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### Viewing cable 05ANKARA4857, RUMBLINGS IN ULTRA-NATIONALIST MHP

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05ANKARA4857 | 2005-08-18 12:12 | 2011-04-20 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ankara

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 004857

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2025
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS TU
    SUBJECT: RUMBLINGS IN ULTRA-NATIONALIST MHP

    REF: A. ANKARA 1730
         ¶B. 2004 ANKARA 7211
         ¶C. ANKARA 1774
         ¶D. ANKARA 0501

    Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; E.O. 12958, reasons
    1.4 (b,d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  Although the current Turkish political
    environment should provide right-nationalist MHP with an
    excellent opportunity to challenge ruling AKP, MHP has failed
    to gain much traction.  MHP leadership,s failure has
    contributed to a growing dissident movement within the party.
     The core problem, however, is that MHP's ideology is rooted
    in the fear of the dissolution of the Turkish state-nation
    and it is unable to address the challenges of globalization
    and economic development.  End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) The failures and missteps of AKP over the past several
    months (REFS A and B); the widespread anxiety regarding the
    future of the Turkish economy; the increase in PKK-related
    violence; and the anti-American and anti-EU tone in the media
    have stimulated the latest nationalist backlash.  Thus the
    current political environment provides an excellent
    opportunity for ultra-nationalist National Action Party (MHP)
    to mount a challenge against ruling Justice and Development
    Party (AKP) (REF C).

    -------------------------------
    IS SUPPORT FOR MHP ON THE RISE?
    -------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Many political commentators and Embassy contacts
    assert that support for MHP is on the rise.  MHP Vice
    Chairman Faruk Bal asserted to POLOFF that party functions
    are well attended and party leaders are well received when
    they deliver speeches to audiences around the country.  On
    August 7, MHP held its 16th annual campout and party rally at
    Erciyes Mountain in Kayseri.  Turkish newspapers reported
    that approximately 500,000 people attended the rally.

    ¶4. (C) There is substantial evidence, however, that MHP,s
    popularity is not on the rise.  MHP deserves credit for
    hosting a rally with 500,000 attendees, but this is roughly
    the same number as have attended MHP,s Erciyes Mountain
    rallies in previous years.  ANAR pollster Ibrahim Uslu,
    moreover, recently told POLOFF that his polls indicate that
    MHP is still below the 10 percent threshold for
    representation in parliament.  Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the
    ARI movement told POLOFFs that his liberal-nonpartisan
    organization,s recent surveys indicated that MHP is polling
    only around 6 percent.  A recent TNS/PIAR poll published in
    Radikal newspaper also placed MHP,s support at around 6
    percent.  MHP member and longtime Embassy contact Riza
    Muftuoglu also believes that MHP remains below the 10 percent
    threshold and he blames this on the failure of the current
    party leadership.

    -------------------------
    POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN MHP
    -------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Party members outside the central administration are
    frustrated with party chairman Devlet Bahceli and the
    leadership,s inability to mount a successful challenge
    against AKP.  There are also lingering irritations over the
    leadership,s decision to join the DSP-led coalition
    government from 1999-2002.  By joining that coalition
    government, MHP shared the blame for the 2000 and 2001
    economic crises and was maneuvered into endorsing policy
    positions that had been anathema to MHP,s grassroots, e.g.
    joining the EU, abolishing the death penalty, supporting a
    life sentence instead of execution for PKK terrorist leader
    Abdullah Occalan, and lifting legal restrictions on the
    Kurdish language.  Muftuoglu told POLOFFs that MHP should
    never have joined the DSP-led government, but even after
    joining they should have left the government during the 2001
    economic crisis or in the summer of 2002 before the
    elections.

    ¶6. (C) Party dissidents led by former minister Namik Kemal
    Zeybek and former party vice chairman Ramiz Ongun have
    accumulated at least 265 signatures calling for an
    extraordinary party convention, more than the 238 signatures
    required.  (Comment.  Some party dissidents claim that they
    have collected over 550 signatures.  End Comment.)  The party
    administration is trying to resist the call for an early
    convention by claiming that some of the signers have changed
    their minds since signing the petition, but a low-level
    Turkish court ruled that MHP must hold a convention.  Whether
    or not MHP will be forced to hold a party convention this
    year is still unclear.
    ¶7. (C) Bahceli has responded to these internal threats by
    having the party make a propaganda film entitled "Orange
    Revolution, Purple Violets" in which he accuses internal and
    external opponents of the party as being part of a global
    plot designed to weaken the Republic of Turkey.  (Comment.
    Bahceli's preference for blaming outsiders is similar to the
    approach of CHP leader Baykal.    Earlier this year, Baykal
    responded to internal challenges to his party leadership by
    accusing the USG being behind efforts to replace him (REF D).
     End Comment.)  The film also accuses the US and EU of
    working together to expand their global power by fomenting
    recent revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and other countries.

    -----------------------------------
    THE FAILURE OF NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
    -----------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) There is a widespread recognition in the party that
    nationalism has failed to adapt to globalization and Turkish
    economic realities, but leading MHP theorists are unable to
    develop a detailed explanation of how Turkish nationalism
    should address the problems of globalization and economic
    development.

    ¶9. (C) Dr. Umit Ozdag is a thuggish nationalist intellectual,
    foreign policy theorist, and one of the individuals trying to
    replace Bahceli as chairman of MHP.  Ozdag recently stepped
    down as president of the Eurasian Strategic Research Center
    (ASAM) so he could devote more time to political activity: he
    told POLOFFS that he delivered over 100 speeches around the
    country in the past year.  The pistol-packing Ozdag is
    clever, but he is not a rigorous thinker and he wraps himself
    in conspiracy theories.  Intense and wily, he is utterly
    lacking in charm or charisma.

    ¶10. (C) Ozdag has written a book calling for a renewal of
    Turkish nationalism, but the thin 100 page opus minimus is
    heavy on rhetoric and light on policy specifics.  He wants
    Turkey to be a wealthy and powerful country and he recognizes
    that this requires Turkey to embrace globalization, but he is
    unsure how to proceed.  He is skilled at recognizing the
    problems and at making nationalistic arguments in favor of
    addressing the problems, but he is unable to develop detailed
    or rational policy proposals that would address the host of
    socioeconomic issues facing Turkey.  (Comment.  In this
    regard he is no different from most Turkish intellectuals on
    the social democratic left and the center-right.  End
    Comment.)

    ¶11. (C) His political ideas are a logically inconsistent
    combination of anti-European conspiracy theories, nationalist
    sentiments, statist solutions, and grudging recognition of
    the realities of globalization and American power.  Ozdag,
    for example, calls for an end to Turkey's EU membership bid
    and a termination of Turkey's Customs Union with the EU, but
    he also wants Turkey to sign a free trade agreement with the
    EU.  (Comment.  Unlike the Customs Union, a free trade
    agreement would allow Turkey and the EU to set different
    tariffs for non-EU countries.  End Comment.)  He states that
    Turkey should end its relationship with the IMF and that this
    step should be preceded by raising the domestic savings rate
    so that IMF loans are not needed, but he is unable to explain
    how the country could accomplish this goal.  He argues that
    Turkish agriculture needs to be modernized and he recognizes
    that this would require the consolidation of landholdings and
    cause social disruptions, but he is unable to propose any
    policies to address these challenges, other than recommending
    that new apartment buildings be built in smaller towns and
    cities.  Ozdag also calls for state-directed economic
    investment in "strategic sectors" and state-encouraged
    research into "high technology", but he is unable to
    elaborate on how this should be done.

    ¶12.  (C) Ozdag also argues in his book -- and in
    conversations with POLOFFs -- that the Europeans are trying
    to create a "Turkish Milosevich," i.e. someone who will lead
    Turkey into an ethno-religious civil war that will result in
    the dismemberment of the country.  Ozdag says that Turkey
    must resist this; but given the relish with which he
    discusses this scenario, we suspect he harbors dark fantasies
    of being Turkey's nationalist leader during a time of
    ethno-religious civil war.
    ¶13. (C) Dr. Riza Ayhan is a professor of international trade
    law at Gazi University in Ankara and another candidate to
    replace Bahceli.  In manner and demeanor he is the exact
    opposite of Ozdag: Ayhan is very smooth and self confident
    with a patrician (if not imperial) style.  Ayhan told POLOFF
    that nationalism must adapt to the realities of
    globalization, but he was unable to elaborate on what he
    meant by this phrase.  As with Ozdag, Ayhan recognizes many
    of the problems facing Turkey and Turkish nationalism, but he
    is unable to come up with more than vague policy
    recommendations.

    ¶14. (C) Ayhan initially told POLOFFs that he was not looking
    to replace Bahceli as leader of MHP, but later admitted ---
    with an air of noblesse oblige --- that other nationalists
    may put him in a position where he is forced to challenge the
    party leader.  When POLOFF asked him to describe Turkish
    nationalism, Ayhan started by stating what it was not, e.g.
    not racist, not undemocratic, not anti-American, and not
    fascist.  (Comment.  This is a mantra that POLOFFs have heard
    repeatedly during their meetings with MHP party members.  End
    Comment.)  Ayhan was very critical of the EU, but he avoided
    --- at least in initial conversations with POLOFFs --- any
    conspiracy theories and, moreover, he expressed the hope that
    Turkey would join the EU in time for the 100th birthday of
    the Republic (i.e. 2023).

    ¶15. (C) Sevket Bulent Yahnici is considered by many Turkish
    observers to be another leading MHP intellectual.  Yahnici is
    a former MHP MP from Ankara, but he is not a candidate to
    replace Bahceli.  Yahnici is slovenly and disorganized.  He
    met POLOFFs in his office/apartment which was littered with
    books and papers.  He sat in a large chair next to a nargile
    (Turkish water pipe) with ashes on the floor.  He started the
    conversation by trying clumsily to bait POLOFF with
    anti-Christian rhetoric.  He then complained about rural
    migration to Ankara and lamented that he was one of the few
    Ankara-born MP to represent the province in the last
    parliament.  (Note.  He claimed that most of Ankara's
    twenty-nine MPs were born elsewhere.  End Note.)

    ¶16. (C) This was followed by a long rant about the Iraq war
    in which Yahnici blamed ethnically Kurdish MPs for voting
    against the failed 1 March 2003 resolution authorizing the
    deployment of U.S. forces into Iraq via Turkey because the
    Kurdish MPs wanted to sabotage US-Turkish relations and
    provide a catalyst for the creation of an independent
    Kurdistan in northern Iraq.  He then eagerly launched into
    another long rant about the threats the EU reforms pose to
    the unity and survival of the Republic of Turkey.  Yahnici
    was completely unable to provide POLOFF with a definition of
    Turkish nationalism, other than to repeat the standard MHP
    mantra that nationalism isn't racist, fascist, etc.  Yahnici
    agreed with other nationalists that economic issues and
    globalization are serious challenges, but he was unable to
    explain how nationalism relates to these topics.  Near the
    end of the conversation, Yahnici blamed the MHP leadership
    for failing to develop and adequately explain the nationalist
    ideology.

    --------------------------------------------- --
    TURKISH NATIONALISM ROOTED IN FEAR AND PARANOIA
    --------------------------------------------- --

    ¶17. (C) Ultimately, MHP's ideology is rooted in fear and
    paranoia.  Turkish nationalists inside and outside of MHP
    have told POLOFFs that they believe that the Turkish
    nation-state formation process is incomplete and that
    enhanced democratic and minority rights could result in the
    dismemberment of the country.  Many nationalists, moreover,
    do not trust the EU or the U.S.  Some believe that the West
    European countries have deviously designed the EU membership
    reforms in a way that would weaken the Turkish state/military
    and result in the formation of an independent Kurdistan in
    southeastern Turkey.  They also choose to believe --- as do
    many Turks --- that the USG orchestrated the rise of the AKP,
    supports the PKK terrorist organization, and is bent on a
    policy of world domination.  In fact, when Turkish
    nationalists tell POLOFFs that Turkey and the U.S. need to
    form a strong alliance it is because they want Turkey to be
    on the side of the global hegemon, not because they share
    specific U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives.

    ¶18. (C)  Comment.  As Turkey moves down the EU road --- and
    especially once the EU requires reforms that will result in
    short-term economic pain --- the MHP will have many
    opportunities to build a powerful political movement
    galvanized around Turkish fear, paranoia, and opposition to
    the EU.  MHP's leadership, however, has been unable so far to
    capitalize on this opportunity because it is mired in the
    policy mistakes of the DSP-led coalition government.  If a
    new leadership is able to gain control of the party; overcome
    the mistakes of the past; reform the party's ideology so that
    it can address the challenges of economic modernization and
    globalization in a persuasive manner; attract a large number
    of ideologically motivated young people to the party; and
    build a loyal cadre of hardworking grassroots activists, then
    MHP will be in a position to challenge AKP.  The degree to
    which this revitalized MHP will also contribute to
    anti-Americanism will be directly linked to how clearly
    nationalists perceive the U.S. to be on Turkey's side in the
    fight against the PKK in northern Iraq.  End Comment.
    MCELDOWNEY

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