect spontaneous, populist cyber attacks to have
    a pre-determined list of targets and precise dates and
    times for coordinated attacks," said XXXXXXXXXXX.

    ¶10. (S) GOE interlocutors expressed their frustration
    that their requests for information from the GOR or
    action on Russian-based ISP attacks were not answered or
    acted upon. XXXXXXXXXXX complained that cooperation
    with  Russia's CERT was almost nonexistent. Even at the height
    of the Bronze Soldier controversy, GOE interlocutors who
    regularly work with their Russian counterparts (e.g., law
    enforcement, customs and tax, border guards, etc.) tell
    us that working level cooperation was positive. In
    comparison, the lack of responsiveness by the GOR and
    Russian CERT personnel only diminished Russia's claims of
    innocence in the eyes of the Estonians.

    ¶11. (S) On May 29, Konstantin Koloskokov, Commissar of
    the pro-Kremlin youth group Nashi in Transnistria,
    claimed responsibility for some of the early cyber
    attacks. While not discounting the possibility of his
    involvement, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that some of the
    attacks were  extremely sophisticated; beyond the technical
    abilities  of an amateur. To illustrate the point, XXXXXXXXXXXX
     and  XXXXXXXXXXXX described an attack that used a mysterious
    data  packet to crash a GOE and Elion router so quickly that
    the Estonians are still uncertain how it was done.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX described in detail a number of
    additional  attacks using different tools and techniques
    and targets  to argue that an organized group with deep
    financial backing was the likeliest culprit. "Koloskokov is
    window  dressing," said XXXXXXXXXXXX, "a convenient
    set-up by the  real perpetrators."

    TALLINN 00000366 004 OF 004

    PHILLIPS

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