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### Viewing cable 06CAIRO4382, NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH AND DNSA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06CAIRO4382 | 2006-07-16 07:07 | 2011-03-16 20:08 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Cairo

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 004382

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER EAID MOPS KPAL EG IS
    SUBJECT: NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY DAVID WELCH AND DNSA
    ABRAMS' JULY 11-12 CAIRO MEETINGS

    Classified by Ambassador Francis Ricciardone for reasons 1.4
    (b) and (d).

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) During a July 11-12 visit to Cairo, NEA Assistant
    Secretary Welch and Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott

    SIPDIS
    Abrams along with the Ambassador met separately with Egyptian
    Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman (sep channel), Foreign
    Minister Aboul Gheit, Arab League Secretary General Amre
    Moussa, and a group of Egyptian civil society activists.
    Aboul Gheit discussed details of planned Strategic Dialogue
    meetings in Washington July 18 (septel), the situation in
    Gaza, and other regional issues. Aboul Gheit requested USG
    assistance in opening the Rafah/Gaza border to permit
    stranded Palestinians to return to Gaza, recommended working
    with Turkey as a conduit to Syria, and agreed that Hamas
    should not benefit from the current regional crisis. Aboul
    Gheit proposed that Israel "forget the soldier (Shalit) for a
    while," in order to de-escalate the crisis and diminish the
    role of Hamas leader Khaled Misha'al. On Iraq, Aboul Gheit
    said the GOE was devising a strategy to jump-start relations
    with Baghdad, "short of sending an Egyptian Ambassador to
    Baghdad." Aboul Gheit warned against allowing Iran to play a
    role in "regional security arrangements," as a result of
    P5/Germany nuclear talks. Aboul Gheit also criticized
    Washington's decision to "keep the Arabs out of the picture"
    on Somalia, and again warned against references to Chapter
    VII in a UNSC mandate for Darfur.

    ¶2. (C) With Amre Moussa (just after hearing of a Hizballah
    attack on northern Israel and kidnappings of two Israeli
    soldiers), Welch and Abrams requested a clear statement from
    the League criticizing the attack and calling for the
    immediate return of the hostages, as well as Moussa's censure
    of Syrian complicity. Moussa sought clarity on the attacks
    before committing, but blamed Tel Aviv for the current
    regional crisis. Moussa, who had recently met with Khaled
    Misha'al in Damascus and just returned from a meeting of
    Iraq's neighbors in Tehran, called for "getting back to
    basics" on the regional peace process. The current "vicious
    circle" won't be broken by additional violence, he warned.
    With a group of six Egyptian civil society activists, Welch
    and Abrams heard recommendations on how the U.S. could best
    support reformers without tarring them in Egyptian public
    opinion or having U.S. criticism become the main issue. The
    group urged the USG to support democratic "principles" and
    not to get pulled into debates over specific cases. End
    summary.

    ----------------------------
    Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
    ----------------------------

    ¶3. (C) The meeting between A/S Welch, Abrams, the
    Ambassador, and Aboul Gheit took place just before the
    Hizballah attack on northern Israel and the kidnapping of two
    Israeli soldiers. Aboul Gheit said Egypt is concerned with
    the humanitarian impact of the Israeli incursion into Gaza,
    the need to target Hamas rather than the general population,
    and the opening of the Rafah border crossing. He
    characterized the situation at the Egyptian border with Gaza
    as desperate and claimed there were "no more than 800"
    Palestinians stranded there (UN reps claim the number is in
    the thousands within the wider border region). A/S Welch
    noted USG concerns over the border crossings situation, and
    said he and Abrams would discuss the situation in Israel and
    Ramallah with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. The U.S., he
    said, would soon announce a USD 50 million donation to UNRWA
    for humanitarian needs.

    ¶4. (C) Turning to Qatar's draft UN Security Council
    resolution on the Gaza situation, Welch requested Egypt to
    press the Arab Group in NY to stand down on the unhelpful and
    unbalanced text. Aboul Gheit said Egypt and other Arab
    regimes had to be seen as "doing something" to respond to
    Israeli transgressions toward Palestinian civilians. Welch
    asked for Egypt's advice on dealing with Syria on the ongoing
    Gaza crisis. Aboul Gheit recommended multiple-channel
    pressure on Damascus, and noted recent diplomatic efforts by
    the Turks and Saudis. Aboul Gheit pointed out that the Turks
    had credibility and influence in Damascus, but had been
    "manouvered" by the Syrians into allowing Hamas to demand
    "international guarantees" for protection if it releases the
    Israeli soldier in Gaza -- a direct snub at Egyptian
    mediation efforts. Similarly, the Saudi King was pressing
    his idea of bringing Arab foreign ministers together, with
    Hamas and Fatah leaders, to help them iron out a political
    compromise to move beyond their current stale-mate. Aboul
    Gheit suggested Israel "forget for a while" its kidnapped
    soldier in Gaza, in order to lessen tensions and diminish
    Hamas influence."

    ¶5. (C) Responding to a question on his Tehran visit with
    foreign ministers of Iraq and its neighbors, Aboul Gheit said
    he was pleased that the discussion was limited only to Iraq,
    and that Tehran was not permitted to use the "Iraq card" in
    its ongoing negotiations with the P-5/Germany on nuclear
    issues. Aboul Gheit said the U.S. "did not play" in the
    debate over whether or not to permit Tehran to host the
    meeting. Welch noted the difficulty in preventing the Tehran
    venue, once the Iraqi government indicated its decision to
    attend. Asked about Egypt's willingness to support the Iraqi
    government, Aboul Gheit said that he and Omar Soliman were
    devising an engagement strategy, "short of sending an envoy"
    to Baghdad. The murder of Egypt's Charge in Baghdad in June
    of 2005, he said, almost led to his resignation -- a
    situation he will not repeat. Pointing to the present
    security situation in Iraq, Aboul Gheit said that Egypt could
    not put itself under U.S. protection within the Green Zone.
    Aboul Gheit also eschewed the possibility of allowing the
    Iraqi expat community in Egypt to play a stronger, more
    visible political role, due to the potential for inter-Iraqi
    violence spreading to Egypt.

    ¶6. (C) In a brief discussion of Egyptian behavior in
    multilateral fora, Aboul Gheit said that it was important for
    Egypt to show its independence and ability to speak its mind
    in international fora. This approach enabled Egypt to
    balance Iranian influence. "We cannot allow Iran to emerge
    as the region's leader," he said.

    ¶7. (C) On Sudan and Somalia, Aboul Gheit chastised
    Washington for "seeking to keep the Arabs out of the picture"
    by excluding Egypt, Yemen, and Djibouti from the Somalia
    Contact Group. After revealing a "weak position in Somalia,"
    he stated, the U.S. would benefit by working with moderate
    Arab states who have the necessary experience, influence, and
    interests there. On Sudan he warned against references to
    Chapter VII in a Darfur UNSC resolution, citing GOS
    opposition, and saying Egypt could not participate in a
    Darfur PKO under a Chapter VII mandate.

    ------------------------------------
    Arab League Secretary General Moussa
    ------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Welch and DNSA Abrams' July 12 meeting with Arab
    League Secretary General Amre Moussa focused on the breaking
    events surrounding the Hizballah attack on IDF positions
    along the Lebanon-Israel border, and the capture of two IDF
    soldiers. Moussa said he planned to call Lebanese FM Siniora
    to inquire about the events, but said he would neither reach
    out to Damascus nor would the Arab League make a statement
    until he knew all the facts surrounding the attack. Moussa
    agreed that the hostage-taking was a serious escalation, but
    cautioned the U.S. not to draw immediate conclusions about
    Syrian complicity in the attack.

    ¶9. (C) Welch informed Moussa of details related to a July 12
    morning attack by Hizballah on Israeli forces along the
    western part of the Lebanon border, including 7 casualties
    and 2 Israeli hostages. A visibly disturbed Moussa
    acknowledged the seriousness of the developments, citing the
    need to control escalation and to secure the release of the
    soldiers. Welch and DNSA Abrams pressed Moussa on what the
    AL would say and do about the attacks. Moussa said he would
    contact Lebanese PM Siniora, and the AL would consider coming
    out "energetically" against the Hizbollah action. Welch
    stressed that if Hizbollah -- a member of the Lebanese
    government -- was responsible for the attacks, the action
    could legitimately be viewed as a government-to-government
    action, essentially an act of war.

    ¶10. (C) Turning to Syria, Moussa said he did not think there
    was a Damascus link -- hoped not, he added -- to the July 12
    attacks, and again cautioned the U.S. against drawing
    conclusions on Syrian complicity. Welch emphasized that
    Damascus bears responsibility due to its complicity in the
    continual re-supply of Hizballah from Iran that in turn
    destabilized the region. Welch strongly urged the AL to
    discuss with the Syrians the seriousness of not only these
    developments, but also of its negative role in Gaza and Iraq.

    ¶11. (C) Moussa said he viewed the "chaos" in Gaza as a
    repercussion of the "wrong approaches" taken by Israel and
    the U.S. following Hamas' parliamentary victory. Moussa said
    there was a possibility to give Hamas a chance to change its
    policies, but it was "pushed into a corner from the first
    minute" which "created chaos." Moussa said the AL had been
    pressing Hamas to "be responsible," and added that it was
    headed in that direction slowly-but-steadily, but Israeli
    acts and U.S. pressure had "closed doors." Abrams pushed
    back, asking what the Arab states had done to stop Qassam
    rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel following the September
    pull-out from Gaza. These attacks, he argued, undermined
    Israeli confidence in a peaceful approach to the situation.
    ¶12. (C) Moussa said the internal chaos within the PA is
    unacceptable, but "all is not totally lost" if the U.S.
    worked with PM Olmert on a common approach that would show
    some benefit to the Palestinians. Moussa added that this
    "vicious circle" of attack and reprisal cannot be broken by
    Israeli force alone. Moussa said he met with Mesha'al "for
    two hours" recently in Damascus. He said it was a useful
    meeting as Mesha'al explained the situation from a Hamas
    perspective, conveying the sense of frustration and distrust
    among the Palestinian people toward Israel. Moussa said the
    logic of Mesha'al and Hamas was strong, and was met with
    widespread sympathy in the region and beyond. Mesha'al had
    described Turkish and Egyptian interventions for the release
    of the Israeli soldier in Gaza, claiming that unfulfilled
    Israeli promises of prisoner releases sowed doubt on any
    similar offers now. Mesha'al reportedly said that prisoner
    releases by PM Sharon consisted only of those already on the
    verge of release, drug dealers, and common criminals, thereby
    shaking his faith in future releases.

    ------------------------
    Civil Society Roundtable
    ------------------------

    ¶13. (C) During a July 12 roundtable discussion at the
    Ambassador's residence with a group of Egyptian civil society
    representatives, discussion centered on frustration with both
    the process and substance of GOE-backed reforms to date, and
    questioning of ruling National Democratic Party "reformers'"
    capabilities of implementing their proposed agenda. The
    attendees were generally disappointed by recently-passed
    press and judiciary laws, and warned of impending "crisis"
    should the GOE demonstrate a similar disregard for the
    consultative process when the upcoming constitutional
    amendments package and Anti-Terror Law come before
    Parliament. Participants urged the USG not to send "mixed
    messages" regarding democratization in Egypt, and offered
    differing suggestions for how the U.S. might best encourage
    reform over the coming months, ranging from a request that
    the U.S. provide "unwavering public support" through "focused
    criticism of Egypt's human rights record and and slow pace of
    democratization," to urging the USG to call on the GOE to
    have "a dialogue with its own people." One attendee noted
    that since national elections will not be held for several
    years, the USG would be most effective be encouraging the
    building of an "infrastructure of democracy," through
    liberalization of the political party registration process,
    increased flexibility for the judiciary and press, and a more
    consultative process as the Anti-Terror Law and new
    constitutional amendments move forward.

    ¶14. (U) NEA Assistant Secretary Welch and DNSA Abrams did
    not have an opportunity to review this message before
    departing post.

    JONES

`