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### Viewing cable 10PANAMA29, Martinelli Ratchets Up Pressure on Attorney General

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10PANAMA29 | 2010-01-26 21:09 | 2011-04-11 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Panama

`

    VZCZCXYZ0092
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHZP #0029/01 0262133
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 262133Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0359
    INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHBE/AMEMBASSY BELMOPAN 0013
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
    RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
    RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0067
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000029

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26
    TAGS: PGOV KJUS PINR PM
    SUBJECT: Martinelli Ratchets Up Pressure on Attorney General

    REF: 09 PANAMA 765; 09 PANAMA 242; 09 PANAMA 776

    CLASSIFIED BY: Gilmour, Charge; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    Summary

    ------------

    1.(U) With his Supreme Court (CSJ) nominees confirmed, President
    Martinelli appears intent on ousting Attorney General Ana Matilde
    Gomez and bringing the Public Ministry under his personal control.
    Martinelli is after Gomez because of her alleged incompetence and
    unwillingness to prosecute the opposition Revolutionary Democratic
    Party (PRD)  - most prominently former President Ernesto Perez
    Balladares aka "El Toro".   Stacking the CSJ facilitates
    Martinelli's pursuit of his (widely-considered corrupt) political
    enemies in two ways;  by enabling the removal of an independent and
    non-compliant AG, and by ensuring that the court will handle the
    coming cases in accordance with his desires.   Civil society and
    the press are vocally upset and are publicly protesting the moves
    against Gomez and the threat to independent democratic institutions
    in Panama. End Summary.

    Persecuting the Prosecutor

    ---------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) With less than subtle timing, the Martinelli administration
    moved against Attorney General Ana Matilde Gomez before the dust
    had settled over the appointment of two new CSJ justices and
    election of the court president. The day after new CSJ president
    Anibal Salas assumed his post, Panama's Solicitor General filed a
    request with the court to remove Gomez, which requires the
    concurrence of a majority of justices. Brand-new Justice and
    Martinelli appointee Jose Almengor, who formerly worked for Gomez
    as a prosecutor, was named to oversee the case.  Almengor joined
    Martinelli's staff in May 2009 after AG Gomez opened an
    investigation against him two months earlier for allowing an
    accused money launderer to leave the country (Ref A).  The
    launderer was connected with David Murcia Guzman, who is currently
    standing trial in the U.S. Since then, there have been allegations
    that Murcia made large campaign donations to both PRD candidate
    Balbina Herrera and Martinelli during last year's presidential
    election (Ref B) - allegations that caused Gomez to request that
    both candidates' immunity be suspended so that she could
    investigate .  Justice Almengor later recused himself after a
    request from Gomez's lawyers and pressure in the media over his
    conflict of interest in the case.

    Ex Post Facto Case Number One

    ---------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) The case against Gomez concerns charges that she ordered an
    unauthorized wiretap on her one of her former drug prosecutors,
    Arquimedes Saez, who was suspected of extortion and bribery.  Saez
    was eventually fired by Gomez in 2005.  The allegation against
    Gomez is "abuse of power", which is not a criminal act and thus is
    not legal grounds for the CSJ to remove her from her position.
    Additionally, her wiretapping of Saez, although not within the
    Attorney General's authority under current Panamanian law, was
    legal at the time that she ordered it carried out. (Ref C)

    ¶4. (C) Juan Antonio Tejada, Gomez's defense attorney, who is both a

    former prosecutor and ombudsman, said to Polcouns that he had
    assumed Gomez's legal defense, but that it is a political, not a
    legal, case.  According to Tejada, the writing is on the wall and
    she will be removed.  Technically, the CSJ cannot remove her on an
    abuse of powers charge, but they will do it anyway.  The best that
    her defense team can do is buy time for the next issue to be worked
    out: who will succeed her.  Here Panama's constitution contradicts
    itself.  One section says she names her successor herself, which is
    the reason she moved her preferred successor Rigoberto Gonzalez
    from her defense team back to his old Secretary General's job at
    the Public Ministry and hired Tejada.  Another part of the
    constitution says the President would get to name a new AG.  Civil
    society groups are opposed to this course of action, as it would
    give Martinelli control over the last remaining independent
    institution in the government.

    Bull Baiting

    ---------------

    ¶5. (C) Martinelli has made no secret of his dissatisfaction with
    Gomez over her tepid efforts to prosecute Perez Balladares.  Perez
    Balladares began appearing in the press in August 2009 after
    Martinelli publicly cancelled the gambling concessions  of several
    slot-machine operators, which had been granted during the Perez
    Balladares administration.  It appears that Perez Balladares was
    receiving a steady stream of income from these casinos at the time
    that Martinelli moved against him. A torrent of stories in leading
    daily La Prensa has since followed, including a full page spread of
    cashed checks from the casinos signed by Perez Balladares.  Post
    has been informed by the editor of La Prensa that the person
    supplying the information is none other than President Martinelli
    himself.

    ¶6.  (C) The hunt for Perez Balladares boiled over in late December,
    when he was subpoenaed to appear before prosecutors - the first
    time that a former President has been required to do so in Panama.
    In a four-day manhunt, as avidly watched in Panama as the LAPD
    pursuit of OJ Simpson, Perez Balladares at first could not be
    located by authorities.  When he did turn himself in, it was in on
    his terms, as he showed up at the prosecutor's office with his wife
    in a fancy car driven by his nephew, and stayed for only 20 minutes
    before invoking his constitutional rights against incriminating
    himself.  Martinelli then went on national TV,  saying he felt
    "frustrated and made fun of".  In the same breath, he felt
    compelled to add that "he respects the idea of separation of
    powers" i.e. between the executive and the judiciary.

    Ex Post Facto Case Number Two

    ---------------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) At its root, the case against Perez Balladares is flawed. In
    the years the transfers were made, "money laundering" was only in
    the criminal code related to narcotrafficking.  Therefore, the
    money laundering charges on casino proceeds won't stand up in court
    and the government does not have a case.  VP/FM Juan Carlos Varela
    admitted to the Ambassador that Martinelli knows this.  According
    to Tejada, civil society is furious with Martinelli for insisting
    that this baseless case be pursued.  While they want to see Preez
    Balladares punished for corruption as much as Martinelli does,
    Panamanian professionals worry that a not-guilty verdict in this
    case will result in the vindication of Perez Balladares and the
    legitimization of his ill-gotten wealth.

    Civil Society and the Civilistas Tread Carefully

    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶8. (C) The handling of El Toro's arrest appears to have been the
    last straw for Martinelli, dissolving what had looked like a truce
    with the AG.  A few days after the affair, the Solicitor General
    presented his case against Gomez to the newly seated CSJ.  Civil
    society reaction has been uniformly negative.  The National Council
    of Private Enterprise (CONEP) and The Fundacion Ethica y Civilismo
    both took out full page ads in leading dailies decrying the move
    against Gomez, which Martinelli has publicly claimed to have
    nothing to do with.  One editorial characterized the current
    situation as the worst constitutional crisis in Panama since a coup
    attempt in 1990.   Poloff attended an Association of Panamanian
    Executives (APEDE) forum in defense of Gomez, who was formerly
    their general council. Yet direct criticism of Martinelli was
    lacking at the three-hour meeting, where speakers tended to focus
    on the technical and legal merits of the case against Gomez vice
    the animus behind it.

    ¶9. (C) The subdued reaction, particularly from the important APEDE
    business association, is partly due to the nature of the governing
    coalition which Martinelli controls.  Many former "civilistas" who
    previously led the charge against an abusive executive power during
    the military dictatorship are now supportive of the anti-PRD
    governing coalition and appear reluctant to publicly criticize
    their leader, though privately they express grave concerns.  The
    main opposition party (the PRD) remains in disarray amidst
    infighting and a serious diminution of their numbers.  Martinelli
    still enjoys unprecedented popularity and has the ability and
    willingness to inflict serious harm on any critics who become too
    vocal.  According to conversations Polcouns has had with civil
    society groups, Martinelli feels that he does not need the
    civilista groups as a bridge to the people - he talks to the people
    directly, and as long as his poll numbers stay up, he sees no
    reason to change his modus operandi.  Civil opposition  may also be
    thrown off-balance by Martinelli's impulsive actions and
    passive-aggressive tactics, which have him in one speech
    admonishing prosecutors "not to be intimidated by those who
    appointed them", and in another implying that El Toro was handled
    too gently by the AG during his subpoena process .  He also
    countered the full-page ads with a GOP communiquC) claiming that his
    administration was acting in the interests of the majority of
    Panamanians against obscure interests while at the same time
    denying any influence in the Attorney General's case.

    Comment

    -------------

    ¶10. (C) Comment: The blunt timing of the action against Gomez is
    confirmation of Martinelli's orchestration of the campaign against
    the Attorney General, despite earlier indications that he had
    reached an accommodation with her. The common perception, as
    illustrated in the political cartoon that appeared January 7 and is
    attached below, is that Martinelli now controls the Supreme Court,
    the Comptroller's office, and the National Assembly.  Panamanian
    chief executives have traditionally used CSJ nominations to control
    the institution. However, the unfortunate conjunction of the court
    appointments and his pursuit of the Attorney General AG contradict
    the raison d'etre for his presidency - a change from corrupt
    business as usual governance to a more accountable and legitimate
    rule.  The risk is that Panamanians may loose faith in their
    democracy as the name of Martinelli's  "Democratic Change" party
    takes on an unintended and ironic meaning among the public.

    Why is the outcry greater against Martinelli than previous
    presidents?  First , other executives used party apparatus to
    control government institutions.  Martinelli is not from a
    traditional party and doesn't have a structure that can work behind
    the scenes and legitimate his actions.  Therefore, he is acting
    much more directly by placing people he personally can trust and
    control in key positions.  Secondly, he has raised expectations of
    change, and is disappointing those who believed in him very early
    in his presidency vice previous leaders who did so much more
    gradually.

    Why does it matter?  Panama has always squeaked by on mediocre
    institutions.  But mediocrity cannot withstand the rapid rise of
    violent crime related to narcotrafficking.  The security situation
    is at a tipping point.  Civil society professionals sense the
    urgency of the security problem and there is a greater demand than
    ever before for democratic institutions that work.

    cid:image002.png@01CA9EA4.F3A2AC30
    GILMOUR

`