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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT517, MGLE01: SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE'S READY TO REMOVE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT517 | 2006-02-21 14:02 | 2011-04-08 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beirut

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8637

`

    VZCZCXRO3699
    OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
    DE RUEHLB #0517/01 0521427
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 211427Z FEB 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2117
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000517

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/WERNER/SINGH

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016
    TAGS: IS LE PGOV PREL PTER SY
    SUBJECT: MGLE01:  SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE'S READY TO REMOVE
    LAHOUD, BUT NEEDS A NAME

    Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (d).

    SUMMARY
     -------
    ¶1.  (C)  Nabih Berri stated that his "national dialogue
    conference," scheduled to run March 2-9, could seal the fate
    of President Lahoud, if the participating political blocs can
    agree on a consensus replacement.  As he has throughout his
    career, Berri has assiduously counted the votes and has
    concluded that if either Amal (15 deputies) or Aoun (21
    deputies) join forces with the March 14 coalition (71
    deputies), it would create the two-thirds majority in
    parliament needed to replace Lahoud.  Although Michel Aoun
    remains opposed to any candidate except himself, Berri
    indicated he is ready to commit his Amal delegates (which
    would create a two-thirds majority) if an acceptable
    replacement can be found.  Berri is annoyed with the "stupid"
    behavior of Saad Hariri in calling for street demonstrations
    on March 14 to oust Lahoud, but believes such a
    confrontational strategy can be avoided if agreement on a
    replacement can be achieved -- an agreement he feels is
    within reach because it requires neither Aoun nor Nasrallah.
    End summary.

    ¶2.  (U)  Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri met the Ambassador
    and poloff on February 21 at his office in Ayn Tine in West
    Beirut.  Amal political affairs advisor Ali Hamdan also
    attended the meeting.  Berri indicated he would soon be
    leaving for Amman for a meeting of the Arab League, but would
    be back in Beirut well before next week's scheduled opening
    of his "national dialogue conference."

    "I WILL COOPERATE ON ONE CONDITION"
    -----------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C)  Following a remark on how rapidly things were
    changing on the political scene, Nabih Berri referred to a
    statement made on February 20 by the religious leader of
    Lebanon's Maronite community, Patriarch Boutros Sfeir.
    Unlike his previous stated position that street
    demonstrations designed to remove Lahoud would be unwise and
    damaging to the institution of the presidency, Sfeir had now
    declared that demonstrations were permissible, but "not in
    front of Baabda Palace" -- to avoid potentially dangerous
    counter-demonstrations.  According to Berri, by making such a
    statement, the Maronite leader moved one step closer to
    joining a growing consensus to replace the Syrian-imposed
    president.  When asked if the patriarch will name a
    candidate, Berri commented that the cleric was "too clever"
    to publicly declare an acceptable replacement, because if he
    did he would antagonize the numerous Maronite candidates not
    chosen.  All the candidate need be, Berri continued, is
    "moderate" and acceptable to the country's diverse
    communities.

    ¶4.  (C)  Berri expressed frustration and annoyance that Saad
    Hariri, in emphasizing a March 14 deadline, had needlessly
    compressed the time available for a consensus solution, but
    even so, indicated there was a way to achieve Lahoud's
    removal peacefully, "if Saad is smart enough" to seize it.
    Berri indicated that preparations for the planned dialogue
    conference were moving ahead and it appeared the necessary
    parties would attend.  As a result, the pieces were in place
    for consensus reQlution of the situation.

    ¶5.  (C)  The speaker, who has previously beaten political
    odds by astute management of leverage, indicated there were
    presently two blocs that, if aligned with the 71 deputies of
    the March 14 coalition, could create the two-thirds majority
    needed to remove Lahoud and select his replacement.
    Acknowledging the obvious, Berri said that unless the
    replacement candidate was Michel Aoun, it was doubtful that
    the general would ally himself with the Hariri-led coalition.

    AVOIDING A POLITICAL VACUUM
    ---------------------------

    ¶6.  (C)  But unexpectedly, Berri then said he would consider
    taking his deputies into such an alliance on one condition:
    "I have to know who it (candidate) is."  Berri indicated he
    really didn't have a preference, but wanted at all costs to
    avoid the dangerous political "vacuum" that would result if
    the president were removed without a consensus replacement.
    In essence, Berri's deputies would prevent a dangerous
    political impasse.  More importantly, Hizballah, with its 14
    deputies, would not be able to block a Amal/March 14

    BEIRUT 00000517  002 OF 002

    parliamentary alliance.

    ¶7.  (C)  Similarly, Berri explained it was important to have
    a two-thirds parliamentary majority even if Lahoud decided
    (unexpectedly) to simply resign, because under Lebanon's
    constitution, matters such as the selection of a new
    president still required the presence of two-thirds of the
    deputies for a legal quorum.  Thus, Hizballah would be unable
    to subvert the process simply by refusing to attend the
    pertinent parliament session.

    ¶8.  (C)  Even though Berri insisted "it would not be
    difficult," he conceded that if his "national dialogue"
    strategy failed and Lahoud survived past March 14 -- Saad
    Hariri's deadline -- there would be a crisis for the March 14
    coalition, and the country, if competing street
    demonstrations broke out in the already tense capital.  In an
    aside, Berri said the still-to-be-released ISF investigation
    of the violent Sunni demonstration on February 5 would
    indicate Syrian and Palestinian involvement was much less
    than originally stated, and that Sunni extremism was the real
    culprit.

    ¶9.  (C)  Berri concluded, "I accept that Lahoud must go, but
    in the street you can do nothing."  He said that even though
    the timeframe was short, the scheduled March 2-9 dialogue was
    the only real solution to the increasing sectarian pressure.
    He expressed hope that once the presidential issue was
    resolved, Lebanon could begin to address the many pressing
    issues it confronted: the truth behind Hariri's
    assassination, implementation of UNSCR 1559, and normalizing
    relations with its most important neighbor, Syria.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶10.  (C)  The confidence of Berri is interesting when viewed
    in connection with Saad Hariri's similar frame of mind (see
    septel).  There is the possibility that Berri and Hariri have
    already decided to join forces (to create the theoretically
    safe two-thirds parliamentary majority) that would explain
    their public statements and comments to this Embassy.  If
    that is the case, it would appear they are playing with an
    awfully thin margin for error.  But the slight, nuanced shift
    in the patriarch's position and the new-found independence of
    Berri to consider new alliances could be construed as key
    developments that may lead to the constitutional removal of
    Lahoud.  In addition, it would be good news for Lebanon if
    Berri's suggestion that he might split from Hizballah is
    sincere.  An Amal-Hizballah split would allow other Shia
    politicians to emerge, if the current Shia monolith
    splinters.  But we are not holding our breath at this point.
    End comment.
    FELTMAN

`