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### Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1830, VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA REVOCATION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09NAIROBI1830 | 2009-09-01 10:10 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Nairobi
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHNR #1830/01 2441009
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 011009Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0830
    INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3312
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T NAIROBI 001830

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR AF A/S CARSON, INL/C/CP: JANE BECKER, NSC FOR
    SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2019
    TAGS: CVIS KCOR KCRM PGOV PREL ECON KE
    SUBJECT: VISAS DONKEY: CORRUPTION 212(F) VISA REVOCATION

    REF: A. 2008 STATE 81854
    ¶B. Td-314/011589-09

    Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Ranneberger for reasons 1.5 (b)
    and (d).

    ¶1. (C) Embassy is seeking a security advisory opinion under
    Section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
    Proclamation 7750, suspending the entry into the United
    States of Amos Sitswila Wako and members of his family. Wako
    was born in Kakamega, Western Province, Kenya on July 31,
    ¶1945. Post strongly believes Mr. Amos Wako has engaged in
    and benefited from public corruption in his capacity as
    Attorney General for the past 18 years by interference with
    judicial and other public processes, and that this corruption
    has had a serious adverse impact on U.S. national interest in
    the stability of democratic institutions in Kenya, U.S.
    foreign assistance goals and the international economic
    activities of U.S. businesses. The following provides
    information requested in ref a, paragraphs 26-28.

    ¶2. (C) Amos Wako has been Kenya,s Attorney General (AG) for
    the past 18 years. During this period, despite a string of
    major corruption scandals, he has not only failed to
    prosecute successfully a single senior governmental figure
    but he also has actively thwarted their prosecution. The
    Attorney General has been repeatedly accused by civil society
    groups as well as the head of the Kenyan Anti-Corruption
    Commission, Justice Aaron Ringera, of failing to prosecute
    cases of official corruption. Others have noted the AG,s
    poor quality of legal advice to the government that helped to
    facilitate both the Anglo-Leasing and Goldenberg
    mega-scandals by lending his stamp of approval to fraudulent
    contracts that were the basis for stealing over a billion
    dollars from the Kenyan government. At the same time, in a
    pattern of supporting Kenya,s culture of impunity, Wako has
    been identified by the UN Special Rapporteur on
    Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions in Kenya as
    &the chief obstacle to prosecuting anyone in authority for
    extrajudicial executions.8 Amos Wako has been AG since 1991,
    serving under Presidents Moi and Kibaki. He is married with
    two children.

    ¶3. (C) Wako,s corrupt practices have been investigated and
    documented in five reports. The first is the Report of the
    Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair
    (October 2005), another initiative of the Kibaki
    administration to investigate a massive financial scam in the
    mid-1990s. The second is the Kenya National Assembly,s
    Public Accounts Committee,s report on the Anglo-Leasing
    scandal (March 2006), a public contracting scam which
    resulted in the payment of hundreds of millions of dollars to
    non-existent companies in Europe that were ostensibly to
    provide big ticket items for the GOK, including ships,
    passport equipment, etc. The third is the Kenya
    Anti-Corruption Commission,s (KACC) status report to
    President Kibaki on a number of the Anglo-Leasing contracts
    (June 2006). Fourth is the report of the United Nations
    Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings or summary
    executions Mission to Kenya (February 2009) which discussed
    police killings and post-election violence. The fifth is the
    Report of the Commission to Investigate Post-Election
    Violence (Waki Report ) October 2008).
    Goldenberg Report

    ¶4. (C) Mwai Kibaki was elected President of Kenya in 2002 on
    an anti-corruption platform that ended then President Moi's
    24-year rule. While there was great expectation of change,
    particularly in dealing head-on with corruption, a number of
    individuals that had served President Moi remained in office.
    One of those was the veteran Attorney General, Amos Wako,
    who had already been in office for 11 years at the time of
    Kibaki,s assumption of power. One of the scandals that
    Kibaki inherited was the Goldenberg affair. The Goldenberg
    affair was a scheme in which Kenyan government export
    subsidies were paid out to Goldenberg International and a
    range of companies around the world for gold that may or may
    not have been exported and was likely smuggled into Kenya
    from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It is clear that
    senior government officials in the Moi administration were
    complicit and took payments for their complicity. By some
    estimates, this scam, which reportedly lasted approximately
    two years (1991-1993) cost Kenya $600 million.

    ¶5. (C) Commissioned by President Kibaki, Justice Bosire
    produced the Report of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry
    into the Goldenberg Affair, published in October 2005. Wako
    figures prominently in the report.

    ¶6. (C) The Goldenberg Report makes clear that the Attorney
    General failed to move on the scandal, even as details of its
    magnitude and the senior level of officials allegedly
    involved were revealed. In what is a pattern of behavior,
    the AG did not file the first case relating to the Goldenberg
    scam despite it having already been the subject of widespread
    media coverage and an investigation by the National
    Assembly,s Public Accounts Committee. The first case was
    filed by the Law Society of Kenya. The AG, according to the
    report, &objected to the prosecution on the ground that he
    was to undertake his own prosecution . . . & The AG did the
    same in a case pursued by then MP Raila Odinga in 1995 where
    &once again the Attorney General moved swiftly to take over
    and terminate this prosecution.8 Meanwhile, the report
    found that, prior to these efforts to bring Goldenberg cases
    to court, &we did not receive any evidence to show that the
    Attorney General moved to order police investigations into
    the affair. We can only conclude that no such action was
    undertaken.8 The report notes that of the nine cases
    eventually filed by the AG, &the common denominator in all
    these cases is that none of them was ever concluded from 1994
    when they were instituted to 2003 when this Commission was
    formed thereby leading to the termination of these cases.8
    The report added, &In all these cases the record shows the
    reluctance on the part of the Attorney General,s officers
    and counsels for the accused persons to proceed.8 &The
    parties seemed to move in circles and at a snail,s pace
    speed,8 said the report. Continuing, the report notes,
    &there was in short extreme lethargy in the prosecution of
    these cases.8

    ¶7. (C) The report focused specifically on the last point
    above. In paragraph 773, the Commission found that & . . .
    even after charging the suspects which it had selected the
    Attorney General,s office appears to have proceeded with the
    cases in a most haphazard and lethargic fashion.8 The
    report then proceeds to describe the &chaotic situation8
    caused by the repeated initiation, withdrawal, and
    consolidation of cases. Further, the report lays out
    repeatedly its concern about the way in which the cases were
    handled, indicating that the way in which the AG proceeded
    inevitably led to a lack of prosecutorial success.
    Paragraphs 776 through 779 of the report describe this
    situation as follows:

    -- &An examination of the framed charges in the foregoing
    cases reveals that most of them were in many respects the
    same. They related to the same offences and the same accused
    persons. It is not clear why the office of the Attorney
    General had to bring several cases against the same accused
    persons.8

    -- &There was also a further negative effect of creating
    needless delays through the chaotic situation caused by these
    many cases. It has been seen for instance that charges would
    be filed in 1995 only to be withdrawn in unexplained
    circumstances in 1997. In other cases a charge would be
    filed with some accused persons but leaving out others.
    Eventually the case would also be withdrawn to consolidate it
    with another one with the other accused persons.8

    -- &On the face of it, this was a pointless merry go round
    resulting in serious delay. In this scenario it is not
    surprising to note that although the Attorney General
    commenced Goldenberg related prosecutions in 1994 it was not
    until 1998 that the hearing of only one case commenced. The
    others as we have noted did not proceed to hearing.8

    -- &The delays and the multiplicity of cases gave Mr. Pattni
    and other accused persons the perfect excuse to lodge High
    Court Miscellaneous Civil case No. 322 of 1999 and Court of
    Appeal Civil Application No. 301 of 1999 in which they
    complained that the delays and the many cases had, among
    other things, prejudiced them and violated their
    constitutional rights.8

    ¶8. (C) As can be seen throughout the AG,s career, it is his
    ability to obfuscate and confuse while giving an appearance
    of action that has so successfully stymied the prosecution of
    Kenya,s many mega-scandals. It is a skill that has kept him
    in office, provided him with personal rewards, and served to
    damage both Kenya,s movement toward a stable democracy and
    U.S. interests in that same stable democracy.

    Kenya National Assembly,s Public Accounts Committee,s
    report on the Anglo-Leasing scandal
    ¶9. (C) The Anglo-Leasing scandal remains, like Goldenberg,
    among the most damaging and far reaching corruption cases in
    Kenya,s history. In short, Anglo-Leasing was one of a
    series of phantom entities used to perpetrate fraud on the
    Kenyan taxpayer through non-delivery of goods and services
    alongside significant overpricing. Again, the beneficiaries
    appear to be a number of GOK officials, including at the most
    senior levels. And again, not a single senior government
    official has been successfully prosecuted for the theft of
    hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars from Kenya. Once more,
    the Attorney General played a key role in ensuring that
    senior Kenyan officials were protected from prosecution. At
    the same time, his performance as the principal legal advisor
    for the Government of Kenya was questionable at best. In
    fact, it appears that he and his office expended its effort
    almost exclusively on providing comfort to the contractors
    about the GOK,s abilities to honor contracts rather than the
    other way around. Since many of the beneficiaries of these
    contracts were Kenyan citizens and/or GOK officials, it is
    clear that the AG was focused primarily on protecting those
    in Kenya,s political and business elite at the expense of
    the people and government as a whole.

    ¶10. (C) The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report speaks
    directly to the role of the AG on pages 49 and 50. The
    bottom line, according to the PAC, is that: (a) the AG
    abdicated his responsibilities by not participating in all
    stages of the procurement process, including in carrying
    out/verifying due diligence; and (b) the AG felt obliged to
    protect the interests of foreign investors but not those of
    the government for which he is advisor. In conclusion, &the
    Committee found him incapable of advising his client
    adequately and a little too late to be charged with
    undertaking any meaningful reforms in the Kenya Law Office.8

    ¶11. (C) Key findings of the PAC relating to the AG are as
    follows:

    -- &The Committee finds that whereas the provision of the
    procurement regulations empower the Attorney General to
    participate in all stages, he has not done so in practice.
    This, in the view of the Committee is an abdication of his
    responsibilities.8

    -- &Secondly, the Attorney General has taken an unbalanced
    and partisan view of his role in government contracts. He
    feels obliged to protect the interests of the foreign
    investors but not those of the government for which he is the
    advisor.8

    -- &The Attorney General in giving a legal opinion was
    merely for the comfort of the financier, it is difficult to
    understand why such comfort was not required by the
    Government. His office misled the Committee that all the
    comments suggested for inclusion in the final document had
    been incorporated (Note: This is reference to one specific
    Anglo-Leasing contract.). The Office of the Attorney General
    had raised serious issues and misnomers in the agreement
    entered into with Anglo Leasing & Finance Limited.8

    -- &The Committee established that many of the comments as
    forwarded by the Attorney General,s office had not been
    captured in the final document yet the Attorney General,s
    office approved the contract agreement. This is clearly a
    case of serious negligence.8

    -- &While taking evidence, the Committee was taken through a
    host of reforms the Attorney General intends to undertake in
    his department to ensure better results are realized by the
    Government. Since the Attorney General has been in office
    from 1991 to date, it is difficult to believe that he was not
    aware of the weaknesses of the department for the entire
    period. The Committee finds him negligent in representing
    his client but keen on paper work to shield himself.8

    -- &The Committee noted that the Attorney General had been
    unable to exercise the functions of his office. In the
    Passport Issuing Equipment Project, the Attorney General was
    unable to show that he took adequate steps to ensure that the
    Agreement signed was favorable to the Government.8

    -- The report also details how both the Chief Magistrate and
    the Attorney General,s office (responsible for the Director
    of Public Prosecutions - DPP) worked to frustrate one
    particular Anglo-Leasing case. The Director of Public
    Prosecutions was fired just after the case began and one and
    a half months later he was replaced as DPP by an individual
    who was Chief Defence Counsel for one of the accused in the
    Anglo-Leasing case. As a result, & . . . the Committee did
    not foresee any possibility of fair prosecution , and
    possible effort to pursue the matters expeditiously.8

    ¶12. (S) The conclusions of this report again demonstrate the
    AG,s ongoing role in complicating, obstructing and
    ultimately killing the ability of the government to prosecute
    corruption. The AG is seen by his own colleagues as
    continuing to protect their interests. In ref b report from
    2009, it is clear that prominent members of the cabinet
    believe that the AG successfully thwarted Anglo-Leasing
    prosecution and that he received direct payment for his work.

    KACC ) Status of the Investigation of Security Related
    Contracts

    ¶13. (C) In a June 2006 document, the Kenya Anti-Corruption
    Commission (KACC) provided President Kibaki with an update on
    the Anglo-Leasing investigations, including providing
    information on key players and their involvement. The
    section on the AG is as follows:

    -- &Other than taking the responsibility for the review of
    the contracts by his office that facilitated the perpetration
    of the frauds by contracting ministries, he also gave his
    personal opinion in a number of financing contracts in which
    he purported to validate the use of promissory notes without
    consultations with Treasury as to the nature of the risk. It
    is understood that even as he approved the use of promissory
    notes, the Government was paying heavily for a contract in
    which promissory notes had been discounted to a third party
    by the supplier who never delivered as per his contract and
    the Government had to pay the non-delivery notwithstanding.
    His legal opinions further make reference to CAP 422
    (External Loans and Credit Act) and are categorical that the
    said piece of legislation has been complied with when in
    actual fact it had been violated. The Honourable Attorney
    General gave that opinion without conferring with Treasury to
    verify whether or not they had complied with the Act. These
    legal opinions are given without any due diligence being
    undertaken to confirm that all laws and regulations have been
    adhered to, suppliers and financiers have been vetted, status
    of registration confirmed and their capacity to contract also
    confirmed. There is a possibility of prosecution.8

    -- Listing the &Challenges to the Investigations,8 the KACC
    told the President that one of those challenges was: &(c)
    investigating the complicity of a sitting Attorney General
    who would have to prosecute cases.8

    UN High Commissioner for Human Rights ) UN Special
    Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions
    Mission to Kenya; 16-25 February 2009

    ¶14. (C) This report and the information that follows from the
    Waki report (see below) goes directly again to AG Wako,s
    involvement in public official corruption through
    interference in public processes. The UN,s Special
    Rapporteur said:

    -- &In my final report, I will explain in detail the
    shortcomings of the two key component parts of the criminal
    justice system apart from the police. They are the Office of
    the Attorney General and the judiciary.8

    -- &The exchange, reproduced in full in the Waki Commission
    report, between Justice Waki and Attorney-General Amos Wako,
    provides a vivid illustration of the latter,s role as the
    chief obstacle to prosecuting anyone in authority for
    extrajudicial executions. He has presided for a great many
    years over a system that is clearly bankrupt in relation to
    dealing with police killings and has done nothing to ensure
    that the system is reformed.8

    -- &Public statements lamenting the system,s shortcomings
    have been utterly unsupported by any real action. In brief,
    Mr. Wako is the embodiment in Kenya of the phenomenon of
    impunity.8

    Report of the Commission to Investigate Post-Election Violence

    ¶15. (C) This Commission, commonly known as the Waki
    Commission, investigated the violence perpetrated on the
    Kenyan people in the aftermath of the December 2007
    elections. The AG appeared before the Commission and
    discussed the lack of prosecution in the aftermath of
    political violence following multiple Kenyan elections
    including the 2007 poll. Concluding their discussion of AG
    Wako in the report, the Commission wrote:

    -- &In view of the lack of any visible prosecution against
    perpetrators of politically related violence, the perception
    has pervaded for some time now that the Attorney-General
    cannot act effectively or at all to deal with such
    perpetrators and this, in our view, has promoted the sense of
    impunity and emboldened those who peddle their trade of
    violence during the election periods, to continue doing so.8

    ¶16. (C) Seen here and elsewhere in this submission, one can
    find an Attorney General who has successfully maintained an
    almost perfect record of non-prosecution. He accomplishes
    this through the most complex of smoke and mirrors tactics,
    seeking to appear to desire prosecution while all along doing
    his utmost to protect the political elites. His reward, as
    noted in ref b, is monetary as well as his unprecedented
    tenure in office ) a sinecure if there ever was one. It
    should be noted that in 2009 the Attorney General,s salary
    was increased from an already healthy $6,900 per month to an
    obscene $22,000 per month -- an even greater reward for an
    individual who has spared many of those responsible for
    Kenya,s high level of corruption.

    Serious Effect on U.S. National Interests

    ¶17. (C) Attorney General Amos Wako,s 18 years of involvement
    in public corruption through interference with judicial and
    other public processes have had serious adverse effects on
    those U.S. interests specified in Proclamation 7750 as well
    as U.S. foreign policy priorities of promoting democracy and
    good governance and sustainable economic development.
    Overarching all U.S. interests in Kenya is the need for the
    GOK to implement the reform agenda agreed to by all major
    political parties in the aftermath of the 2008 post-election
    violence. This agenda -- which focuses on accountability for
    the violence and preventing corruption through constitutional
    revision, electoral, judicial, police and land reform, is
    essential to democratic success, economic prosperity,
    stability and security in Kenya. As made clear by Secretary
    Clinton during her August 2009 visit to Kenya, pressing for
    implementation of the reform agenda and dismantling Kenya,s
    culture of impunity is at the core of U.S. policy. Without
    significant progress on the reform agenda, including
    significant curbs on corruption, Kenya will almost certainly
    repeat (or surpass)the election-related violence ahead
    of/during/after 2012 elections. By obstructing due process
    and committing corrupt acts, Wako has repeatedly demonstrated
    that he is an obstacle to reform in Kenya and a major
    contributor to the country,s culture of impunity. As a
    result, he is pillar standing against vital U.S. interests in
    Kenya.

    ¶18. (C) Stability of Democratic Institutions and Nations: AG
    Wako,s efforts to ensure that those most responsible for
    grand scale corruption and election violence in Kenya are not
    punished has made it possible for both to continue to
    flourish thereby undermining the rule of law, judicial and
    law enforcement institutions. At the same time, the lack of
    accountability for previous Kenyan political violence
    resulted in the worst episode of election-related violence in
    Kenya,s history as an independent nation ) over 1000 dead
    and more than 350,000 displaced with not a single case
    brought against any perpetrator of violence despite extensive
    documentary evidence. In the aftermath of the post-election
    violence, Mr. Wako,s obstruction in both the Goldenberg and
    Anglo-Leasing scandals means that many of those suspected of
    stealing massively from the country,s treasury have remained
    not only unpunished but on the job as Ministers of Government
    to this day. His protection has ensured that they continue
    to be in position to steal funds to support election
    campaigns, and incite/support violence. At the same time, it
    is clear to all Kenyans that participating in public
    corruption, especially if you are among the political elite,
    does in fact pay. There is little, if any threat of
    punishment. The corrosive nature of this culture of impunity
    has: directly undermined the ability of the Kenyan economy to
    grow at levels required to move the population to middle
    income status; built a permanent level of disregard for the
    rule of law and the institutions that are meant to enforce
    those laws; and reinforced a system whereby the government
    does not serve its population, but rather further
    marginalizes the population while enriching those in power.
    The bottom line is that the Kenyan state is weaker and less
    able to enhance the lives of its population and maintain the
    security of the country,s already porous and dangerous
    border areas.
    ¶19. (C) U.S. Foreign Assistance Goals: According to
    Transparency International, the Goldenberg scam alone
    directly cost the Kenyan taxpayers an estimated $500 million.
    Anglo-Leasing as well cost(and may still be costing due to
    ongoing payments) the Kenyan government and people hundreds
    of millions of dollars. Under AG Wako the return of even a
    fraction of these funds, which could be possible with a
    vigorous prosecution, could bring significant benefits to an
    economy the size of Wyoming. The election violence, which
    might have been prevented, pushed GDP in the first quarter of
    2008 into negative territory and forced the country to
    attempt an economic rebound in the midst of the worst global
    recession since the 1930,s. The same violence resulted in
    the loss of crops and halted planting such that, combined
    with the current drought, approximately 10 million Kenyans
    (nearly 25 percent of the population) are food insecure. With
    an action-oriented AG, not busy protecting political elites
    in return for rewards, previous political violence may have
    been punished, mitigating what took place after the 2007
    elections. Because the scale of the Goldenberg and
    Anglo-Leasing scams were so massive, it directly caused
    destabilization of the Kenyan economy, damaged the investment
    climate and, eventually, resulted in the suspension of the
    IMF and World Bank programs in Kenya, thereby negatively
    affecting U.S. foreign assistance goals.

    ¶20. (C) Former Kenyan Economic Secretary Terry Ryan testified
    before the judicial commission investigating Goldenberg that
    the Central Bank of Kenya printed billions of shillings on
    the premise that exporters would bring in foreign currency
    and stabilize the exchange rate. When those exports proved
    fraudulent, the Kenyan shilling sharply depreciated. Ryan
    told the inquiry that the impact of the Goldenberg scam would
    continue to haunt the Kenyan economy for another two decades.
    For example, according to witnesses in the Goldenberg
    inquiry, although it took 10 years for Kenya's money supply
    to grow from 20 billion Ksh in 1980 to 50 billion Ksh in
    1990, the money supply soared to 100 billion Ksh by January
    1993, sparking rampant inflation and the devaluation of the
    Kenya shilling from an average of 24.08 Ksh to one USD in
    1990 to 68.16 in 1993. Staple maize and bean prices rose by
    334 percent and 233 percent over the same period. Government
    borrowing from commercial banks grew by more than 400
    percent. If the Attorney General had not been so clearly
    acting on behalf of those suspected of corruption,
    prosecution of Goldenberg suspects might have not only
    resulted in some kind of return of funds but it may have
    prevented the equally damaging Anglo-Leasing scandal.

    ¶21. (C) International Activity of U.S. Businesses: In his 18
    years in office, Attorney General Wako has institutionalized
    the culture of impunity that is rife in Kenya. Under his
    leadership, the Attorney General,s office routinely ensures
    that cases of corruption are not filed, are withdrawn or are
    made so complex that they are simply dropped. In 18 years,
    not a single, senior GOK official has been successfully
    prosecuted for corruption in a country that is consistently
    rated amongst the most corrupt in the world. That is a
    remarkable record, given that at least two scandals (and
    there have been more) that resulted in losses to Kenya of
    several hundred million dollars each. That level of impunity
    only encourages greater and greater corruption throughout
    Kenya at all levels. The resulting corruption has a direct
    impact on U.S. business attempting to operate in Kenya from
    the police roadblocks set up along major transport routes, to
    moving goods to/from the Port of Mombasa, to fighting
    counterfeit products that are undermining American
    manufacturers based here, to simply being able to operate on
    a day-to-day basis with bribe-seeking local and regional
    officials. The AG,s corruption ) protecting the most
    corrupt from accountability ) ensures that U.S. businesses
    struggle in Kenya.

    In Summary

    ¶22. (C) Attorney General Amos Wako is at the center of the
    corruption problem in Kenya. Post strongly believes Mr. Amos
    Wako has engaged in and benefited from public corruption in
    his capacity as Attorney General for the past 18 years by
    interference with judicial and other public processes. The
    record from the reports detailed in the paragraphs above
    demonstrate a clear pattern of ensuring that the justice
    system works to protect those involved most in stealing
    public funds from the general population. The reports show
    that the Attorney General was &negligent,8 showed a
    &reluctance to proceed,8 &extreme lethargy,8 created
    &needless delays,8 engaged in an &abdication of
    responsibilities,8 and was paid for his trouble (ref b).
    Finally, one report summed it up by accurately describing the
    AG as the &embodiment in Kenya of the phenomenon of
    impunity.8 Each of these reports has also demonstrated how
    funds lost to the GOK are often diverted not only for the
    personal gain of senior officials but also to influence the
    results of Kenyan elections. In addition, the AG,s
    unwillingness to hold accountable those involved in election
    violence over the years led in part to the single worst
    episode of conflict and death in Kenya since independence in
    ¶2008. For these reasons, Post believes that Mr. Amos Wako is
    the major obstacle to ending the culture of impunity in Kenya
    and recommends that he be made ineligible under Presidential
    Proclamation 7750.

    Additional Information Required For Finding

    ¶23. (C) Mr. Amos Wako has not been informed of the fact that
    he may be ineligible for a U.S. visa under section 212(f) of
    the INA and Proclamation 7750.

    ¶24. (C) Wako currently holds an A-1 visa, issued September
    27, 2005 and expiring September 27, 2010.

    ¶25. (C) Wako has traveled to the U.S. seven times since 2003.
    The port of entry for all visits was New York. All of his
    visas have been G2 or A1. Wako last departed the U.S. in
    December 2008. He currently uses a diplomatic Kenyan
    passport, number D009450. He is married to Flora Ngaira (we
    have no record of her having received a U.S. visa) and has
    two children, Julius and Debora. We have no record of Debora
    having received a visa. The son, Julius Wako, (DPOB: June
    26, 1974, Nairobi, Kenya) was issued one visa, a B1/B2, that
    expired on August 19, 2008. He has a regular Kenyan
    passport, A1086975.

    ¶26. (C) Because of the serious wide-reaching nature of Mr.
    Amos Wako,s corruption, Post recommends that Mr. Amos Wako
    be excluded for travel to the U.S. under section 212(f) of
    the INA and that no exception be granted.

    Ranneberger

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