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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT955, MGLE01: NON-HIZBALLAH SHIA PERSPECTIVE ON

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT955 | 2006-03-27 07:07 | 2011-04-08 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8637

`

    VZCZCXRO2166
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
    DE RUEHLB #0955/01 0860709
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 270709Z MAR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2768
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000955

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
    TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
    SUBJECT: MGLE01:  NON-HIZBALLAH SHIA PERSPECTIVE ON
    NATIONAL DIALOGUE

    Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b).

    SUMMARY
     -------
    ¶1.  (C)  Shia MP Ali Bazzi and MP Ali Osseiran view the
    on-going national dialogue as an important development whose
    long-term impact considerably outweighs any immediate
    results.  These independent Shia politicians believe that,
    although several formerly sensitive issues had already
    entered public discourse (Hizballah's arms, Lahoud's
    legitimacy, Palestinian militias), the dialogue was the first
    time these issues were being discussed by the principal
    protagonists face-to-face.  Bazzi, however, believes that
    regional involvement, specifically intermediation efforts by
    Saudi Arabia, will be necessary to resolve the thorniest
    issues, because they all involve the Syrian regime.  Shia MP
    Ali Osseiran, on the other hand, insists that US/Syrian and
    US/Iranian relations are the real key to progress in Lebanon.
     Osseiran contends that Damascus and Tehran still call the
    shots for Hizballah and, with international pressure
    increasing on Iran, is certain that Tehran will prevent
    Nasrallah from moving too far -- especially with regard to
    Hizballah's arms.  Concerning the Palestinian militias
    located in Lebanon, Osseiran believes they are a spent force,
    remarking "certainly Nasrallah would prefer to keep them as a
    buffer against disarmament pressure, but few in the Shia
    community care for them, and Shia leaders have decided to let
    the government disarm them."  End summary.

    ¶2.  (SBU)  MP Ali Bazzi, an Amal ally of Nabih Berri who
    holds a US passport and represents a constituency in Bint
    Jubayl (a few miles north of the Blue Line), met with poloff
    on March 22 at his office in parliament.  MP Ali Osseiran,
    who comes from a long line of political leaders -- his father
    was Speaker of Parliament in the 1950s -- and represents the
    south Lebanon district of Zahrani, met with poloff the
    following day in south Beirut.  Both legislators are regarded
    as honest, dedicated public servants.  They share the
    characteristic of blunt conversation and neither believes
    Hizballah should be the only representative of the country's
    Shia community.

    ABOVE EXPECTATIONS
    ------------------

    ¶3.  (C)  MP Bazzi expressed modest surprise that the national
    dialogue's headstrong participants have been able to maintain
    relative comity during nearly three weeks of meetings.  When
    he first learned of Berri's plan for the conference, he did
    not give it much chance of success and felt that Jumblatt and
    Aoun in particular would use the forum to grandstand.  He now
    believes that despite the attendees apparent inability to
    resolve two core issues -- Lahoud's presidency and
    Hizballah's arms -- the fact that they have placed these
    issues on the table is significant and will set the stage for
    further discussion and resolution in the next few months,
    particularly regarding the presidency.

    ¶4.  (C)  The chain-smoking delegate from Bint Jubayl
    acknowledged that the presidency issue had become more
    difficult in the past few days.  Whereas in the initial
    sessions, Hassan Nasrallah had indicated that a list of
    several presidential candidates would be acceptable -- as
    long as the candidates' intended policies regarding the
    "resistance" were presented up front -- now the Hizballah
    leader was insisting that only one candidate could be
    proposed by the Maronitecommunity.  This change of position
    resulted fro a realization that the country's electoral
    systm basically allows Hizballah/Amal an effective vet for
    only one round of parliamentary voting to select a president.

    ¶5.  (C)  Bazzi felt that Nasrllah was seriously calculating
    the costs of stayng with Lahoud -- who he remarked that even
    in the Shia community was becoming something of a laugh line.
     But being a cunning politician, Bazzi believed Nasrallah was
    patiently waiting for the best deal to switch his support.

    ¶6.  (C)  With regard to how much the national dialogue would
    actually accomplish, Bazzi said the answer depended on Saudi
    Arabia's influence with the Asad regime, because nearly all
    the issues under consideration had a Syrian component.
    Although he was not aware of specific plans, he suspected
    that next week's Arab Summit in Khartoum would be the scene
    of concerted arm twisting for Syria to make concessions on
    diplomatic relations, demarcation of borders, and the Lahoud
    presidency.

    BEIRUT 00000955  002 OF 002

    ALI OSSEIRAN TAKES A BROADER VIEW
    ---------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C)  MP Osseiran, who last year was considered a leading
    candidate for Speaker before Nabih Berri seized the prize,
    predicted that Hizballah would faithfully obey its Iranian
    sponsors and jealously protect its arms for as long as
    possible.  In his opinion, Nasrallah had skillfully
    eliminated all opposition in the Shia community and had made
    Hizballah an important regional asset for the ambitious
    Iranian regime.  Osseiran strongly believed it was wishful
    thinking on the part of Hariri, Aoun and others that they
    could somehow moderate Hizballah and negotiate a near-term
    disarmament.

    ¶8.  (C)  The veteran member of parliament said, like it or
    not, US relations with Syria and, more importantly Iran, were
    the key to resolving Lebanon's difficulties.  Osseiran said
    his evaluation envisions continued hostile relations between
    the US and the two regional powers over the difficult issues
    of Iraq and nuclear weapons, and as long as that conflict
    persists, Syria and Iran will keep as many proxies as
    possible in the region, specifically in Iraq, Lebanon, and
    the West Bank/Gaza.  He suggested that perhaps a deal could
    be made that would finish off the decaying Lahoud presidency,
    but the primary objectives of the international community as
    expressed in UNSCR 1559 were most likely not achievable in
    the current political environment.  Additionally, Osseiran
    was not optimistic regarding the establishment of normal
    diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon and plainly
    expected the Syrian regime to delay, obfuscate, and deny
    responsibility.

    PALESTINIAN ARMS
    ----------------

    ¶9.  (C)  Other than the status of Lahoud, the only other
    issue which was possible to resolve at this time was the
    disarmament of the Palestinian militias located outside the
    twelve established refugee camps and "better control" of the
    militias inside the camps.  Osseiran remarked that the
    Palestinian leadership in Lebanon was inept and had
    squandered considerable goodwill.  This mismanagement, along
    with residual Lebanese resentment over Palestinian actions
    during the long civil war, had put the community in a
    vulnerable political situation.  He commented on the relative
    ease with which the national dialogue members reached
    consensus on disarming/controlling the Palestinian militias,
    and said the door to this action had actually been opened by
    Abu Mazen several months ago when he stated that Palestinian
    refugees in Lebanon were "guests" and had responsibilities as
    such.

    ¶10.  (C)  Even with this success, however, the veteran
    politician expressed his regret that further progress on
    other issues, such as bilateral relations and offering the
    Shia community political alternatives, appeared unlikely for
    the foreseeable future.
    FELTMAN

`