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### Viewing cable 07PARIS4533, FRENCH MFA OVERVIEW OF NORTH AFRICAN ISSUES

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07PARIS4533 | 2007-11-20 16:04 | 2011-02-21 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Paris
Appears in these articles: http://www.mediapart.fr/journal/international/170211/tunisie-wikileaks-portrait-dune-diplomatie-francaise-soumise-au-regime-

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    VZCZCXYZ0000
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHFR #4533/01 3241611
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 201611Z NOV 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1172
    INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

` `

    S E C R E T PARIS 004533

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ETRD PINR FR MO AG TU LY
    SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA OVERVIEW OF NORTH AFRICAN ISSUES

    REF: RABAT 1657

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah
    Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4. (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (S)  Summary:  We reviewed a number of North African
    issues with French MFA DAS-equivalent for North Africa
    Nathalie Loiseau earlier this month.  She called President
    Sarkozy,s state visit to Morocco positive and, despite the
    failure to sell the Moroccans Rafale fighters, excellent for
    French commercial interests.  The decision by a French
    investigating judge to sign arrest warrants for the head of
    the Moroccan gendarmerie and other former officials over the
    1965 Ben Barka disappearance had not disrupted the visit but
    upset the French justice minister accompanying Sarkozy.
    There was no hidden agenda behind the action, according to
    Loiseau; just a zealous judge looking for publicity.
    Sarkozy,s forward-leaning public statement on Western Sahara
    had predictably pleased the Moroccans and displeased the
    Algerians, although their demarche had been more tepid than
    expected.  Preparations were underway for Sarkozy,s early
    December state visit to Algeria, which will follow municipal
    elections in that country and occur amid ongoing French
    concern about the security situation.  During an early 2008
    visit to Tunisia (Action Request Paragraph 7), Loiseau
    expects Sarkozy to press President Ben Ali to improve what
    France considers to be an unsatisfactory relationship in
    terms of security cooperation and exchange of information on
    terrorism.  Loiseau said no dates had been set for a much
    rumored visit by Libyan leader Qadhafi to Paris, although the
    Elyse,s NEA adviser said he is working on a program for a
    December visit.  End summary

    Morocco:  A Good State Visit Despite Ben Barka
    --------------------------------------------- -

    ¶2.  (C)  Loiseau had little to add to the excellent summary
    of the highlights of French President Sarkozy,s late October
    visit to Morocco in reftel.  The only sour note was the
    French loss of the Rafale fighter sale because of a better
    U.S. offer to sell used F-16s.  Loiseau was philosophical
    about the missed opportunity and deflected French press
    claims that the episode had spurred creation of an
    interagency ""rapid reaction cell"" to coordinate France,s
    response to similar competition in the future.  She claimed
    the Rafale debacle had been a shock but not the first or
    necessarily the last.  France had long ago learned that it
    needed to work more effectively in the face of American
    competition and had set up the group some time ago.  The
    feverish manner in which the French press reported the
    Moroccan decision not to buy the Rafale made it appear that
    it had caused the GOF to set up this working group.  Overall,
    the French were comforted by the other commercial and
    construction contracts signed.

    ¶3.  (C)  Loiseau indicated that the decision by a French
    investigating judge during the visit to sign international
    arrest warrants for a number of former and current Moroccan
    officials (including Gendarmerie head Benslimane) over the
    1965 disappearance of Moroccan oppositionist Ben Barka had
    not come up.  Sarkozy,s Moroccan hosts said nothing, and the
    predictably angry Moroccan press treatment did not begin
    until after Sarkozy and his delegation had left the country.
    Even though the Moroccans had not raised the Ben Barka case,
    according to Loiseau, French Justice Minister Rachida Dati,
    who accompanied Sarkozy and is of half Moroccan origin, was
    furious over the judge,s action.  As with the Rafale,
    Loiseau was more philosophical.  The judge knew what he was
    doing by signing the warrants while Sarkozy was in Morocco
    and wanted both the publicity he would receive and the added
    pressure on the Moroccan government that it would generate.
    Loiseau observed that the Moroccans, as indicated in numerous
    articles, had ignored previous requests by the judge for
    assistance in his investigation or been otherwise
    uncooperative.  She denied any suggestion that the GOF had
    somehow encouraged the judge to take the action in order to
    pressure the Moroccans over human rights in Morocco or
    Western Sahara.  (Comment:  As Loiseau noted, the current
    iteration of this longstanding ""cold case"" was brought by Ben
    Barka,s family several years ago and early in the reign of
    King Mohammed VI (""M6"").  The move to reopen the case, in
    fact, initially triggered hope that M6 would underscore his
    desire to break with the human rights abuses his father
    tolerated by finally allowing access to security files and
    testimony by those still living who were implicated in the
    case.  End comment)

    ¶4.  (C)  We asked whether Sarkozy raised any human rights
    issues with M6, including restrictions on the press as called
    for by a leading French NGO.  Loiseau responded that Sarkozy
    may have raised the subject in his private meetings with M6
    but claimed not to have any readout.  She added that France
    has preferred to conduct its dialogue with Morocco on human
    rights and reform in a larger EU context.  Loiseau was
    familiar with the range of concerns we tend to raise with
    Morocco, having previously served in Rabat, and generally
    agreed with them.  However, France feels Morocco overall is
    doing more things right than wrong in terms of reform and
    respect for human rights.  The recent elections may have been
    flawed but more because the parties were not able to generate
    enough enthusiasm among voters to turn out at the polls.
    While she acknowledged the lackluster nature of new
    government, the real problem for Morocco was the general
    apathy and lack of connection by most people to the
    country,s political class.

    Western Sahara
    --------------

    ¶5.  (C)  Taking note of Sarkozy,s relatively strong public
    endorsement while in Morocco of the Moroccan position on the
    long-running dispute over the Western Sahara, we asked
    Loiseau whether this had generated any negative reaction in
    Algiers or from the Polisario.  She replied that the
    Algerians had complained but in a remarkably mild, almost
    inert fashion.  They had delivered their demarche at a lower
    level than one might have expected and were less strident or
    ideological than usual.  Loiseau did not offer an explanation
    for the Algerian attitude but agreed that there seemed to be
    more inertia than energy at play.  She expected that the
    Polisario would have more to say when she met with them later
    in the week.  Loiseau agreed that the Moroccans were not
    eager to resume UN-sponsored negotiations under current
    circumstances but expected they would resume according to the
    timeframe UN envoy van Walsum outlines.

    On to Algeria
    -------------

    ¶6.  (C)  Loiseau said her office was now working with the
    French Presidency on Sarkozy,s early December state visit to
    Algiers.  She offered no insights into what the GOF expected
    from that visit, although the security situation and
    President Bouteflika,s health are on everyone,s mind.
    Loiseau was not happy about the visit occurring immediately
    after Algerian municipal elections, whose outcome would
    inevitably color perceptions.

    And Beyond that Tunisia
    -----------------------

    ¶7.  (S)  Looking ahead to Sarkozy,s state visit to Tunisia
    early in 2008, Loiseau indicated that Sarkozy intended to
    raise with President Ben Ali French concerns about continuing
    Tunisian reticence in terms of sharing information about
    security threats.  She said that Sarkozy, as a former
    interior minister, is extremely unhappy with the
    unsatisfactory state of cooperation and the exchange of
    intelligence information concerning terrorism.  The memories
    of what happened late last year and early this year when the
    AQIM cell that went undetected for so long as well as
    Tunisian dissembling in the aftermath of its discovery still
    linger.  Loiseau asked whether the USG could provide, in
    whatever appropriate channel, a summary of its own experience
    to help the GOF prepare Sarkozy for this conversation.
    (Action request: Please inform Embassy Paris if Washington
    takes action on this request).

    Libya and Rumors of a Qadhafi Christmas in Paris
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶8.  (C)  We inquired whether reports in the press about
    Libyan leader Qadhafi visiting Paris in December were
    accurate.  Loiseau answered that Sarkozy had invited Qadhafi
    to visit France last July, when Sarkozy visited Libya, and
    repeated the invitation in subsequent phone calls.  However,
    the press was not necessarily accurate because it was trying
    to link the visit to ongoing and tendentious coverage of the
    parliamentary investigation of the deal that led to the
    release of the Bulgarian ""medics.""  We asked whether Libya,s
    past association with terrorism was an element in this
    coverage and how the GOF would treat Qadhafi, given his
    ambiguous title as ""guide"" of the revolution and not head of
    state, should he be the subject of calls for prosecution in
    connection with the bombing of UTA 772.  Loiseau responded
    that the past association with terrorism was certainly part
    of the general interest in whether Qadhafi had truly been
    ""rehabilitated,"" but she said the resonance of protests by
    family members of UTA 772 was limited compared to that of Pan
    Am 103 in the U.S.  As for Qadhafi,s legal status, France
    would grant him full legal immunity as de facto head of state.

    ¶9.  (C)  In a November 13 meeting with French Presidency
    adviser on NEA issues Boris Boillon, he indicated that he was
    actively working on a program for a December Qadhafi visit.
    He claimed no date had been set and implied that the fault
    lay with the Libyans.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

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