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### Viewing cable 06TELAVIV3370, CRITICISM OVER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06TELAVIV3370 | 2006-08-24 12:12 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tel Aviv
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    null
    Leza L Olson  08/25/2006 02:05:09 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Leza L Olson

    Cable
    Text:

    C O N F I D E N T I A L        TEL AVIV 03370

    SIPDIS
    CXTelA:
        ACTION: POL
        INFO:   IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID ADM RSO
                CONS

    DISSEMINATION: POL
    CHARGE: PROG

    APPROVED: AMB:RJONES
    DRAFTED: POL:MDPEARLSTEIN/RBL
    CLEARED: DCM:GCRETZ, POL:NOLSEN, ECON:BMASILKO, DAO:PJDERMER

    VZCZCTVI017
    PP RUEHC RUEHXK RHEHNSC
    DE RUEHTV #3370/01 2361255
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 241255Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5862
    INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003370

    SIPDIS

    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IPA
    NSC FOR WATERS AND LOGERFO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/23/2016
    TAGS: PGOV PREL IS
    SUBJECT: CRITICISM OVER ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF
    LEBANON WAR ON THE RISE

    Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).

    ¶1. (C) Summary and comment: The cease-fire in Lebanon has
    rapidly eroded the strong public and political support for
    the Government's conduct of the war and has left both Prime
    Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz open to
    an increasingly loud chorus of criticism.  Initial GOI
    attempts to channel criticism through a friendly commission
    of inquiry evoked strong protests and leave Olmert with the
    option of ordering a formal government inquiry or risking an
    independent investigation.  The problems faced by Olmert and
    Peretz are exacerbated by coalition infighting on the budget
    and by political maneuvering within Kadima and Labor, while
    the opposition Likud Party waits for the appropriate moment
    to strike in an effort to increase its own support.  Israelis
    will continue to digest and assess the outcome of the war,
    Olmert's first real test as prime minister, over the next
    weeks and months.  This process will likely determine the
    political futures of Olmert and Peretz.  End summary and
    comment.

    --------------------------------------------- ---
    Strong Public Support Drops Following Cease-Fire
    --------------------------------------------- ---

    ¶2. (SBU) Following the July 12 attack by Hizballah, Israeli
    political leaders and the public rallied around Prime
    Minister Ehud Olmert and his government as they authorized
    extensive air and ground operations in Lebanon.  Olmert's
    approval ratings soared and even the often-acerbic Bibi
    Netanyahu offered support.

    ¶3. (SBU) As pressure from the international community for a
    cease-fire increased and hostilities came to an -- at least
    temporary -- end, this situation changed.  Embassy contacts
    and the media are all skeptical that the war has removed the
    threat or resulted in anything but a minor setback for
    Hizballah.  To many, this result is inadequate compensation
    for the approximately 180 Israelis (including 110 soldiers
    and more than 70 civilians) killed in the conflict, the
    disruption of economic life from rocket attacks and the
    call-up of the reserves, the high financial cost of
    conducting the war, the destruction of homes and businesses
    in parts of northern Israel, and the failure to obtain the
    return of kidnapped IDF soldiers.

    ---------------------------------------------
    Olmert Likely to Form a Commission of Inquiry
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (SBU) The emerging criticism is exacerbated by a public
    debate over the government's planning and conduct of the war.
     A small but vocal group of reserve soldiers have called for
    the resignation of Olmert, Peretz, and IDF Chief of Staff LTG
    Dan Halutz.  They blame the political leadership for what
    they say was a grave underestimation of Hizballah's
    capabilities and for a failure to provide Israeli troops with
    the necessary equipment and, in isolated incidents, even
    sufficient food and water.

    ¶5. (SBU) Such charges played a role in leading Peretz to form
    a commission led by his advisor, former IDF Chief of Staff
    Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, to examine the conduct of the war.  This
    idea, however, drew fire from both the IDF -- which wants to
    guarantee the confidentiality of any military witnesses --
    and much of the public -- which objects to an investigation
    led by a Peretz supporter -- and the commission has suspended
    its activity.  As he faces increasing pressure for a more
    independent investigation, Olmert has two choices: a
    governmental inquiry over which he would have substantial
    influence, or an independent commission.  While the latter
    option would be more acceptable to the public, any potential
    findings of mismanagement or lack of planning by the GOI
    could potentially bring down senior members of the coalition.
     In a conversation with congressional visitors from
    Washington on August 20, Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon
    Barak said that he believed such a commission would be formed
    and hinted that he expects to be chosen to lead it.

    -------------------------------
    Coalition and Party In-fighting
    -------------------------------

    ¶6. (SBU) In addition to the public criticism, the government
    has also suffered from coalition infighting, as well as
    internal party disputes in both Kadima and Labor.
    Transportation Minister and former Defense Minister Shaul
    Mofaz abstained from the Cabinet vote on the cease-fire,
    calling UNSCR 1701 "less than satisfactory."  More
    importantly, FM Tzipi Livni and Olmert disagreed on tactics
    during the cease-fire negotiations, resulting in Olmert
    calling off at the eleventh hour Livni's planned trip to the
    UNSC on September 12.  The disagreement was an apparent
    first.  Livni was widely viewed as a real asset to Kadima's
    electoral campaign, and her decision to back Olmert after
    Sharon's stroke precluded any leadership challenge at that
    time.

    ¶7. (SBU) Peretz faces similar problems in Labor.  His
    performance during the Lebanon war has only strengthened
    criticism that he is unqualified to manage what most Israelis
    feel is the country's most important portfolio.  Former naval
    chief and Shin Bet Director Ami Ayalon and former IDF Deputy
    Chief of Staff Matan Vilnai, both Labor MKs who see
    themselves as future prime ministers, have attacked Peretz in
    public.  Former Prime Minister Ehud Barak has been more
    subtle in his criticism, but is building upon his image as
    the leader who extricated Israel from the last Lebanon war.
    One or more of them is likely to challenge Peretz for the
    Labor leadership in internal party elections scheduled for
    May 2007.

    ¶8. (C) The two main parties in the coalition, Kadima and
    Labor, have also publicly disagreed on how to finance the
    war.  With Treasury experts now leaking war cost estimates
    exceeding NIS six billion (approximately 1.3 billion
    dollars), the coalition has been unable to reach consensus on
    where to find the funding.  As a result, Kadima caucus chair
    Avigdor Yizhaki publicly threatened to end the coalition,
    telling reporters "the Labor Party is not a coalition partner
    that can be trusted.  Therefore, I am going to propose to the
    Prime Minister that he immediately reshuffle (the Cabinet)
    and enter into new coalition negotiations."  Note: Gabi
    Golan, advisor to the Prime Minister for Planning and
    Development told EconCouns that while the next few months
    will be rocky for the coalition, he does not expect the Labor
    members on the Finance Committee to continue to disrupt
    budget negotiations because, "they know that if the PM
    reshuffles the Cabinet their position will not be any
    stronger."  End Note.

    -----------------------
    Likud Waiting to Pounce
    -----------------------

    ¶9. (SBU) To further compound Olmert's difficulties, Likud
    Chairman Bibi Netanyahu is waiting for the right opportunity
    to pounce.  Netanyahu was atypically restrained in his
    comments during the fighting, merely referring in a Knesset
    speech to "hitches" in the conduct of the war.  On August 22,
    however, he told the press that "with this many inadequacies,
    there is no choice but to form a state commission of
    inquiry."  Likud is also attempting to lure former IDF Chief
    of Staff Moshe "Boogie" Ya'alon into the party to bolster its
    claims to the "strong on defense" title.

    --------------------------------------------- ---------
    Comment: Jury Still Out, but GOI Facing Difficult Time
    --------------------------------------------- ---------

    ¶10. (C) Comment: The conflict with Hizballah was Olmert's
    first real test as Prime Minister.  Israelis will continue to
    digest and assess the outcome of the war over the next weeks
    and months.  Their views of the war's achievements -- or lack
    thereof -- will have a long-term impact on his government's
    political standing.  Local perceptions of the deployment
    timing, mandate, and composition of the enhanced UNIFIL
    force, as well as the effectiveness of the arms interdiction
    regime and progress on securing the return of the two
    abducted soldiers, will play a large role in shaping their
    opinion.  These factors will also determine what type of
    inquiry on the war's conduct Olmert will feel compelled to
    order.  In the end, Olmert and Peretz are both likely to face
    increasingly vocal opposition within their own parties.

    ********************************************* ********************
    Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

    You can also access this site through the State Department's
    Classified SIPRNET website.
    ********************************************* ********************
    JONES

`