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### Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE596, NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09THEHAGUE596 | 2009-10-02 16:04 | 2011-01-22 17:05 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO0249
    RR RUEHIK
    DE RUEHTC #0596/01 2751600
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 021600Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3320
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000596

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ENRG EPET PREL NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL ENVOY
    MORNINGSTAR,S VISIT TO THE HAGUE, OCTOBER 7-9, 2009

    THE HAGUE 00000596 001.2 OF 004

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Post warmly welcomes you to The Hague to
    convene the 2009 Regional Energy Officers Conference. During
    your stay, you will also meet the Foreign Minister, Economic
    Affairs Minister, Royal Dutch Shell's Executive Director
    responsible for Russia/Central Asia, and address Dutch energy
    industry and policy leaders at the Netherlands' premier think
    tank. No high-level U.S. official has discussed energy
    security in the Netherlands (the world's fifth-largest
    natural gas exporter) in several years. The Dutch
    fundamentally share our commitment to enhancing Europe's
    energy security through diverse sources and supply routes.
    However, we would like the Dutch to take on a more prominent
    role within the EU to achieve these objectives and avoid
    backsliding into narrow commercial diplomacy. END SUMMARY.

    ---------------------
    DUTCH ENERGY OVERVIEW
    ---------------------

    ¶2. (U) The Netherlands' energy position is unique within the
    EU. It is the world's seventh largest gas producer and the
    EU's largest net exporter of gas by a wide margin. The
    Netherlands produces about 14 percent of the natural gas
    consumed in Europe and has observer status at the recently
    formed Gas Exporting Countries Forum. Since its discovery in
    1959, the giant Groningen field has helped underwrite the
    Dutch welfare state. (Note: Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil
    are 50/50 partners in Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij
    (NAM), the country's largest gas producer and 60 percent
    shareholder of the Groningen field; the Dutch state operator
    EBN owns the remainder. End note.) The Dutch economy runs
    on natural gas -- it accounts for 45 percent of primary
    energy supply and 58 percent of electricity production.

    ¶3. (U) The Netherlands' gas reserves are forecast to run out
    by 2030, forcing the Dutch to rethink their energy policy.
    To remain a regional energy player after its own resources
    are depleted, the Dutch government is patiently cultivating
    energy relationships with Russia, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Libya,
    Qatar, and Angola as long-term supplier countries. The
    Netherlands wants to develop as a natural gas roundabout --
    a hub that gathers natural gas from various sources (North
    Sea, LNG, Russia) and then distributes it via pipeline to
    continental Europe.

    ¶4. (U) The Dutch are also pursuing opportunities to develop
    gas storage reservoirs. The prevalence of depleted gas
    fields means the Netherlands has huge storage potential,
    either for natural gas or carbon dioxide (CCS). Abu Dhabi
    national energy company TAQA announced in December 2008 it
    would lead a consortium developing a USD 1 billion, 4.1
    billion cubic meter gas storage facility in Bergermeer (in
    conjunction with Gazprom and EBN) to be operational by 2013.
    The Dutch oppose EU regulations that would require each EU
    member state to have adequate gas storage capacity of its
    own. The Dutch want to provide storage service to others in
    the region -- for a price.

    ¶5. (SBU) The Port of Rotterdam is one of the world's major
    centers for crude oil imports, trading, refining, and
    petrochemical production. Key oil import sources include
    Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Norway. Vitol, Trafigura, and
    Shell operate there and export oil to Iran.

    ¶6. (U) The Dutch want Rotterdam to become an important
    destination for LNG as well. Dutch companies Vopak (liquid
    storage) and Gasunie (gas pipelines) are teaming up to build
    a 12 billion cubic meter (bcm) per year LNG terminal at the
    port, due for completion in 2011. TAQA is planning a
    sea-based LNG terminal near Rotterdam. On the other side of
    Qsea-based LNG terminal near Rotterdam. On the other side of
    the country, energy company Essent (now owned by Germany's
    RWE) is developing an LNG terminal with Vopak and Gasunie in
    Eemshaven, near the German border.

    ¶7. (U) Despite the GONL's enthusiastic support for strict EU
    renewable energy targets, the country derives only 2.5
    percent of its total energy supply from renewables, mostly
    biomass and wind. Grand plans and subsidy schemes abound for
    offshore wind parks in the North Sea, but these have not left
    the drawing board.

    ¶8. (U) The Netherlands has one 485 MW nuclear plant in
    Borssele, co-owned by utilities Delta and Essent. Delta
    wants to build additional reactors on the same site, but
    nuclear energy is a political taboo, and the current
    government is reluctant to approve any expansion plans.

    ¶9. (U) The Netherlands embraced full ownership unbundling of
    its electricity and gas utility companies in order to attract
    new investment capital and increae competition. Local
    THE HAGUE 00000596 002.2 OF 004
    government authorities have retained ownership of regulated
    network businesses, but foreign energy giants RWE and
    Vattenfall acquired the two largest Dutch energy supply and
    production companies -- Essent and Nuon, respectively -- in
    ¶2009. The Dutch government was frustrated when Germany and
    France succeeded in watering down the EU's unbundling rules
    in favor of national champions.

    -----------------------
    GASUNIE AND NORD STREAM
    -----------------------

    ¶10. (SBU) Dutch gas pipeline company Gasunie is 100 percent
    state-owned, unlike most other European gas infrastructure
    companies. The GONL maintains an arms-length relationship
    with Gasunie's management, expecting it to operate like a
    publicly traded company and earn a reasonable return of
    around 7 percent for the government, according to Finance
    Minister Wouter Bos.

    ¶11. (SBU) Gasunie holds a 9 percent stake in Gazprom's Nord
    Stream pipeline. This participation was announced during
    Prime Minister Balkenende's November 2007 visit to Russia.
    Gasunie CEO Marcel Kramer told post the GONL gave positive
    feedback to the deal as a way of retaining a significant
    role for the Netherlands in Europe's energy equation. To
    burnish Nord Stream's image, Gasunie has tried hard to
    portray the project as ambitious but realistic; to
    characterize Gazprom as driven by commercial concerns, not
    political ones; and to leverage the Dutch reputation as
    transparent, trustworthy businesspeople.

    ¶12. (SBU) Gasunie has a 60 percent share in the Bacton
    Balgzand Line (BBL), operational since 2006, which transports
    natural gas from the Netherlands to the UK (although it is
    bi-directional). Belgian gas transport company Fluxys and
    German energy giant e.ON Ruhrgas each have 20 percent shares.
    In exchange for Gasunie's share in Nord Stream, Gazprom
    received an option to buy a 9 percent stake in BBL. If
    Gazprom exercises this option, the shares will come from
    Gasunie, leaving it with a majority 51 percent. According to
    Kramer, Gasunie had to explain to Gazprom that BBL meets EU
    rules, meaning the shareholders just own and operate the
    pipeline but cannot dictate who runs gas through it. Post
    has heard that BBL did not reverse flow (i.e., send gas from
    UK to continental Europe) during the winter 2009
    Russia/Ukraine gas crisis.

    ¶13. (U) Gasunie bought BEB Transport -- the gas transport
    division of a German Shell/Exxon joint venture -- in November
    ¶2007. BEB's pipelines tie into Gasunie's existing network,
    linking the Netherlands to northern Germany, Berlin, Denmark,
    and the landing points for Norwegian gas.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    MEETING FOREIGN MINISTER AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS MINISTER
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶14. (SBU) Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen and Economic
    Affairs Minister Maria van der Hoeven constitute an active
    tag team on energy diplomacy with producer countries as they
    pursue the Netherlands' vision of becoming a gas hub.
    Verhagen, a career politician, and Van der Hoeven, an
    educator before embarking on politics, both belong to the
    center-right Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) party, the
    ruling coalition's largest. When you meet Van der Hoeven,
    she will have just returned from the Kazakhstan International
    Oil and Gas Expo and a September 23-26 visit to the U.S.
    where she met with Energy Secretary Chu. A planned meeting
    with Commerce Secretary Locke did not happen. Her Ministry
    of Economic Affairs (MEA) spans energy, commerce, and trade.
    Qof Economic Affairs (MEA) spans energy, commerce, and trade.
    In the past year, she has visited Angola (March 2009 to lobby
    for future LNG shipments to Rotterdam), Algeria (January 2009
    also for LNG supplies), Russia (December 2008 for broad
    energy investment), Qatar (October 2008 for LNG), and Saudi
    Arabia (October 2008 for broad energy investment). Verhagen
    visited Qatar and Saudi Arabia (May 2009) and Algeria
    (November 2008) to push for closer economic and energy
    cooperation as well as human rights.

    ¶15. (SBU) Under Van der Hoeven's lead, the Netherlands'
    overarching goals in the energy sector are similar to ours:
    maintain open markets, ensure diverse and secure supply
    sources, and develop new and clean alternatives to fossil
    fuels. As she said in a speech during her recent trip to
    Washington, The way to improve energy supply security is to
    build and maintain good relations with energy suppliers ...
    The solution is a variety of sources and suppliers ... to
    stimulate an energy mix for Europe that consists of the whole
    palette: fossil fuels, sustainable energy, and nuclear energy
    THE HAGUE 00000596 003.2 OF 004
    on a way to sustainable energy. The Dutch support the main
    points of EU strategic energy policy, especially
    interconnections. However, they are reluctant to be Europe's
    producer of last resort in the event of a gas crisis as they
    plan to draw down their reserves slowly, prolonging the
    buffer they enjoy by virtue of their domestic production.

    ¶16. (SBU) We expect Verhagen and Van der Hoeven to raise the
    following issues:
    -- U.S.-EU Energy Council: The Netherlands will want to play
    an active role in the proposed UEEC and will be eager to hear
    the U.S. vision for this body.
    -- Caspian Basin: The Ministers will be interested to discuss
    how the United States and the Netherlands can align our
    energy strategy in the region. They will also want to
    exchange views on the Caspian Development Corporation.
    -- Energy Charter Treaty: Russia's decision to withdraw from
    the ECT caught the Dutch by surprise. They judge it to be a
    self-defeating move but will want to maintain other channels
    of EU-Russia dialogue on energy matters.
    -- Turkey/Southern Corridor: Minister Verhagen will likely
    share the Dutch perspective on Nabucco and relations with
    Turkey. (Note: Former Nabucco coordinator and Dutch
    Foreign Minister Jozias van Aartsen is now Mayor of The
    Hague. End Note.)
    -- International Energy Forum: The Dutch have firm advocates
    of IEF's producer-consumer dialogue. (Note: IEF Secretary
    General Noe van Hulst is a Dutch national and former DG for
    energy at MEA. End note.)
    -- Russia: The Dutch acknowledge we have some differences
    concerning Russia (see below) and will want to discuss them.
    -- Iran: The GONL and Shell (see below) are both concerned
    about proposed U.S. legislation to impose sanctions on
    companies selling refined products to Iran. They think this
    will only succeed in giving Chinese and Russian companies
    access to Iran's hydrocarbon resources at the expense of U.S.
    and European competitors.

    ¶17. (SBU) Commercial interests are always central to Dutch
    economic relations and nowhere is this more evident than with
    Russia. For example, during President Medvedev's June 2009
    visit to the Netherlands, he met with representatives from
    major Dutch companies including Shell, Phillips, and ING.
    According to a well-placed MEA official, Prime Minister
    Balkenende hit if off with Gazprom Chairman (and former
    Russian PM) Viktor Zubkov during the visit and they agreed
    that energy and gas cooperation remains central to their
    relationship. The two countries committed to increasing
    Russian companies' investment in the Port of Rotterdam, and
    Russia's Lukoil acquired a 45 percent stake in a Total
    refinery in south Holland. However, the Dutch are defensive
    about the clubby atmosphere of these twice-yearly high-level
    visits. GONL energy officials have told us bluntly in the
    past, Don't lecture us about Russia. They are especially
    sensitive to criticism about Nord Stream; MEA took offense at
    the September 2008 editorial written by the then U.S.
    Ambassador to Sweden raising objections to the pipeline.
    Despite close commercial relations with Russia, the GONL
    supports the so-called Gazprom clause and would likely try
    to block a Russian takeover of a Dutch utility without
    reciprocal market access.

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    SHELL
    -----

    ¶18. (SBU) As Forbes' number two global corporation (after
    GE), Rotal Dutch Shell exerts strong influence on Dutch
    foreign economic policy. For example, Simon Smits (MFA's
    Director for Economic Cooperation whom you will meet October
    Q7) recently returned from a secondment to Shell's government
    relations group. Finance Minister Bos also held executive
    positions at Shell in the 1990s before turning to politics.
    You will meet Matthias Bichsel, Shell's Executive Director
    responsible for Russia/Central Asia, on October 9. Large
    Dutch dredging and energy infrastracture companies such as
    Boskalis, Van Oord, and Fugro also enjoy substantial
    political influence.

    ¶19. (SBU) Shell tries to keep the U.S. government updated on
    the Persian LNG (PLNG) project. Shell is a minority partner
    in PLNG and has successfully delayed a final investment
    decision for several years. Shell wants to keep a foothold
    THE HAGUE 00000596 004.2 OF 004
    on the project and not let (yet another) lucrative, long-term
    Iranian energy contract go to China, but knows it cannot move
    ahead on the project in the current climate. Shell would
    welcome another UNSC resolution that levels the playing
    field by imposing broader trade sanctions on Iran and
    forcing Chinese and Russian firms to comply, thereby reducing
    the IOCs' competitive disadvantage.

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    CLINGENDAEL
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    ¶20. (U) Your participation in the Eurasian Energy Security
    roundtable with Minister van der Hoeven at the Clingendael
    International Energy Program will send a positive signal
    about U.S. willingness to engage with European allies on this
    issue. The audience will include Dutch energy executives and
    policy makers eager to hear your remarks and ask you
    questions about U.S. international energy strategy.
    LEVIN

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