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### Viewing cable 08SANJOSE596, ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: ENDURING FRIENDSHIP

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08SANJOSE596 | 2008-07-11 22:10 | 2011-03-07 18:06 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2702320.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702325.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2702324.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702326.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-06/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2702327.aspx

`

    VZCZCXRO5349
    OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGR RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT
    RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHSJ #0596/01 1932230
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    O 112230Z JUL 08
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9938
    INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
    RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEABND/DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUWDQAC/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SAN JOSE 000596

    SIPDIS
    SENSITIVE

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC, INL/LP, AND PM; OSD FOR POLICY;
    SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR FPA

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PREL MASS MCAP PINS SNAR CS
    SUBJECT: ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: ENDURING FRIENDSHIP
    BOATS ARE NOT THE BEST SOLUTION FOR COSTA RICA

    REF: A. 07 SAN JOSE 2074
         ¶B. SAN JOSE 586
         ¶C. SAN JOSE 530
         ¶D. SAN JOSE 400
         ¶E. SAN JOSE 63

    ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Post appreciates Department's and other
    agency's hard work to secure Merida Initiative funding for
    Costa Rica. However, we do not/not recommend the purchase of
    Enduring Friendship (EF) vessels for Costa Rica.  We
    understand there is a short deadline to develop the spending
    plan required by Congress, but a hasty decision that appears
    expedient in the short run may not prove effective over the
    longer run. We therefore ask that our views be given serious
    consideration during inter-agency review of the Merida
    package for Central America.  Our reasons are as follows:

     -- A U.S. Coast Guard survey in March 2008 reported that EF
    vessels were not an appropriate platform to conduct primary
    Costa Rican Coast Guard (SNGC) missions, such as
    counternarcotics operations;

     -- Our Office of Defense Representative (ODR), has
    consistently reported the difficulties experienced by other
    countries' EF boats in the region, especially their fairly
    sophisticated, maintenance-intensive nature.  Moreover, some
    of the regional maritime services experiencing problems with
    EF boats are more capable than Costa Rica's.  If these other
    users are having problems, we expect that the SNGC would as
    well; and

     -- Our ODR's own survey of current SNGC capabilities, which
    highlight the challenges of keeping high-maintenance boats
    such as EF in service.

    ¶2. (SBU) ACTION REQUESTS:  Post understands that Merida
    Initiative maritime interdiction assistance is likely to come
    from FMF funding, since INCLE Merida funds were cut.

    --  Please advise if INCLE funding for refurbishing existing
    SNGC vessels, as we have requested since 2007 (Ref A), is now
    completely out of the question.

    --  Please also advise why FMF funding could not be used for
    the refurbishment and acquisition package Post originally
    suggested for Merida, and which has been included, up to this
    point, in Merida planning.

    Post very strongly believes that the challenges presented by
    operating and maintaining EF boats would hobble USG maritime
    counternarcotics efforts in Costa Rica.  In our view, one
    size does not fit all.  We strongly urge that other options
    be carefully considered (e.g., SPE-LE boats, Ref B), before
    the USG presents the GOCR (and this Post) with what appears
    to be an Enduring Friendship fait accompli.  We invite other
    embassies in the region to comment on their experiences with
    EF boats.  END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS.

    ==========================
    USCG SURVEY AND POST INPUT
    ==========================

    ¶3. (SBU) From March 24-28, a U.S. Coast Guard Maritime
    Assessment team conducted a survey of the SNGC.  The
    assessment focused on Maritime Law Enforcement, SNGC
    operations, engineering and preventative maintenance,
    training, and legal authorities.  Although not yet issued,
    the draft report highlights problems with EF boats for Costa
    Rica as follows:

    BEGIN QUOTE: These high speed, high performance (Enduring
    Friendship) boats require extensive maintenance hours, both
    electronically and mechanically.  They also require a
    significant amount of technical coxswain training for high
    speed maneuvering.  Moreover, they do not provide an
    appropriate platform to conduct the primary SNGC missions.
    END QUOTE.

    ¶4. (SBU) One of the practical considerations for interceptor
    boats is the ability to safely board vessels without causing
    damage to either the boarding vessel or the vessel being
    boarded.  EF boats have rigid hulls that increase the

    SAN JOSE 00000596  002 OF 003

    likelihood of damage in high seas during boarding operations.
     Options, such as U.S. Coast Guard Safe boats, negate that
    possibility with foam-filled hulls that are similar to
    inflatables but without the risk of being punctured and
    losing air.  This soft "fender" capability greatly reduces
    the risk of damage.

    ¶5. (SBU Post acknowledges that Safe boats may also be
    maintenance intensive, and we would certainly welcome
    suggestions for other craft that are more basic and simpler
    to operate and maintain, but we firmly believe that this type
    of soft-sided vessel would be an overall better fit for the
    SNGC than EF units.  They would provide the interceptor
    capability while maximizing safety factors for all involved
    in boarding operations.  We understand that one option under
    consideration is to modify EF boats, by retrofitting rubber
    side rails, to minimize boarding damage.  We believe that
    such modifications, even if seemingly cost-effective and
    potentially available quickly, would not make the EF boats
    significantly less maintenance-intensive or easier to operate
    for the SNGC.

    ¶6. (SBU) Post's ODR office reports that some other regional
    navies or coast guards have had maintenance problems with EF
    boats, including the Dominican Republic and Panama.  We
    understand that all the Panamanian EF boats are inoperable at
    the moment, for example, due to maintenance problems.  If so,
    we urge that these problems be taken into account before
    supplying EF boats for all users in the region.  If other, in
    some cases more capable, users have difficulties operating EF
    boats, we expect the same would happen in Costa Rica.  We
    welcome input from posts with EF assets: have these boats
    been a prudent and effective acquisition for your host
    nations?

    ¶7. (SBU) Given these reasons, we strongly believe that
    Enduring Friendship boats are not/not the best choice for
    Costa Rica.  We therefore do not/not recommend their
    purchase, but strongly urge that other options be considered
    (such as USCG Safe boats or similar).

    ===============================
    REVIEW OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
    ===============================

    ¶8. (SBU) We stand by our earlier recommendations (Ref A) of
    what the SNGC needs most, based on GOCR input and our own
    2007 assessment:

    A) FY2008 MERIDA INITIATIVE SUPPLEMENTAL ($1.975 million
    total):  Refit and refurbish the inoperable SNGC 65-foot
    patrol boat in Limon ($900K); modernize all electronics on
    two 82-foot patrol boats ($175K); buy two new interceptors
    ($600K); refit four existing 25-foot Eduardono-type "go-fast"
    patrol boats ($300K).  This would leave the SNGC with two new
    and seven improved maritime assets for CN operations.

    Although we understand that Congressional and funding
    realities require adjustment to these plans, the most
    generous alternative under discussion in the inter-agency
    process now would provide just two EF boats (and supporting
    equipment) to the SNGC, with none of the refurbishment
    support for the older boats, and at a higher cost.  We do not
    understand how such a "trade down" from nine new/improved
    assets to just two (at a higher cost) serves GOCR, USG (or US
    taxpayer) interests.

    B) FY 2009 MERIDA INITIATIVE REQUEST ($2.035 million total):
    Refit and refurbish the two 82-foot patrol boats that would
    have received the electronics package in FY08 ($1.6M); buy
    one new interceptor ($300K); install FLIR on three air
    surveillance aircraft ($135K).

    C) FY2010 MERIDA INITIATIVE REQUEST ($2.8 million total):
    Refit inoperable SNGC 105-foot patrol boat ($2.5M); buy one
    new interceptor ($300K).  We would modify the FY09 and FY10
    requests based on the final decision for FY08.  If INCLE
    funding for boat refurbishment is out of the question for
    Merida FY08, then we strongly urge that these requirements be
    factored into Merida FY09.

    =======

    SAN JOSE 00000596  003 OF 003

    COMMENT
    =======

    ¶9. (SBU) As per Refs. B-C, Costa Rica's Ministry of Public
    Security has consistently told us of their most important
    priorities, which are mainly fixing the SNGC and receiving
    police professionalization training and new police equipment.
     The GOCR has supported the goals of the Merida Initiative as
    well, especially with their valued input at the January
    SICA-based Merida input meeting in El Salvador (Ref E).  We
    should respond by providing what the SNGC needs and what it
    can use, not an off-the-shelf package that is inappropriate
    for the SNGC's capabilities.  This would be like giving a
    15-year a Ferrari.
    CIANCHETTE

`