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### Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1610, ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INSIDER ON GOA POLICY IN THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BUENOSAIRES1610 | 2006-07-20 14:02 | 2011-03-29 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1361157-la-relacion-con-chavez-al-desnudo

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    VZCZCXRO6431
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBU #1610/01 2011439
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 201439Z JUL 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5293
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1674

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001610

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
    NSC FOR DAN FISK
    TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
    USCINCSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2016

    TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR

    SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: KIRCHNER INSIDER ON GOA POLICY IN THE

    REGION

    REF: 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141

    Classified By: CDA, a.i., Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: On July 5, the DCM paid a farewell call on

    Secretary General of the Presidency (President Nestor

    SIPDIS

    Kirchner's chief of staff) Oscar Parrilli that included a

    frank discussion on GOA policy in the region.  Attempting to

    clarify Kirchner's recent comments about the U.S. in Madrid,

    Parrilli said that Argentina valued U.S. support during the

    crisis and that Kirchner wanted a ""mature"" relationship with

    the United States.  Parrilli's comments reflected the view

    that the GOA accepts the idea of the U.S. leadership in the

    region, as long as it also benefits Argentina.  The DCM

    raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that Kirchner's close

    relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and

    Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his penchant

    for slandering President Bush and the USG made it difficult

    for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral relations

    with the GOA.  Parrilli responded by saying the GOA's

    relationship with the GOV was based primarily on economics

    and Mercosur.  The DCM next turned the discussion to Bolivia,

    expressing the U.S. concern that Bolivian President Evo

    Morales needs to respect Bolivia's constitutional democracy

    and cooperate with the U.S. and regional neighbors to control

    narcotrafficking.  Parrilli said that the GOA shares the U.S.

    goal of ensuring President Evo Morales operates within a

    democratic framework and said that the two nations should be

    very clear with Morales on counternarcotics.  On the whole

    question of hemispheric free trade, the DCM noted the U.S.

    view that the Summit of the Americas was a success in the

    sense that a majority of the region -- 29 countries -- said

    that they wanted to continue discussions about creating an

    FTAA.  END SUMMARY.

    ¶2.  (C) On July 5, the DCM paid a farewell call on Secretary

    General of the Presidency Oscar Parrilli that included a

    frank discussion on GOA policy in the region.  Oscar

    Parrilli, President Nestor Kirchner's chief of staff, is a

    key Kirchner insider (See Reftel).  Parrilli has been a good

    contact of the Embassy and is known for his calm disposition,

    although he clearly shares the world view of the rest of

    Kirchner's inner circle.  Parrilli began the discussion by

    remarking on the good personal relations the Casa Rosada has

    enjoyed over the past three years with the Ambassador and

    DCM.  The DCM highlighted the strong background of incoming

    Ambassador Wayne and corrected the misperception expressed by

    some members of the GOA that Ambassador Wayne had praised

    former President Carlos Menem during his recent confirmation

    hearings.

    ¶3.  (C) Attempting to clarify Kirchner's recent comments

    about the U.S. in Madrid, Parrilli said that Argentina valued

    U.S. support during the crisis and that Kirchner wanted a

    ""mature"" relationship with the United States.  ""President

    Kirchner has acknowledged this publicly in the past.  Despite

    our differences, the U.S. has come to Argentina's aid when

    Argentina really needed it.""  Parrilli said that Argentina,

    in turn, can help ensure ""tranquillity"" in the region.  He

    said that at times in the past, the U.S. has not played the

    leadership role necessary in the region.  Parrilli said that

    Kirchner was referring to this ""historic debt"" of the U.S. in

    the region, not necessarily about current U.S. policy.  ""What

    Kirchner wants is a 'mature' relationship with the U.S.""

    Parrilli further commented that ""what crashed in 2001 was not

    the de la Rua government, but an economic model.  The model

    of having your economy owned by foreign interests.  Countries

    need to be able to defend their rights, their economy.""

    (COMMENT: Parrilli's comments reflect the GOA view that they

    acknowledge and accept the idea of the U.S. as the natural

    leader of the region, but they want that leadership to act in

    Argentina's and the region's interests.  In particular, he

    mentioned that the GOA would like to see more U.S. economic

    assistance to the region.  END COMMENT.)

    ¶4.  (C) The DCM raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that

    Kirchner's close relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo

    BUENOS AIR 00001610  002 OF 003

    Chavez and Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his

    penchant for slandering President Bush and the USG made it

    difficult for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral

    relations with the GOA.  The DCM said, ""One day Kirchner is

    meeting with Chavez, and Chavez may be on good behavior

    because Kirchner has asked Chavez to avoid incidents, but the

    next day Chavez is calling President Bush a drunkard, a

    genocidal maniac and worse than Hitler.""  The DCM said that

    by so closely associating himself with a leader like Chavez,

    Kirchner risks being viewed by Washington as sharing Chavez's

    views.

    ¶5.  (C) Parrilli responded by saying that the GOA's

    relationship with the GOV was based primarily on economics

    and Mercosur.  Parrilli also said that the GOA does not agree

    ""with the message or the style of Chavez's attacks on

    President Bush or the U.S.""  Parrilli added, ""Our

    relationship with Venezuela is not an axis.  Argentina and

    Brazil are the two main drivers of regional integration in

    South America.  We need to include the other big countries in

    the region -- Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile -- in this

    process.""

    ¶6.  (C) The DCM next turned the discussion to Bolivia,

    expressing the U.S. concern that Bolivian President Evo

    Morales needs to respect Bolivia's constitutional democracy

    and cooperate with the U.S. and regional neighbors to control

    narcotrafficking.  Parrilli said that the GOA shares the U.S.

    goal of ensuring President Evo Morales operates within a

    democratic framework.  Parrilli said that Morales is

    defending and respecting the rights of the mainly indigenous

    voters that elected him, who have been excluded from the

    Bolivian political system until now.  Parrilli added that ""we

    have to hope that Morales is successful.""  The DCM noted the

    concern that the recent increase in Bolivian coca production

    will lead to an increase in cocaine trafficking.  Parrilli

    agreed that the two nations should be very clear with Morales

    on counternarcotics.

    ¶7.  (C) On the whole question of hemispheric free trade, the

    DCM noted the U.S. view that the Summit of the Americas was a

    success in the sense that a majority of the region -- 29

    countries -- said that they wanted to continue discussions

    about creating an FTAA.  The DCM said that the Mercosur

    objections to the FTAA over agricultural issues at least

    leaves room for discussion, while Venezuela was the only

    country in the region to object to the FTAA on ideological

    grounds.  Parrilli responded by saying, ""In the past what you

    were offering us in terms of free trade deals was not what

    Argentina needed.""  The DCM pointed to the benefits of free

    trade and noted that NAFTA is no longer an issue for the left

    or the right in both Canada and Mexico.  ""NAFTA has been a

    win-win for all countries involved.""

    -------

    COMMENT

    -------

    ¶8.  (C) Oscar Parrilli shares the leftist world view of most

    of Kirchner's inner circle, but like other Casa Rosada

    insiders, always appears friendly and cooperative in private

    to Embassy officials.  Parrilli clearly received the official

    talking points on how to respond to questions about

    Kirchner's recent statements on the U.S. in Madrid and on GOA

    relations with Venezuela, as we have heard Parrilli's

    comments on these two issues repeated on several recent

    occasions by high-level GOA officials.  This continues a long

    pattern in the Kirchner administration where GOA officials

    tell us what they think we want to hear in private, while

    Kirchner's actions and public statements project a different

    image to the rest of the world.

    ¶9.  (C) Although Kirchner's inner circle may not diverge fromthe official line, engaging them is beneficial.  Messages

    given to them are immediately conveyed to President Kirchner,

    and Kirchner uses them to deliver his message to the USG.

    With President Kirchner often inaccessible and relying on an

    BUENOS AIR 00001610  003 OF 003

    ever-shrinking group of close advisors, engaging Kirchner's

    inner circle is often the best way to maintain a dialogue

    with the GOA.  We believe it would be far worse for U.S.

    interests to discontinue dialogue with some of the only

    people that can still influence Kirchner.  END COMMENT.

    LLORENS

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

    "

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