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### Viewing cable 05THEHAGUE2136, NETHERLANDS/VENEZUELA/ANTILLES: DUTCH WORRIED

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
05THEHAGUE2136 | 2005-08-03 10:10 | 2011-01-20 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy The Hague

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002136

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015
    TAGS: PREL PHUM EPET NA NL VZ
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/VENEZUELA/ANTILLES: DUTCH WORRIED
    ABOUT CHAVEZ; DETERMINED TO ENGAGE

    REF: A. A) THE HAGUE 2127
    ¶B. B) THE HAGUE 2044 AND PREVIOUS

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: According to Prime Minister Balkenende's
    chief foreign policy advisor, concerns about Venezuelan
    interference in the Dutch Antilles and Aruba have recently
    risen to the top of the Dutch list of foreign policy
    priorities. A Chavez visit to the Netherlands is not
    currently under consideration, but Balkenende may try to
    deliver a firm message to Chavez on the margins of the
    upcoming UNGA. Foreign Minister Bot and Justice Minister
    Donner both plan to visit Caracas in the next few months, and
    Balkenende is also considering a possible visit in November.
    During a recent briefing by a visiting USG Venezuela expert,
    working level MFA contacts admit that the Dutch feel torn
    between their desire to support an EU consensus on Venezuela
    and protecting Dutch national interests in the Caribbean.
    The Dutch have compiled a list of grievances ranging from
    flyovers by military aircraft to public statements by
    Venezuelan officials recalling Venezuelan territorial claims
    to the islands. Further U.S.-Dutch consultations in this
    area would be beneficial to both parties. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (C) Rob Swartbol, Prime Minister Balkenende's senior
    foreign policy advisor, told Ambassador Sobel on August 1
    that the Dutch government is increasingly concerned about
    Venezuelan President Chavez' efforts to broaden his influence
    in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Swartbol acknowledged
    that for years the Dutch did not take Venezuelan maneuvering
    seriously, but stressed that now it is at top of our
    agenda. Prime Minister Balkenende has taken a personal
    interest in the issue, he added, and has asked for a paper in
    the next two to three weeks to help clarify Dutch options.
    Swartbol confirmed that, contrary to earlier indications, the
    Dutch do not plan to invite Chavez to visit The Netherlands
    in the near future. If Chavez does come to The Netherlands
    as part of a broader European tour, however, the Prime
    Minister would expect to meet with him, he added.

    ¶3. (C) Ambassador Sobel stressed that the U.S. shared Dutch
    concerns about destabilizing Venezuelan moves in the region.
    The Dutch, he added, could play a role in encouraging the EU
    to stand firm against Chavez' destabilization efforts. The
    EU, he added, needs to be very careful in engaging Chavez,
    who is a proven master at manipulating engagement efforts
    to his own advantage. EU members considering selling weapons
    to Venezuela for ostensibly legitimate purposes, in
    particular, need to understand the broader impacts of such
    sales. Swartbol agreed that the EU should have a coordinated
    approach on arms sales and other issues that took such
    concerns into account. Although the Dutch do not want to
    give Chavez a day in the sun, he added, they also see no
    realistic alternative to engagement at this point.

    ¶4. (C) According to Swartbol, Prime Minister Balkenende may
    propose meeting Chavez on the margins of the UNGA in
    September to send a strong signal that Venezuelan
    infiltration efforts in the islands are unacceptable.
    Swartbol suggested, however, that a final decision on whether
    Balkenende would engage Chavez in New York would depend in
    part on FM Bot's plans, as the Prime Minister would not want
    to engage Chavez before Bot has had an opportunity to meet
    with him. (Note: The MFA told us on July 29 that Bot
    currently plans to visit Venezuela in the October 17-24
    timeframe.) If a meeting in New York does not take place,
    the next logical time for a Balkenende-Chavez meeting could
    be in November, when the Prime Minister is scheduled to
    travel to Suriname.

    ¶5. (C) PM Balkenende confirmed to Ambassador Sobel during a
    private meeting on July 29 that he hopes to engage Chavez
    directly about Dutch concerns over the Antilles, but left
    open the issue of timing and venue. In addition to the Bot
    and/or Balkenende meetings with Chavez, Dutch Minister of
    Justice told the Ambassador on July 30 that he also plans to
    travel to Venezuela, Colombia, Suriname, and Curacao
    beginning August 27. Although Donner's trip will focus
    primarily on improving counter-narcotics cooperation in the
    region (especially with Colombia), Donner also expressed
    serious concerns about political developments in Venezuela
    and Chavez' intentions toward the Netherlands Antilles and
    Aruba, which he described as our Malvinas.

    ¶6. (C) Separately, during a briefing on Venezuela by a
    visiting USG expert on July 28, Dutch working-level
    representatives from the MFA's Western Hemisphere Department
    expressed deep concern over the increasing frequency and
    growing seriousness of Venezuelan attempts to influence and
    intimidate the Dutch Antilles' government. Dutch
    interlocutors provided a four page list of incidents
    (reported in other channels) to illustrate their concerns.
    These ranged from an unauthorized 2002 flyover of Curacao by
    Venezuelan military aircraft, to Venezuelan accusations
    (around the time of the USS Saipan visit) that the Antilles
    supported U.S. aggression against Venezuela, to recent public
    statements (including by the Venezuelan Consul General in
    Curacao and the Governor of Falcon) calling for a restoration
    of the historic relationship between Venezuela and the
    islands. Most disturbing to the Dutch were the many
    instances of Chavez apparently offering assistance to
    political figures (including former minister Cova) to
    encourage them to challenge Prime Minister Ys' government as
    well as existing ties between The Netherlands and the
    islands. The Dutch representatives noted that Chavez had a
    wide range of tools for exerting influence on the islands,
    including the flow of oil, pro-Venezuelan politicians (such
    as Cova), and even criminal groups (such as that gathered
    around former strongman Godett); used together, these
    elements could have a powerful destabilizing effect on the
    islands and create serious problems for the Dutch government.

    ¶7. (C) The Dutch diplomats noted that they found it difficult
    to reconcile their national interests regarding the
    Antilles with their general desire to support and implement
    EU consensus positions. For example, the Dutch found it
    unlikely that the EU could find consensus on taking a
    strong public position on Venezuelan Human Rights abuses,
    although they argued that EU representatives could and would
    deliver tough messages in private. The Dutch diplomats noted
    that Chavez had successfully maneuvered to avoid having an EU
    team observe elections in the past and predicted he would do
    so again, but doubted that this would lead to a public
    confrontation between the EU and Caracas. At the same time,
    the recent Dutch deployment of F-16s to Aruba -- a move
    unrelated to any tensions with Venezuela, but one they hoped
    Caracas noticed -- demonstrated that the Dutch remain capable
    of defending their national interests in the region if
    necessary. In recent meetings with the Ambassador and DAO,
    CHOD Berlijn said that the Dutch are exploring options for
    boosting the military presence around the islands
    (potentially including submarines and naval forces from other
    EU members), primarily for counter-narcotics purposes. As
    noted ref a, the CEO of Royal Dutch Shell has recently
    expressed concerns regarding Chavez' illogical approach to
    foreign investors and the potential impact of his policies in
    the region.

    ¶8. (C) COMMENT: As an EU state with Caribbean interests, the
    Dutch have good justifications for assuming a leading role
    within the EU in developing a strategy toward Venezuela.
    Such a role does not come naturally to the Dutch, however,
    and they will be reluctant to challenge traditional Spanish
    leadership on Latin American issues without serious cause
    and/or encouragement. A policy of confronting Chavez would
    also be risky domestically given the Dutch public's
    ambivalent attitude toward the Antilles and Aruba and the
    Dutch colonial legacy in general. That said, senior Dutch
    officials, including Balkenende, clearly understand that
    Chavez' machinations threaten Dutch interests directly -- in
    addition to destabilizing the region more broadly -- but
    believe that their options for dealing with this threat are
    currently limited. We should continue to seek every
    opportunity to engage the Dutch on this issue to help develop
    regional options for countering Chavez' destabilizing
    policies, and to encourage the Dutch to work within European
    circles to help stiffen the spine of the EU. END COMMENT.

    SOBEL

`