Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 12404 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01 2011/05/02 2011/05/03 2011/05/04

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/06 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/09 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/08 2002/09 2002/11
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples Consulate Naha
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AE AF AM AR AJ AU AORC AG AEMR AMGT APER AGMT AL AFIN AO AMED ADCO AS ABUD ABLD ASUP ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG APECO AID AND AMBASSADOR AN ARM AY AODE AMG ASCH AMCHAMS ARF APCS APEC ASEAN AGAO ANET ADPM ACOA ACABQ AORL AFFAIRS ATRN ACS AFSI AFSN ADANA ASIG AA AX AUC AC AECL AADP AGRICULTURE AMEX ACAO ACBAQ AQ AORG ADM AINF AIT ASEX AGR AROC ATFN AFGHANISTAN AFU AER ALOW AZ AVERY
BA BY BU BR BE BL BO BK BM BILAT BH BEXP BF BTIO BC BBSR BMGT BTIU BG BWC BB BD BX BP BRUSSELS BN BIDEN BT
CW CH CF CD CV CVIS CM CE CA CJAN CLINTON CIA CU CASC CI CO CACM CDB CN CMGT CS CG CBW CIS CR CONDOLEEZZA CPAS CAN CWC CY COUNTER CDG CL CT CIC CIDA CSW CHR CB CODEL COUNTERTERRORISM CTR COM CICTE CFED CJUS CKGR CBSA CEUDA CARSON CONS CITEL CLMT CROS CITT CAC CVR CDC CAPC COPUOS CBC CBE CARICOM COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CACS CTM CNARC
DA DR DPRK DJ DEA DEPT DTRA DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEFENSE DOMESTIC DHS DAO DCM DO DE DEAX DOE DK DS
ECON EFIN ETRD EUN EFIS EG ETTC EZ EPET EAID EAGR ENRG ECUN EU ELAB ECPS EAIR EINV ELTN EWWT EIND EMIN EI ECIN ENVR ELECTIONS EINVEFIN EN ES ER EC EUC EINT EINVETC ENGR ET EK ENIV ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECONOMY EAP EFTA EUR EUMEM EXIM ERD ENERG EUREM ESA ERNG EXTERNAL EPA EINVECONSENVCSJA ECONOMICS ELN EINN EFINECONCS ENNP EEPET ETRDEINVTINTCS ENVI ETRO ESENV ECINECONCS ECONOMIC EAIDS EDU ETRA ETRN EFIM EIAR ETRC EAIG EXBS EURN ECIP EREL ECA ENGY ECONCS ECONEFIN ETC ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINDETRD
FR FJ FI FREEDOM FTAA FARC FAO FINANCE FOR FO FDA FAC FM FTA FISO FMLN FBI FOREIGN FOI FAS FINR
GM GE GG GA GZ GV GH GT GR GY GAERC GOI GAZA GOV GTMO GL GLOBAL GTIP GCC GANGS GERARD GF
HO HURI HA HILLARY HR HU HUMOR HK HUMAN HSTC HEBRON HI HYMPSK
IR IZ IS IAEA INRB IRAJ IQ IN IT IMO INTERPOL ICAO IO IC ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI ICTY ID IPR IWC ILC INTELSAT IL IBRD IMF IA IRC ICRC ILO ITU ITRA IV IDA IAHRC ICJ ISRAELI IRS INMARSAT ISRAEL ISLAMISTS INDO IZPREL ITPHUM ITPGOV ITF IBET IEFIN INR IACI INTERNAL IDP IGAD IEA ICTR IIP INRA INRO IF
JO JA JAMES JM JP JOSEPH JOHNNIE JOHN JUS
KJUS KSCA KNNP KU KCOR KCRM KDEM KTFN KHLS KPAL KWBG KACT KGHG KPAO KTIA KIRF KWMN KS KG KZ KN KMDR KISL KSPR KHIV KPRP KAWK KR KUNR KDRG KCIP KGCC KTIP KSUM KPKO KVIR KAWC KPIN KGIC KRAD KIPR KOLY KCFE KMCA KE KV KICC KNPP KBCT KSEP KFRD KFLU KVPR KOCI KBIO KSTH KMPI KCRS KOMC KTBT KPLS KIRC KREL KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KFLO KBTS KSTC KTDB KFSC KX KFTFN KNEI KIDE KREC KMRS KICA KPAONZ KCGC KSAF KRGY KCMR KRVC KVRP KSEO KCOM KAID KTEX KNUC KNAR KNUP KNNPMNUC KLIG KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KCRCM KHDP KGIT KNSD KOMS KWMM KPAI KHSA KTLA KO KMFO KRCM KCSY KSAC KTRD KPWR KID KWNM KRIM KPOA KCHG KOM KSCI KFIN KMOC KESS KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KPRV KBTR KERG KTER KDDG KPAK KRFD KHUM KDEV KCFC KWWMN KWMNCS KJUST
LE LY LG LU LH LI LO LOG LAB LTTE LA LABOR LT
MARR MOPS MU MTCRE MNUC MY MASS MCAP MOPPS MAR MPOS MO ML MR MASC MX MD MP MA MTRE MIL MCC MZ MK MDC MRCRE MAPS MV MI MEPN MAPP MEETINGS MAS MTS MLS MILI MTCR MG MC MARAD MIK MILITARY MEDIA MEPI MUCN MEPP MT MERCOSUR MW MASSMNUC MQADHAFI
NZ NATO NG NI NO NATIONAL NU NPT NIPP NL NPG NS NA NGO NP NSG NDP NAFTA NR NC NH NE NSF NPA NK NSSP NRR NATOPREL NSC NT NW NORAD NEW NV NSFO NAR NASA NZUS
OTRA OVIP OPRC OPDC OSCE OAS ODIP OIIP OFDP OVP OREP OFFICIALS OSAC OEXC OPCW OIE OIC OFDA OSCI OPIC OBSP OECD ON OCII OHUM OES OCS OMIG OPAD OTR
PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PTER PSOE PINS PARM PK PBTS PEPR PM POLITICAL PARTIES PREF PBIO PROP PA PSI PINT PO PKFK PL PAK PE POLITICS PINL POL PHSA PU PF POV PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PARMS PRGOV PNAT POLINT PRAM PMAR PG PAO PROG PRELP PPA PCUL PSEPC PSA PREO PAHO PGIV PREFA PALESTINIAN PAIGH POSTS PTBS PGOVLO PORG PGOVE PLN PINF PAS PUNE POLICY PDEM PDOV PCI PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PHUMPGOV PMIL PNG PP PS PHUH PECON POGOV PY PHUMPREL PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PGGV PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PEL
QA
RS RU RW REGION RP RICE ROBERT RSP RUPREL RM RO RCMP RSO RELATIONS REACTION REPORT RIGHTS ROOD RF RFE RIGHTSPOLMIL
SP SA SY SF SYR SENV SCUL SOCI SNAR SO SU SG STEINBERG SHUM SW SMIG SR SZ SIPRS SI SAARC SPCE SARS SN SYRIA SANC SL SCRS SC SENVKGHG SAN SNARCS SHI SWE SNARIZ SIPDIS SEN SNARN SPCVIS SEVN SSA SH SOFA SK ST
TPHY TU TRGY TI TX TS TW TC TFIN TD TSPA TH TT TIP TBIO TSPL TZ TERRORISM TRSY TN THPY TINT TF TL TV TK TO TP TURKEY TNGD TBID TAGS TR
UP US UNSC UK UZ UE UNESCO UV UNGA UN UNMIK UNO UY UAE UNEP UG UNHCR UNHRC USUN UNAUS USTR USNC USOAS UNCHR UNCSD UNDP USEU USPS UNDC UNDESCO UNCHC UNFICYP UNC UNODC UNPUOS UNCND UNICEF UNCHS UNVIE USAID UNIDROIT
VE VZ VN VT VTPREL VM VTIZ VTEG VI VAT VC
WTO WMO WI WTRQ WHO WWARD WA WB WBG WITH WTRO WHA WMD WIPO WS WZ WHTI WFP WEU
XF XA XL XM XR XS XT XK XY XC XG XW XD XV XX XB XE XZ XH XTAG XQ XU XI
YM YI YE YMCS
ZI ZP ZR ZF ZANU ZOELLICK ZU ZO ZB ZL ZK ZEALAND ZN ZA ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09PARTO40301, U) Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09PARTO40301.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09PARTO40301 | 2009-04-03 17:05 | 2011-02-21 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | US Delegation, Secretary
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/secretaria-de-estado-pide-a-embajada-evaluacion-de-calderon

`

    VZCZCXRO9333
    OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 031728Z APR 09
    FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
    TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    200714
    2009-04-03 17:28:00
    09PARTO40301
    US Delegation, Secretary
    CONFIDENTIAL

    VZCZCXRO9333
    OO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUCNAI #0003/01 0931728
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 031728Z APR 09
    FM USDEL SECRETARY//MEXICO//
    TO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO IMMEDIATE
    INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARTO 040301

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2019
    TAGS: OVIP CLINTON HILLARY PREL SNAR MX
    SUBJECT: (U)  Secretary Clinton's March 25 Conversation
    with Mexican President Felipe Calderon

    Ref:  White House 0813 dated 03/21/09

    ¶1.  (U)  Classified by Uzra Zeya, Deputy Executive
    Secretary, S/ES, Department of State.  Reason 1.4 (d).

    ¶2.  (U)  03/25/09, 1 p.m., Mexico City, Mexico

    ¶3.  (U)  Participants

    U.S.
    The Secretary
    Charge Bassett
    A/S Shannon
    Laura Pena, Senior Advisor to the Secretary
    Dan Restrepo, Senior Director, National Security Council

    Mexico
    President Calderon
    Foreign Secretary Espinosa
    Amb. Sarukhan
    U/S Rico
    Presidential Advisor Fernandez de Castro

    ¶4.  (C)  Summary:   During an extremely cordial
    conversation with Secretary Clinton, President Calderon
    emphasized his personal commitment to providing security
    for Mexican citizens, pressed for greater U.S. actions
    against arms trafficking, conveyed concerns about how the
    issue of Cuba will be treated at the upcoming Summit of
    the Americas, and discussed his ideas for global action
    on environmental issues.  Secretary Clinton praised
    Calderon's commitment and leadership, acknowledged U.S.
    co-responsibility for the drug war, and pledged U.S.
    partnership against organized crime.  President Calderon
    encouraged the United States to re-assume its key role in
    the region and expressed his personal admiration for
    Secretary Clinton's leadership.  He closed by expressing
    appreciation for President Obama's decision to visit
    Mexico.  End Summary.

    ¶5.  (C)  President Calderon's aides tried several times
    to interrupt his animated conversation with Secretary
    Clinton,  which lasted 1 hour 45 minutes and included a
    15-minute one-on-one session, but he waved them off time
    after time.  He opened by expressing his admiration for
    Secretary Clinton, confessing that he attended her 1998
    appearance at Davos and submitted the written query,
    "Would you consider running for President?"  Secretary
    Clinton said she was delighted to see him again, and
    conveyed her appreciation for his commitment and courage.
    The United States, she continued, recognized its co-
    responsibility for the current situation, and would stand
    shoulder to shoulder with Mexico until the battle was
    won.  Secretary Clinton added that it was a personal
    priority for her to work on the broad relationship and
    have positive outcomes.

    --------
    SECURITY
    --------

    ¶6.  (C)  President Calderon acknowledged that our agenda
    is broader than security, but turned to that topic as the
    most urgent.  His personal commitment was to leave his
    successor a secure Mexico with credible institutions free
    of the taint of corruption.  To succeed he needed U.S.
    support, and suggested renewing the assault weapons ban.
    He said that there was a clear correlation between the
    lifting of the ban in 2004 and Mexico's current
    situation.  During the six years of the Fox
    administration, Mexican forces captured 3,000 assault
    weapons.  In the last two years, they confiscated 16,000,
    with no end in sight.  The availability of assault
    weaponry had contributed to the cartels' new aggression
    against government forces.  A second factor was cartels'
    expanding interests.  While they still fought for access
    to the U.S. market, they were increasingly seeking to
    control the growing Mexican drug market, as well.  The
    combination of assault weapons and an increased
    imperative for geographic control prompted the dramatic
    increases in violence Mexico had recently witnessed.  The
    third factor was the Mexican government's increased
    pressure on the cartels.

    ¶7.  (C)  Calderon cited the situation in Ciudad Juarez as
    a case in point.  Ciudad Juarez was important to the
    cartels as a launching point into the United States, he
    said, but it was also a growing metropolis with a
    potentially lucrative drug market.  The cartels' battle
    for this territory had driven homicide rates up to record
    levels.  President Calderon said he had made the decision
    to flood the city with federal forces and take over
    security while pressing the city and state governments to
    convert their local police into effective patrolling
    units and to do more against common crime.  In just a
    month, violence in Ciudad Juarez had fallen by 73
    percent, but this progress had to be sustained.

    ¶8.  (C)  Calderon said that a second priority should be
    to cut U.S. drug consumption.  Mexico was working to halt
    the supply -- the United States needed to cut demand.
    This led to the third priority -- cutting money flows to
    the cartels.   Calderon assessed that direct action to
    interdict bulk cash coming from the United States to
    Mexico would also strangle the cartels and their
    operations.  Mapping money flows and sharing that
    information would help both countries interdict cash more
    effectively and shut down the institutions facilitating
    cash transactions.  Mexico, he conceded, would have to do
    more to check inbound travelers and vehicles, ideally
    reaching a near 100 percent inspection rate through non-
    invasive (NIIE) means.  That might not be possible with
    existing technology, he admitted, but deploying more NIIE
    machines along more points of the border would be very
    helpful.

    ¶9.  (C)  Calderon said he appreciated the change in the
    tenor of USG officials' remarks in recent weeks, and
    hoped that trend would continue.  Suggestions by eminent
    U.S. government officials that Mexico was unable to
    govern its territory or risked becoming a failed state
    did incalculable damage, not just to Mexico's image, but
    to its efforts to confront organized crime.  These
    statements caused law enforcement officials to lose hope,
    helped motivate local officials to surrender to
    intimidation, and discouraged citizens from supporting
    the government's efforts.  On the other hand, he opined,
    such statements led criminals to believe the government
    would fail, and gave them renewed confidence to continue
    to confront the forces of order.  Calderon said he needed
    the support of the Mexican people, and he needed them to
    believe the rule of law would triumph.

    ¶10.  (C)  Secretary Clinton responded that her message
    was one of co-responsibility and cooperation.  She was
    personally committed to making sure both countries
    succeed.  The United States would do its share.  In the
    coming weeks, AG Holder and DHS Secretary Napolitano
    would visit Mexico to further this important dialogue.
    The Obama Administration had announced on March 20 a
    series of new measures along the U.S. border to impede
    smuggling or arms and cash into Mexico.  The Secretary
    said she could not be confident that an assault weapons
    ban would be passed by Congress, but she was confident
    the Administration would use every means to aggressively
    enforce existing law.  She offered to share ideas with
    Mexico on demand reduction in both countries.  She
    affirmed the Administration's absolute confidence that
    Calderon would succeed in his efforts, and that the
    United States would be with him every step of the way.

    ¶11.  (C)  President Calderon thanked her, noting that he
    appreciated the announcements made on the 20th, but
    adding that moving the National Guard to the border would
    pose a problem for Mexico.  Turning back to Mexico's
    situation, he  commented that the cartels were more
    aggressive in confronting Mexican institutions than ever
    before.  They were more openly intimidating elected
    officials, and more brutally killing Mexican law
    enforcement personnel.  They had undertaken terrorist-
    like acts, including throwing a grenade into a crowd of
    civilians last September.  Mexico had to face evidence
    that corruption extended to all levels.  The cartels had
    a strong distribution network in the United States,
    Calderon noted, and unchecked they could start to apply
    the same tactics in the United States.  Mexico had to
    face the harsh truth about corruption in the Attorney
    General's office; the United States should be concerned
    that the massive volume of drugs, money, and weapons
    flowing across the border could imply corruption problems
    on the U.S. side, as well.  Calderon said that both
    countries needed to coordinate efforts closely to be
    successful.  The President expressed some frustration
    with the pace of Merida deliveries, while noting his
    appreciation for the partnership the Merida Initiative
    represented.

    ----------
    THE REGION
    ----------

    ¶12.  (C)  President Calderon observed that, while there
    were many sensitivities in Mexico to working too closely
    on security matters with the United States, the nations
    of Central America did not face the same political
    constraints.  Mexico was concerned by the vulnerabilities
    in Guatemala and other Central American nations where
    security, judicial, and even democratic institutions were
    weak and susceptible to corrupt influences.  In
    Guatemala, almost half the security forces had been
    forcibly retired by the prior president, leaving its
    security situation difficult at best.  The United States
    should focus regional Merida assistance on these most
    vulnerable countries.

    ¶13.  (C)  President Calderon then went on to express his
    hope that the United States would re-assert its
    leadership role in the region, using the Summit of the
    Americas as an important opportunity.  The region was
    eager to meet President Obama, and excited to hear his
    vision of U.S. policy towards Latin America.  Calderon
    confessed that a recent meeting with Summit host Prime
    Minister Manning of Trinidad and Tobago had left him
    concerned that Manning would try to force the Cuba issue
    at the Summit.  Calderon said he had advised against
    this, arguing the United States and Cuba needed to work
    out their issues bilaterally first, before the region
    engaged.  Calderon did not think Manning was persuaded,
    describing the leader as seduced by the idea of making
    history with this issue.

    ---------
    THE WORLD
    ---------

    ¶14.  (C)  Secretary Clinton noted U.S. appreciation for
    Mexico's leadership role in the G-20, and especially its
    early call for replenishing the international financial
    institutions.  Calderon pointed out that the Inter-
    American Development Bank was one of those institutions
    that needed replenishing, and should not be overlooked.

    ¶15.  (C)  Calderon continued that he and President Obama
    had many things in common, and one was a "green" agenda.
    Calderon noted this was another personal passion of his.
    The global community set goals for the environment, but
    didn't create mechanisms to make those goals attainable.
    Calderon discussed his ideas for regional "clean energy"
    markets, and for the creation of a "green fund" that
    would provide incentives for nations who successfully
    actualized plans to reduce emissions.  Secretary Clinton
    said that Mexico's vision on the range of issues
    affecting the environment, renewable energy options, and
    climate change was greatly valued, and for that reason
    President Obama wished to invite him to a Major Economies
    Forum on Energy and the Environment in Italy this July
    (reftel).  President Calderon noted that, as Secretary of
    Energy and earlier, as President of the Development Bank
    (Banobras), he had approved wind energy and biogas
    programs across Mexico.  Now those programs were models
    of their kind.  Secretary Clinton told him she was
    pleased to be visiting Mexico's showcase biogas plant in
    Monterrey, drawing a warm smile from the President.

    ----------
    NEXT STEPS
    ----------

    ¶16.  (C)  Calderon summed up the discussion by noting
    that our two countries need a broad strategy to focus on
    security, competitiveness, and the range of bilateral
    issues.  He said that we should build strategic alliances
    in areas like healthcare, where U.S. demand could be met
    by Mexican supply.  Calderon noted he had shared these
    ideas with President Obama, and very much looked forward
    to discussing them further in April.  He reiterated again
    how honored Mexico was to receive the U.S. President.
    Secretary Clinton thanked Calderon for his time and
    leadership, and again pledged her personal commitment to
    concrete results in the relationship.

    CLINTON

`