Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 11218 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04 2011/05
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10 2011/04/11 2011/04/12 2011/04/13 2011/04/14 2011/04/15 2011/04/16 2011/04/17 2011/04/18 2011/04/19 2011/04/20 2011/04/21 2011/04/22 2011/04/23 2011/04/24 2011/04/25 2011/04/26 2011/04/27 2011/04/28 2011/04/29 2011/04/30
2011/05/01

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03 1985/06
1986/05
1987/06
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1991/05
1992/01 1992/12
1993/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/05 2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/06 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/01 2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/01 2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Apia Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Auckland Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belmopan Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town Consulate Calgary
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dili Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guayaquil Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Ho Chi Minh City Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamilton Consulate Hamburg Consulate Halifax
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kingston Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USOSCE Mission USNATO Mission UNESCO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manila Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy Nicosia Embassy New Delhi Embassy Ndjamena Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito Consulate Quebec
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Suva Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate St Petersburg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Toronto Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Office Almaty US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok Consulate Vancouver
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF AM AJ ASEC AS AFIN AMGT AU AE AR ABLD AG AY AORC ASIG AEMR APER AMBASSADOR ASEAN AA AL ASUP ABUD AMED AX APECO AID AUC ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ADANA AFFAIRS AND AN ADCO ARM ATRN AECL AADP ACOA APEC AGRICULTURE ACS ADPM ASCH AMEX ACAO ANET AODE ARF ACBAQ APCS AMG AQ AMCHAMS AORG AGAO ADM AFSI AFSN AINF AIT ASEX AO ATFN AROC AFGHANISTAN AFU AER ALOW AC AZ AVERY AGMT
BA BRUSSELS BR BL BM BEXP BH BTIO BIDEN BO BT BC BU BY BX BG BK BF BBSR BMGT BTIU BE BD BWC BB BP BILAT
CA CW CH CO CONDOLEEZZA CR CASC CSW CVIS CPAS CMGT CS CI CU CJUS CY CDG CE CG CBW COUNTER CN CKGR COUNTERTERRORISM CODEL CWC CJAN CIA CD CLINTON CT CARSON CONS CB CM CFED CLMT CROS CNARC CIDA CBSA CIC CEUDA CHR CITT CAC CACM CVR CDC CAPC COPUOS CBC CBE COM CDB CAN COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CACS CF CL CIS CTM CV CICTE
DR DEA DA DOMESTIC DHS DAO DCM DEPT DTRA DPRK DEFENSE DE DJ DISENGAGEMENT DOD DEAX DOE DK DS
ENRG EPET ETRD EFIS ECON EK EAID EUN ES EFIN EWWT ECIN EINV ETTC EAGR EC ELAB ECPS EN EG ELTN EAIR EPA ER EI EU EZ ET EIND EINVECONSENVCSJA ECONOMICS EXTERNAL ELN ELECTIONS EMIN EINN EFINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENIV ECUN EINT ENGR ENNP EUR EAP EEPET ETRDEINVTINTCS ENVI EFTA ETRO ESENV ECINECONCS ENVR ECONOMY ECONOMIC EUMEM EAIDS ETRA ETRN EUREM EFIM EIAR EXIM ERD EAIG ETRC EXBS EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL ECA ENERG ENGY ECONCS EINVETC ECONEFIN ESA ETC ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH
FI FR FREEDOM FTAA FARC FAO FJ FMLN FBI FOR FTA FOREIGN FINANCE FO FISO FDA FAC FOI FM FINR
GG GT GM GV GH GOI GA GTIP GR GZ GE GCC GY GOV GAERC GANGS GL GLOBAL GERARD GF GAZA GTMO
HO HA HK HUMAN HU HR HILLARY HSTC HUMOR HEBRON HI HURI HYMPSK
IWC IR IZ ICAO IV IRS IC IS IT IZPREL IRAQI IO IN IAEA ID ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IPR INRB IMO ITALY ICRC INTERPOL IQ ICTY INTELSAT IEFIN IA INR IRC IACI ITRA IL ICJ INTERNAL ISRAELI INMARSAT ITU ILC IBRD IMF ILO IDP ITF IBET IGAD IEA IAHRC ICTR IDA IIP INRA INRO IRAJ IF
JP JA JO JOSEPH JOHNNIE JM JUS JAMES
KSCA KNNP KIPR KOLY KS KPAO KMPI KDEM KZ KG KJUS KRVC KICC KTIA KISL KTIP KCRM KWMN KMDR KVPR KV KHLS KU KTFN KIRF KR KPKO KTDB KIRC KGHG KFRD KCOR KE KSUM KPAL KSEP KSTC KGIC KOMC KFLO KAWC KUNR KNPP KIDE KNEI KBIO KPRP KN KWBG KMCA KCIP KTEX KGIT KNSD KCFE KLIG KFLU KBCT KOMS KBTS KACT KCRS KGCC KDRG KWMM KAWK KHIV KSPR KRAD KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KSTH KPAI KHSA KTLA KO KFSC KVIR KX KFTFN KHDP KPLS KSAF KMFO KRCM KCSY KSAC KPWR KTRD KID KWNM KMRS KICA KRIM KSEO KPOA KCHG KREC KOM KRGY KCMR KSCI KFIN KVRP KPAONZ KCGC KNAR KMOC KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KNUC KPIN KPRV KBTR KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNUP KTER KDDG KPAK KREL KCOM KNNPMNUC KRFD KHUM KDEV KCFC KWWMN KTBT KWMNCS KJUST
LE LY LU LTTE LI LO LH LG LAB LA LABOR LOG LT
MNUC MARR MASS MCAP MIL MO MOPS MU MX MEPI MR MDC MPOS MEETINGS MD MTCRE MK MUCN MY MASC MRCRE ML MA MEPP MAR MAPP MP MT MAS MTS MLS MI MERCOSUR MC MV MEDIA MILI MEPN MG MW MIK MTCR MARAD MZ MOPPS MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MTRE
NZ NL NATO NO NAFTA NDP NIPP NP NS NPT NU NI NATIONAL NPG NGO NG NK NA NSSP NRR NSG NSC NPA NORAD NT NW NEW NH NSF NV NR NE NSFO NC NAR NASA NZUS
OTRA OEXC OIIP OVIP OAS OREP OSCE OPRC ODIP OSAC OPIC OPDC OFDP OIE OECD OPCW OVP OPAD OFDA OIC OSCI OMIG OBSP ON OCS OCII OHUM OTR OFFICIALS
PGOV PARM PREL PHUM PTER PINR PK PREF POL PINS PSOE PAK PBTS PHSA PAO PM PF PNAT PE POLITICS PARMS PBIO PSI POLINT POLITICAL PARTIES PL PA PROP PO PGOVLO PORG PGOVE PLN PINF PRELP PAS PPA PRGOV PUNE PG PALESTINIAN POLICY PROG PDEM PREFA PDOV PCI PRAM PTBS PSA POSTS PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PGIV PHUMPGOV PCUL PSEPC PREO PAHO PMIL PNG PP PS PHUH PEPR PINT PU PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PMAR PHUMPREL PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PGGV PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PEL POV
QA
RICE RUPREL RU RS RIGHTS RO RW RSP RP REACTION REPORT RCMP RSO RF RFE RM RIGHTSPOLMIL ROBERT REGION
SENV SCUL SNAR SOCI SW SMIG SP SZ SA SY SENVKGHG SU SF SAN SR SO SHUM SYR SAARC SL SI SNARCS SWE SN SARS SPCE SNARIZ SCRS SC SIPDIS SEN SNARN SPCVIS STEINBERG SG SIPRS SH SOFA SANC SK ST SEVN
TPHY TW TC TX TU TI TN TS TT TRGY TO TH TBIO TSPL TIP TP TERRORISM TURKEY TSPA TD TZ TFIN TNGD TINT THPY TBID TF TL TV TAGS TK TR TRSY
UNSC UZ USEU US UN UK UP USTR UNGA UNMIK USUN UNESCO UNHRC UY UNO UG UNDC UAE UNAUS UNDESCO UNHCR UNEP UNCHC UNFICYP UNCHR USNC UNIDROIT UNCSD UNDP UNC UNODC USOAS UNPUOS UNCND USPS UNICEF UV UNCHS UNVIE UE USAID
VZ VT VE VTPREL VM VI VAT VN
WS WTRO WITH WHO WTRQ WBG WI WTO WHA WMD WMO WIPO WHTI WFP WB WWARD WA WEU WZ
XM XV XF XR XA XK XH XL XS XG XW XY XE XT XD XZ XX XTAG XQ XB XU XI XC
YM YI YMCS YE
ZR ZI ZANU ZU ZO ZP ZB ZL ZK ZF ZEALAND ZN ZA ZOELLICK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 05OTTAWA268, PLACING A NEW NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #05OTTAWA268.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05OTTAWA268 | 2005-01-28 15:03 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Ottawa

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    281556Z Jan 05

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000268

    SIPDIS

    SENSITIVE

    STATE FOR WHA/CAN - BREESE AND HOLST

    WHITE HOUSE/NSC - SHIRZAD

    STATE PASS USTR FOR CHANDLER

    USDOC FOR 4320/OFFICE OF NAFTA/GWORD/TFOX;
    3134/OIO/WESTERN HEMISPHERE

    TREASURY FOR IMI

    GENEVA FOR USTR

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: ETRD EINV CA
    SUBJECT:  PLACING A NEW NORTH AMERICAN INITIATIVE
           IN ITS ECONOMIC POLICY CONTEXT

    REF:  (A) 04 Ottawa 3431  (Regulatory agenda)

          (B) 04 Ottawa 066   (Canadian trade policy)

    SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION
    --------------------

    ¶1. THIS MESSAGE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR
    DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE USG CHANNELS.

    ¶2.    (SBU) An incremental and pragmatic package of tasks
    for a new North American Initiative (NAI) will likely gain
    the most support among Canadian policymakers.  Our research
    leads us to conclude that such a package should tackle both
    "security" and "prosperity" goals.  This fits the
    recommendations of Canadian economists who have assessed the
    options for continental integration.  While in principle
    many of them support more ambitious integration goals, like
    a customs union/single market and/or single currency, most
    believe the incremental approach is most appropriate at this
    time, and all agree that it helps pave the way to these
    goals if and when North Americans choose to pursue them.

    ¶3.    (SBU) The economic payoff of the prospective North
    American initiative - in terms of higher incomes and greater
    competitiveness - is available, but its size and timing are
    unpredictable, so it should not be oversold.  Still, a
    respectable economic case has been made for such an
    initiative, and this message spells it out.  We believe
    that, given growing Canadian concern about "border risk" and
    its effects on investment, a focus on the "security" side
    could also produce the most substantial economic/trade
    benefits.

    END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION

    CANADIAN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
    -----------------------------

    ¶4.   (SBU) Canadian economists in business, academia and
    government have given extensive thought to the possible
    options for further North American integration.  Nearly all
    of this work assumes that each of the three countries is
    pursuing standard economic policy goals - growth,
    productivity and competitiveness (rather than more specific
    concerns raised by Mexican analysts such as migration
    management, regional development, or environmental
    protection).  Since 9/11, Canadian economists working in
    this area have generally endorsed a comprehensive initiative
    with the United States on security, trade, and immigration.
    Following is our summary of the professional consensus:

    PROCESS:  At this time, an "incremental" approach to
    integration is probably better than a "big deal"
    approach.  However, governments should focus on
    choosing their objectives, and not on choosing a
    process.

    BORDER VS. PERIMETER:  Even with zero tariffs, our land
    borders have strong commercial effects.  Some of these
    effects are positive (such as law enforcement and data
    gathering), so our governments may always want to keep
    some kind of land border in place.  Canada and the
    United States already share a security perimeter to
    some degree; it is just a question of how strong we
    want to make it.

    BORDER RISK:  The risk that business will be obstructed
    at the border by discretionary U.S. actions, such as
    measures to defend against terrorism or infectious
    disease, in addition to growing congestion, have become
    major risks to the economy, inhibiting investment in
    Canada.  For small businesses, the complexities of
    navigating the border are apparently even more
    intimidating than the actual costs.  Reducing this risk
    is Canada's top motive for pursuing further
    integration.

    LABOR MARKETS:  Many Canadian economists point to labor
    markets - both within and among countries - as the
    factor market where more liberalization would deliver
    the greatest economic benefits for all three countries.
    They advocate freeing up professional licensing laws,
    and developing a quick, simple, low-cost work permit
    system, at least for U.S. and Canadian citizens.

    REGULATION:  Canadian economists agree that Canadian
    regulations (if not their standards, then their
    complexity) are needlessly restricting foreign
    investment and impeding food, communications and other
    industries.  (Inter-provincial differences are
    important here, since Canada's federal government does
    not have the benefit of a U.S.-style "interstate
    commerce" clause).  While much of the problem is
    domestic in nature, an international initiative could
    help to catalyze change.

    CUSTOMS UNION:  A common external tariff, or a customs
    union which eliminated NAFTA's rules of origin (ROO),
    is economically desirable.  NAFTA's ROO are so
    restrictive that importers often prefer to pay the
    tariff rather than try to prove North American origin.
    However, economists differ on the size of the benefits
    available and on whether these would justify the effort
    of negotiation.  One study estimated that a full
    customs union which eliminated ROO would only raise
    national income by about one percent.

    CURRENCY UNION:  Canadian economists are split on
    whether a return to a fixed exchange rate, or adopting
    the U.S. dollar, would benefit Canada in current
    circumstances.  (Canada last tied its dollar to the
    U.S. dollar from 1962 to 1970).  The central bank
    governor has taken the position that "monetary union is
    an issue that should be considered once we have made
    more progress towards establishing a single market."

    NORTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION:  WHAT WE KNOW
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶5. (SBU) Past integration (not just NAFTA but also many
    bilateral and unilateral steps) has increased trade,
    economic growth, and productivity.  Studies suggest
    that border efficiency and transportation improvements
    (such as the lower cost and increased use of air
    freight) have been a huge part of this picture.
    Indeed, they may have been more important to our
    growing prosperity over the past decade than NAFTA's
    tariff reductions.  Freight and passenger aviation are
    critically important to our continent's
    competitiveness, and businesses are very sensitive to
    the timing, security, and reliability of deliveries -
    hence the "border risk" which so concerns Canadian
    policymakers.

    ¶6. (SBU) A stronger continental "security perimeter"
    can strengthen economic performance, mainly by
    improving efficiency at land borders and airports.  It
    could also facilitate future steps toward trilateral
    economic integration, such as a common external tariff
    or a customs union, if and when our three countries
    chose to pursue them.  Paradoxically, the security and
    law enforcement aspects of the envisioned initiative
    could hold as much - or more - potential for broad
    economic benefits than the economic dimension.
    WHERE'S THE UPSIDE?
    -------------------
    ¶7. (SBU) Some international economic initiatives (such
    as FTAs) produce across-the-board measures that
    generate broad benefits for a country's industries and
    consumers on a known time-line.  This was true of NAFTA
    but it is less likely to be true of the economic
    aspects of the NAI.  Non-tariff barriers such as
    standards and regulations generally must be tackled one-
    by-one.  This is a piecemeal process and the ratio of
    payoff to effort is likely to be lower than with across-
    the-board measures.  Governments naturally focus on
    resolving the problems which their firms or citizens
    bring to their attention.  While this approach has
    merits, it tends to deliver the payoffs toward
    particular interests.  If there are hidden costs, there
    might be little impact on national performance.  As we
    move toward a list of barriers to tackle, it will
    remain important to balance those interests.  For
    example, some Canadian economists have suggested that
    NAFTA fell short of expectations with respect to
    increasing consumer choice in Canada; that may be a
    theme we should stress as efforts to promote further
    integration take shape.

    ¶8. (SBU) In contrast, cooperative measures on the
    "security" side, a critical focus of current bilateral
    efforts,  can deliver substantial, early, and
    widespread economic benefits.  Security and law
    enforcement within North America have evolved rapidly
    since 9/11, leading to many less-than-perfect processes
    for handling legitimate international traffic.
    Collaboration to improve these processes could yield
    efficiency improvements which would automatically be
    spread widely across the economy, leading to general
    gains in trade, productivity, and incomes.

    A NOTE OF CAUTION
    -----------------

    ¶9. (SBU) There is little basis on which to estimate the
    size of the "upside" gains from an integration
    initiative concentrating on non-tariff barriers of the
    kind contained in NAI.  For this reason, we cannot make
    claims about how large the benefits might be on a
    national or continental scale.  When advocating NAI, it
    would be better to highlight specific gains to
    individual firms, industries or travelers, and
    especially consumers.

    CELLUCCI

`