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### Viewing cable 07MADRID545, SPAIN/CUBA: FM MORATINOS PLANNING TO VISIT HAVANA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07MADRID545 | 2007-03-23 17:05 | 2010-12-10 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    VZCZCXRO4133
    PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMD #0545/01 0821710
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231710Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2149
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 5146
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0490
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0322
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1113
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0581
    RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2559
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0181

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000545

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
    TAGS: PREL CU SP
    SUBJECT: SPAIN/CUBA: FM MORATINOS PLANNING TO VISIT HAVANA

    REF: A. MADRID 426

    ¶B. LISBON 750
    ¶C. MADRID 538

    MADRID 00000545 001.2 OF 003

    Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary. MFA Director General for Iberoamerica Javier
    Sandomingo informed DCM on March 23 that Spanish Foreign
    Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos plans to visit Cuba, though
    no date has been fixed. Sandomingo (strictly protect) shared
    this with the DCM during a readout of the March 17 visit to
    Madrid of Cuban FM Felipe Perez Roque, making clear that
    Moratinos himself was the strongest proponent of a high level
    Spanish visit to Cuba and that others in the media "and in
    the Zapatero Government" opposed such a visit. He said that
    MFA Secretary of State for Iberoamerica Trinidad Jimenez, who
    was on travel with the Royal family, had asked Sandomingo to
    brief the DCM on Moratinos' intention to visit Cuba, per her
    agreement to keep the USG informed (REF A). Sandomingo
    assessed that a Moratinos visit could help advance Spanish
    objectives in Cuba, including increased dialogue with
    potential post-Castro leaders, Cuban agreement to allow the
    resumption of Spain's development aid to Cuba, and the
    reopening of the Spanish Cultural Center in Havana that was
    shut down by Castro in 2003.

    ¶2. (C) The DCM asked whether Spanish officials saw any real
    signs of change in Cuban Government policy that would warrant
    such optimism or the symbolism of a high level Spanish visit,
    noting the Cuban Government's continued strong repression of
    dissidents. Sandomingo acknowledged that he did not see much
    evidence of substantial policy shifts in Cuba, but allowed
    that such changes might be taking place. He reviewed overall
    Spanish objectives in Cuba, saying the fundamental objective
    was to get the Cuban Government "to leave its people alone
    and let them lead normal lives." The DCM asked that the USG
    be informed immediately if a date was set for a Moratinos
    visit, noting that any surprises would be badly received by
    the USG since we had tried in good faith to coordinate Cuba
    policy with Spain. Sandomingo said that Trinidad Jimenez had
    emphasized with Moratinos the need to advise partners prior
    to making news of such a visit available to the press.
    Post's assessment is that Moratinos is indeed the driving
    force behind Spanish plans to visit Havana. The Zapatero
    Government's desire to firm up its left wing in the runup to
    key May 27 regional/municipal elections may be one factor in
    Moratinos' plans to go to Cuba, but his rivalry with Jimenez
    and his conviction that he can affect change in Cuba through
    good relations with Perez Roque may be more important
    considerations. The fact that this visit does not have
    unanimous support virtually guarantees that internal
    differences on this policy will be aired in the Spanish
    media. End Summary.

    //PEREZ ROQUE VISIT//

    ¶3. (C) The DCM requested the meeting with Sandomingo to
    review the March 17 visit of Cuban FM Perez Roque (REF B).
    Sandomingo provided a brief readout, saying Perez Roque had
    mostly reviewed long-standing Cuban grievances, such as the
    EU Common Position, the existence of the 2003 EU Restrictive
    Measures on Cuba (suspended at Spain's behest in 2004), and
    the continuing elaboration of an EU strategic document
    regarding Cuba. Sandomingo discussed Spain's views on each
    of these issues, saying that the Common Position was not
    particularly effective, but it was the best available tool in
    the absence of EU consensus on how to deal with Cuba. He
    said that Spain had "nothing against" the development of a
    strategic document on Cuba at the EU level, but that the
    drafts shared by other EU members contained language that
    would guarantee a break in Cuban-EU relations. Sandomingo
    asserted that maintaining a principled stand on the need for
    democracy in Cuba was a key element of Spanish policy, but so
    was Spain's determination to keep open its channels to the
    Cuban leadership. The DCM noted that President Zapatero
    himself had recently publicly declared his preference for a
    democratic Cuba and suggested that further statements by
    Spanish officials along these lines would be very helpful in
    sending the right message to the Cuban leadership.

    //MORATINOS WANTS TO GO TO CUBA//

    ¶4. (C) Ending his review of Perez Roque's visit, Sandoming
    said that, at Trinidad Jimenez's request, he wanted the DCM
    to know that the MFA was working to lay the groundwork for a

    MADRID 00000545 002.2 OF 003

    Moratinos visit to Havana and that he (Sandomingo) would be
    going to Cuba on March 25 to establish the parameters for
    such a visit. Sandomingo said that he would not be going to
    Havana with proposed dates, but said that it was Moratinos'
    intention to visit Cuba. (NOTE: The conservative Spanish
    daily "ABC" reported March 23 that Moratinos planned to visit
    Cuba during the second half of April, despite mixed signals
    from Jimenez as to whether this trip was on the agenda. END
    NOTE). Sandomingo pointed to the controversial nature of
    this planned visit and said that he expected strong criticism
    of a Moratinos visit not only from the opposition Popular
    Party, but also from Spanish "media generally sympathetic to
    the Zapatero Government and from members of Zapatero's
    Government itself." However, he dismissed as irrelevant the
    media speculation surrounding contradictory public statements
    by Trinidad Jimenez this week regarding Cuba, telling the
    Spanish Senate on March 19 of MFA plans to visit Cuba, then
    telling a Parliamentary committee on March 21 that there were
    "no plans to visit Cuba."

    ¶5. (C) Sandomingo said that the Spanish Government saw Cuba
    as being in the initial phase of a period of change, though
    Fidel Castro's reemergence might delay progress for the time
    being. He said that Spain's primary objective at the moment
    was to promote stability in Cuba and to put itself in a
    position to influence the orientation of the post-Fidel Cuban
    leadership. He suggested (without much enthusiasm) that a
    Moratinos visit could advance specific Spanish objectives in
    Cuba, including:

    -- Cuban agreement to allow resumption of Spanish development
    programs in Cuba, unilaterally suspended by Cuba in 2003.
    Sandomingo said that, ideally, Spain could convince Havana to
    allow the resumption of all EU aid, but that the resumption
    of Spanish aid alone would represent a victory. He said that
    Spanish aid was aimed at fomenting the growth of Cuban civil
    society.

    -- Cuban agreement to reopen the Spanish Cultural Center in
    Havana shuttered by the Cuban authorities in 2003.
    Sandomingo said that he had opened the Cultural Center during
    his stint as charge d'affaires in Havana and that the first
    session had been a discussion of Spain's political transition
    (much to the annoyance of Cuban Government officials). He
    said that the Cultural Center had served as one of the few
    channels of uncensored information to the Cuban people and as
    a "free space" for Cuban intellectuals and other citizens.

    -- Launching discussions on Cuba's need to repay outstanding
    official short-term debt to Spain (REF C). Sandomingo
    assigned much lower priority to this objective, saying the
    political objectives were at the forefront of Spanish MFA
    efforts.

    //FEW SIGNS OF CHANGE//

    ¶6. (C) The DCM asked whether Moratinos decision was final.
    Sandomingo said that the decision would not be finalized
    until dates for a visit had been fixed, but that he was
    certain that Moratinos wanted to go to Cuba. The DCM asked
    whether Spain saw any signs of positive change in Cuba that
    would warrant such a high level visit, noting that the regime
    continued to crack down on dissidents. Sandomingo
    acknowledged that he had not seen anything more than minor,
    unspecified indicators of a desire for change by Cuban
    officials. However, he allowed that change might be underway
    and that this could justify a Moratinos visit. Sandomingo
    reviewed Spain's objectives in Cuba, which he broadly defined
    as convincing the Cuban leadership to "leave its people alone
    and let them lead normal lives." He said that,
    unfortunately, Cuba's repressive apparatus had eliminated
    internal political pressure as a factor, but said that the
    poor socio-economic conditions experienced by the Cuban
    people represented a significant factor that did have to be
    taken into account by the Cuban Government. Spain's
    assessment is that some in the Cuban leadership, including
    around Raul Castro, agree with the need to cease harrassing
    the population and are open to reform. Sandomingo argued
    that it was important to encourage Cuba's post-Castro
    leaders, to make them feel less fearful of change and
    therefore more willing to accept a shift in the status quo.

    //KEEPING USG INFORMED//

    ¶7. (C) The DCM underscored the importance of Spain

    MADRID 00000545 003.2 OF 003

    maintaining close consulations and a dialogue with the USG on
    Cuba and asked that the MFA advise the USG immediately if
    Moratinos confirmed his plans to travel to Cuba. The DCM
    reiterated A/S Shannon's request that Spain "not leave the
    USG alone" on Cuba and coordinate with us as much as
    possible, given our joint interest in a democratic Cuba. He
    laid down a marker, cautioning Sandomingo that any surprise
    announcement of a Moratinos visit to Havana would be badly
    received in Washington, particularly in light the USG's good
    faith effort to coordinate with Spain on Cuba policy. The
    DCM regretted that he had had to wait five days for a readout
    of the FM Perez Roque visit after having first requested such
    a meeting on March 19. Sandomingo said he fully agreed on
    the need for good communication and noted that Trinidad
    Jimenez had emphasized to Moratinos the need to brief key
    partners (meaning the USG) before announcing to the media any
    specific plans by him to visit Havana. On the issue of
    discussions with the USG, Sandomingo said that Trinidad
    Jimenez would likely be forced to postpone plans for an April
    visit to Washington and that May presented a better
    opportunity. Sandomingo confirmed that both he and Jimenez
    would be in Madrid for the May 17-18 conference organized by
    the Inter American Dialogue.

    //COMMENT//

    ¶8. (C) While disappointing, Moratinos' planned visit to Cuba
    does not come a shock, given media reporting over the last
    few months of a possible visit. Post's assessment is that
    Moratinos is indeed the driving force behind Spanish plans to
    visit Havana. The Zapatero Government's desire to firm up
    its left wing in the runup to key May 27 regional/municipal
    elections may be one factor in Moratinos' plans to go to
    Cuba, but his rivalry with Jimenez and his conviction that he
    can affect change in Cuba through good relations with Perez
    Roque may be more important considerations. The Spanish
    Government is well aware of USG sensitivities on this issue
    (see REF A). The depth of internal differences within the
    Zapatero Government is somewhat surprising and reflects the
    varied expertise of those involved. Moratinos has little
    experience on Cuba and appears optimistic regarding his
    ability to change Cuban leadership behavior. By contrast,
    Trinidad Jimenez, Javier Sandomingo, and MFA DG for Foreign
    Policy Rafael Dezcallar have worked on Cuba for many years
    and are more skeptical of the Cuban leadership in general,
    and of Spain's capacity to change their behavior. In any
    case,the fact that this visit does not have unanimous GOS
    support virtually guarantees that internal differences on
    this policy will be aired in the Spanish media
    Aguirre

`