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### Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3079, ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06TELAVIV3079 | 2006-08-08 08:08 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Tel Aviv
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    null
    Carol X Weakley  08/08/2006 04:49:20 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Carol X Weakley

    Cable
    Text:

    S E C R E T        TEL AVIV 03079

    SIPDIS
    CXTelA:
        ACTION: POL
        INFO:   AMB AID ADM RSO CONS IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM
                DAO

    DISSEMINATION: POL
    CHARGE: PROG

    APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
    DRAFTED: POL:MCKEAYS
    CLEARED: DCM:GACRETZ, POL:NOLSEN

    VZCZCTVI676
    OO RUEHC RUEHLB RUEHFR RUEHNO RUCNDT
    DE RUEHTV #3079/01 2200836
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 080836Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5433
    INFO RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0693
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 8795
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0140
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3850

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 003079

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR NEA, IO/UNP, L

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
    TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS LE IS
    SUBJECT: ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT
    DRAFT OF UN RESOLUTION

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (S) In their August 6 meeting, Israeli FM Tzipi Livni told
    NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch that Israel could not
    approve of the draft UN resolution in its current form.
    Making impassioned, emotional appeals, she more than once put
    forward the following reasons:

    -- In Israel's view, the resolution leads to negotiations
    over Shebaa Farms, a territory disputed between Syria and
    Lebanon. Livni asserted that the international community has
    no right to make Israel a party to the dispute, and make
    Shebaa Farms an irritant in the Israel-Lebanon bilateral
    relationship. Livni also asserted that -- if the resolution
    were approved -- Lebanon would press first for a resolution
    of Shebaa Farms at the expense of all other matters for
    resolution. In this case, Livni said, Lebanon would get what
    it wants, fail to follow through on anything else, and
    Hizballah aggression would be rewarded.

    -- In Israel's view, the draft resolution will allow Lebanon
    to place conditions on its assent to the political framework
    envisioned in operative paragraph six (OP6). She suggested
    that a weak Lebanese government will make its agreement
    conditional on something that Israel would not be able to
    accept, and thereby shift the international community's focus
    onto Israel as the intransigent party.

    -- In Israel's view, the two-resolution approach is flawed.
    As the second resolution concerning the multinational force
    (MNF) is, as Israel understands, almost complete, it and the
    first resolution should be combined.

    ¶2. (S) SUMMARY, CONTINUED: FM Livni instead strongly pushed
    for the draft UNSCR to call for full implementation of UNSCR
    1559s and 1680 -- especially as they concern disarming
    militias and delimiting Lebanon's border with Syria. She
    stressed that Israel has no quarrel with Lebanon, and wants
    to see the Siniora government succeed -- if necessary with
    appropriate help from the international community. She
    argued that the international community's undertakings need
    to recognize and focus on the fact that the conflict started
    when Hizballah attacked Israel from Lebanon's territory. The
    conflict, she asserted, is between Hizballah and its backers,
    and Israel -- not between Lebanon and Israel. FM Livni also
    expressed disappointment at the news that France has been
    tapped to organize and lead the multinational force (MNF)
    envisioned to enter southern Lebanon after a cease-fire. She
    repeatedly probed for information on what the Europeans --
    and EU High Representative Solana -- were doing to comprise
    an MNF, and wondered aloud if NATO is considering whether to
    deploy the NATO Response Force (NRF) to the region.
    Assistant Secretary Welch briefed FM Livni on his meetings in
    Lebanon. END SUMMARY.

    --------------------------------------------- ------------
    ISRAEL REJECTS MAKING Shebaa FARMS AN ISRAEL-LEBANON ISSUE
    --------------------------------------------- ------------

    ¶3. (S) With media representatives present, FM Livni opened
    the meeting by cautioning everyone not to believe what the
    newspapers write: "Israel is not satisfied with the draft UN
    resolution as it stands." After the media reps departed the
    room, Livni reiterated to the Assistant Secretary that Israel
    -- like Lebanon -- does not approve of the current draft of
    the resolution. Over the next hour and a half, FM Livni made
    repeated, impassioned appeals to the Assistant Secretary not
    to allow the draft UN resolution to address the long-standing
    Shebaa Farms territorial dispute. First, she argued that
    Shebaa Farms is a territorial dispute between Lebanon and
    Syria. As such, Israel has no right to be involved in it,
    and does not wish to have it placed on its bilateral agenda
    with Lebanon. She argued that IF/IF Shebaa Farms were
    returned to Lebanon in any kind of post-conflict resolution
    -- and Israel were implicated in the return -- then Syria
    might attack Israel, arguing that Israel had no right to hand
    the territory over to Lebanon.

    ¶4. (S) FM Livni also returned to what she said were the GOI's
    initial objections to addressing the Shebaa Farms issue in
    the first place -- that return of any disputed territory as
    part of a resolution to the current conflict would be
    tantamount to rewarding aggression. Hizballah, she claimed,
    would grow stronger, and terrorists in the region would be
    emboldened, perceiving that their aggression had paid
    dividends. Asking for five minutes to lay out the Israeli
    position on Shebaa Farms, Livni continued: "In past
    discussions between Israel and the U.S., it was clear that
    Shebaa Farms would be the end of a process -- full
    implementation of (UNSCR) 1559. Now, it is being put as
    something to start with! I am so fed up with weak leaders
    who want to get something good without implementing their
    deals." She wondered aloud what would happen next -- perhaps
    Hizballah would press for return of the West Bank? Pounding
    the table, Livni said, "Surely the U.S. and other Western
    governments are not naive enough to believe Hizballah's
    statements that it exists because of Shebaa Farms. Iran is
    the reason why Hizballah exists. Iran, Syria, the
    Palestinians and Hamas are watching us. We will be sending
    the wrong message. They will see that they get something by
    killing Israelis. I do not care about Siniora's 'blah blah'
    about how this is something for him. If Shebaa Farms are
    returned to Lebanon, Hizballah will merely take up another
    cause. It exists solely to advocate for and execute the
    destruction of Israel. This is about our existence, not
    Shebaa Farms. Shebaa Farms is a Syria-Israel conflict. I
    ask you, do not lead us to a situation where the end of this
    conflict becomes a victory for Hizballah."

    ¶5. (S) Pressed by the Assistant Secretary to address Israel's
    specific concerns with the language, Livni repeatedly
    returned to operative paragraph six (OP 6 -- which she
    claimed places obligations on Israel to resolve issues that
    previously were to be resolved by Lebanon) and operative
    paragraph seven (OP 7) in the draft text, which she said
    envisions the UN Secretary General securing assent from
    Lebanon and Israel for a political framework. Livni
    explained that Israel's fear is that the return of Shebaa
    Farms is perceived by the government of Lebanon as part of
    the political framework. Israel envisions a worst-case
    scenario in which Lebanon conditions its assent to the
    political framework on Israeli fulfillment of something that
    it cannot fulfill -- or worse, the return of Shebaa Farms.
    In this case, Israel would appear to be the intransigent
    party. One could, she said, imagine a scenario in which
    Shebaa Farms were returned, and then the weak Siniora
    government decides not to take action on any of its
    "obligations," including complete execution of UNSCR 1559.
    Livni summarized -- Lebanon gets something for nothing.
    Hizballah -- which started this war -- is rewarded for
    aggression. Israel is hereafter saddled with obligations
    based on a war that it did not start.

    ¶6. (S) Livni stressed that prior to the outbreak of the
    fighting, there was a series of UNSCRs that concerned
    Lebanon: 425 (Israel's withdrawal behind a UN-mandated
    line), 1559 (disarmament of militias) and 1680 (calling on
    Syria to delimit its borders with Lebanon). Accepting
    Assistant Secretary Welch's clarification that expectations
    laid out in 1559 were not "obligations" set on Lebanon's
    government, Livni nonetheless argued that it needs to be made
    clear that the conflict has evolved out of unfulfilled
    resolutions calling for action by countries in the region
    other than Israel. Israel, she asserted, has executed all
    that it has been called upon to do in the resolutions. It
    should not, she stressed, be burdened with any actions as the
    result of a conflict that it did not initiate. "The way to
    resolve this conflict," she said, "is to return to 1680. If
    the government of Lebanon does not want it, then tough luck!
    We need to refer to full implementation of 1680. We want you
    to agree to the idea that Shebaa Farms will be dealt with
    only after 1559 is fully implemented."

    --------------------------------------------- -------------
    ISRAEL DOES NOT LIKE 1ST RESOLUTION; USING TWO RESOLUTIONS
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶7. (S) Livni also wondered aloud why the U.S. and France had
    decided on a process involving two UNSC resolutions -- the
    first calling for a cease-fire, and the second mandating the
    insertion of a multinational force (MNF) into southern
    Lebanon. If Israel understood correctly that 90 percent of
    the second resolution had already been composed, Livni
    wondered why the U.S. would not just combine the two
    resolutions together. She complained that separating the two
    left the process open-ended, starting with a cease-fire that
    could ultimately prove indefinite -- a return to the status
    quo ante. Livni stressed that Israel is "willing to give the
    keys" to the MNF, and is not trying to buy more time for the
    IDF: "We do not need more time to allow our forces to be
    attacked by Hizballah. From the beginning, we have said we
    are willing to leave Lebanon. We do not, however, want to
    face another UNIFIL again."

    ¶8. (S) Assistant Secretary Welch clarified that the first
    resolution calls for a cessation of hostilities -- something
    considerably different than a cease-fire. He confessed that
    he did not have any details to share on the MNF itself,
    noting only his understanding that France has taken upon
    itself the role of organizing whatever MNF eventually enters
    southern Lebanon. As for the step-by-step nature of the
    process, the Assistant Secretary explained that potential
    troop contributors to the MNF needed to have Israel's and
    Lebanon's commitment to the framework political agreement
    before their governments could consider assigning forces to
    the MNF. No country, he said, could be expected to place its
    troops in southern Lebanon without the consent of the parties
    to their presence. He added that raising an MNF takes time,
    and noted that France postponed the first meeting of the
    force generation conference that was scheduled to take place
    in New York earlier in the week. Responding to the FM's
    re-statement that Israel would prefer one resolution and the
    opportunity to "insert more details" regarding the arms
    embargo, the MNF's rules of engagement and the Syria-Lebanon
    border, the Assistant Secretary stressed that re-opening the
    matter posed greater danger than continuing with the current
    process.

    --------------------------------------------- ----
    A/S WELCH BRIEFS LIVNI ON HIS MEETINGS IN LEBANON
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶9. (S) The Assistant Secretary shared with Livni the results
    of his August 4-5 meetings in Lebanon with PM Siniora, former
    economy minister Marwan Hamadi, Druze leader Walid Jumblat;
    the UNSYG's Personal Rep, Geir Pederson; Lebanese
    Parliamentary Speaker Nabi Berri, and Maronite leader Natal
    Malawi. Stressing that he had met with representatives from
    all of Lebanon's confessions, the Assistant Secretary
    characterized the meetings as very professional.
    Specifically, he told FM Livni that:

    -- Berri sees himself as able to represent Shia interests,
    and is willing, but does not feel obligated, to do so. He is
    providing considerable help to PM Siniora, who relies upon
    him to keep the Shia in line with the GOL. Berri indicated
    his willingness to be an intermediary to Hizballah.

    -- Lebanon's Druze are plugged into all the issues and assert
    that a Shia figure needs to take the lead to stop the
    conflict. The Maronites as a group are more divided in their
    views, but are more anti-Hizballah, anti-Syria and anti-Iran
    than the other confessions.

    -- Jumblat claimed that the IDF is not making much headway
    against Hizballah and needs to keep up pressure on the group.
    All of the Assistant Secretary's interlocutors understood
    that it is helpful to have Hizballah "militarily pressured."

    -- His Lebanese interlocutors had reached a common view on
    reparations. They also asked for U.S. help on reconstructing
    bridges.

    -- All of his interlocutors shared a common view on Shebaa
    Farms, including the importance of the issue and the view
    that its resolution would deprive Hizballah of its claim for
    its resistance. All want to see Shebaa Farms returned as
    part of a political change and victory over Hizballah. They
    do not need all of the territory returned, and they do not
    want delimitation, as this would give Syria a veto. They do
    not insist that Lebanon control the returned territory, or
    that all Lebanese displaced persons and refugees return.
    They would agree to full demilitarization of the returned
    portion. All agreed on the seven points contained in the
    Lebanese cabinet's understanding. All expect a specific
    proposal from Israel regarding withdrawal.

    -- All of his interlocutors perceive that the international
    community is pressuring Lebanon to make peace with Israel.
    The Lebanese want an armistice agreement to provide them
    cover so that they can carry out any undertakings with
    Israel. Progress has been made on the principles of an
    armistice. If the Lebanese can obtain the principles and
    elements that they desire, they would quickly agree. They do
    not like the draft resolution in its current form as it does
    not address withdrawal. (NOTE: The Assistant Secretary
    stressed that he might have more influence on the Lebanese if
    he could return to them with withdrawal language acceptable
    to Israel. END NOTE.)

    -- Like the Israelis, the Lebanese are not happy with the
    lead role France has appointed itself in organizing the MNF.

    -- All said that they cannot ask for or approve a
    multinational force under a Chapter 7 mandate, but can accept
    one if it is imposed on Lebanon. They are planning for the
    deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) immediately
    upon withdrawal of the IDF -- even if the MNF is not yet in
    place. Berri implied that Hizballah would agree, and
    volunteered to personally lead a vanguard of 10,000-15,000
    troops into the south. All shared the Israeli view that
    there should be no space between Phases One and Two. The
    Lebanese view, however, is that as long as the IDF remains in
    Lebanon, it should expect the fight to continue. All of the
    Assistant Secretary's interlocutors preferred that the IDF
    withdraw right away, and noted that the growing plight of
    displaced persons increases the scope for Iranian and Syrian
    interference. PM Siniora has been in touch with potential
    Islamic troop contributors -- including Malaysia and
    Indonesia -- and wants the bulk of Muslim MNF troops to be
    Sunni.

    -- All accept that there should be no arms in the area of
    operations except those held by the LAF and MNF. They accept
    the responsibility to stop weapons re-supply, and are willing
    to accept some UNIFIL role in monitoring this. (NOTE: FM
    Livni responded that "This is most important for Israel right
    now." END NOTE.)

    -- All agreed that Iran and Syria want to continue the fight.

    -- All of his interlocutors were very realistic on the
    prisoner issue. They want to see it referred to in the draft
    resolution, but will not make their agreement to the
    resolution conditional on it. Responding to Livni, the
    Assistant Secretary said that he had no more information on
    the condition of the Israeli soldiers being held prisoner.
    He recounted that PM Siniora had told him that right after
    their abduction, he had been told that they were safe and
    "out of the South." Siniora had also said very empathetic
    things about how prisoners would be cared for under Islamic
    law.

    ¶10. (S) The Assistant Secretary said that the USG's goal is
    to aim for a vote on the draft resolution on August 8, and
    that Secretary Rice would relocate to New York the evening of
    August 7 in support of that aim. FM Livni wondered aloud
    whether Israel or Lebanon could alter the timetable. The
    Assistant Secretary replied that UNSYG Annan would likely
    press ahead, notwithstanding any Lebanese or Israeli
    reservations.

    ¶11. (C) The U.S. side was represented by Assistant Secretary
    Welch, State Deputy Legal Adviser Jonathan Schwartz,
    Ambassador Richard H. Jones, DCM Gene Cretz, and Pol-Mil
    Officer Michael Keays (notetaker). The Israeli side was led
    by Foreign Minister Livni and included her Chief of Staff,
    Daniel Pinhasi, MFA Director General Aharon Abramovich and
    MFA Adviser Tal Becker.

    ¶12. (U) This cable was cleared by NEA Assistant Secretary
    David Welch.

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