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### Viewing cable 08HELSINKI541, SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO FINLAND,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08HELSINKI541 | 2008-11-25 15:03 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Helsinki

`

    VZCZCXYZ0018
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHHE #0541/01 3301505
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 251505Z NOV 08
    FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4683
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
    RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0075
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4931
    RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0207

` `

    S E C R E T HELSINKI 000541

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018
    TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO FINLAND,
    DEC 4, 2008

    REF: HELSINKI 431

    Classified By: Ambassador Barbara Barrett for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. You will arrive in Finland as the Finns enjoy
    considerable international acclaim for their efforts in
    international crisis management, not only as a result of
    their effective Chairmanship of the OSCE, but also for the
    award of the Nobel Peace Prize to former President Martti
    Ahtisaari. While Finns are proud of their participation in
    peacekeeping operations, and the Government is committed to
    its comprehensive civilian-military approach to international
    crisis management, there remain divisions within the
    government on how to pursue its policies, in particular in
    relation to Afghanistan.  With the government currently
    reviewing its crisis management, development and Afghanistan
    policies, your visit provides an opportunity not only to
    thank Finnish leaders for the important role they have played
    within the OSCE, but also (1) to encourage Finland to
    continue to play a constructive role in promoting peace and
    security through Euro-Atlantic and other international
    institutions; (2) to contribute more military and development
    assistance to Afghanistan; (3) and to urge Finnish leaders to
    publicly support a common U.S.-EU policy on Russia. END
    SUMMARY.

    Political Overview
    ------------------

    ¶2. (SBU) As the head of the Finnish Government, Prime
    Minister Matti Vanhanen and his cabinet share
    responsibility for the implementation of Finnish foreign
    policy with President Tarja Halonen. Vanhanen leads a
    center-right governing coalition that has placed high
    importance not only on working through the EU, but also on
    improving Finland,s partnership with NATO and its overall
    relationship with the United States. We share with the GOF
    the view that creating global economic wealth and defeating
    terrorism require Western nations to engage in international
    security operations and use diplomacy to
    promote democratic values beyond the borders of Europe and
    North America.

    Comprehensive approach to crisis management
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶3. (U) Finnish participation in international peacekeeping
    operations dates back to the Sinai in the 1950s. As former
    President Martti Ahtisaari has stated, the Finns are
    internationally well-regarded because of their longstanding
    participation in operations and their reputation as "honest
    brokers and fair dealers."  Ahtisaari,s receipt of the Nobel
    Peace Prize and widespread praise for the Finns,
    Chairmanship of the OSCE support his assertion (OSCE
    scenesetter septel).

    ¶4. (C) The Finns describe their approach to international
    crisis management as comprehensive, seeking to utilize all
    resources - civilian and military, public and private - to
    best advantage.  On the military side, the GOF aims to
    maintain its international military presence at approximately
    680 troops. Its key operations are KFOR (approximately 440),
    ISAF (100) and Chad (61).  With the expected scaledown of
    troops in Kosovo next year, the GOF has stated publicly it
    will consider an increase to
    operations in Chad and Afghanistan (though in meetings GOF
    officials say an increase to the Chad contribution is more
    likely).  The GOF estimates that its civilian participation
    will reach 150.  Approximately 60 xperts have been deployed
    to EULEX Kosovo, and 2 police experts are expected to
    participate in EUPOL in Afghanistan by early 2009.

    No unanimity on the comprehensive approach
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) As the GOF pursues this approach, it still grapples
    with how to realize it fully, and within the government and
    the Parliament there is no unanimity.  This in part results
    from long-held attitudes.  For example, the vast majority of
    Finnish military resources are devoted to territorial
    defense, with only a relatively small amount for crisis
    management operations; this flows from the deeply-entrenched
    notion that in war the Finns, always have stood alone. Also,
    development policy has not been coordinated with crisis
    management policy, a separation due in part from the idea
    held by some in the government that security operations
    necessarily precede delivery of development assistance. The
    GOF has undertaken reviews of its international crisis

    management and development policies, as well as Afghanistan
    policy (see below), with the results to be presented to
    Parliament in early 2009.

    Afghanistan: policy deadlock
    ----------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Afghanistan presents the Finns the opportunity to
    demonstrate the effectiveness of their approach, and the GOF
    has contributed comprehensively, through military and
    civilian personnel and development assistance (approximately
    12 million euros per year over the next six years).  While no
    one within the GOF is advocating a troop or assistance
    reduction, there are clear divisions in Vanhanen,s cabinet:
    One side advocates doing more (mainly within the Conservative
    party, Foreign Minister Stubb and Defense Minister Hakamies),
    and the other believes Finland is doing enough and that
    budgetary realities do not permit troop or aid increases.
    Vanhanen,s Center Party is part of the latter group, though
    Vanhanen himself may favor doing more.  At the NATO Summit in
    Bucharest last April, President Halonen spoke about
    continuation of Finland,s engagement through ISAF, and made
    a broad reference to Finland increasing "her contribution in
    Afghanistan."  However, Halonen has not offered the Finnish
    public a strong voice supporting Finland,s contributions to
    Afghanistan.  Halonen is part of the camp that believes
    Finland is already doing enough.  We do not agree.

    GOF responds to conflict in Georgia
    -----------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Russia is Finland,s largest bilateral trading partner
    and its primary energy supplier, and Finns are proud of the
    way they have managed their relations with Russia through the
    Cold War and up to the present day.  That management
    typically involves careful public statements by government
    officials calculated not to provoke.  Both PM Vanhanen and
    President Halonen employed such tactics as the recent
    conflict in Georgia unfolded, referring to the events as
    "highly unusual" and "unsettling phenomena";
    neither offered explicit condemnation.  Stubb, who has argued
    for a more assertive foreign policy that abandons bland and
    ritualistic statements from officials, condemned the Russian
    incursion, albeit as OSCE Chairman.

    ¶8. (SBU) The GOF has strongly supported both the OSCE,s and
    the EU,s role in responding to the crisis in Georgia.
    Vahanen was an early opponent of any economic sanctions
    against Russia.  The GOF supported the decision to undertake
    negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement,
    saying that such negotiations would provide future leverage.
    (NOTE: Halonen has ruled out NATO membership for Finland
    during her tenure, which ends in 2012.  The Georgia conflict
    sparked debate about Finland,s relationship with NATO, and
    Vanhanen reiterated the GOF policy to maintain the "option"
    of membership.  Stubb publicly holds to the GOF policy, but
    acknowledged his own support for membership in a speech to
    Finnish diplomats last August.  A poll in September showed an
    increase in the number of Finns uncertain about Finland,s
    possible NATO membership, an increase that drew from both
    from supporters and opponents. END NOTE.)

    Finland seeks JASSM
    -------------------

    ¶9. (S) Embassy Helsinki wholly endorses Finland's request for
    release and eventual Foreign Military Sale purchase of the
    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) System. They
    deem such a system vital to their strategic national defense,
    as JASSM provides the Finnish military the means to defeat
    advanced air defense networks that would otherwise preclude
    the Finns' use of their own airspace to defend their border.
    We base our strong support on Finland's clearly articulate
    national defense needs, the war-fighting support requirements
    stipulated by Commander, U.S. European Command, General Bantz
    Craddock, and the importance of continuing the excellent
    relationship between the U.S. and Finland (REF).  Finnish
    leaders have raised JASSM previously with you, as well as
    with Vice President Cheney and Secretary Gates.  The Pentagon
    intends to respond before the Finns, stated deadline, the
    end of this year.

    Pharmaceutical Pricing
    ----------------------

    ¶10. (SBU) The Finns tout their "international credentials,"
    but those credentials suffered a setback in November when the
    Parliament approved a GOF proposal to amend a pharmaceutical

    pricing scheme in order to allow the substitution of lower
    priced generics for patent-protected drugs. The Health
    Minister proposed the change as a cost-cutting device but
    reimbursing only at generic drug prices undermines the patent
    rights of a number of protected medicines, including those of
    U.S. manufacturers.  The Foreign Ministry and Ministry of
    Economy saw the potential damage to Finland,s reputation and
    lobbied against the measure, although parliament passed the
    bill unanimously in November.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶11. (C) As the Finns end their much-lauded OSCE chairmanship,
    they look to other opportunities to act internationally and
    employ their brand of crisis management, e.g., a seat on the
    UN Security Council (2013-14).  The Finns offer a pragmatic
    voice and active presence that should not be lost.  By
    encouraging the Finns, robust internationalism and
    supporting strong trans-Atlantic ties we can advance our
    common interests in combining civilian and military tools to
    address global security challenges.  END COMMENT.

    BARRETT

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