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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2553, TFLE01: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2553 | 2006-08-08 05:05 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    VZCZCXRO3413
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2553/01 2200525
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 080525Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4939
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0035
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0915

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002553

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
    TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER LE IS SY
    SUBJECT: TFLE01: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID
    LAF DEPLOYMENT

    Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
    ).

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C) During an August 7 meeting with the Ambassador and
    TDY poloff (notetaker), Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr
    confidently claimed that 15000 LAF troops, if called upon,
    could begin deploying to the South within 12 hours. (Note:
    this meeting took place before the cabinet decision
    authorizing deployment of that number after a full Israeli
    withdrawal. End note.) Following this deployment, the LAF
    would require assistance from the Arab countries,
    particularly Saudi Arabia, in the provision of additional
    equipment to support their permanent presence in the South.
    Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at
    Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to
    draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.
    Turning to the draft UNSC resolution, Murr cautioned that
    without a clear solution to the Sheba'a Farms issue, the GOL
    would not be able to undercut Hizballah's pretext for
    remaining in the South and would therefore have a much harder
    time dislodging them. Murr also supported the idea of a
    beefed-up UNIFIL with a close coordination mechanism - such
    as a Joint Operations Room (long a demand of the
    international community) - for quickly passing messages
    between the LAF and IDF. End Summary.

    ASSESSING THE CURRENT CONFLICT
    ------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel
    had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that
    Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment
    as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he
    estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets,
    he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah
    with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links. Murr
    believes that the time for a cease-fire is now. The Israelis
    will find it much harder to pick off individual rocket
    emplacements hidden in towns and villages without causing
    significant civilian casualties and more international
    uproar. Furthermore, according to Murr, the entire Lebanese
    populace, including the Shi'a, are tired of the conflict and
    want a cease-fire. This works to the advantage of the
    cease-fire actually holding.

    ¶3. (C) As to the potential for an escalation of the
    conflict, such as a Hizballah attack on Tel Aviv, Murr does
    not see that as likely. Murr said that the decision to
    strike Tel Aviv with Zilzal 1 and Zilzal 2 missiles would
    have to come from Tehran. Israel would have to strike
    downtown Beirut, which Murr thinks will not happen. When
    asked whether Hizballah might cynically move a rocket
    launcher into Solidere in order to draw Israeli aerial fire,
    Murr dismissed this as "impossible." Saying that he had 3000
    LAF troops stationed in Beirut, Murr scoffed, "Hizballah
    cannot launch a rocket from Solidere. I have too many
    soldiers there." He also claimed that three days ago the LAF
    successfully interdicted a Hizballah-bound container of
    rockets and impounded them in the Ministry of Defense,
    refusing to release them to Hizballah.

    "COUNT ON ME FOR THE DEPLOYMENT"
    --------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) When asked about the LAF's ability to deploy to the
    South, Murr replied that he could have 15,000 troops begin
    deployment to seven sectors in the South within 12 hours of a
    ceasefire. Pulling out a rough map, Murr elaborated on the
    troop deployment numbers in the various sectors (Note. These
    geographic sectors are estimates based on a quick glimpse at
    the map. End Note.):

    2,500 troops southwest of the Litani to the Blue Line ( 60
    M48 tanks)
    2,500 southeast of the Litani to the Blue Line ( 60 M48 tanks)

    2,000 northwest of the Litani up to Sidon ( 60 M48 tanks)
    2,000 northeast of the Litani around An-Nabatiyeh ( 60 M48
    tanks)
    - These two sectors would be augmented by another 1000 troops

    BEIRUT 00002553 002 OF 002

    already stationed just to the north of them.

    2,000 north of the Blue Line roughly above Sheba'a Farms
    2,000 north of that sector on the other side of Jabal Bi'r
    ad-Dahr
    1,000 northeast of those sectors

    ¶5. (C) Murr said that he planned to recall 12,000
    reservists (something announced in the Lebanese press on
    8/7), which he said would take 12 days, and to cancel all
    leave for the entire army of 43,000. He added that the LAF,
    once deployed, will need to receive additional equipment and
    support from Arab nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, and
    that he would need U.S. assistance in making that request.
    "With a push from you, we can get from the Arab countries the
    equipment that we need."

    ¶6. (C) Murr did not mention whether or not the LAF would
    assume Hizballah's weapons and positions in the South. When
    asked if he really thinks Hizballah will peacably accept this
    arrangement, Murr challenged, "Let them play with the
    Lebanese army. When we're in the South, anyone who moves,
    we'll shoot at. No joke." He also thinks that Nabih Berri
    will have to accept this plan, thereby providing at least
    some Shi'a buy-in. Murr urged though that the international
    community support this endeavour by providing a clear answer
    on the Sheba'a Farms issue, thereby weakening Hizballah's
    pretext for continuing the resistance. "With a political
    agreement, no more resistance."

    ¶7. (C) Responding to the suggestion that the Israelis will
    be skeptical as to the LAF's ability to assume security in
    the South, Murr said that he supports the idea of a beefed-up
    UNIFIL lending assistance to the LAF mission. He agrees with
    establishing a joint operations room with UNIFIL in order to
    quickly transmit messages to the IDF in the event of a
    Hizballah attack launched from the South, with an eye to also
    forestalling an Israeli response which might take out LAF
    positions. When asked, Murr said he supports having UNIFIL
    or UNTSO monitor points of entry, including ports and
    airports, in order to reassure the Israelis that Hizballah
    will not be resupplied.

    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶8. (C/NF) This meeting with Murr took place just a few
    hours before the cabinet took its historic decision to deploy
    15,000 troops to the south upon Israeli withdrawal behind the
    Blue Line -- a decision that, had it occurred any time before
    Hizballah's July 12 hijacking operation -- would have been
    hailed by the international community. From the maps and
    files Murr had, planning was already well underway for this
    potential deployment before the cabinet decision. The fact
    that the cabinet unanimously approved this proposal, with
    little debate, indicates that Hizballah is fully on board.
    Hizballah's acquiescence in a deployment that it had
    strenuously opposed since the Israeli withdrawal from the
    south in May 2000 suggests that Hizballah is now ready for a
    cease-fire. If we can use this cabinet decision (and other
    steps) to encourage an early withdrawal, Hizballah (on top of
    whatever military losses it has suffered) is harmed
    politically, as we can emphasize the fact that the LAF
    deployment, not Hizballah's weapons, is what achieved the
    Israeli withdrawal.

    ¶9. (C/NF) We still need to examine, however, how best to
    achieve not just a simple cease-fire but a sustainable
    cease-fire. That will require more than 15,000 LAF troops,
    no matter how confidently Murr praises their commitment and
    abilities. We also suggest that we begin consultations on an
    urgent basis with Gulf Arabs in providing needed equipment to
    the LAF on an accelerated basis. Whatever the final formula
    for the hoped-for sustainable cease-fire, the LAF will surely
    play a role, especially in light of this cabinet decision,
    and the more quickly we can assemble equipment, the better.
    FELTMAN

`