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### Viewing cable 87BOGOTA7890, THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR?

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
87BOGOTA7890 | 1987-06-09 22:10 | 2011-04-16 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy Bogota

`

    P 092218Z JUN 87
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510
    INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
    AMEMBASSY QUITO
    AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    AMEMBASSY LIMA
    CIA WASHDC
    DIA WASHDC

` `

    id: 163
    date: 6/9/1987 22:18
    refid: 87BOGOTA7890
    origin: Embassy Bogota
    classification: SECRET
    destination: 87BOGOTA3997
    header:
    P 092218Z JUN 87
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7510
    INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN
    AMEMBASSY QUITO
    AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    AMEMBASSY LIMA
    CIA WASHDC
    DIA WASHDC

    ----------------- header ends ----------------

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 07890

    E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
    TAGS: KPRP PINS MILI PTER CO
    SUBJECT: THE GUERRILLA SITUATION: PREPARING FOR WAR?

    REF: BOGOTA 3997

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA WAR HAS BEEN
    QUIESCENT THE LAST FEW WEEKS.  THOUGH ARMED CONTACTS
    BETWEEN THE VARIOUS GUERRILLA GROUPS AND THE MILITARY
    CONTINUE, THE PACE OF MAJOR CONFRONTATIONS HAS
    SLACKENED.  THE MAIN ARENA OF CONFRONTATION HAS BEEN THE
    MEDIA, WHERE THE UNION PATRIOTICA (UP), POLITICAL FRONT
    OF THE COLOMBIAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES (FARC),
    LEVELED CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST THE
    MILITARY.  COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA GROUPS ARE IN A
    RETRENCHMENT PHASE: REGROUPING, FORGING ALLIANCES, AND
    RETHINKING STRATEGIES.  THE GOC CONTINUES TO
    RESTRUCTURE ITS SECURITY APPARATUS AND TO AUGMENT THE
    ARMY'S STRENGTH THROUGH RECRUITMENT OF VOLUNTEER UNITS.
    THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE PREPARING FOR
    AN EVENTUAL BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND THE
    RESUMPTION OF FULL-SCALE CONFLICT.  END SUMMARY.

    GUERRILLAS - THE PUBLIC PROFILE
    -------------------------------
    ¶2. (S/NF) WAVING THE HUMAN RIGHTS BANNER:  THE FARC AND
    THE UNION PATRIOTICA ARE THE ONE COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA
    GROUPING POSSESSED OF A MEDIA SENSE.  IN RECENT WEEKS,
    THEY HAVE USED THE MEDIA TO MAKE THEIR CASE TO THE
    COLOMBIAN AND FOREIGN PUBLIC.  THE MAJOR THRUST BY THE
    UP WAS A MAY 8 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH EX-PRESIDENTIAL
    CANDIDATE JAIME PARDO LEAL CHARGED OVER 100 MILITARY
    OFFICERS WITH HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AGAINST UP MEMBERS AND
    ACTIVISTS (SEE BOGOTA 6456).  THE UP'S CHARGES RESULTED
    IN A SWIFT DENIAL AND A NAME-BY-NAME REBUTTAL BY DEFENSE
    MINISTER SAMUDIO.  PARDO'S THRUST WAS COMPLEMENTED BY
    REPORTS OF A PARIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH UP
    CONGRESSMAN AND EX-FARC COMANDANTE BRAULIO HERRERA
    DECLARED THE UP AND THE PEACE PROCESS TO BE IN DANGER OF
    EXTINCTION FROM ASSAULTS BY THE MILITARY AND
    MILITARY-SUPPORTED PARA-MILITARY GROUPS (SEE BOGOTA
    7001).  HERRERA'S PARIS SOJOURN IS PROBABLY THE OPENING
    PHASE OF A LARGE SCALE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
    COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY FORCES.  SPECIAL
    REPORTING INDICATES THAT THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY
    (PCC) IS COORDINATING SUCH A CAMPAIGN WITH LEFTIST
    GROUPS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE.  THE CAMPAIGN IS TO
    BE MODELED ON THOSE CONDUCTED AGAINST THE GOVERNMENTS OF
    EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, AND ARGENTINA.  ANALOGY BETWEEN
    ARGENTINA'S "DIRTY WAR" AND CONTEMPORARY COLOMBIA WILL
    BE THE KEY THEME.  THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO
    CONSTRAIN GOC ACTIONS AGAINST ANY GUERRILLA GROUP AND TO
    FRUSTRATE ATTEMPTS TO SECURE COUNTER-INSURGENCY SUPPORT
    FROM ABROAD.

    ¶3. (U) PARDO ON THE PEACE PROCESS: FOLLOWING ON THE
    CHARGES OF MILITARY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, THE
    CONSERVATIVE WEEKLY "GUION" PUBLISHED AN INTERVIEW WITH
    PARDO IN ITS MAY 27 EDITION.  AFTER THE NOW-RITUAL
    DECLARATION OF THE UP'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE FARC,
    PARDO WENT ON TO DENOUNCE THE BARCO ADMINISTRATION'S
    CONDUCT OF THE PEACE PROCESS.  HE DECLARED THE PROCESS
    TO BE IN CRISIS BECAUSE THE GOC LACKS THE WILL TO BUILD
    ON THE BASE CREATED BY THE BETANCUR ADMINISTRATION.  IN
    PARTICULAR, HE CITED THE GOC'S REFUSAL TO NAME AN
    INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION COMMISSION AS PROOF OF A LACK
    OF INTEREST IN PEACE.  "THE GOVERNMENT," PARDO
    CONTINUED, "HAS NOT MOVED A SINGLE FINGER TO PUT AN END
    TO...ARMED CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE
    GUERRILLA MOVEMENT OBSERVING THE TRUCE."  HE ALSO
    CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT CONTENTION THAT THE ARMED
    FORCES MUST HAVE FREE ACCESS TO ANY PART OF THE
    COUNTRY.  CHALLENGED THAT THE TREATY DID NOT CONCEDE
    "INDEPENDENT REPUBLICS" TO THE FARC, PARDO COUNTERED
    THAT "THE FARC NEEDS A GEOGRAPHICAL SITE, A PIECE OF
    EARTH."

    ¶4. (U)  A LETTER TO BARCO:  THE UP'S EFFORTS WERE
    COMPLEMENTED BY DESPATCH MAY 10 OF A LETTER FROM THE
    FARC COMANDANTES TO PRESIDENT BARCO.  REVEALING A NEW
    AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, THE FARC WARNED
    THAT THE FATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS IS IN BARCO'S HANDS.
    SIGNIFICANTLY, THE FARC DECLARED THAT THEY DID NOT SIGN
    A TRUCE WITH "MILITARISM" AND ARE READY TO JOIN "OUR
    PEOPLE WHEN IT DECIDES TO RISE UP AGAINST MILITARISM."
    THE FARC'S LETTER CONTAINS AN IMPLICIT THREAT: SHOULD
    BARCO BECOME "MILITARISTIC" IN THE FARC'S EYES, THE
    GUERRILLAS WILL HAVE THE LEGAL RIGHT TO ABANDON THE
    PEACE PROCESS AND RESUME OPERATIONS.

    GUERRILLAS - BEHIND THE SCENES MANEUVERING
    ------------------------------------------
    ¶5. (C/NF) FARC - STIRRING FROM THE NEST:  WHILE THE
    FARC'S PUBLIC ORGANS ARE ENGAGED IN TARRING THEIR
    GOC/MILITARY OPPONENTS, THE FARC AND COLOMBIA'S OTHER
    GUERRILLA ARMIES, SINGLY OR IN CONCERT, HAVE BUSIED
    THEMSELVES WITH REORGANIZATION, ALLIANCES, AND STRATEGIC
    RETHINKING.  AS THE LARGEST GUERRILLA ARMY, AND THE SOLE
    GROUP REMAINING WITHIN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC'S
    ACTIVITIES COMMAND THE LION'S SHARE OF INTEREST.  RECENT
    REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS REDISTRIBUTING
    FORCES, POSSIBLY WITH AN EYE TO READINESS IN EVENT OF AN
    OPEN BREAK WITH THE GOC.  ONE MILITARY SOURCE REPORTS
    THAT FIVE ADDITIONAL FARC FRONTS ARE BEING FORMED.  IT
    IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS PROJECTED EXPANSION REFLECTS
    ADDITIONAL ARMED STRENGTH, A REDISTRIBUTION OF AVAILABLE
    STRENGTH TO COUNTER GOC INITIATIVES, OR A RESPONSE TO
    RIVAL GUERRILLA GROUPS.  HOWEVER, GIVEN THE GROWTH IN
    FARC STRENGTH SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PEACE PROCESS,
    IT FAIR TO ASSUME THAT THE NEW FRONTS REFLECT
    AUGMENTATION OF THE FARC'S ARMED STRENGTH.  BY CONTRAST,
    OTHER SPECIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT THE FARC IS
    CONSOLIDATING FRONTS IN ANTICIPATION OF THE MARCH 1988
    ELECTIONS.  ANOTHER FACET OF THE SITUATION IS A JUNE 2
    REPORT IN "EL ESPECTADOR", BOGOTA'S LEADING DAILY, THAT
    THE FARC IS ABANDONING ITS MOUNTAIN HEADQUARTERS AT LA
    URIBE AND SHIFTING FORCES TO META AND GUAVIARE
    DEPARTMENTS.  THIS REPORT REMAINS UNCONFIRMED; GOC
    OFFICIALS PLED IGNORANCE WHEN PRESSED BY THE MEDIA FOR
    CONFIRMATION.  IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE FARC WOULD
    LEAVE INACCESSIBLE LA URIBE FOR NEW AND UNHARDENED
    QUARTERS.  ANY SHIFT OF PERSONNEL FROM LA URIBE MAY IN
    FACT BE TIED TO THE ACTIVATION OF NEW FRONTS.

    ¶6. (S/NF) EXTENDING A HAND TO THE EPL: WHILE CONTINUING
    TO SPAR WITH THE GOC ON THE PEACE PROCESS, THE FARC HAS
    NOT ABANDONED ITS HOPES OF DOMINATING COLOMBIA'S
    GUERRILLA MOVEMENT.  A MAJOR STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WAS
    THE APRIL 4 AGREEMENT WITH THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
    (EPL) WHICH CALLED FOR GUERRILLA UNITY, "DEMOCRATIC
    CONVERGENCE" AND POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO COLOMBIA'S
    PROBLEMS.  CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING SUGGESTS THAT EACH
    SIDE SEES ADVANTAGES FLOWING FROM THE PACT.  THE FARC
    FORESEES A NOMINAL TRUCE BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE EPL
    WHICH WOULD ALLOW INCREASED EPL TO INCREASE POLITICAL
    ACTIVITY IN ITS CORDOBA DEPARTMENT STRONGHOLD -- AN
    ADVANTAGE FOR THE RADICAL LEFT.  THEY ALSO VIEW THE PACT
    AS AN INCENTIVE FOR OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS TO NEGOTIATE
    WITH THE FARC.  FOR ITS PART, THE EPL SEES THE AGREEMENT
    AS A MEANS OF LURING THE FARC OUT OF THE PEACE PROCESS.
    THUS, THE AGREEMENT COULD SUCCUMB TO THE DISTRUST AND
    IDEOLOGICAL SQUABBLING THAT HAVE KEPT COLOMBIA'S
    GUERRILLAS DIVIDED.

    ¶7. (S/NF) EXTENDING A FIST TO THE ELN: DESPITE SUCCESS
    IN FORGING LINKS TO THE EPL, TENSIONS BETWEEN THE FARC
    AND THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN) HAVE ESCALATED.
    IN PARTICULAR, THE FARC HAS ACCUSED THE ELN OF MURDERING
    MEMBERS OF THE FARC'S UNION PATRIOTICA (UP) POLITICAL
    FRONT IN ARAUCA INTENDENCY.  THE SITUATION MIRRORS THE
    CONFLICTING AMBITIONS OF THE TWO GROUPS IN THAT AREA.
    WHILE THE FARC REMAINS INTENT ON MONOPOLIZING POLITICAL
    POWER IN ARAUCA, AND USING THE AREA AS A RECRUITING
    POOL, THE ELN SEEKS TO DOMINATE THE AREA THROUGH ATTACKS
    ON THE OIL PIPELINE.  CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING INDICATES
    THAT THE ELN DESIRES A MEETING TO RESOLVE THESE
    PROBLEMS.  IT IS UNKNOWN IF SUCH A MEETING OCCURRED, BUT
    NEW DEVELOPMENTS SUGGEST THAT THE FARC AND THE ELN HAVE
    TEMPORARILY SHELVED THEIR DIFFERENCES.

    ¶8. (C) ONE FOR ALL, ALL FOR ONE:  THE NEW DEVELOPMENT
    SUGGESTING A SUBSUMPTION OF FARC-ELN DIFFERENCES IS THE
    GENERAL STRIKE CALLED FOR JUNE 7-9.  THIS STRIKE,
    DESIGNED TO PARALYZE SEVEN DEPARTMENTS OF NORTHEASTERN
    COLOMBIA, WAS JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE FARC, THE
    PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY (EPL), THE M-19, THE NATIONAL
    LIBERATION ARMY (ELN), AND THE NEWLY-REACTIVATED RICARDO
    FRANCO FRONT (A DISSIDENT WING OF THE FARC).
    VICE-MINISTER OF GOVERNMENT FERNANDO BOTERO TOLD MISSION
    JUNE 9 THAT THE STRIKE HAS NOT ASSUMED THE DIMENSIONS
    ORIGINALLY FEARED.  URBAN WORKERS HAVE LARGELY IGNORED
    CALLS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS.  BOTERO ADDED THAT ABOUT
    18,000 CAMPESINOS HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED UNDER DURESS BY
    THE GUERRILLAS, THREATENED WITH A 20,000 PESO FINE OR
    DEATH FOR NON-COMPLIANCE.  WHILE SATISFIED THAT THE
    STRIKE'S IMMEDIATE IMPACT IS MINIMAL, BOTERO COMMENTED
    THAT THE EVIDENT GUERRILLA COOPERATION IN FOMENTING THE
    CAMPESINO MARCHES IS DISTURBING (COMMENT: WE SHARE
    BOTERO'S CONCERN; WHATEVER THE SUCCESS OF THE CIVIC
    STRIKE, ITS PLANNING POINTS TOWARD POSSIBLE GREATER
    COOPERATION AMONG THE GUERRILLAS.)

    ¶9. (S/NF) M-19 -- THROWING THEIR HAT IN THE RING: THE
    FARC IS NOT ALONE IN RETHINKING ITS POSITION AND IN
    RESTRUCTURING ITS FORCES.  CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING
    INDICATES THAT THE LONG-UNHEARD-FROM M-19 HAS DECIDED TO
    PARTICIPATE IN THE 1988 MAYORAL ELECTIONS.  THE GROUP
    INTENDS TO ACT THROUGH FRONT GROUPS AND TO SEEK
    ALLIANCES WITH MAINSTREAM POLITICIANS AND GROUPS SUCH AS
    THE FARC'S UNION PATRIOTICA.  THE FARC/EPL AGREEMENT
    CITED IN PARAGRAPH (6) IS A PRIME MOTIVATION FOR THE
    M-19'S ACTION.  IN ADDITION, THE M-19 INTENDS TO FORGE
    CLOSER LINKS WITH THE FARC.  AS WITH OTHER
    INTER-GUERRILLA AGREEMEMTS, SELF-INTEREST ASSUMES A
    COMMANDING POSITION; THE M-19 HOPES THAT CLOSER
    RELATIONS WITH THE FARC WILL FOSTER JOINT OPERATIONS
    SHOULD THE FARC-GOC TRUCE COLLAPSE.  IN OTHER
    DEVELOPMENTS, THE M-19 IS CREATING NEW URBAN TERRORIST
    UNITS IN COLOMBIA'S MAJOR CITIES, AND HAS BEGUN JOINT
    TRAINING WITH THE EPL TO REBUILD ITS DEPLETED STRENGTH
    ALONG THE CARIBBEAN COAST.

    ¶10. (S/NF) ELN - PULSO FIRME Y MANO TENDIDA:  IN
    ADDITION, THE ELN IS NEARING COMPLETION OF A MAJOR
    REORGANIZATION OF ITS BOGOTA UNITS.  FORMERLY LARGELY
    AUTONOMOUS, THESE UNITS WILL NOW BE SUBJECT TO THE ELN'S
    NATIONAL DIRECTORATE.  GIVEN THE ELN'S REPUTATION FOR
    DISCIPLINE, FUTURE ELN ACTIONS IN BOGOTA MAY SEEK TO
    HAVE AN IMPACT SIMILAR TO THEIR PIPELINE ATTACKS IN
    ARAUCA.  REGARDING THE PIPELINE, ON JUNE 1, THE ELN
    PROPOSED TO THE GOC A CESSATION OF PIPELINE ATTACKS,
    PROVIDED THE GOC MET SEVERAL ELN DEMANDS REGARDING
    PETROLEUM EXTRACTION AND EXPORT (SEE BOGOTA 7451).
    THESE DEMANDS WERE ROUNDLY REJECTED BY RECONCILIATION
    ADVISOR CARLOS OSSA ESCOBAR, WHO DECLARED THAT THE GOC
    WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ITS ENERGY POLICY "WITH AN ARMED
    MINORITY INTENT ON ATTACKING THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY."

    THE GOVERNMENT - RESTRUCTURING FOR CONFLICT
    -------------------------------------------
    ¶11. (C/NF) MILITARY GROWTH:  GUERRILLA EFFORTS AT
    RESTRUCTURING HAVE THEIR PARALLEL ON THE GOVERNMENT
    SIDE.  THOUGH PRESIDENT BARCO REITERATED TO VISITING
    GENERAL GALVIN (SEE BOGOTA 7463) HIS BELIEF THAT HIS
    REHABILITATION PLAN WILL SAP MUCH OF THE FARC'S
    STRENGTH, HE REMAINS INTENT ON EXPANDING THE SIZE,
    MOBILITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE ARMED FORCES.
    BARCO BELIEVES (COMMENT: WE AGREE) THAT THE ARMED FORCES
    ARE NOT NOW IN A POSITION TO TAKE ON A FULLY-ACTIVE
    FARC.  HOWEVER, HIS RECENT COMMENTS SUGGEST THAT
    ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS ARE BRAKING THE PACE OF ARMY
    EXPANSION.  IN A JUNE 2 SPEECH AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY,
    BARCO STATED THAT HIS GOVERMMENT WOULD PROVIDE THE
    "BASIC ELEMENTS" NEEDED BY THE ARMY, BUT ONLY "TO THE
    MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE."  WHATEVER THE REALITY OF
    BUDGET LIMITATIONS, THE COLOMBIANS HAVE DECIDED TO
    PURCHASE U.S.-MADE TRANSPORT HELICOPTERS AT A COST OF
    $36 MILLION, THOUGH DELIVERY OF THE FIRST UNIT WILL NOT
    TAKE PLACE UNTIL LATE 1987.  IN ADDITION, THE ARMY HAS
    BEEN RECRUITING SOME 2,000 DISCHARGED SOLDIERS FOR
    SERVICE IN SPECIAL VOLUNTEER COMPANIES.  THESE UNITS ARE
    HIGHLY RATED DUE TO THE MEN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE, AND HAVE
    BEEN DEPLOYED IN CONTESTED AREAS SUCH AS CAQUETA
    DEPARTMENT.  RECRUITMENT OF ADDITIONAL VOLUNTEER UNITS
    IS EXPECTED.

    ¶12. (U) SECURITY RESTRUCTURING:  AS A FURTHER STEP IN
    COMBATTING THE THREAT POSED BY THE GUERRILLAS AND THE
    EROSION OF PUBLIC ORDER, THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL
    INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANS HAVE BEGUN MAJOR
    REORGANIZATIONS.  THE NATIONAL POLICE ANNOUNCED JUNE 2
    THE ACTIVATION OF 30 INTELLIGENCE "BRIGADES" DESIGNED TO
    DETECT URBAN ACTIVITIES BY GUERRILLA GROUPS, BE THEY
    MILITARY OR POLITICAL IN NATURE.  FOR ITS PART, THE
    ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY (DAS - COLOMBIAN
    FBI) HAS CREATED THREE NEW COMMANDS DEDICATED TO
    SECURITY, EXPLOSIVES AND COUNTER-TERRORISM, AS WELL AS
    INTELLIGENCE CENTERS IN BOGOTA, CALI, MEDELLIN, AND
    CUCUTA.  ACCORDING TO DAS COMMANDER GENERAL MAZA, ALL
    UNITS ARE DESIGNED TO COUNTER THE WAVE OF CRIMINALITY,
    TERRORISM, AND ARMED SUBVERSION CONFRONTING COLOMBIA.

    PROGNOSIS
    ---------
    ¶13. (C) AS INDICATED IN MISSION'S LAST ASSESSMENT OF
    COLOMBIA'S GUERRILLA SITUATION (REFTEL), THE LEVEL OF
    CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA IS EXPECTED TO GROW DURING 1987.
    THE STEPS BEING TAKEN BY BOTH THE GOC AND THE VARIOUS
    GUERRILLA GROUPS REFLECT THAT EXPECTATION.  THE ACTIVE
    GUERRILLA GROUPS APPEAR INTENT ON STRIKING THE GOC ANEW
    ONCE REDEPLOYMENT AND RETRAINING ARE ACCOMPLISHED.
    HOWEVER, THE MAJOR DANGER TO COLOMBIAN INSTITUTIONS AND
    U.S. INTERESTS HERE LIES IN THE ATTITUDES OF THE FARC.
    EVOLUTION OF EVENTS, OF COURSE, WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE
    FARC FORESEES PROSPECTS OF ITS UNION PATRIOTICA
    POLITICAL FRONT IN THE MARCH 1988 POPULAR ELECTIONS FOR
    MAYORS.  CURRENT PROJECTIONS SUGGEST THE UP WILL DO
    FAIRLY WELL IN SOME ISOLATED RURAL AREAS, AND MAY ELECT
    UP TO EIGHTY MAYORS (OUT OF OVER 1,000), ALL IN
    RELATIVELY SMALL TOWNS.  BASED ON THIS EXPECTATION, MOST
    OBSERVERS HERE THINK THE FARC WILL BE VERY RELUCTANT TO
    FORMALLY BREAK THE TRUCE BEFORE NEXT MARCH -- ALTHOUGH
    THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE MAY RISE WITHOUT ANY DECLARATION.
    BEFORE OR AFTER MARCH, THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE EVENTS IS
    WIDE: THE FARC IN OPEN WARFARE, OR STILL-NOMINAL
    ADHERENCE TO THE PEACE ACCORDS;  THE UP LEAVING THE
    CONGRESS, OR STAYING TO USE IT AS A PLATFORM TO DENOUNCE
    THE GOVERNMENT.  BUT IN OUR JUDGEMENT ALL THESE
    SCENARIOS WILL HAVE ONE COMMON FACTOR:  HEIGHTENED
    VIOLENCE AND INCREASED THREAT TO COLOMBIA'S INSTITUTIONS
    AND U.S. INTERESTS.

    GILLESPIE

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