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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2540, TFLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2540 | 2006-08-06 07:07 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    VZCZCXRO1749
    PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2540/01 2180727
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 060727Z AUG 06 ZDK
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4913
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0019
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002540

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016
    TAGS: IS LE MOPS PREL PTER SY
    SUBJECT: TFLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

    ¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: On August 4 A/S Welch, Ambassador, and
    PolOff attended a dinner hosted by Marwan Hamade, Minister of
    Telecommunications, and attended by Walid Jumblatt, leader of
    the Druze community and the Progressive Socialist Party.
    Jumblatt warned that what he described as Israel's
    ineffective ground operations and intelligence is a danger
    for Israel and the region. Hamade and Jumblatt expressed
    hesitancy about a two-resolution UNSCR approach to end the
    fighting. They believe that Hizballah will fire upon the
    Israeli army if it remains in southern Lebanon, even if a
    cease-fire is agreed upon. They think it is useful to
    increase pressure on the south to coax Speaker Berri and
    Hizballah into a cease-fire. Finally they believe that for
    Lebanon to become stronger, the ties between Iran and Syria
    must be weakened. END SUMMARY

    Culture of Death
    ----------------

    ¶2. (C/NF) Jumblatt expressed regret that, in his view, Israel
    failed to assess Hizballah,s operations on the ground. He
    questioned how Israel was completely taken by surprise on
    July 12. He concluded that today the tables have turned to
    Hizballah's advantage as the organization is founded on a
    "culture of death." Hizballah fighters want to die as
    martyrs and will not hesitate to blow themselves up to kill
    Israelis. In addition, there is a new generation of Israeli
    soldiers that are not as driven and motivated as their
    predecessors. He thinks this was illustrated in the past
    weeks of fighting and warns that it is dangerous for Israel
    and the region for this to be revealed.

    Cease Fire Not
    At Any Price
    ------------

    ¶3. (C/NF) Hamade expressed concern over the two resolutions
    for a cease-fire that will be proposed by the UN instead of
    one proposal that addresses all concerns at one time. A/S
    Welch explained that this was a compromise between the U.S.
    and the French. After extensive consultations with the
    Israelis, the U.S. believed that a cease-fire is not possible
    without a new capable stabilization force, while the French
    argued that a stabilization force is not possible without the
    cease-fire. The two-resolution solution ends the violence,
    which is important for Lebanon and the Lebanese people.
    Jumblatt exclaimed that Lebanon wants a cease-fire, but not
    one at just any price.

    ¶4. (C/NF) Ambassador noted that PM Siniora had argued for a
    one-phase plan, saying that there must be momentum. Siniora
    had suggested that the LAF immediately deploy upon a
    cease-fire. Jumblatt and Hamade both agreed that Siniora's
    approach would not work. In their view, the army is not
    entirely reliable, and Hizballah will remain armed and
    dangerous in the south if there is no international force.

    ¶5. (C/NF) But Hamade and Jumblatt were also skeptical about
    the two-phase sequencing. If the IDF stays in place
    temporarily, Hizballah will fire upon the Israelis -- even if
    a cease-fire is agreed upon in a first resolution. That
    would essentially scuttle the possibility for implementation
    of a second resolution, as no international force will come
    to Lebanon while Hizballah is firing on Israeli Army. Just
    as Hizballah, Syria, and Iran want, the fighting will
    continue. Jumblatt added that one way to remedy this is for
    the Israeli army to partake in a focused ground incursion
    that will be more likely to destroy or seriously Hizballah.
    But, he shrugged, Israel has already shown that it will not
    do this.

    ¶6. (C/NF) A/S Welch advised that another way to avoid this
    outcome is to gain rapid UN passage of the resolution and for
    GOL to quickly accept. The burden will then be on Israel to
    do the same and it is up to the international community to
    provide the troops for the stabilization force.

    Pressure to Influence
    Outcome
    --------

    ¶7. (C/NF) When asked if the GOL will agree to the resolution
    Hamade stated the majority of the government could but
    Hizballah would have to ask Iran. Jumblatt added that
    Nasrallah will not make the decision to support the
    resolution alone. A Shia catalyst will have to pressure

    BEIRUT 00002540 002 OF 002

    Nasrallah.

    ¶8. (C/NF) Hamade nominated House Speaker Nabih Berri to be
    the catalyst, though warning that this strategy may not work
    because of the influence of Syria and Iran. Nonetheless,
    Berri can play the role of a mediator because of his role in
    the Lebanese state. Yet to coax Berri, and ultimately
    Nasrallah, more destruction and occupation of the Shia south
    might be needed, until a Shia leader was ready to say "enough
    fighting." Hamade suggested that the occupation of villages
    would be blow to Hizballah because before the conflict all
    villages were liberated.

    ¶9. (C/NF) Both Berri and the Shia constituents themselves
    must be convinced to "hold on to what is left" and choose
    between having a state or endless war. Berri already sees
    that everything that he has built in the south is destroyed,
    added Jumblatt. Hamade agreed with the assessment and added
    that the Shia are weak. All of the Shia from the south,
    except for two villages, have been displaced. There are
    weekly disputes between supporters of Amal and Hizballah in
    areas where they are displaced. The pressure on the Shia
    should continue. Then offer a cease-fire, reconstruction
    money and the possibility of Shebaa.

    ¶10. (C/NF) Jumblatt and Hamede suggested that A/S Welch
    approach Berri with the prestige of being the main Shia
    leader in the state apparatus. Be honest with him about the
    two-phase resolution, they counseled; indicate to him that
    the international community is not asking GOL and GOI to
    support the resolution but to accept it as soon as it is
    passed.

    Marginalize Syria
    and Iran
    --------

    ¶11. (C/NF) Asked about his advice to move the resolutions
    forward, Jumblatt advised to "keep the Syrians out." Yet he
    admitted not knowing how to do so. Hamade warned that Syria
    will try to return to Lebanon. In his view, it is essential
    to close and protect the routes to Syria.

    ¶12. (C/NF) A/S Welch stressed that the overall objective must
    be to strengthen Lebanon. Jumblatt responded that Syria must
    be weakened for Lebanon to be strengthened. He praised the
    Egyptian and Saudi positions to break the ties between Syria
    and Iran. He recommended that a civilian line be created to
    transport Lebanese in and out of Lebanon because lines to
    Syria should be closed. He added that Syria will loose face
    if Lebanese territory is occupied and Shebaa Farms is not
    liberated. The Shia will question why Syria did not help
    Hizballah.

    ¶13. (U) Assistant Secretary Welch has cleared this cable.
    FELTMAN

`