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### Viewing cable 09RIYADH408, SAG-USG COUNTER-TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09RIYADH408 | 2009-03-10 14:02 | 2011-04-11 22:10 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Riyadh
Appears in these articles: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/state_cables_show_rising_concern_about_al_qaeda_in_yemen/2011/04/07/AFrH6EAD_story.html

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    VZCZCXRO5227
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
    RUEHROV
    DE RUEHRH #0408/01 0691436
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 101436Z MAR 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0356
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 1635
    RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 0086
    RHMFISS/COMUSAFCENT SHAW AFB SC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0271
    RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE
    RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHRH/CHUSMTM RIYADH SA IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000408
    SIPDIS
    DEPARTMENT FOR M U/S PKENNEDY, DOE FOR DAS WBRYAN, CENTCOM
    FOR POLAD
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2014
    TAGS: ECON ENRG EPET IR IZ MARR MCAP MOPS OVP PGOV
    PK, PREL, PTER, SA, YM
    SUBJECT: SAG-USG COUNTER-TERRORISM PARTNERSHIP
    REF: A. A:07 RIYADH 1778
    ¶B. B: RIYADH 272
    ¶C. C: RIYADH 268
    ¶D. D: RIYADH 326
    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell
    for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The SAG’s MOI-hosted Security Conference in
    Riyadh and the meeting between CENTCOM DCOM LtGen John Allen
    with Asst. Minister for National Security Affairs Prince
    Mohammed bin Naif (MbN) highlight the SAG’s commitment to
    counter-terrorist activity in the Kingdom by partnering with
    the USG in protecting its critical infrastructure, especially
    its energy production sites. MbN reconfirmed the SAG’s
    commitment to pay all critical infrastructure protection
    costs of the Office of Program Management-Ministry of
    Interior (OPM-MOI), including USG employee salaries. He
    concurred any changes necessary in the Technical Cooperation
    Agreement (TCA) be made to allow such payments, but remarked
    hopefully the lawyers would not be problematic. Regarding
    the Saudi deradicalization program, he considered it a
    success in generating Saudi public anger at radical
    extremists and was unconcerned by those who escaped the
    program to rejoin Al Qaeda (AQ), noting they actually serve
    the SAG’s purpose because they delegitimize extremism by
    rebuffing the chance for rehabilitation and a new life,
    further alienating violent radicals from the populace. MbN
    did express concern that some ARAMCO employees posed a threat
    of internal sabotage to oil facilities due to extremist
    sympathies. END SUMMARY.
    OPM-MOI NOW OPERATIONAL
    -----------------------
    ¶2. (SBU) OPM-MOI, a DOS-led interagency security assistance
    organization including DOE and DOD, established by the formal
    TCA signed by the Secretary and Minister of Interior HRH
    Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in May 2008 to partner with
    the Saudi MOI in protecting the Kingdom’s critical
    infrastructure with full SAG funding (Reftel A), is now
    operational in Saudi Arabia. In the March 9 meeting between
    LtGen Allen and MbN, LtGen Allen introduced the senior U.S.
    military officer assigned to assist the MOI in training its
    Facilities Security Force (FSF). Likewise, we informed MbN
    of the arrival of the senior DOS officer in Riyadh on March
    10 to serve as OPM-MOI’s Program Manager and overall leader.
    These officers, along with the senior DOE Liaison and
    associated CENTCOM and Embassy Riyadh personnel, now serve as
    the core of OPM-MOI who will begin assisting the Saudis in
    enhancing the protection of their critical infrastructure,
    with initial focus on Saudi oil facilities.
    ¶3. (C) LtGen Allen reaffirmed to MbN the USG’s full
    commitment to the protection of Saudi critical
    infrastructure, emphasizing that CENTCOM Commander GEN David
    Petraeus guarantees CENTCOM’s full support to this program.
    Both concurred on the importance to the global economy of
    preventing terrorists from attacking Saudi oil facilities.
    MbN asserted the goal is to prevent attacks from ever being
    carried out, recommending OPM-MOI include intelligence links
    in its operational plans. LtGen Allen commended MOI’s
    success in dealing with internal terrorist threats in the
    Kingdom, and its successful rehabilitation program with Saudi
    Guantanamo returnees and extremists captured in Saudi Arabia.
    RIYADH 00000408 002 OF 003
    ¶4. (SBU) MbN was informed that the initial OPM-MOI work
    contracts, consisting of the DOE Project Specific Agreement
    (PSA) to conduct vulnerability assessments of oil sites and
    the DOD Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) to implement
    urgent needs training of FSF troops, have been submitted to
    MOI staff for approval and signature. MbN was grateful for
    USG efforts and assured us full funding would soon follow the
    signing of these documents, and reconfirmed the SAG’s
    commitment to pay all OPM-MOI costs. He also agreed to fund
    all USG employee costs, concurring with any necessary TCA
    changes to allow such payments, commenting that "hopefully
    the lawyers will not cause us any problems."
    ¶5. (SBU) MbN had previously acknowledged to the Ambassador
    the MOI’s lack of technical capacity in effectively working
    with OPM-MOI. To rectify this problem, OPM-MOI has begun
    coordination with the Saudis for SAG-funded English language
    and management training in the U.S. for mid-level MOI
    officers who will be our future interlocutors. In the
    interim, OPM-MOI is drafting a plan for MOI to contract and
    fund bilingual Americans experienced in USG contracting and
    Foreign Military Sales to work in MOI assisting in PSA, LOA,
    and related OPM-MOI projects.
    DEFUSING THE INTERNAL SAUDI THREAT
    ----------------------------------
    ¶6. (SBU) MOI sponsored the second annual Riyadh Security
    Conference from March 2-5, which included such notables as
    FBI Director Robert Mueller and former Attorney General Edwin
    Meese. Other participants were U.S., British and Saudi
    security officials, academics, and the U.S. and U.K
    Ambassadors to the Kingdom. The theme of this well-received
    conference was how to deradicalize extremists. This topic
    was noteworthy as several Saudi Guantanamo returnees had
    recently disappeared, with two resurfacing in Yemen as AQ
    members (Reftels B, C and D).
    ¶7. (C) In private discussions with us, MbN observed it was
    unfortunate these individuals had escaped and some had
    rejoined AQ, but stated the Saudi deradicalization
    rehabilitation program was nonetheless a success and was
    unconcerned by these individuals. He explained while these
    Guantanamo returnees rejoining AQ in Yemen was embarrassing
    to the SAG, the program itself was achieving the true goal of
    turning the Saudi populace against extremist radicals. These
    individuals were being denounced by the Saudi public, and
    even by their immediate families. The SAG was offering these
    individuals employment and marriage opportunities to allow
    new, peaceful and productive lives. MbN shared that if the
    Saudi people saw that the SAG had offered these extremists a
    helping hand which they slapped away, instead of a clenched
    fist used against them, then their families, tribes and the
    Saudi nation as a whole would view the SAG as "the
    benefactor" and these unrepentant extremists as "deviants."
    According to MbN, in Arab culture this is an extremely
    powerful and advantageous position for the SAG as it cuts off
    the necessary public support extremists need to operate.
    THREATS - YEMEN, IRAN AND FROM WITHIN
    -------------------------------------
    ¶8. (C) In response to his views on the current threat, MbN
    listed three:
    -- Yemen was "a dangerous, failed state" similar to
    Afghanistan by allowing AQ to regroup and become its
    RIYADH 00000408 003 OF 003
    operational base. He mentioned the SAG was using its funds
    to gain Yemeni tribal cooperation through public works
    programs, especially as a way to curb the lawlessness along
    the Saudi-Yemeni border. MbN offered that while Yemeni
    President Saleh was not the best leader, after 30 years in
    power, his removal, either through natural causes or
    rebellion, would leave a vacuum that would further weaken
    Yemen. He opined that overtures to the Taliban in
    Afghanistan were useful, as it would make Al Qaeda leaders
    there nervous and unsure if they would be betrayed, but this
    would also make them more likely to seek "safe haven" in
    Yemen. LtGen Allen informed that U.S. Special Forces and
    U.S. Navy trainers were stepping cooperation with Yemeni
    forces to counter border and maritime threats.
    -- Iran, according to MbN, was a greater threat from its
    destabilizing actions than from its nuclear program. He
    added Iran currently has many weaknesses due to its
    deteriorating economy. USG overtures for talks with Iran
    would exploit those weaknesses and further undermine the
    mullahs.
    -- Regarding the internal Saudi threat, MbN stated AQ was
    beaten down in the Kingdom, but he was concerned of "insiders
    in ARAMCO" and that ARAMCO employees with full access to its
    facilities were extremists or extremist/Hezbollah
    sympathizers, using their authorized access and/or technical
    knowledge to commit sabotage. Again, he then emphasized the
    importance of OPM-MOI to provide rapid training of the FSF
    and detailed assessments of the vulnerabilities of Saudi oil
    facilities.
    ¶9. (C) COMMENT. The SAG has worked to counter terrorism
    within the Kingdom, achieving significant success. Both
    through its kinetic operations against AQ, to its soft power
    deradicalization rehabilitation program where it has turned
    the Saudi public against AQ and violent extremism. Bilateral
    cooperation on the protection of Saudi critical
    infrastructure, as previously reported, is of immense
    importance to ensure adequate energy supplies are available
    to the global economy. OPM-MOI offers a tremendous venue to
    strengthen the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship which then
    allows a broadening of Saudi support on a host of issues.
    END COMMENT.
    FRAKER

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