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### Viewing cable 06CARACAS751, CHAVEZ' ANGER-BASED LEADERSHIP

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06CARACAS751 | 2006-03-22 14:02 | 2010-12-10 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Caracas

`

    VZCZCXRO8106
    PP RUEHROV
    DE RUEHCV #0751/01 0811422
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 221422Z MAR 06
    FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3641
    INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6180
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 5290
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 1803
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 0012
    RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA PRIORITY 1077
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 3632
    RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0626
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 1877
    RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 3360
    RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0055
    RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0882
    RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0017
    RUEHMI/USOFFICE FRC FT LAUDERDALE PRIORITY 2920
    RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA PRIORITY 0577

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000751

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2021
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM ELAB KDEM VE
    SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' ANGER-BASED LEADERSHIP

    Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor,
    for Reason 1.4(b).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) President Hugo Chavez currently faces the conundrum of
    whether he can maintain a leadership style of exploiting
    resentment among Venezuela's poor while extolling the
    benefits of a seven-year revolution, according to anti-Chavez
    psychiatrist Roberto de Vries. De Vries describes
    Venezuelans' emotional states as two minority extremes --
    revenge for Chavistas and desperation for the opposition --
    that ride herd on a disappointed and depressed majority.
    Chavez easily drives the Venezuelan political and social
    scene with his messianic tendencies and mastery of emotional
    manipulation. Despite this, de Vries believes Chavez'
    charisma is starting to wane, both for lack of a genuine
    opponent and growing expectations among his traditional
    constituency. We present this as one person's analysis of
    developments in Venezuela, though de Vries is clearly
    tailoring his psycho-political theories for desperate
    opposition audiences. Post has noticed, however, that Chavez
    has seemed off his game of late, appearing more irritable and
    explosive. End summary.

    ------------------------------------
    The Psycho-Social State of Venezuela
    ------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Dr. Roberto de Vries is a psychiatrist and public
    commentator who has written extensively on the psychological
    aspects of Venezuelan life, including politics. He told
    Poloff March 3 that, prior to the rise of Bolivarianism,
    Venezuelans were, in psychological terms, "happy" to the
    point that they ignored the decaying social environment
    around them. Candidate Hugo Chavez was able, however, to
    whip up latent resentment and frustration among the poor to
    achieve a remarkable electoral victory. After seven years of
    political turmoil, he said, society is fragmented with
    radical minorities (about 10 percent each) occupying the
    extremes of the political spectrum dominating the debate.
    The pro-Chavez extremists he describes as having "happiness
    in anger," or revenge, those who enjoy watching Chavez stick
    it to the former ruling class. On the opposition side, de
    Vries said, are those who experience "sadness with fear,"
    which translates to desperation and often leads to
    politically imprudent actions. This is why Chavez routinely
    takes actions that heighten their fears, such as threatening
    to prosecute various members of the opposition.

    ¶3. (C) The majority of Venezuelans, de Vries said, experience
    "sadness with anger." These people feel disappointment,
    whether in the failed promise of Chavez to deliver or for
    opposition leaders to find a way to rid Venezuela of Chavez.
    This explains, he argued, why most Venezuelans seem to have
    no reaction to often outrageous statements and actions by
    both sides in the political fight. This behavior leads to
    depression and, in the case of individuals, could suggest
    suicidal tendencies. In the case of a large population, de
    Vries said, it could cause instability and unexpected
    outbreaks of violence.

    -------------------------------
    Chavez: All Things For All Men
    -------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) De Vries described "image of power" that he emits to
    the public. (Note: Obviously, de Vries has never examined
    Chavez directly, which limits his analysis to secondhand
    accounts.) Chavez' physical appearance, the "first
    impression," allows him to relate simultaneously to white,
    indigenous, and African Venezuelans. His style of speech is

    CARACAS 00000751 002.2 OF 003

    hard and fast, which de Vries said comes from Chavez' desire
    to be perceived as an ardent revolutionary. Chavez likes
    being seen as a "victimario," loosely translated as the one
    who exacts revenge on behalf of others, like an executioner.

    ¶5. (C) De Vries emphasized Chavez' "emotional intelligence"
    as his greatest strength -- and weakness. Chavez can
    instinctively read and manipulate the emotions of individuals
    and groups. Chavez, de Vries said, can also make people feel
    like they are in the majority or the minority, as
    appropriate, which affects their self-perception. (De Vries
    noted the irony that Chavez is actually speaking from the
    elite minority of a new ruling class when he pitches his
    message to the poor masses.) The catch is that Chavez lacks
    maturity and often cannot control his own emotions, which
    explains his tendency to spout off the moment he feels his
    authority challenged. De Vries said Chavez will even become
    depressed himself if his emotions get the best of him, like
    when his own constituency rejects his more outlandish
    statements.

    ¶6. (C) Ideologically, Chavez wants to project an image of a
    "utopian socialist," which de Vries described as someone who
    is revolutionary, collectivist, and dogmatic. In reality, de
    Vries argues, Chavez is an absolute pragmatist when it comes
    to maintaining power, which makes him a conservative.
    Coupled with Chavez' self-love (narcissism), sense of
    destiny, and obsession with Venezuelan symbolism, this
    pragmatism makes Chavez look more like fascist, however,
    rather than a socialist. Morally, Chavez combines a sense of
    tragedy and romanticism (a desire for an idyllic world) to
    project a messianic image. De Vries, however, said Chavez is
    a realist who uses morals and ethics to fit the situation.

    ¶7. (C) De Vries said that Chavez has two principal fears:
    rejection and anonymity. His fear of rejection comes, said
    de Vries, from Chavez' early childhood in which he was
    reportedly rejected by his father (and with whom he is
    reportedly not close today). Chavez also suffered
    humiliation and rejection as a child from degrading jobs like
    having to sell candy on the street. His related fear of
    anonymity is a fear that he will prove to be irrelevant to
    history. De Vries said this explains why Chavez has
    established a leadership structure in which he is the final
    decisionmaker, and even micro-manager.

    -----------------
    Falling Charisma?
    -----------------

    ¶8. (C) De Vries argued that Chavez' domination of the
    Venezuelan state is making it more difficult to use
    resentment and revenge to motivate core supporters. Poor
    Venezuelans, de Vries claimed, are not seeing the results of
    Chavez' promised revolution and are starting to slip into the
    "disappointed" majority, where loyalty is gained with
    deliverables. But Chavez cannot satisfy their needs, de
    Vries contended, because it would require him to act as a
    conciliator and governor, taking him away from the
    revolutionary image from which he draws strength. De Vries
    said this contradiction, made manifest by the meager voter
    turnout in last December's legislative elections, is taking
    its toll on Chavez. He opined that Chavez has limited his
    public appearances since December and has lashed out publicly
    against criticism from his own supporters.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶9. (C) De Vries caters his analysis to the opposition crowd,
    a fact which should be taken into account in assessing his
    observations. But we have noticed of late some new
    irritability in Chavez, including publicly lashing out at

    CARACAS 00000751 003 OF 003

    supporters who are not showing him the respect he thinks he
    deserves. Chavez has also given some of the shortest
    speeches of his life in recent months. We are in no
    position, however, to assess his state of mental health.
    Generally speaking, however, de Vries' analysis is compelling
    because Chavez is seeking, with some success, to re-found
    Venezuelan society into one that increasingly revolves around
    him. His personality quirks, therefore, will no doubt play
    an increasing role in how the Bolivarian Republic of
    Venezuela is governed.

    BROWNFIELD

`