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### Viewing cable 07DILI101, AUSSIES BRIEF ON REINADO OPERATION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07DILI101 | 2007-03-12 08:08 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Dili

`

    VZCZCXRO2275
    PP RUEHPB
    DE RUEHDT #0101/01 0710857
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P R 120857Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY DILI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3350
    INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
    RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0851
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0810
    RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0919
    RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0745
    RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0055
    RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2702

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000101

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EAP/MTS,IO
    PACOM FOR JOC AND POLAD
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/12/2017
    TAGS: KPKO MOPS PGOV PREL TT AU NZ
    SUBJECT: AUSSIES BRIEF ON REINADO OPERATION

    REF: A) DILI 94, B) DILI 96, C) DILI 95

    DILI 00000101  001.2 OF 003

    CLASSIFIED BY: Seiji T. Shiratori, DCM, EXEC, State.
    REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary:  International Stabilization Forces (ISF)
    commander Brigadier Malcolm Rerden and Australian Ambassador to
    East Timor Margaret Twomey briefed Emboffs March 9, reviewing
    the current status of ISF operations to apprehend Major Alfredo
    Reinado and summarizing a meeting Rerden has just attended with
    top GOET and UN officials to discuss strategy to resolve the
    crisis.  Rerden told us that the ISF mission remains committed
    to apprehend dissident military officer Major Alfredo Reinado
    and his band alive.  Rerden said the operation to date has been
    a success in that it has met the prerequisite of no civilian
    casualties, and Reinado was able to slip away from the holdout
    in Same on March 4 in large part because ISF had given him every
    opportunity to surrender before launching an assault.
    Summarizing his just-concluded meeting with the Special
    Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), the President,
    Prime Minister, Prosecutor General, the military commander,
    Speaker of Parliament and other officials, Rerden described how
    neither UN nor GOET officials could find a face-saving way of
    communicating with Reinado in order to convince the rogue
    soldier to turn himself in.  Rerden confirmed that ISF does not
    know where Reinado is hiding, that they are trying to cut off
    attempts to escape by boat, and that the President had stated
    the Government's determination to let the operation drag on for
    weeks if necessary.  End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) Australian Ambassador Margaret Twomey at our request
    arranged for Charge d'Affaires (CDA), Deputy Chief of Mission
    (DCM) and U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) to meet with ISF
    commander Brigadier Malcolm Rerden the evening of March 9, to be
    briefed on the current state of the operation to bring in rebel
    military officer Major Alfredo Reinado.  Rerden came to our
    meeting directly from Tripartite consultations among GOET
    leaders, UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) leaders,
    and Rerden.  Rerden briefed us extensively verbatim from his
    written notes of the meeting.  The primary purpose of the
    meeting apparently was to discuss a March 4 revised petition on
    terms of surrender from Reinado sent to GOET and UNMIT leaders
    by Reinado's attorney Benevides Correia.  (Note:  See Ref A.
    CDA received same document two days ago and passed this to
    Twomey.  We sent scanned version to EAP).  Besides Rerden,
    attendees at the meeting included:  President Xanana Gusmao,
    Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta, Vice Prime Minister (VPM)
    Estanislau da Silva, Prosecutor General Longuinhos Monteiro,
    SRSG Atul Khare (SRSG), Deputy (security) SRSG Eric Tan, Timor
    armed forces (F-FDTL) Commander Taur Matan Ruak, and Speaker of
    Parliament Francisco Lu-Olo Guterres, among others.

    Rerden Recounts Political Discussion of Reinado Predicament
    --------------------------------------------- -----------------

    ¶3. (C) Rerden recounted the following discussion with GOET and
    UNMIT officials:  Monteiro spoke first stating that he would no
    longer be in contact with Reinado, in order to avoid conflict of
    interest.  SRSG Khare, listed along with Dili Bishop Dom Alberto
    Ricardo da Silva as a witness on the Reinado petition, said
    UNMIT could not be a witness because of troubling points in the
    petition.  Khare noted that all weapons must be secured before
    the UN can be involved, and that the SRSG cannot be a witness to
    a document between the government and someone facing criminal
    charges.  VPM da Silva then said Reinado must be treated as a
    deserter.

    Ramos-Horta Vacillates
    ------------------------

    ¶4. (C) An uncertain Ramos-Horta then replied that there are both
    political and social issues at play, that they should not rule
    out the option of some sort of surrender, and that GOET should
    not be publicly seen as ruling out the surrender option.  He
    added, however, that surrender is the first goal, asking if
    perhaps Dili Bishop Ricardo could help open direct doors of
    communications with Reinado. (See Ref B for account of the
    Bishop saying he does not want to play that role).  Ramos-Horta
    closed by vacillating back to the view that Reinado must
    surrender himself and his weapons.

    DILI 00000101  002.2 OF 003

    ¶5. (C) President Gusmao replied that the Reinado petition has no
    status and that the state would not respond to the document
    directly.  (Note:  See Ref C, Gusmao Expounds on Reinado,
    Elections.)  He asked if perhaps Reinado would talk to the
    Bishop.  Gusmao told the Prosecutor General that he could talk
    to lawyer Correia only about item 6:  "That all charges be
    dropped against me."  Also, all weapons would need to be turned
    in before any discussions could begin.

    ¶6. (C) Matan Ruak then also chimed in that perhaps the Church
    could help, or maybe they should appeal to Reinado through the
    media, but that there should be no direct negotiations.  Lu-Olo
    took a hard-line stance of no state negotiations:  surrender or
    arrest.  If the Church is used, the word will leak out and the
    state will be damaged.  Gusmao said the GOET should not contact
    the Church, and that only Correia should.  Lu-Olo rejected
    talking to the media and all dialogue, but did suggest that
    perhaps Father Domingos Maubere might talk to Reinado.  (Note:
    Father Maubere is known as pro-Alfredo Reinado and is often
    opposed to the ruling Fretilin party.  Observers suggest,
    however, that his close occupation-era ties to independence
    movement leaders continue to afford him respect and trust among
    current GOET leaders.)  Ramos-Horta wanted someone to take the
    GOET message directly to the media but in the end no one in the
    room was willing to do so, Rerden recounted.  (Note:
    Ramos-Horta had already addressed the nation on local television
    --- TVTL --- the night of March 8, telling Reinado that if he
    wants UN Police and ISF to withdraw, he must surrender all
    weapons.  The speech resulted in rumors that same night that the
    PM had announced Reinado's surrender and the withdrawal of ISF
    troops, a false interpretation of a confusing speech that Rerden
    said reached all the way to Canberra).

    Military Operation Described
    ------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Rerden also briefed us on the military operation.  He
    said the overall mission  remained one of  "apprehending Reinado
    and his men," without casualties if at all possible, with
    surrender being the primary emphasis of the operation.  He said
    the March 4 operation "was a success" because it met the
    prerequisite of no civilian casualties.  Reinado's side had five
    killed in the course of two significant engagements initiated by
    Reinado's side, Rerden confirmed.  Rerden described how ISF
    called out for Reinado to surrender one last time in the early
    hours of Sunday morning when ISF was staged for an assault, and
    then initiated the attack with teargas.  ISF's Australian and
    New Zealand forces continued to call out to Reinado's group to
    surrender during the beginning of the assault even though they
    were being fired upon, and did not fire back until it became
    clear that Reinado's men were not going to cease fire, and
    because they were in imminent danger, Rerden said.  ISF assumed
    great risk in operating in this manner but minimization of
    civilian casualties was preeminent, Rerden told us.  There would
    have been many more than five casualties had they acted more
    aggressively, he said.  There were no Australian casualties, he
    confirmed.

    ¶8. (C) One of Reinado's key lieutenants - "Nixon" - was found in
    the company of nuns who were nursing his injuries; they
    subsequently turned him in to ISF after prolonged negotiations.
    There were four killed in initial reports, but ISF later found a
    fifth casualty who had fallen off a steep embankment after being
    shot.

    ¶9. (C) ISF conventional forces were pulling out of Same and
    operating at a lower operational profile because larger forces
    were actually spooking Reinado's men to stay under cover, Rerden
    said.  They are now operating in a smaller, covert manner in the
    hope that the fugitives can be lured into the open.  ISF is no
    longer conducting vehicle checkpoints in the Same area.  Same is
    no longer a restricted area and is safe for general passage.
    (Note:  Rerden invited Emboffs to visit Same and following a
    check by RSO with ISF and other security officers that Same is
    safe, Emboffs arrived in Same the afternoon of March 12 to talk
    firsthand with persons on the scene.  Emboffs are also talking
    with sources in other parts the western region to determine the
    extent of Reinado's support.)

    Interesting Operational Notes
    ------------------------------

    DILI 00000101  003.2 OF 003

    ¶10. (C) Rerden said the focus of continuing surveillance
    operations is along the Ainaro - Same - Alas corridor.
    Reinado's group is greatly dispersed and operating in 2-3 man
    teams; over 25 escaped from the target area during the ISF
    assault on March 4, more than likely armed.  ISF also is closely
    watching suspicious maritime activity, largely due to Reinado's
    penchant for using the sea as a means of facilitating his own
    operations; the night of March 8 there was a boat operation in
    Dili which resulted in the boarding of one underway vessel by
    ISF helicopter commandos; no weapons were found, and boat
    occupants were released following the search.  Rerden said
    Reinado will hear about this search, and this may dissuade him
    from conducting boat operations.  Contrary to previous reports,
    no tunnels were found at the Portuguese fort Reinado was
    encamped at in Same.

    Rerden:  Reinado Support All Hype
    ------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) Rerden said that contrary to their initial analysis that
    Reinado was moving  from town to town building support, they now
    believe that he kept moving because townspeople "got sick of
    him."  Claims of widespread Reinado support are all media hype,
    he opined.  Rerden cited threats of mass demonstrations that
    never materialized.  There was no big reaction in any western
    cities nor any sign of discontent.  An ISF officer talked with
    69 petitioners in Gleno the night before the assault to discuss
    the operation in a public diplomacy outreach.  They all
    sympathized with Reinado but none said they would join him.
    "Maybe he was too much of a loose canon," Rerden said.

    ¶12. (C) Rerden described a call the night before the assault by
    Prosecutor General Monteiro to Reinado, in which negotiations
    lasted for a couple of hours, with Ramos-Horta and Rerden
    listening quietly in on speaker phone.  Finally, Ramos-Horta got
    fed up with the dialogue and gestured to Monteiro to cut off the
    dialogue.  The assault came a few hours later.

    U.S. Officials Offer Support, Caution
    --------------------------------------

    ¶13. (C) CDA reiterated to Rerden and Twomey that the USG fully
    supports ISF and Australian policy in this operation and that we
    will work in close cooperation with them.  We cited how we have
    conveyed the importance of Reinado surrendering, and our support
    for the GOET/ISF operation, in all our meetings.  We also
    conveyed how we are rebuffing overtures to communicate with
    Reinado and the petitioners (F-FDTL soldiers dismissed last year
    after they complained of discrimination in the military) in
    order to not jeopardize the ISF operation, and that we will
    continue to share information that might be important for that
    operation.  We shared information from our meetings with the
    President, the Bishop, Benevides and others.  We did caution
    Rerden that his assessment of lack of support for Reinado only
    took into account the reaction by such groups as the Movement
    for National Unity and Justice (MUNJ) and the petitioners, and
    immediate visible public reaction; that Reinado might be seen
    more as an icon than a hero, and that apprehension or killing of
    Reinado could cause a groundswell of grassroots reaction
    triggered by other factors such as disillusionment with the
    government and poverty, although no one can predict.  We said
    our staff would be traveling to western parts of East Timor over
    the weekend to take the pulse of the people in order to gauge
    support for Reinado and his cause.
    HARSHA

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