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### Viewing cable 09MEXICO3092, MEXICO: THE LEGACY OF PGR'S MEDINA MORA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MEXICO3092 | 2009-10-27 22:10 | 2011-04-05 01:01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Mexico
Appears in these articles: http://wikileaks.jornada.com.mx/notas/bajo-la-mesa-washigton-culpa-a-mexico-del-trafico-de-armas

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    VZCZCXRO1778
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #3092/01 3002220
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 272220Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8783
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHME/USMLO MEXICO CITY MX
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
    RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC

` `

    231668
    2009-10-27 22:20:00
    09MEXICO3092
    Embassy Mexico
    CONFIDENTIAL

    VZCZCXRO1778
    RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHME #3092/01 3002220
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 272220Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8783
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHME/USMLO MEXICO CITY MX
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHME/USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
    RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003092

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2028
    TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR UN MX
    SUBJECT: MEXICO: THE LEGACY OF PGR'S MEDINA MORA

    REF: MEXICO CITY 002759

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado.  Reason: 1
    .4 (b),(d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary.  With his resignation on September 8, Mexican
    Attorney General (AG) Eduardo Medina Mora Icaza leaves a
    two-fold legacy.  His tenure in office was very positive for
    the USG, as he forged a solid relationship with us, offered
    full support on high-level extradition cases, and laid the
    groundwork for future bilateral cooperation.  He was clearly
    committed to cracking down on Mexico's drug cartels and took
    a strong stand on high-level corruption within his
    institution. Notwithstanding his considerable achievements,
    he lacked the political heft and possibly the institutional
    vision necessary to transform fully the Attorney General's
    Office (PGR) and make significant advances on crucial justice
    reform issues. His modest record of convictions of thousands
    arrested on drug-related charges, and his reservations with
    regard to the more aggressive use of his office, clearly
    contributed to Calderon's decision to replace him.  Medina
    Mora's biggest failure may have been his inability to
    overcome the deep personal animosity he had with Secretary
    Garcia Luna of the Secretariat for Public Security (SSP), a
    source of additional tension between the PGR and the SSP that
    undermined Mexico's counternarcotics effort and complicated
    our Merida Initiative programming.  End Summary.

    Producing Results ....

    ¶2. (SBU)  As the head of the PGR, Medina Mora was viewed as
    one of the key members of Calderon's security team leading
    the fight against organized crime.  During his tenure, Mexico
    realized new records in seizing cash - at least $214 million
    dollars in drug money, though $207.4 million dollars came
    from Chinese-born businessman Zhenli Ye Gon - and drugs, most
    notably 35.1 tons of cocaine in two operations in October
    ¶2007.  Medina Mora also banned the importation of
    pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, the drug used to manufacture
    methamphetamine, into Mexico.

    ¶3. (U)  Recognizing the importance of a strong relationship
    with the U.S. in Mexico's fight against organized crime,
    Medina Mora played a lead role in forging greater
    collaboration between our two countries. DOJ and DEA
    officials praise Medina Mora for working through Mexico's
    legal morass to produce record numbers of extraditions,
    including many high-value targets.  In January 2007 alone,
    Mexico extradited 15 fugitives to the U.S. including leader
    of the Gulf Cartel, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, with another 10
    fugitives on the U.S. Most Wanted List extradited in December
    ¶2008.

    ¶4. (C) On the sensitive issue of arms trafficking, USG
    officials generally credit Medina Mora with pushing for a
    constructive and collaborative approach, rather than trying
    to score cheap political points by attacking the Second
    Amendment or publicly bashing the repeal of the Assault
    Weapons Ban.  There were some exceptions to his largely
    positive collaboration, notably, at a conference in December
    2008 where Medina Mora criticized the U.S. for having done
    little to curb the illegal transfer of arms into Mexico.

    ¶5.  (SBU)  Perhaps most importantly, Medina Mora proved a key
    player for the GOM in defining the Merida Initiative and
    establishing areas for assistance and cooperation in terms of
    equipment and training programs.  He also sought greater
    cooperation with Colombia on fighting the drug cartels.  This
    collaboration culminated in the Tripartite Agreement - an
    agreement between Colombia, the U.S., and Mexico that helped
    bring about the capture of several high-value Colombian
    targets in Mexico.

    ¶6.  (U)  Medina Mora also took unprecedented steps to attack
    corruption within PGR, the police, and local governments.
    The anti-corruption investigative initiative "Operacion
    Limpieza" led to the arrest of several high-level officials,
    including his subordinate - former Chief Organized Crime
    Prosecutor Noe Ramirez - arrested for passing information
    about police operations to the drug cartels and receiving
    monetary compensation.  Medina Mora also had several mayors
    arrested on charges of corruption, though this operation was
    marred by accusations that political considerations had
    driven the arrests.

    MEXICO 00003092  002 OF 003

    ¶7. (SBU) Medina Mora's supporters applaud his efforts to
    modernize the PGR.  During his tenure, he created the
    Costanza Project, a $200 million dollar initiative designed
    to transform PGR's culture in part by promoting transparency,
    training attorneys to build stronger cases, and digitizing
    files in order to incorporate a paperless system.  We are
    hopeful that this program will be operational by next year
    and that the new AG, Arturo Chavez Chavez, will continue
    supporting its mandate.  As another example of Medina Mora's
    commitment to efficiency, Oscar Rocha, a Senior Advisor to
    Medina Mora, pointed to his role in expediting the issuance
    of search warrants - a process that used to require working
    through local judges in cities where the property was
    located.  Now seven designated judges located in the capital,
    working on a 24/7 rotational basis, can issue the warrants
    for any property in Mexico through an electronic application
    process.

    But Falling Short in Some Key Respects

    ¶8. (C)  On the downside, many of Medina Mora's critics
    complain he did little to settle the historical rift between
    PGR and the SSP.  Given the personal animosity between Medina
    Mora and Garcia Luna, the relationship deteriorated during
    Medina Mora's time at PGR.  The inability of Medina Mora to
    strategize and work together with Garcia Luna hindered drug
    enforcement efforts and the PGR's capacity to prosecute
    criminals.  Rocha ascribed the difficult relationship to
    differing philosophies as to which agency should be
    responsible for carrying out investigations.  Whereas Medina
    Mora believed Mexican law gave the PGR the lead investigative
    authority, Garcia Luna was keen on seeing the police assume a
    wider role.

    ¶9. (C) Others fault Media Mora for not doing enough to
    promote greater transparency.  As one example,   PGR provided
    little information regarding the steps it was taking to
    institute justice reform, information we need to establish
    our own program priorities.   Emboffs also found it difficult
    to obtain information from PGR on cases it was investigating
    in a number of sensitive areas including human rights, TIP,
    and crimes against journalists.  Judicial officials from
    several Mexican states complained about Medina Mora's uneven
    communication with them on reforms and investigations,
    hindering their efforts in both of these areas.   Similarly,
    the PGR never submitted its Merida coordination work proposal
    to USAID, a document we requested to facilitate the
    identification of priorities and the implementation of key
    programs.  It is unclear if Medina Mora felt these issues
    were lower priority of if he simply failed to empower staff
    to work them thoroughly.

    ¶10.  (C) Representatives of Mexico's NGO community, as well
    as the quasi-governmental National Commission on Human Rights
    (CNDH), faulted Medina Mora for prioritizing operational
    objectives over longer term reform.  Some blame him for
    securing adoption of reforms that violate the due process
    rights of defendants, such as the establishment of pre-charge
    detention ("arraigo") - for up to 80 days - for defendants
    implicated in organized crime activity.  Many welcomed
    Mexico's adoption of a TIP law in 2008 but criticized PGR for
    assigning responsibility and oversight to two offices - its
    organized crime unit in SIEDO and its Crimes Against Women
    Office in FEVIMTRA - creating competing jurisdictions for
    dealing with TIP cases.  Even Rocha conceded this was not the
    optimal way to handle these cases.

    ¶11. (C)  Much of the blame foisted upon Medina Mora for
    delays in prosecuting criminals has more to do with Mexico's
    antiquated justice system than with personal inadequacies or
    lack of concern.  Marcos Fastlicht, Director of PGR's Council
    of Civic Participation, insisted Medina Mora genuinely
    supported justice reform but could not always count on the
    institutional or political backing he needed to produce
    changes across the board.  Rocha stated that Medina Mora,
    with his connections to the opposition PRI, often had
    disagreements with Calderon because he failed to tout the PAN
    party line.

    ¶12. (C) Comment. A seasoned political player with allies
    across the political spectrum, Medina Mora worked proactively
    with us on cleaning house, improving training in the PGR, and
    extraditions.  His critics contend he could have done more to
    implement judicial reform and bridge gaps with the SSP.  New

    MEXICO 00003092  003 OF 003

    AG Chavez' strong PAN credentials will help him with the
    Presidency, but there are those who believe Medina Mora's
    replacement is a less capable political operator, who will be
    overshadowed by Garcia Luna and stymied by his considerable
    human rights baggage (reftel).  The challenge of building
    bridges with the SSP remains considerable and will require
    Chavez to be both tough and adroit in dealing with the
    difficult politics he faces. Implementing justice reform that
    transforms PGR into a more transparent, pragmatic, and nimble
    institution that works effectively with SSP will prove a tall
    challenge for Chavez Chavez as well.  End Comment
    Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
    Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /

    FEELEY

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