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### Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA249, EVALUATING PARIS PACT ON AFGHANISTAN: OPTIMIZING THE NEXT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09UNVIEVIENNA249 | 2009-05-29 14:02 | 2011-04-28 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | UNVIE

`

    VZCZCXRO6028
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHUNV #0249/01 1491442
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    O 291442Z MAY 09
    FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9517
    INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1665
    RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
    AFGHA/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0099

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000249

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958:  N/A
    TAGS: KCRM PREL PTER SNAR UN AF PK CA RU IR UK

    SUBJECT:  EVALUATING PARIS PACT ON AFGHANISTAN: OPTIMIZING THE NEXT
    PHASE

    REF: A: 08 UNVIE VIENNA 170
     B: KABUL 1064
     C: UNVIE VIENNA 195
     D: UNVIE VIENNA 152

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A May 14 briefing for donor and participant
    countries by the consultant UNODC hired to assess the Paris Pact
    emphasized inefficiencies in expert roundtable meetings, the
    unsustainable Pact footprint, the Pact's enduring political utility,
    and under-utilization of the ADAM system, all observations which
    attendees welcomed.  The consultant noted that the Automated Donor
    Assistance Mechanism (ADAM), which lists all donor assistance
    programs in Afghanistan with the aim of avoiding duplication, is
    technically sound but under-utilized and that the 15 Paris Pact
    expert roundtables held in the last five years developed many
    recommendations with little follow-up action.  He stressed that the
    Paris Pact should develop in depth, but not breadth because the
    current wide coverage, from Afghanistan to the Caspian and Black
    Sea, is not sustainable.  Furthermore, that the increase in members
    and round-table participants is an inefficient way to utilize
    resources and ineffective in making concrete decisions.  He
    concluded that the donors would have to decide whether they would
    want to continue to fund the Paris Pact, which is entering its third
    phase.  Donor comments included calls for operational results and
    more coordination with other regional organisms.  Based on these
    comments, the consultant will prepare a draft report to UNODC by
    June 10, and a final report by end of June.  Mission believes that
    the USG should support a third phase for the Paris Pact.  However we
    recommend that we start working with other donors to find ways to
    improve the efficiency of the Paris Pact before the consultant
    submits his final report.  END SUMMARY.
    --------------------------------------------- --------
    Briefing Donors: Expert Roundtable not Expert Enough
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶2. (SBU) The UNODC hired UK's Omega Consultancy to carry out a
    five-year review of the Paris Pact Initiative.  On May 14, Omega's
    Neil Bailey briefed donor and other member countries.  He summarized
    his sources, methods, preliminary findings, and next steps.  The
    Paris Pact is completing its second phase, which began in January
    2007 and will end in December 2009.  For his evaluation, Bailey
    attended Pact meetings, interviewed meeting participants and senior
    UNODC officials, and reviewed Pact documents from previous expert
    roundtables.  He concluded that if the Paris Pact were to be
    extended to a third phase, it should "extend by depth, not breadth."
     He was encouraged that host governments were well-disposed to the
    Pact's National Security Analysts (NSAs).  He considered the large
    Pact footprint, now extending from Afghanistan into central Asia and
    beyond, as unsustainable.  He questioned the cost and utility of the
    expert roundtables which, by his calculations, absorbed nearly $1.4
    million of the Pact's $3.2 million budget for Phase II.  (Of the
    rest of the budget, $800,000 went to ADAM, and $1.1 million to NSA
    support).  The Phase II roundtables, in his view, also proved less
    useful, as countries sent participants based on rank or political
    importance rather than technical expertise.  That, coupled with the
    growing number of participants (more than 100), resulted in
    political recommendations that had little practical utility.

    -----------------------------
    ADAM Suffers from Lack of Use
    -----------------------------

    ¶3.  (SBU) Bailey commented that the Automated Donor Assistance
    Mechanism (ADAM) suffered technical problems during the first phase
    which have been resolved.  However, donors have not been using ADAM
    during Phase II.  (Note: ADAM is intended to provide a database of
    assistance programs in Afghanistan, in order to avoid duplication of
    donor programs.  However, this requires donors to update their
    programs regularly, something which donors apparently have not been
    doing.  End Note.)  Counselor noted that seizures of precursor
    chemicals under Operation TARCET were helpful because they provided
    concrete, tangible results to justify support for the Paris Pact.
    Counselor also highlighted that donor ambassadors, in an informal
    meeting on the margins of the last Policy Consultative Group meeting
    in December, had proposed establishing concrete benchmarks to
    measure the Pact's effectiveness.  The Russian and Austrian
    representatives echoed this sentiment.

    ¶4. (SBU) Bailey characterized the Pact roundtables as having become
    examples of "narco-tourism."  The 15 roundtables held in the last
    five years have consumed a majority of the Paris Pact budget.  He
    noted that in 2003, experts attended the Pact roundtables, but in

    UNVIE VIEN 00000249  002 OF 003

    2006, experts were fewer in number.  Instead, countries have been
    sending delegates because of their rank or political influence.  As
    a result, Bailey claimed, it is difficult for the round tables to
    reach meaningful, practical recommendations.

    ¶5. (SBU) Bailey acknowledged that nothing much has been done with
    many of the roundtables' recommendations.  Some of the
    recommendations from the last three years could have been taken
    forward, but were not.  He lamented the increasingly political
    nature of the participants.  He proposed that donor countries could
    remedy this by restricting the use of their funds for the
    participation of relevant experts only.  Bailey also noted the
    importance of limiting the size, number, attendance, and agenda, as
    well as changing the format of the roundtables.

    ¶6. (SBU) Counselor commented that instead of holding annual
    roundtables on different topics, Pact partners should focus on
    implementation of the recommendations produced by the 15 round
    tables of the last five years.  She proposed that some future round
    tables could be devoted to reviewing the progress of implementing
    past recommendations.  Russia voiced enthusiastic support for a
    third phase of the Pact, but advocated a "comprehensive, balanced
    approach" consisting of partnerships with other regional
    organizations for the third phase, such as Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization (SCO).  Russia also voiced its desire to expand the
    Paris Pact mandate to include tracking financial flows.  (Note:  In
    various Vienna fora related to Afghanistan, Russia has always tried
    to give prominence to the regional organizations which Russia leads,
    such as the SCO.  It has also been a longstanding, albeit
    unsuccessful, advocate of some kind of financial security belt
    around Afghanistan.  End Note.)

    ¶7. (SBU) Bailey noted that the roundtables generated an
    "unmeasurable political benefit" simply because they occurred, but
    that operational results were now more important than ever.  He
    asked in conclusion if donor countries thought the Paris Pact should
    be extended to a third phase, or "left to wither."  Russia said it
    would "remain engaged" but would also consider how to make the
    Pact's approach more comprehensive to include issues like financial
    flows.  Several countries, including the U.S., said they would have
    to report back to capital.  Bailey closed by noting his draft report
    was due to UNODC June 10th, and the final report was due at the end
    of June.  He added that countries may email him with further
    questions and comments at neilbailey@aol.com.

    -----------------------------------------
    More Briefing: Afghanistan and Iran Clash
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶8. (SBU) Bailey repeated his findings to a group of about 15 Pact
    members after his briefing to the donors.  (Note: Some of the
    donors, such as Canada, did not attend the earlier briefing.  End
    Note.)  Before he could finish, the Afghan Ambassador asked Pact
    members to take note of the drug problems in Pakistan and Iran.  The
    Iranian Ambassador disagreed, noting the most problematic element in
    the drug supply chain is the production of heroin in Afghanistan, in
    its many labs.  He added that while Iran considers the Pact to be a
    productive forum for exchanging views - and is satisfied with its
    outcomes - it finds the Pact lacking in action.  He urged more
    action, specifically to focus on three fronts - production, transit
    areas, and consumption.

    ¶9. (SBU) Canada remarked on the difficulty producing actions from
    the roundtables, since the so-called action recommendations are
    often vague.  The Afghan Ambassador proposed to have future
    roundtables focus on something practical, like precursors.  Bailey
    reminded him that there was a precursor component in the 2006
    program review he conducted, but that recommended actions on
    precursors were never used.  He suggested reviewing demand and
    supply side projects in his report.  The Russian representative
    repeated Russia's position on regional organizations and financial
    flows (See para 7 above).  Egypt acknowledged the need for
    high-level action, and underlined the importance of evaluating
    program effectiveness.  Bailey suggested that future roundtables
    could be used to review the implementation of recommendations.  Iran
    voiced support for the Canadian and Russian positions on the Pact,
    adding that there could be one roundtable of technical specialists.
    Bailey stressed that any such expert group would be a small group to
    replace, not supplement, the roundtables.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶10. (SBU) The Paris Pact is a pioneer initiative for tackling the
    Afghan drug problem on a regional and technical basis.  It has

    UNVIE VIEN 00000249  003 OF 003

    served an important political function by bringing together experts
    from countries which may not be on speaking terms otherwise.
    However, as the consultant has observed, Paris Pact roundtables are
    losing their practical purpose and becoming increasingly political.
     While Mission believes the Pact is worthy of continuing U.S.
    support, we recommend that we start brainstorming with other donors
    in the coming weeks to determine what actions we can take to improve
    the Pact's efficiency  before the consultant submits his final
    report.  END COMMENT.

    SCHULTE

`