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### Viewing cable 06LAPAZ417, MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06LAPAZ417 | 2006-02-16 23:11 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy La Paz

`

    VZCZCXRO0302
    PP RUEHLMC
    DE RUEHLP #0417/01 0472310
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 162310Z FEB 06
    FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8110
    INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5607
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 2872
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6744
    RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3968
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1316
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1215
    RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 3568
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3953
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 8470
    RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL
    RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 000417

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA A/S T.SHANNON AND PDAS C.SHAPIRO
    STATE FOR WHA/AND P.FRENCH AND L.PETRONI
    NSC FOR D.FISK
    USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SNAR PINR PHUM EAID BL
    SUBJECT: MINISTER OF PRESIDENCY ON COCA, ERADICATION, AND
    BILATERAL RELATIONS

    REF: LA PAZ 0406

    Classified By: Ambassador David Greenlee for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramos de la
    Quintana told the Ambassador February 15 that the GOB wanted
    USG agencies to continue their programs in the Chapare,
    though implementation methods may need to be modified. He
    acknowledged that the GOB's counternarcotics policies were
    still being formulated, but assured that the GOB's commitment
    to combat the illicit drug trade would be met and that the
    cocalero federations did not speak on the GOB's behalf.
    Quintana said the depenalization and industrialization of
    coca was a priority for President Evo Morales. The Minister
    said cocaleros would be paid to eradicate coca in the
    national parks while other negotiated alternatives would be
    pursued with the cocalero federations. On interdiction,
    Quintana asked for greater information sharing from the DEA
    on organized criminal networks. When the Ambassador raised
    objections about anti-U.S. rhetoric creeping into GOB
    statements, the Minister blamed the Bolivian press for
    distorting reality. Quintana was forthright, somewhat
    confused, and suspicious of USG programs. The new GOB may or
    may not be disposed ideologically to work with us; but it
    certainly does not yet have the internal cohesion or
    coherence to cooperate effectively. End Summary.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    FIRST MEETING WITH MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY QUINTANA
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶2. (C) At our request, the Ambassador, DCM, and Econ/Pol
    Chief met the evening of February 15 with Minister of the
    Presidency Juan Ramos de la Quintana to seek clarification of
    GOB policy regarding USG programs in the Chapare. Newspaper
    headlines that morning carried the cocalero federations'
    decision to throw out USG agencies operating in the region, a
    position supported by GOB spokesman Alex Contreras (see
    reftel). The Ambassador told Quintana that the federations'
    statements--Evo Morales remains their titular head--and the
    apparent presidential endorsement had sparked considerable
    confusion about the GOB's intent. The Ambassador suggested
    that if eradication is to be stopped and USG involvement in
    the Chapare ended, the new policy should be communicated
    officially and we could begin shutting off our multi-million
    dollar assistance programs now.

    ¶3. (C) Quintana responded that he appreciated open, frank
    exchanges free of entangling rhetoric and underscored the
    GOB's continuing need for U.S. help on the counternarcotics
    front. But, he added, that message is not being clearly
    communicated because "...we do not yet have an agreement
    between the GOB and all the relevant actors on this issue."
    At the same time, he said the cocalero federations did not
    speak on behalf of the GOB, which has a stronger commitment
    than previous administrations and wants to "...break the
    stigma that Bolivia protects narcotraffickers."

    ¶4. (C) In that vein, Quintana claimed the GOB had a sound
    strategy to combat the illegal drug trade: compartmentalizing
    the problem into "clear chapters" for greater enforcement
    efficiency on the one hand, and depenalizing coca for
    industrialization and commercialization on the other.
    "Depenalization is a complex but necessary task because we
    want coca to have commercial and industrial purposes. This
    is an explicit priority for the President," he said, adding
    that the GOB would meet next week with EU representatives to
    discuss the terms of the demand study required for domestic
    purposes. (Note: While not stated, the implication was that
    the EU study should include consideration of Bolivian
    domestic demand to include coca necessary for these
    yet-only-imagined industrial purposes. End Note).

    --------------------------------------------- -

    LA PAZ 00000417 002 OF 003

    A NEW APPROACH TO ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶5. (C) Quintana said the GOB would preserve the best of
    previous GOB policies, including eradication, but implement
    them differently. The first priority, he offered, is to
    limit additional cultivation, although he added curiously
    that the GOB would not strictly interpret the 3200 hectare
    limit for Chapare cultivation set aside by the October 2004
    agreement. He assured that eradication would continue in the
    two problem areas of the Carrasco National Park and the
    Yungas de Vandiola, saying that he would travel to the region
    himself this weekend to meet with cocaleros, but noted that
    existing military eradicators would work only in the areas
    where they can proceed peacefully, with negotiation--an
    open-ended concept--the rule in more conflictive zones.

    ¶6. (C) Quintana saw no change in the GOB's willingness to
    cooperate with the USG on interdiction and noted that the DEA
    was welcome to stay in the Chapare. The GOB's non-political
    approach to interdiction was exemplified, he said, by the
    non-partisan appointment of a new chief for the
    counternarcotics police. The Minister asserted that these
    units had committed human rights violations in the past, a
    situation this GOB would not tolerate. The Ambassador
    retorted that any such incidents did not involve DEA agents
    and that we shared Quintana's concern about human rights.
    Quintana went on to say that he was not critical of the
    results obtained by interdiction efforts, but of the methods
    used to obtain them. "In the past, because of the weakness
    of Bolivian institutions, USG involvement appeared more like
    intervention than cooperation. We ask that your cooperation
    be transparent, conducted with consideration and respect."
    While expressing a desire to be autonomous in their
    interdiction operations, he acknowledged the need for the
    USG's offer of helicopters and other equipment "in the spirit
    of shared responsibility," and said the GOB had no plans to
    alter the DEA's role in the drug enforcement arena.

    ¶7. (C) When the Ambassador asked what immediate changes in
    the interdiction efforts were contemplated, Quintana observed
    that the GOB had little understanding of how criminal
    organizations operated in Bolivia. "All we get," he
    complained, "are statistics on drugs intercepted and labs
    destroyed, but nothing on Bolivian criminal organizations and
    their links to other countries. This makes us suspicious
    that the counter-narcotics efforts are not sufficiently
    explained to the GOB or the Bolivian people." He also
    lamented that the Bolivian anti-drug unit (FELCN) did not
    have an institute to study criminal organizations. The
    Ambassador replied that maintaining the integrity of
    international criminal investigations was crucial but that he
    would raise the issue with the DEA.

    -------------------
    INTELLIGENCE ISSUES
    -------------------

    ¶8. (C) The Minister noted that the GOB wanted its
    intelligence services to respond better to the needs of the
    GOB and was suspicious of their relationship with the DEA.
    (Note: Quintana associated intelligence cooperation only with
    the DEA and the counternarcotics effort. End Note.) The
    Minister said that he wanted "a more democratic intelligence
    service" in the future. The Ambassador noted USG interest in
    promoting intelligence cooperation on counter-terrorism
    issues as well, given regional threats in the Tri-Border
    region and elsewhere, and suggested a subsequent meeting to
    discuss these issues in greater depth.

    -----------------------------------------
    MUTUAL DESIRE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
    -----------------------------------------

    LA PAZ 00000417 003 OF 003

    ¶9. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern about anti-U.S.
    rhetoric creeping into GOB statements and policies and warned
    that gratuitous insults did not encourage strong bilateral
    ties. Talking about imaginary U.S. military bases in
    Paraguay "as you have done publicly, Mr. Minister," does
    little to build confidence. Noting the billions of U.S.
    dollars of assistance in the past few decades, including the
    nearly one million in disaster assistance for Bolivian flood
    victims, the Ambassador observed that the USG would sometimes
    appreciate a good word or thank you, something President
    Morales notably forgot to offer in his conversation with
    President Bush.

    ¶10. (C) While acknowledging that the GOB probably had no
    intention of ratifying an Article 98 agreement, the
    Ambassador asked that the GOB respect the U.S. position
    without intentionally mischaracterizing it and claiming that
    the U.S. sought to shield its soldiers from justice. The
    issue is one of jurisdiction, not immunity, he said, and
    noted that over 100 countries had signed Article 98
    agreements with the U.S.

    --------------------------------------------- ------
    ATTACKING THE PRESS AND RE-ORIENTING USG ASSISTANCE
    --------------------------------------------- ------

    ¶11. (C) Quintana, perhaps a little disingenuously, said he
    shared the Ambassador's concerns about poisonous rhetoric,
    but blamed the press for distorting the GOB's comments about
    the U.S. He described the Bolivian press as unprofessional
    and perverse because it was too closely associated with
    political parties. At the same time, Quintana said the U.S.
    was counterproductively omnipresent in Bolivian
    institutions--an ironic exageration in view of reportedly
    increasing Venezuelan and Cuban presence--and suggested that
    our assistance was too dispersed to be strategically
    effective. He lamented the uneven economic development
    throughout the country, noting that Potosi remained in abject
    poverty while Santa Cruz was developing fast "with its
    radical federalist ideas," and suggested a U.S. Corps of
    Engineers road project uniting the country would be a smart,
    focussed investment. The Ambassador reminded Quintana that
    the GOB nixed expanded military help by attacking us on
    Article 98.

    ¶12. (C) Comment: Quintana seemed forthright, a little
    confused, and abidingly suspicious of USG intentions. He
    exposed inaccurate views about existing USG programs, a
    strong ideological bent on coca, and a disturbing
    disaffection with the media--particularly disturbing since
    the MAS is considering laws to limit freedom of press. His
    most revealing comment was that the GOB is still struggling
    to clarify its policies, including on counternarcotics.
    Whether the new GOB wants to work with us is an open
    question; whether it can work with us is equally perplexing.
    End Comment.
    GREENLEE

`