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### Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2539, TFLE01: UN REP SEES CRITICAL WINDOW OF

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BEIRUT2539 | 2006-08-05 15:03 | 2011-03-15 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Beirut
Appears in these articles: not yet set

`

    VZCZCXRO1565
    OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
    DE RUEHLB #2539/01 2171523
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 051523Z AUG 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4911
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002539

    SIPDIS

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/SINGH/HARDING

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/05/2016
    TAGS: KPKO MOPS PREL PTER IS SY LE
    SUBJECT: TFLE01: UN REP SEES CRITICAL WINDOW OF
    OPPORTUNITY FOR LASTING CEASEFIRE

    REF: A. BEIRUT 2491

    ¶B. BEIRUT 2509

    Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador. Reason: Section 1.4 (d
    ).

    SUMMARY
    --------

    ¶1. (C) On August 5, A/S Welch and Ambassador Feltman met
    with the UNSYG's Personal Representative for Lebanon Geir
    Pedersen and UN Senior Political Affairs Officer Salman
    Sheikh. Reiterating concerns expressed previously (refs a
    and b), Pedersen stressed that Israeli military action would
    not achieve the intended political objectives and that the
    longer it took to reach a cease-fire, the greater the
    prospect of a "total collapse" in Lebanon. Pedersen provided
    a laundry list of "doomsday" scenarios including a Hizballah
    attack on Tel Aviv, an influx of al-Qaeda-styled militants
    into Lebanon, and Samir Ja'ja "going mad and declaring his
    own kingdom." Furthermore, Pedersen feared the
    "Palestinianization of the conflict" into a West Bank and
    Gaza-type situation, with Israel unwilling to withdraw unless
    Hizballah ceased its rocket attacks but with Hizballah
    unwilling to cease the attacks as long as Israel remained in
    the South. Turning to the time lag between a possible
    cease-fire and deployment of an international force to
    southern Lebanon, Pedersen saw a critical "window of
    opportunity" for making the deal work during which several
    pieces would need to come into place: LAF deployment to the
    South, withdrawal of Hizballah forces north of the Litani,
    the layering of a more robust international force on top of
    UNIFIL, and an Israeli withdrawal. During this timeframe,
    there would have to be guarantees from Israel to cease air
    raids and from Hizballah to stop firing into Israel.

    FOR HIZBALLAH: "MISSION ACCOMPLISHED"
    -------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Pedersen met with both PM Siniora and Hizballah the
    previous day (August 4) and touched briefly on both meetings.
    He described Siniora as "rather emotional," questioning why
    it was that nobody was pointing fingers at Israel.
    Hizballah, meanwhile, is "happy" with the current conflict.
    To their minds, even if hostilities were to stop now, they
    come out "looking great" in the eyes of their followers.
    Pedersen believes, though, that Hizballah has an interest in
    stopping the conflict soon. Hizballah told him that they
    still support PM Siniora and Speaker Berri and the Lebanese
    government line in demanding a complete cease-fire and IDF
    withdrawal. They would support deployment of the LAF to the
    South, but regarding Hizballah's own withdrawal north of the
    Litani river, Hizballah believes that this would be a matter
    for Lebanese Cabinet discussion.

    STARK CHOICE FOR ISRAEL: CEASEFIRE OR
    "TWENTY MORE YEARS IN LEBANON"
    -------------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) Pedersen stressed his belief that Israel will not
    succeed in destroying Hizballah on the ground nor in stopping
    the rocket attacks. Thus, in his view, Israel needs to come
    to a quick accommodation to allow "political factors" to deal
    with the threat from Hizballah, otherwise Israel risks
    another protracted conflict in Lebanon. One such political
    factor would be Lebanese public opinion; Pedersen surmised
    that once hostilities stop, the non-Shia Lebanese would look
    back none too fondly on Hizballah's egregious July 12 killing
    and kidnapping of IDF soldiers which sparked the current
    hostilities. The significant sectarian counterweight of
    Sunni, Christian, and Druze displeasure would serve to
    pressure Hizballah into ceasing such unilateral actions and
    integrating more fully into the Lebanese body politic.
    Essentially, Pedersen speculated, the Lebanese would ask the
    question of Hizballah: "Are you dictated to by Lebanon, or by
    Iran?" Salman Sheikh added that, "the diversity of Lebanon
    is a plus here. There are groups here that would not want to
    go back to the status quo ante." Pedersen commented that the
    deployment of the LAF and an international force to the South
    would serve as an additional political deterrent to
    Hizballah. Hizballah would not want the public relations
    disaster of injuring or killing Lebanese soldiers in the
    South.

    GUARANTEES NEEDED FROM BOTH SIDES
    ---------------------------------

    BEIRUT 00002539 002 OF 002

    ¶4. (C) As Pedersen envisioned it, there would need to be
    certain guarantees in the critical timeframe between the
    declaration of a ceasefire and the deployment of the LAF and
    an international force to the South. Hizballah would need to
    cease all attacks on Israel, and also have the firm
    understanding that Israel would withdraw entirely from the
    South once the LAF and elements of an international force are
    in place. Pedersen asked that A/S Welch and Ambassador
    Feltman stress these points later today in their meeting with
    Speaker Berri (a Shiite from Tyre and leader of the Amal
    party, which together with Hizballah forms the Shiite bloc in
    Parliament). Though Pedersen is not certain that Berri would
    want to convince Hizballah not to attack "an occupying
    force," getting Berri to agree to do so would increase
    pressure on Hizballah to hold its rocket fire while the
    conditions are put in place for an Israeli withdrawal, and
    for getting Hizballah to withdraw north of the Litani.
    Pedersen suggested proposing to Berri that the Israelis will
    also withdraw from the Sheba'a Farms area: "You will help
    Berri with Hizballah if you have something on Sheba'a."
    Pedersen acknowledged that there would be inevitable hostile
    exchanges between Hizballah militants and the IDF in the
    South in the interim, but that these could be contained.

    ¶5. (C) On the Israeli side of the equation, Pedersen asked
    for U.S. help in getting the Israelis to guarantee the
    cessation of aerial attacks against suspected Hizballah
    positions and leaders. "Be clear with the Israelis: if
    there are no Hizballah rocket attacks, Israel should not
    conduct aerial attacks." In this context, Pedersen suggested
    altering the language in operative paragraph 1 of the UN
    draft resolution from "cessation of offensive military
    operations" to read only "cessation of hostilities." While
    allowing that Israel has the right to self-defense, Pedersen
    felt that the current language left too much room for
    interpretation and would allow Israel a backdoor to
    continuing its aerial bombardments of Lebanon.

    ¶6. (C) Pedersen accepted that the LAF and a beefed-up
    international force in the South would not be a significant
    military deterrent to Hizballah if they opted in the future
    to lob rockets at Israel or return south of the Litani, but
    neither would sustained Israeli military action ever end the
    Hizballah threat. Israel would need to be reassured that the
    political and diplomatic pressure from inside and outside
    Lebanon will serve to more effectively hamstring Hizballah in
    the short term and ultimately allow for the disarmament of
    Hizballah according to UN resolution 1559.

    ¶7. (C) A/S Welch suggested that, as an added confidence
    builder for Israel, UNIFIL should ensure against the
    resupplying of Hizballah by stationing observers at the nine
    entry points along the Lebanese/Syrian border. Pedersen
    thought this was a good idea in principle, but that it might
    lead the Syrians -- whom Pedersen said are being "unhelpful"
    -- to scupper the ceasefire/force deployment deal.

    ¶8. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this message.
    FELTMAN

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