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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT3132, LEBANON: SHIA HEALTH MINISTER EVALUATES HIZBALLAH,

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT3132 | 2006-09-28 08:08 | 2011-04-08 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Beirut

Appears in these articles:
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8639
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8636
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8635
http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/8637

`

    VZCZCXRO2719
    PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #3132/01 2710808
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 280808Z SEP 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5808
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0359
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1196

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003132

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH
    STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
    TAGS: LE PGOV PREL PTER KDEM
    SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA HEALTH MINISTER EVALUATES HIZBALLAH,
    POLITICAL ALLIANCES

    Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason: 1.4 (d)

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (S) Shia Health Minister Khalifeh (Shia, allied with Nabih
    Berri) told the Ambassador that while Hizballah is cornered
    in a security sense, it remains potent and dangerous
    politically and could even make major inroads into Lebanon's
    Sunni community.  He speculated that Hizballah is using
    Michel Aoun to push for a national unity government because
    Hizballah could not otherwise expand its influence
    sufficiently in a cabinet which already has its quota of
    Shiites.  He speculated that Hizballah would soon be
    compelled to disarm one way or another.  Meanwhile, relations
    between PM Siniora and Speaker Berri remain difficult
    following the "unnecessary" Jezzini affair, and Shia-Sunni
    relations in general are tense.  One way out of Lebanon's
    current political blockage may be to propose early elections
    and push for a new electoral law.  End Summary.

    ¶2. (S) The Ambassador and Polchief called on Shia Health
    Minister Mohammad Khalifeh (one of three Shia ministers in
    the cabinet who are allied with Nabih Berri) in his office
    September 27 to discuss the Lebanese political scene.
    Khalifeh was troubled by what he saw as an "escalation" in
    the tone of the political discourse; provocation is going out
    of control.  There were "too many" in the crowd at the
    Hizballah rally last Friday; this is not the time for the
    other parties to confront them.

    HIZBALLAH IN A BOX, BUT POLITICALLY DANGEROUS
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶3. (S) Now that UNIFIL is here in force, Khalifeh continued,
    we must focus on technical issues.  Hizballah is not as free
    to move around, the Ambassador suggested, and Khalifeh
    agreed.  They know their old freedom is over, but they need
    to come out with a moral victory and a propaganda victory.
    Then, he continued, we need to bring them into the inner
    circle.  We can't get rid of them; they are making too much
    of a reputation for themselves looking after the poor.

    ¶4. (S) If they get their internal organization right,
    Khalifeh said, Hizballah, with its financial resources, will
    be in a position to control a large part of the Sunni
    population of Lebanon also.  That would be our nightmare
    scenario, he said.

    ¶5. (S) Hizballah is under careful watch from Tehran, Khalifeh
    said, but cannot do much in south Lebanon at present.
    However, if Syria fails to make an arrangement with UNIIIC
    and the Hariri tribunal,0 Hizballah will make our lives hell,
    he said, and there will be a return to car bombs and terror
    attacks.  Syria can also use its Palestinian proxies and
    sleeper agents in Lebanon.

    ¶6. (S) If Syria does make a deal on the UNIIIC inquiry,
    Hizballah will make our lives hell politically, he said.
    Syria has also been making inroads in Tripoli by inviting
    Sunni clerics and other leaders for training and
    indoctrination in Syria.

    NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT
    -------------------------

    ¶7. (S) The Ambassador noted that Hizballah has been using a
    negative marketing campaign to obtain its goal of a national
    unity government.  Khalifeh agreed, and added that Hizballah
    is only coordinating with Aoun because there is no other way
    for them to expand their influence in the cabinet.  There are
    five Shia members of the Council of Ministers, he noted, and
    that number can't be changed to six or four.  Even if the
    cabinet is expanded to 30 members, only one additional Shia
    seat is gained.  Thus, Hizballah has expanded to be as
    influential as it can be without controlling minister slots
    belonging to other confessional groups -- i.e., Christian
    ministers.  That is why the alliance with Aoun is so
    important to Hizballah, to allow Hizballah to gain a blocking
    minority inside the cabinet by including Christian ministers
    belong to Aoun.

    BEIRUT 00003132  002 OF 003

    ¶8. (S) When the LAF deployed to the south, Khalifeh added,
    Hizballah entered into political difficulties, and this lay
    behind its increasing emphasis on a government of national
    unity.  He observed that the present government cannot be
    dissolved before forming a new one, because not only will
    President Lahoud withhold the new government's approval but
    the political maneuverings to form a new cabinet will be
    endless.  Therefore Aoun's proposal of a national unity
    government remains Hizballah's only recourse to expand its
    power.  Aoun would ask for a "main ministry" such as Justice,
    Khalifeh suggested, as well as a number of new ministers
    without portfolio.

    ¶9. (S) How could Lahoud be made to agree, the Ambassador
    asked.  Khalifeh responded that Lahoud can't stand against
    the Christians (meaning, presumably, Aoun and his followers).
     Lahoud has few interests other than survival -- delaying the
    time at which he will have to leave the office.  After
    Ramadan, Khalifeh suggested, the government will be under
    greater pressure to form the national unity cabinet.

    ¶10. (S) What would Hizballah gain, the Ambassador asked; they
    already have means to exercise power.  Khalifeh suggested
    that the party wants blocking power in the cabinet (i.e.,
    one-third plus one of the ministers).  They want assurances
    over UNSCR 1701, including that the resolution won't be used
    "for political purposes" or for controlling the border.

    HIZBALLAH MUST DISARM
    ---------------------

    ¶11. (S) Hizballah must change, Khalifeh said.  They can't
    refuse to.  UNSCR 1701 has finished them as an armed group.
    They will disarm in the same exercise as other parties
    following the Civil War.  They should be incorporated into
    the LAF, and they will then fade away as an identity within
    7-10 years, as no new generations of Hizballah fighters will
    be recruited.  When asked why Hizballah -- or Iran -- would
    agree to such a future, Khalifeh said that "everyone will
    oppose them, including the Shiites in the south."  They want
    the government to return to their lives, Khalifeh said, and
    that means the LAF.  Hizballah has 4-5,000 full-time
    followers, Khalifeh estimated.

    ¶12. (S) The Ambassador noted that some had interpreted
    Nasrallah's speech last Friday to say that Hizballah would
    not disarm until there was a "clean and just government" in
    place and that Nasrallah was the sole arbiter of when the
    government achieved that state of cleanliness and justice.
    The Minister suggested that that was a misinterpretation, and
    that Nasrallah may not have been watching his words carefully
    if he left that impression.

    ¶13. (S) Khalifeh noted that in three cases, Hizballah
    redlines had been crossed.  The LAF had deployed to the
    south; UNIFIL was given an expanded mandate; and UNIFIL had
    taken on the role of maritime patrolling, all against
    Hizballah's will.  On the latter, he noted the personal role
    he had played in getting Council of Ministers approval,
    making the proposal himself in the cabinet in order to
    provide cover for Speaker Berri and Shia Minister of Foreign
    Affairs Salloukh to support a maritime role for UNIFIL.
    Although the Shia on the cabinet split over the decision,
    with Hizballah dissenting, the Ambassador noted that the
    current cabinet has not been a bad one for Hizballah.

    JEZZINI AFFAIR
    --------------

    ¶14. (S) The Minister said that the recent flap over Surete
    Generale chief Wafic Jezzini had added unnecessary tension to
    the relationship between Speaker Berri and PM Siniora.
    Jezzini is with Hizballah, and therefore Berri doesn't care
    for him anyway, Khalifeh added.  However, he explained, there
    was a deal between them that Siniora broke by not addressing
    in last week's Council of Ministers meeting the proposal,
    which Siniora himself had added to the agenda, of creating a
    committee to examine the question of whether or not Jezzini
    was under the authority of Acting Interior Minister Fatfat.
    Siniora had gone on to support Fatfat's move to refer Jezzini

    BEIRUT 00003132  003 OF 003

    to the state prosecutor's office, raising the temperature.

    ¶15. (S) The Ambassador characterized as scandalous the fact
    that Jezzini had permitted Syrians to enter and leave Lebanon
    without a record, and Khalifeh agreed that the security
    services should be placed in a coordination mechanism and
    answer to a "higher commission."

    SHIA-SUNNI TENSIONS AND ELECTIONS
    ---------------------------------

    ¶16. (S) In general, Shia-Sunni tensions are "high, but not at
    a peak" Khalifeh said.  The Ambassador noted that the PM
    needs to rebuild his partnership with Berri, which is
    currently broken.  Khalifeh noted that Berri is also not
    supporting Siniora or Hariri with the institutions of
    government.  The Ambassador recounted that he had suggested
    to Berri that if the National Dialogue remains impossible,
    that he should look at issues such as the electoral law to
    focus the energies of different factions toward a common goal.

    ¶17. (S) The Minister suggested that a proposal for early
    elections could focus politicians on reforming the electoral
    law.  The Minister continued that he would soon table an
    election law before the Council of Ministers and also push
    for early approval of ambassadorships for Washington, New
    York and other key posts.
    FELTMAN

`