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### Viewing cable 09MONTERREY102, NUEVO LEON?S EFFORTS TO REFORM STATE AND LOCAL POLICE HAVE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MONTERREY102 | 2009-03-04 21:09 | 2011-02-10 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Consulate Monterrey
Appears in these articles: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/02/10/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol

`

    VZCZCXRO5484
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHMC #0102/01 0691819
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 042156Z MAR 09 ZDS
    FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3571
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0071
    RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHGD/DTS GUADALAJARA
    RUEHGD/AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA 0115
    RUEHHO/DTS HERMOSILLO
    RUEHHO/AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO 0049
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEHRS/DTS MATAMOROS
    RUEHRS/AMCONSUL MATAMOROS 0261
    RUEHRD/DTS MERIDA
    RUEHRD/AMCONSUL MERIDA 0276
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 4624
    RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9137
    RUEHNG/AMCONSUL NOGALES 0013
    RUEHNL/DTS NUEVO LAREDO
    RUEHNL/AMCONSUL NUEVO LAREDO 0222
    RUEHTM/DTS TIJUANA
    RUEHTM/AMCONSUL TIJUANA 0103

` `

    195277
    2009-03-04 21:56:00
    09MONTERREY102
    Consulate Monterrey
    SECRET//NOFORN

    VZCZCXRO5484
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHMC #0102/01 0691819
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 042156Z MAR 09 ZDS
    FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3571
    INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RUEHCD/AMCONSUL CIUDAD JUAREZ 0071
    RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHGD/DTS GUADALAJARA
    RUEHGD/AMCONSUL GUADALAJARA 0115
    RUEHHO/DTS HERMOSILLO
    RUEHHO/AMCONSUL HERMOSILLO 0049
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEHRS/DTS MATAMOROS
    RUEHRS/AMCONSUL MATAMOROS 0261
    RUEHRD/DTS MERIDA
    RUEHRD/AMCONSUL MERIDA 0276
    RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 4624
    RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9137
    RUEHNG/AMCONSUL NOGALES 0013
    RUEHNL/DTS NUEVO LAREDO
    RUEHNL/AMCONSUL NUEVO LAREDO 0222
    RUEHTM/DTS TIJUANA
    RUEHTM/AMCONSUL TIJUANA 0103

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 MONTERREY 000102

    C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - Classification

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/4/2019
    TAGS: SNAR KCRM ASEC CASC PGOV MX
    SUBJECT: NUEVO LEON?S EFFORTS TO REFORM STATE AND LOCAL POLICE HAVE
    NOT BEEN EFFECTIVE

    MONTERREY 00000102  001.4 OF 005

    CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, Monterrey,
    State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    ¶1. (C) Summary. The state of Nuevo Leon has instituted many
    changes to clean up its state and municipal police forces,
    including annual lie detector tests, the creation of an
    integrated municipal police force called Metropol, and the
    construction of a high technology C-4 CCTV monitoring center.
    The state, and one municipal, police force are also utilizing
    the Plataforma Mexico system to share information, and these
    entities are eager to obtain assistance from the Merida
    Initiative. Despite these actions, results in terms of reducing
    common crime are mixed. Civil society and security experts have
    not seen any real improvement in the quality and reliability of
    state and municipal police, and the Nuevo Leon Secretary of
    Public Security has no confidence in the municipal police
    forces. Meanwhile, neither the state nor the local police forces
    dare to interfere with the drug cartels. End Summary.

    State and Local Police Infiltrated by Drug Cartels

    ¶2. (C) The state of Nuevo Leon?s lucrative drug trafficking
    routes are controlled by the Gulf/Zeta cartel, except for the
    wealthy suburb of San Pedro (where the Consulate families
    reside) which is under the Beltran Leyva branch of the Sinaloa
    Cartel. There is no doubt that the Nuevo Leon state and local
    police have been substantially compromised by the Gulf/Zetas.
    The GOM?s National Center for Evaluation and Control of
    Confidence tested police nationwide with medical, psychological,
    toxicology, and polygraph examinations and measured their
    wealth. The Center found that it could not provide a positive
    recommendation for 60.4 of Nuevo Leon?s federal, state and
    municipal police, right in line with the national average of
    61.4%. Similarly, Nuevo Leon Secretary for Public Security Aldo
    Fasci estimated that 50% of the state and city police forces
    were infiltrated by drug cartels.

    ¶3. (S/NF) In the past, post law enforcement representatives were
    able to provide informational assistance to the state police on
    several successful state police operations against organized
    crime. However, this stopped with the 2006 assassination of
    Marcelo Garza y Garza, the head of the state investigative unit.
    Post officials see Garza?s replacement as a figure who has been
    compromised by the Gulf/Zeta cartel. Note. Post law enforcement
    officials have a good working relationship with state police on
    non-drug matters, such as pursuing fugitives or protecting the
    Consulate. End Note. Moreover, although there have been over 200
    executions in the last three years, including over 40 police and
    soldiers, none of these cases has been solved. One knowledgeable
    contact states that Nuevo Leon Secretary Fasci is isolated
    within his own office, since his lieutenants in reality report
    to his corrupted underlings.

    ¶4. (SBU) According to statistics from the state attorney
    general?s office, crime rates were generally stable in 2008,
    although economic crimes are now trending upward. The total
    number of premeditated homicides declined 7% from 2007 to 2008,
    partially reflecting the relative peace between the drug
    cartels. The drug cartels actively contested Nuevo Leon until
    mid-year 2007, so while there were 107 executions in 2007 that
    number fell to less than 45 in 2008. The record on other crimes
    is mixed with simple robberies (-8%) and robberies of businesses
    (-0.5%) both declining, and home burglaries (+2%), robberies of
    people (+16%) and car thefts (+20%) all increasing. Following an
    upward trend the last half of 2008, in January 2009 there have
    been sharp increases in economic crimes such as simple robbery
    (+56%), home burglaries (+102%), robberies of businesses (+65%),
    robberies of people (+138%), while car thefts continued to rise
    (+18%) and premeditated homicides were up 5%. The public
    statistics on kidnappings are not reliable, since few cases are
    reported and Mexican law does not classify most abductions as
    kidnappings as under U.S. law. Local businessmen think that

    MONTERREY 00000102  002.4 OF 005

    there have been substantial increases in extortion and
    kidnapping, at least some of them linked directly to cartel
    members.

    The Good: Plans and Actions to Reform Local Police Forces

    ¶5. (SBU) Nuevo Leon Governor Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras has
    repeatedly promised new programs to clean up the police forces,
    including annual polygraph tests, higher levels of education for
    police recruits, improved coordination with municipal police
    forces, and more federal resources. In addition, four
    metropolitan Monterrey PAN mayors proposed creation of Metropol,
    a new integrated municipal police force, including uniform
    requirements, salaries and equipment. The PAN mayors later
    agreed to include the PRI Mayors in their plans, and the PRI
    Governor Gonzalez Paras adopted the Metropol plan for the entire
    Monterrey Metropolitan area. The Metropol plan now includes
    creating a joint unit composed of different municipal police
    forces to respond to crime, as opposed to the normal
    preventative function of Mexican municipal police.

    ¶6. (C) State and local police also use technology to increase
    police effectiveness. President Calderon inaugurated the C-4
    (Center for Communication, Command, and Control) built by the
    wealthy suburb of San Pedro in September 2008. The San Pedro C-4
    is impressive, and 300 cameras enable San Pedro police to
    monitor the entrances and exits into the city and analyze crime
    trends to deploy the police more effectively (e.g. moving police
    to areas and times when burglaries are likely to occur). San
    Pedro Secretary of Public Security Rogelio Lozano contends that
    the cameras are effective because they cannot be corrupted.
    Meanwhile, the C-4 operators must pass special confidence
    testsand are not permitted to bring cell phones into the
    facility,. Both Secretary Lozano and a member of the Citizens
    Security Advisory Council think that the C-4 discourages crime
    in San Pedro, since the criminals know that they are being
    watched. San Pedro statistics show that crime is stable or
    falling slightly since the C-4 came into operation. The state of
    Nuevo Leon is currently building a C-5 (so-called because it
    will coordinate the C-4s). However, the C-5 was originally
    scheduled to be completed by October 2007, but due to repeated
    delays, state officials now hope that it will open in summer
    ¶2009. Apparently, Northrop-Grumann served as a prime contractor
    for this facility.

    ¶7. (SBU) Nuevo Leon and San Pedro police both praise Plataforma
    Mexico, which shares information about crime throughout the
    country. The San Pedro C-4 is linked to Plataforma Mexico, so
    San Pedro police can instantly analyze cars license plates in
    minutes to determine if they were stolen, including in other
    states. Nuevo Leon Secretary Facsi also stated that Plataforma
    Mexico information has helped them solve crimes and avoid hiring
    police with criminal records elsewhere in Mexico. State and
    local police are also very eager for assistance through the
    Merida Initiative, but have not yet seen any funds.

    The Bad: Promising Reforms Bring at Best Mixed Results

    ¶8. (C) Despite all his efforts, Nuevo Leon Secretary Facsi does
    not think that he has made progress cleaning up the Nuevo Leon
    state and municipal police forces. Fasci does not think that
    annual polygraphs are effective, since he has seen the ?fear in
    the eyes? of the polygraph examiners, who may ignore the actual
    results. He noted that he has seen a number of cases where
    compromised police have passed all of the required confidence
    tests. Facsi also faces a deficit of officers, since his state
    police only number 7,000, 2,000 below their authorized strength.
    Nuevo Leon screens police candidates, and only 200 of 1,000
    applicants passed the initial confidence tests to enter the

    MONTERREY 00000102  003.4 OF 005

    police academy. Fasci finds that he must keep moving his
    commanders around to maintain their effectiveness, before they
    fall prey to bribes and influences. He thinks that police
    commanders are only at maximum effectiveness for only three
    months, and he has moved some commanders around five times.
    Facsi does not have any confidence in the municipal police
    forces. The state police have weekly strategy meetings with the
    military, CISEN, and the federal police, and Fasci excludes
    local police because he doesn?t trust them. . (Note: ironically,
    local military commanders say the same about the state police,
    i.e., they exclude them from their planning sessions because
    they don?t trust them.) Facsi also complained that his forces
    need better arms to fight the cartels, but he did not want the
    municipal police to upgrade their weapons, noting that when the
    Gulf/Zeta cartel sponsored demonstrations against the military,
    the municipal police forces did nothing to stop them.

    ¶9. (C) San Pedro Secretary of Security Lozano was far more
    optimistic, claiming that he has weeded out 300 of his 500
    officer police force through polygraphs, drug and psychological
    tests. Although Post law enforcement officials consider the San
    Pedro police force to be the most reliable and best equipped,
    they still think that it is compromised by organized crime and
    unwilling or unable to move against drug cartels. Similarly, a
    prominent member of the San Pedro Citizens Security Council, who
    met monthly with Lozano, did not think that the San Pedro police
    had improved substantially, although she did think that the San
    Pedro C-4 had been effective in reducing common crime.

    ¶10. (C) Poloff has met with an organizer of the citizens? march
    for security, security consultants and academics, and none
    believe that there have been real improvements in the
    reliability of local police forces. For example, one security
    consultant reported that in the city of Guadalupe the commander
    took the new police recruits to a narco-warehouse to collect
    their share of the money. A contact with close ties to the
    police said that the police only use the confidence tests to
    harass the officers they don?t like, not to clean up the force.
    In addition, in June 2008, the day after Nuevo Leon Governor
    Gonzalez Paras urged citizens to file complaints against
    kidnapping, a jewelry owner and his son were kidnapped from
    inside the Guadalupe municipal police station and a state police
    station while filing complaints. The kidnappers encountered no
    resistance from the police. Indeed, there were 60 state police
    stationed nearby with weapons and body armor, but they reported
    to the newspaper that they were ordered not to intervene. None
    of the police involved were disciplined. In some cases the
    municipal police actively assist the cartels. For example,
    federal police and the Mexican military liberated a three year
    old victim of a kidnapping, and found that the kidnappers were
    seven police from the rural town of Salinas Victoria. They also
    found money, backpacks and other evidence at a safehouse
    indicating that these municipal police were helping organize the
    narco-funded demonstrations against the Mexican military.
    Similarly, Post law enforcement officials believe that Guadalupe
    municipal police actively assist the Gulf/Zeta cartel in
    kidnapping and holding victims. Similarly, in the suburban town
    of Juarez, the police basically serve as an auxiliary for the
    Gulf Cartel.

    ¶11. (C) Metropol was originally designed by four PAN mayors who
    only included neighboring PRI towns grudgingly. Metropol was
    designed to provide uniform standards for the municipal police
    forces to improve their effectiveness, and Nuevo Leon Secretary
    Facsi said that the municipal police will have minimum pay of
    $666 per month. However, independent observers dismiss Metropol
    as a political stunt. For example, Javier Hernandez, a United
    Nations official posted to Nuevo Leon for a project to observe
    crime rates, said that Metropol systems have never been

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    evaluated to see if they were effective and that the whole
    effort is just political theater. San Pedro Secretary Lozano,
    one of the original architects of Metropol, now seems
    disenchanted, since the Metropol concept has been changed to
    include joint police forces, apparently under the control of the
    state.

    ¶12. (C) In contrast, most civil society observers think that
    Plataforma Mexico and the C-4 are reasonably effective in
    controlling common crime. Nuevo Leon and San Pedro utilize
    Plataforma Mexico, which they say helps them track down
    criminals, but the rest of the municipal forces are not
    connected to Plataforma Mexico. Indeed, Plataforma Mexico is
    limited because it only includes data from federal crimes or
    state crimes where the state requested assistance from the
    federal government. The PGR recently conducted a search for Post
    on Plataforma Mexico, but warned that for state crimes, such as
    murder or kidnapping, Post would have to ask each state since
    nationwide data was still not available. Others are less sure of
    the value of Plataforma Mexico. One contact with close police
    ties, argued that the police do not actually use the Plataforma
    Mexico intelligence and that the C-4 does not analyze any
    information. Lozano argues, however, that Plataforma Mexico
    permits local police to stop cars with no license plates or
    stolen cars, which can be used by drug cartels to commit crimes.
    In our view, neither Plataforma Mexico nor the San Pedro C-4
    have hindered cartel operations.

    The Ugly: Impunity for the Drug Cartels

    ¶13. (C) Comment. In Nuevo Leon the drug cartels do not fear the
    state and municipal police; instead, clean police officers are
    afraid of the cartels. Over the last three years over 40 police
    and soldiers have been executed by the drug cartels, and none of
    the cases has been solved. Indeed, a recent case illustrates how
    the drug cartel members are protected, but not the police.
    During the recent narco-demonstrations, a policeman arrested one
    of the leaders, a zeta cell leader. The zetas threatened him
    within 10 minutes, and two days later they executed him after he
    dropped off his children at their school. In contrast to the
    cartels, who tried to get their leader released, we understand
    that the police have decided not to investigate the murder of
    their fellow officer (see reftel B).

    ¶14. (C) Comment continued. It should be noted that Mexican
    federal and state constitutions often tie the hands of the state
    and local police. While Nuevo Leon has many thousands of
    preventive police, they are prohibited by law from investigating
    crimes. Most street crimes in the U.S. are solved by patrol
    officers who follow up routine leads and are empowered to make
    warrantless arrests. Mexican street police are in large part
    deterred from exercising basic police investigative techniques
    either by law or though coercion. Some minor constitutional
    modernization would have to be considered to make police reform
    a reality.

    ¶15. (C) Comment continued. Since 93% of Mexico?s police forces
    and are state and municipal police, honest and professional
    state and municipal police forces are critical to success in the
    battle against drug cartels. Several political leaders have
    recently approached Poloff to request USG help, arguing that
    unless trends change Nuevo Leon could become a state fully
    controlled by the drug cartels. Nuevo Leon Secretary Facsi and
    several civic leaders argue that the U.S. should help through
    the Merida Initiative, making Nuevo Leon a positive model. Local
    leaders note that technology alone will not solve the issue, as
    the state and municipal police will need to become professional
    (including higher salaries) to become assets in the battle
    against drug cartels. Starting state police officers only earn

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    $500 per month (commanders make $1,000 per month), so their
    salaries would need to be increased substantially before they
    could become a professional force. Unfortunately, truly
    reforming the police is a long-term process and in many ways
    Nuevo Leon leaders haven?t even taken the first necessary steps.
     End Comment.
    WILLIAMSON

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