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### Viewing cable 08PARIS114, SARKOZY, KOUCHNER ADVISERS ON NATO, RUSSIA, IRAN,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08PARIS114 | 2008-01-23 14:02 | 2010-11-29 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO9064
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #0114/01 0231453
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 231453Z JAN 08
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1745
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0534
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6031
    RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0484

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000114

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR NATO FR RU IR GG UP AG
    SUBJECT: SARKOZY, KOUCHNER ADVISERS ON NATO, RUSSIA, IRAN,
    AND SARKOZY

    Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
    ns 1.4 b and d.

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  On January 16, Joseph Wood, Deputy
    Assistant to the Vice President for National Security
    Affairs, met with Philippe Errera, strategic affairs adviser
    to FM Kouchner, and Francois Richier, strategic affairs
    adviser to President Sarkozy.  Errera and Richier provided
    their views on NATO, ESDP, Russia, the Iran NIE, and
    President Sarkozy's own guiding principles.  Both advisers
    emphasized that French reintegration into NATO needs thorough
    consideration and is unlikely to take place before 2009.
    They shared their concerns about recent signals from Russia
    and described the "disastrous" consequences of the Iran NIE
    on international efforts.  Finally, they shared their
    perspectives on the principles that underlie President
    Sarkozy's dynamic administration, including France's desire
    to be influential on the world scene while maintaining close
    relations with its allies.  END SUMMARY.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    NATO Reintegration -- Not Before 2009
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶2.  (C) Both Richier and Errera noted that President Sarkozy
    has publicly accepted the principle of French reintegration
    into NATO.  Furthermore, according to Richier, he is the
    first elected president in France to go on the record as
    supportive of NATO.  The U.S. should not underestimate the
    attitude shifts that have made reintegration politically
    feasible today.  At the same time, both interlocutors
    stressed that the GOF will not "rush" into a final decision
    on reintegration into the military command structure.
    Richier observed that the 2009 NATO summit would be a
    reasonable timeframe for the announcement of a final
    decision, noting the need for a thorough evaluation of the
    implications of the decision.  He added that France's defense
    white paper will include a vision for French and collective
    security, but that the exercise will conclude no sooner than
    the end of April 2008.

    ¶3.  (C) Errera said the GOF prefers the term "normalization"
    to "reintegration," in part to underscore for domestic
    political reasons that the NATO of today is not the NATO of
    previous eras.  Errera said that President Sarkozy wants to
    work for a "new" NATO, and that France needs to be on the
    inside to work for reform.  He stressed that use of the
    correct terminology should help frame the public dialogue
    that is certain to ensue in France, despite the lack of
    public outcry responding to Sarkozy's initial expressions of
    interest.  Richier noted that there is much ignorance in
    France today about what NATO does; for example, many think
    ISAF is under UN auspices.  Errera pointed out that the
    defense white paper commission, which is conducting a broad
    review of defense and security policy, includes people who
    are skeptical of NATO.

    ¶4.  (C) Errera characterized this moment as "awkward," given
    that formal discussions about the form of French
    reintegration have not yet started.  He noted that political
    commitment and practical considerations had to be developed
    simultaneously and incrementally, adding that the Joint
    Chiefs must have a sense for where in NATO French officers
    would be posted, for example, before a decision is made.
    Most importantly, he said that France (including Sarkozy's
    diplomatic adviser Jean-David Levitte) wants to avoid the
    same mistakes that were made in the 1990s when reintegration
    was last on the table.  To avoid repeating those mistakes,
    Errera said smaller, practical questions should not be
    permitted to become pressure points that could block a
    political decision.  Richier said that it would be a mistake
    to set firm goals today on what had to be achieved before a
    political decision could be made, and that the overall
    direction is more important than the specifics.  He
    acknowledged that there is suspicion in Europe regarding
    France's motivations, and suspicion in France regarding NATO,
    that will need to be overcome.  He pointed to President
    Sarkozy's scheduled February 1 meeting with NATO SYG Jaap de
    Hoop Scheffer as one important step to alleviate some
    concerns.

    ¶5.  (C) Errera said that generally, newer members of NATO
    will view French reintegration positively, reducing their
    current suspicion of France for its non-normalized NATO
    membership.  On the other hand, newer members of NATO use
    NATO jobs to reward their top leadership, and French

    PARIS 00000114  002 OF 004

    reintegration would put a tight squeeze on command structures
    and high-level posts.  High-level positions are also an issue
    with Germany and the U.K.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    NATO and ESDP:  Inseparably Linked
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶6.  (C) Errera stated that during France's upcoming EU
    Presidency, President Sarkozy will push hard to strengthen
    European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), while working
    for a revitalized NATO.  Richier called this a transatlantic
    effort to strengthen European security, while noting that
    billing it as an "alternative" to NATO would be both
    politically and financially absurd.  Errera observed that
    substantive progress on ESDP will be very difficult, partly
    due to British concerns.  Richier expressed hope that
    European defense budgets could increase, noting that the gap
    vis--vis the U.S. is growing, but added that if budgets
    cannot be increased in the short term, efficiency must be
    increased.

    - - - - - - - - -
    NATO Enlargement
    - - - - - - - - -

    ¶7.  (C) Adriatic 3:  Errera said that France is comfortable
    in principle with each of the Adriatic 3 candidates.  In
    particular, France has "no problems" with Croatian
    membership.  However, Errera said Albania seems to be taking
    acceptance for granted, and needs to make more of an effort
    to "clean up" corruption issues.  Regarding Macedonia, Errera
    said the GOM underestimates the seriousness of the name issue
    for Greece and that the U.S. should not make the same
    mistake.  France will not pressure Greece on this issue.
    Furthermore, if Athens were to give in on the name issue, the
    Greek government could fall, thus bringing in a new
    government which would be responsible for -- and presumably
    hostile to -- the NATO enlargement ratification progress.

    ¶8.  (C) Georgia and Ukraine:  Errera said that the GOF does
    not want a public dispute with the U.S. on these issues
    before Bucharest, adding that European allies are hedging
    because Washington is not sending clear signals.  Errera
    expects that new Ukrainian PM Tymoshenko will come out soon
    publicly in favor of MAP for Ukraine, a step for which France
    will "not have a great appetite."  Errera said MAP is not
    just one more step in closer relations, but a serious
    decision in light of Article 5 commitments.  Regarding
    Georgia, he said Saakashvili "pulled off the election
    somehow" but still not under ideal circumstances, and that
    NATO may not be ready for Article 5 guarantees to Georgia
    either.  That said, the GOF has systematically made clear to
    Russia that there is no Russian redline or veto regarding
    Ukraine and Georgia.  In response, Wood noted that France's
    hesitation regarding Article 5 commitments implies a de facto
    "sphere of influence," because Russia is the only possible
    menace to Ukraine or Georgia.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Russia:  Negative Trends
    - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶9.  (C) Richier characterized the current Russian regime as
    revisionist, saying that Putin made much-needed improvements
    to Russian infrastructure but has gone too far in seeking to
    restore Russia's grandeur at the expense of international
    cooperation and development.  Among the Russian population,
    many are culturally and economically oriented towards the
    West, but remain politically tied to Putin.  According to
    Errera, Russian judgment on important issues is worsening.
    In the past, Russia has been difficult to work with, but has
    ultimately made the right decisions -- until recently.  As an
    example, in President Sarkozy's private meeting in Moscow
    with President Putin, Putin was very hardline on Iran
    (notwithstanding Russia's exports of fuel for Bushehr), but
    that in the subsequent press conference, Putin distanced
    himself on this issue, to Sarkozy's surprise and chagrin.
    Errera said that in the past, Russia did not mind hurting
    Iran as long as Russia was not hurt as well; now Russia seems
    not to want to hurt the Iranians.

    - - - - - - - - -
    Energy Dependence
    - - - - - - - - -

    PARIS 00000114  003 OF 004

    ¶10.  (C) Both interlocutors noted that France's use of
    nuclear energy makes it less dependent than some other
    European countries on Russian oil and gas.  That said,
    Richier expressed concern that Russia is "grabbing" gas
    infrastructure and supply at a time of military buildup and
    strong rhetoric.  He said that it will be difficult for
    Europe to agree on a common energy policy, as there is
    currently no consensus, nor any great ideas, on how to solve
    the problem.  Richier described Russian policies as motivated
    to obtain short-term profit for individuals, rather than to
    build long-term, worldwide power.  Errera observed that
    dependence on Russia for energy is better than dependence on
    Iran, which is the only other real option.  He said that
    Sarkozy had made overtures to Algeria on gas before and
    during his visit to Algiers, but that France was "stiffed."
    Nor is there any sense that there will be progress with
    Algeria on gas in the near term.  Errera said that while
    France seeks a commercial relationship, Algeria views energy
    cooperation as complicated by history and tinged with a sense
    of nationalism.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    -
    NIE:  "The Best Christmas Gift Ahmadinejad Could Have
    Imagined"
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    -

    ¶11.  (C) Both interlocutors called the NIE a "disaster" that
    has "substantially jeopardized" progress on Iran in the short
    term and will have lasting consequences, including
    eliminating France's ability to build consensus in Europe.
    French views are unchanged, but many others have been
    affected, and the NIE destroyed not just the momentum of the
    international community but also what little leverage France
    and the international community had on less radical Iranian
    elements.  Errera noted that the timing of the release of the
    NIE was especially bad, with EU Political Directors having
    been poised for a new UNSC resolution just before the NIE
    release.  He said at the IISS Manama Dialogue in December,
    speculation was rampant about why the current U.S.
    administration did not better manage the report's fallout by
    postponing its release or changing the characterization of
    Iran's enrichment activities as exclusively civil.

    ¶12.  (C) Both interlocutors said quick passage of a new UNSC
    resolution, although likely to be a weak, is key.  Richier
    said that Iran has no incentive to negotiate and that the
    international community's most effective mechanism has been
    creating a financially difficult operating environment for
    Iran.  If the perception declines in the financial community
    that investment in Iran is dangerous, this will change.
    Errera noted the EU might be able to go farther than the
    Security Council will, perhaps with Gulf countries and/or the
    G7, to pressure Iran on continued uranium enrichment by
    raising the price for doing so.

    ¶13.  (C) Errera also said that an intelligence team from the
    French DGSE traveled to the U.S. recently to meet with their
    U.S. counterparts regarding the NIE, and was disappointed
    that the information shared was "even less" than has been
    reported in the press.  This reception did not help the
    perception shared by some in the GOF that France has not been
    treated as a full partner by the U.S., despite working
    side-by-side and fielding criticism following the NIE
    release.

    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
    Sarkozy's Governing Philosophy
    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

    ¶14.  (C) Errera said that two clear priorities underlie
    Sarkozy's administration.  The first is realigning French
    presence with French objectives, and reestablishing French
    influence where it had been diminished (for example, within
    the EU, by giving momentum to the simplified EU treaty).
    Errera said France will maintain its influence in Africa but
    seeks to rebalance its overseas investments, for example by
    creating a military base in the UAE.  Errera said that France
    cannot say Iran is a key threat without investing more in the
    Gulf and that the Iranians will "get the message."  He noted
    that the new base in the UAE will be the first French
    military installation not in a former colony.  Secondly,
    Errera said that Sarkozy believes in the concept of "the
    West," making him the first non-Gaullist French president not
    to consider France an exclusively independent actor.  This

    PARIS 00000114  004 OF 004

    identification provides Sarkozy a clear course for steering
    French policy even on difficult questions like dealing with
    Libyan President Qadhafi.

    ¶15.  (C) Richier suggested that Sarkozy's core conviction is
    that France must be pulled into the 21st century.  He said
    Sarkozy likes to use the metaphor of a person who exercises
    for the first time in a while -- many muscles may be sore
    afterwards, but the exercise has done them good.  Richier
    said he sees new energy in French diplomacy, focused on
    bringing diversity and reconciliation to the global stage.
    Sarkozy wishes to encourage countries to accept the diversity
    (ethnic, religious, etc.) within their own societies, as
    tolerance for others is key to democracy.  Sarkozy also
    recognizes a need for reconciliation and believes the effort
    to correct the course of a "bad guy" is worthwhile (COMMENT:
    In public Sarkozy has defended his outreach to Qadhafi and
    Hugo Chavez along these lines.)  According to Richier,
    Sarkozy believes the short-term costs of talking to rogue
    actors by using carrots and helping them move forward are
    less than the long-term costs of inaction.  However, he also
    recognizes the importance of not creating gaps between the
    U.S. and Europe in reaching out to "bad guys," marking a
    departure from previous French governments.  Finally, Richier
    noted that "relations with Islam" and climate change were two
    immediate priorities of President Sarkozy's that would
    nevertheless remain on the French agenda.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    PEKALA

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