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### Viewing cable 07HELSINKI150, FINLAND'S MARCH ELECTION: SDP LIKELY TO TAKE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07HELSINKI150 | 2007-03-05 14:02 | 2011-04-24 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Helsinki

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    VZCZCXRO5572
    RR RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
    DE RUEHHE #0150/01 0641450
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 051450Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3034
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
    RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4685
    RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0289

` `

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HELSINKI 000150

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PGOV PREL FI
    SUBJECT: FINLAND'S MARCH ELECTION:  SDP LIKELY TO TAKE
    CHARGE -- IN SPITE OF THEMSELVES

    ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The latest polls give Finland's Social
    Democratic Party (SDP) a chance to win the March 17
    election, but the popularity of Center Party (CEN) PM
    Matti Vanhanen seems to indicate that the SDP will more
    likely come in a very close second.  But in the follow-on
    negotiations to form a new government, look for the SDP
    to come away a winner.  Entrenched in government for
    nearly all of the past 60 years, the SDP boasts arguably
    the most experienced bureaucrats, best political
    negotiators, and a certain intangible pride of place in
    "being in government" that pundits across the spectrum
    acknowledge.  Oddly, despite these advantages, the Social
    Democrats face their own internal challenges, including
    the retirement of their major party heavyweight, a
    leadership often divided on key issues, and the
    persistent unpopularity of party leader Eero Heinaluoma.
    Given these challenges, we expect the SDP to come just
    short of winning the election.  But in Finland, second is
    good enough for the SDP to ensure itself a dominant role
    in the governing coalition, snap up key ministries and in
    many ways take charge.  End Summary.

    A DEAD HEAT IN THE POLLS, BUT ADVANTAGE VANHANEN
    --------------------------------------------- ---
    ¶2. (U) Two weeks before the Finnish Parliamentary
    election, the polls are forecasting few surprises.  The
    Center Party (CEN) and the Social Democrats (SDP) -- the
    main partners in the current government coalition -- are
    tied for the lead, with each likely to grab about 24
    percent of the vote.  This puts them safely ahead of the
    Conservative Party (CONS), which will likely score about
    19 per cent.  None of the parties will reveal a word
    about the back-room negotiations which by now are well
    underway regarding possible future governing coalitions,
    but most pundits are anticipating the return of an CEN-
    SDP led coalition, with some combination of smaller
    parties invited along to ensure an ample parliamentary
    majority.

    ¶3. (SBU) While the polls show a stastical dead heat,
    observers across the spectrum give the ultimate edge to
    CEN, thanks to the great popularity of PM Matti Vanhanen
    (see reftel A).  More than 60% of voters, regardless of
    party affiliation, say they would like to see Vanhanen
    return as PM.  In 2003, without a "political superstar,"
    CEN edged the SDP by a mere one parliamentary seat, and
    with Vanhanen having emerged as something of a star, we
    expect CEN to edge SDP again by a razor thin margin.

    HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE FAVOR THE SDP
    ------------------------------------
    ¶4. (SBU) Yet even with a second place finish, the SDP has
    a way of coming out a winner.  In 2003, the SDP had its
    own superstar in the form of incumbent PM Paavo Lipponen
    -- the man who, as PM from 1995 to 2003, guided Finland
    into the EU; presided over the GOF's successful first EU
    Presidency; strengthened trans-Atlantic relations; and
    delivered on a range of domestic issues that, among other
    things, helped pull Finland out of the devastating
    recession it suffered following the collapse of the
    Soviet Union.  Lipponen and the party were shocked when
    CEN won -- but they regained their footing immediately,
    and by all accounts promptly went on to outfox CEN during
    the coalition negotiations:  CEN had earned the
    Premiership through the ballot box, but SDP maneuvered
    itself into almost all the other key posts, including
    Speaker of Parliament and the Ministries of Education,
    Justice, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Finance.

    ¶5. (SBU) CEN strategists insist to us that regardless of
    whether they finish first or second, they do not intend
    to get outmaneuvered by the SDP again.  Nevertheless,
    politicians and commentators from across the spectrum
    marvel at the SDP's consistent ability to get their hands
    on the controls of government regardless of whether they
    sit atop the coalition or play second fiddle.  Having
    served in nearly every government coalition since
    1950, the SDP boasts by far and away the broadest
    grouping of experienced politicians with ministerial-
    level experience, as well as the most bureaucratic and
    technocratic government expertise at lower levels.  The
    party has rotated its activists in and out of ministerial
    posts and other key positions for decades, skillfully
    seasoning up-and-comers while also balancing their
    nominations with very experienced subject matter experts.
    The result has been both governments that can deliver for
    voters, as well as a party machinery that knows in
    advance what posts it needs in order to implement the key
    parts of its agenda.  In addition to these factors, our
    CONS and CEN contacts admit that they always enter post-

    HELSINKI 00000150  002 OF 003

    election negotiations that lead to forming the government
    at a disadvantage.  CONS suffers from least government
    experience in the past half-century, while CEN arguably
    boasts the best nation-wide electoral machinery but lacks
    national-level technical experience and a certain
    political "eye for the game."  By contrast, as one CONS
    candidate put it, the SDP simply "expects itself to be in
    government," and thus enters the negotiations with an
    intangible but real advantage.

    IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT -- DESPITE THEMSELVES
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶6. (SBU) Yet in 2007, despite these historical and
    bureaucratic advantages, the SDP faces tough internal
    challenges that could hurt it at the polls.  Most
    importantly, the SDP is not only running without a
    "political superstar"; it is led by something of an
    "anti-superstar."  With Speaker Lipponen retiring, the
    SDP faces a double-whammy:  first, it loses its single
    largest vote winner, in a parliamentary system that
    rewards the whole party for individual candidates'
    successes; and second, Party Leader Eero Heinaluoma, the
    party's de facto PM candidate, simply cannot shake a
    persistent unpopularity with voters.  Heinaluoma, who
    comes from the powerful labor wing of the SDP, has proven
    himself a tough debater, a master of his issues as
    Finance Minister, and a respected campaign strategist.
    However, polls asking "Who would make the best PM?"
    consistently place him near the bottom of the eight-party
    field -- as many as a whopping 50 percentage points
    behind PM Vanhanen, and consistently behind the CONS
    superstar, candidate Sauli Niinisto, who is not even his
    party's PM candidate.  Moreover, polls in Heinaluoma's
    Helsinki district show him likely to capture just over --
    or maybe just under -- the roughly 6000-vote threshold he
    would need to get elected.  This has opened up the
    potentially very embarrassing possibility that SDP Leader
    Heinaluoma might not even win a seat in Parliament -- in
    a district where his predecessor Lipponen won more than
    30,000 votes for himself and the party in 2003.

    ¶7. (SBU) In addition to Heinaluoma's lack of popularity,
    the SPD is finding it difficult to deliver a unified
    message on several issues.  On foreign and security
    policy (FSP), the party is badly divided between
    Lipponen's disciples, who favor NATO membership and
    stronger trans-Atlantic ties but fear that saying so will
    cost them votes, and others like Tuomioja and President
    Tarja Halonen who are clearly luke-warm on those issues.
    However, the party has rather effectively papered over
    these differences and, more importantly, succeeded in
    colluding with rival parties to keep a real FSP
    discussion off the agenda until after the election.

    ¶8. (U) Of greater concern to voters, in any case, a
    varied basket of domestic issues, including elder care
    and pensions; immigration; jobs and taxes; nuclear power;
    education; Finland's place in the EU; and the role of
    Swedish language in Finnish culture.  And on many of
    these SDP leaders have been all over the map.  Just two
    examples: (1) On immigration, many SDP candidates have
    called for more liberal policies, in large part to bring
    in workers to help finance the expensive Finnish welfare
    state model -- a point of SDP pride -- in the face of a
    shrinking workforce and aging population.  However,
    Heinaluoma has joined his long-time labor colleagues in
    voicing skepticism about foreign workers who might
    compete with Finns for jobs, while SDP Interior Minister
    Kari Rajamaki has called for almost draconian measures to
    cut down on the already-scant numbers of immigrants who
    do come to Finland.  (2) On nuclear power, Lipponen and
    others have consistently supported increases in capacity
    -- to include building a sixth reactor -- both to meet
    Finland's energy needs and as a way to mitigate green
    house gas emissions; yet almost simultaneously, President
    Halonen (who, as President, is theoretically supposed to
    rise above the fray of party politics but can never
    resist an occasional plunge) has called for limiting
    nuclear power.

    Whither FM Tuomioja?
    --------------------
    ¶9. (SBU) Perhaps ironically, Foreign Minister Erkki
    Tuomioja has emerged well ahead of Heinaluoma as the
    SDP's potential heavy hitter, both in terms of delivering
    a consistent message and as a magnet for votes.  Tuomioja
    is an ideological counterweight to Lipponen on security
    policy and trans-Atlantic relations, to be sure.
    However, as a politician, his star has risen dramatically
    in recent months.  Tuomioja's mastery of international

    HELSINKI 00000150  003 OF 003

    issues, his leadership during the Finnish EU Presidency,
    and his reputation as an intellectual have earned him
    extremely high domestic approval ratings.  In recent
    weeks alone, Finland's most widely read news magazine
    rated Tuomioja the GOF's most effective minister; a
    historical novel Tuomioja penned was chosen for Finland's
    most prestigious literary prize; and polls have shown
    that Tuomioja will quite likely be the SDP's number one
    vote-getter.  Foreign Ministry and SDP party sources
    still tell us that Tuomioja is unlikely to return to the
    MFA, as he announced late last year.  However, if his
    coattails carry the SDP in the way party strategists are
    beginning to hope, he will be able to demand his post of
    choice in any SDP coalition government.

    COMMENT:  SDP - IN GOVERNMENT AND OF GOVERNMENT
    --------------------------------------------- --
    ¶10. (SBU) Despite internal divisions and a lack of star
    power, look for the SDP to come out well following the
    March elections.  Threats by CONS and CEN to form a "non-
    socialist" coalition in the run-up to the election
    (Reftel B) have largely faded, and at least at this point
    the election appears to be an every-party-for-itself
    affair.  And while the exact breakdown of the final
    results may be tough to call, the easy bet appears to be
    the SDP back in government, either as the leader of the
    coalition or as a secondary but in many ways dominant
    partner.  END COMMENT.
    WARE

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