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### Viewing cable 06BUENOSAIRES1632, ARGENTINA: FAREWELL CALL ON KIRCHNER INNER CIRCLE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06BUENOSAIRES1632 | 2006-07-21 21:09 | 2011-03-29 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Buenos Aires
Appears in these articles: http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1361157-la-relacion-con-chavez-al-desnudo

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    VZCZCXRO8269
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHQU RUEHTM RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBU #1632/01 2022127
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 212127Z JUL 06
    FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5333
    INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCNMRC/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
    RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1677

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUENOS AIRES 001632

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR WHA TOM SHANNON, JOHN MAISTO, AND CHARLES SHAPIRO
    NSC FOR DAN FISK
    TREASURY FOR DAS NANCY LEE
    USCINCSO FOR POLAD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016

    TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AR

    SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: FAREWELL CALL ON KIRCHNER INNER CIRCLE

    MEMBER

    REF: A. 05 BUENOS AIRES 00141

         ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 01610

    Classified By: CDA, a.i., Hugo Llorens, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: On July 19, the DCM paid a farewell call on

    President Kirchner's closest and most influential advisor,

    Technical and Legal Secretary Carlos Zannini, that included a

    discussion on the bilateral relationship and GOA regional

    policy.  Reviewing the U.S. bilateral objectives over the

    past three years, the DCM said he and the Ambassador had

    sought to support Argentina's democracy, economic recovery

    and political stability, cooperate with the GOA on security

    and counterterrorism issues, and after Argentina recovered,

    seek the GOA's constructive role in the region.  The DCM

    praised Argentina's economic recovery and Zannini thanked the

    U.S. for its help during the crisis.  Turning to regional

    issues, the DCM noted U.S. regional concerns regarding

    Venezuela and Bolivia.  The DCM said that Kirchner's close

    relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and

    Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his penchant

    for slandering President Bush and the USG, made it difficult

    for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral relations

    with the GOA.  Zannini said that the GOA's relationship with

    Venezuela was based on economics and that Mercosur membership

    would change Venezuela, not the other way around.  On

    Bolivia, both the DCM and Zannini agreed that isolating

    President Morales would not be good, but the DCM said that

    both countries needed to work to moderate Morales' actions.

    Looking towards the future, Zannini said he hoped

    communication between the two countries would be further

    strengthened.  The DCM highlighted incoming Ambassador

    Wayne's strong qualifications and noted that he would

    continue Ambassador Gutierrez's professional diplomacy.  END

    SUMMARY.

    --------------------------

    REVIEWING THE RELATIONSHIP

    --------------------------

    ¶2.  (C) On July 19, the DCM paid a farewell call on Technical

    and Legal Secretary Carlos Zannini that included a discussion

    on the bilateral relationship and GOA regional policy.

    Carlos Zannini is a long-time, close Kirchner advisor and

    probably his most influential policy confidant (See reftel

    A).  Zannini began the discussion by noting the good

    relationship the Casa Rosada enjoyed with the Ambassador and

    DCM and expressed appreciation for U.S. help during the

    crisis.  The DCM said the U.S. is pleased that Argentina's

    economic recovery has been strong and said that Kirchner

    deserves a great deal of the credit for it.  Zannini replied

    that Argentina's process of recovery was unfinished, but that

    they too were pleased they were on the way.

    ¶3.  (C) The DCM reiterated U.S. objectives in Argentina.  The

    DCM said that in the past three years he and the Ambassador

    had sought to support Argentina's democracy, economic

    recovery and political stability, strengthen cooperation with

    the GOA on security and counterterrorism issues, and after

    Argentina recovered, seek the GOA's constructive role in the

    region.  The DCM detailed the support that the U.S. gave to

    Argentina during the depth of the financial crisis, from

    advocating for Argentina within the G-7 to the U.S.

    Treasury's decision to support the private sector debt

    exchange that allowed Argentina to secure a higher rate of

    participation in the deal.  The DCM noted that no major U.S.

    company left Argentina during the crisis and that roughly 500

    U.S. companies currently operate in Argentina generating

    roughly 200,000 jobs.

    ---------------

    REGIONAL ISSUES

    ---------------

    ¶4.  (C) Turning to regional issues, the DCM noted U.S.

    regional concerns and said the U.S. wanted to see Argentina

    take a more active role in supporting regional democracy.

    BUENOS AIR 00001632  002 OF 003

    The DCM thanked Zannini for the GOA's continued help in

    Haiti.  The DCM raised the issue of Venezuela, stating that

    Kirchner's close relationship with Venezuelan President Hugo

    Chavez and Chavez's threats against democracy, as well as his

    penchant for slandering President Bush and the USG, made it

    difficult for the Embassy to maintain constructive bilateral

    relations with the GOA.  The DCM said, ""One day Kirchner is

    meeting with Chavez, and Chavez may be on good behavior

    because Kirchner has asked Chavez to avoid incidents, but the

    next day Chavez is calling President Bush a drunkard, a

    genocidal maniac and worse than Hitler.""  The DCM said that

    by so closely associating himself with a leader like Chavez,

    Kirchner risks being viewed by Washington as sharing Chavez's

    views.  The DCM said that the U.S. does not oppose

    Argentina's economic ties with Venezuela, as the

    U.S.-Venezuelan trade relationship is extensive, but both

    Argentina and the U.S. need to support Venezuela's democracy.

    ¶5.  (C) Zannini responded by emphasizing the economic nature

    of Argentina's relationship with Venezuela and noted that the

    U.S. and Argentina ""have different definitions of democracy.""

     Zannini said, ""Our relations with Venezuela are not

    anti-U.S., but based on economic interests.""  Zannini

    acknowledged Chavez's anti-U.S. tendencies, ""Attacking the

    U.S. is a way for him (Chavez) to build power in Venezuela.""

    He said that Argentina does not share Chavez's anti-U.S.

    message.  Regarding Venezuela's democracy, Zannini said that

    for the GOA, the most important part of a democracy is

    voting, pointing out that Chavez has won numerous national

    elections.  Zannini said that part of the problem with

    Venezuela's democracy is the intransigence of Venezuela's

    opposition.  Zannini noted the many ways that Venezuela was

    helping Argentina, from buying bonds, helping to meeting

    Argentina's energy needs, to selling Argentina agricultural

    equipment.

    ¶6.  (C) The DCM responded by noting the increasingly

    authoritarian nature of the Chavez government.  He stressed

    Chavez's concerted efforts to weaken judicial independence

    and retain monopoly control of Venezuela's Congress, as well

    as his crackdown against the political opposition and media.

    The DCM said that many in the opposition and in the media in

    Venezuela lived in fear.  The DCM also noted the foreign

    policy dimension of the problem, citing Chavez's cultivation

    of the rogue regimes in Iran and North Korea.  Zannini

    replied by highlighting the GOA's cooperation with the U.S.

    on counterproliferation efforts on both Iran and North Korea

    in the UN Security Council.

    ¶7.  (C) On Bolivia, the DCM said that the U.S. is not trying

    to isolate Bolivian President Morales, but is instead seeking

    to moderate Morales' actions.  Zannini said that isolating

    Morales would just create a worse situation.  Zannini said

    that Morales and Chavez often have rhetoric that is much

    worse than their actions.  The DCM acknowledged that focusing

    exclusively on rhetoric was not helpful, but reaffirmed that

    the U.S. is also concerned with some of the actions of both

    Morales and Chavez.

    ¶8.  (C) Zannini raised the issue of the Mercosur Summit in

    Cordoba.  Zannini said Venezuela's incorporation into

    Mercosur should not concern the U.S.  ""Venezuela will adapt

    to Mercosur, not the other way around.  Argentina does not

    have a regime like Venezuela's; Argentina has its own

    characteristics.""  Zannini acknowledged that

    misunderstandings about Argentina's relationship with

    Venezuela could cause many problems with the GOA's

    relationship with the U.S.  However, he again sought to allay

    U.S. fears, ""Argentina is not going to be a tool of Cuba.""

    Zannini said that the highlights of the Summit in Cordoba

    would be announcing the creation of a South American

    parliament and a regional infrastructure fund.  Zannini noted

    that Mercosur's success would lead to stronger democracies in

    the region, ""With better economies, democracy can grow.""

    ---------------------

    BUENOS AIR 00001632  003 OF 003

    LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

    ---------------------

    ¶9.  (C) Looking towards the future, Zannini said he hoped

    communication between the two countries would improve.

    Zannini said that ""Argentina is focused just on the region

    and the U.S. is focused on the world.  At times, the U.S. has

    not exercised the leadership in the region that was needed.""

    The DCM replied that Argentina has benefited first-hand from

    the U.S. regional leadership in recent years.  The DCM

    highlighted incoming Ambassador Wayne's strong

    qualifications, predicting that he would maintain Ambassador

    Gutierrez's efforts to reach out and seek to strengthen

    bilateral ties.

    ¶10.  (C) Zannini, noting incoming Ambassador Wayne's economic

    background, appealed for more U.S. investment in Argentina as

    the best way to improve bilateral relations.  The DCM said

    that the GOA needs to ensure that U.S. companies have the

    freedom to operate in Argentina without GOA price controls

    and interference that would harm the U.S. companies' ability

    to compete.  The DCM said that U.S. companies need open and

    clear regulations in order to encourage them to invest.

    Zannini acknowledged the benefits of the U.S.-style of

    business-government relations, which he said was superior to

    the common practice in Europe.

    -------

    COMMENT

    -------

    ¶11.  (C) As Secretary of the Presidency Oscar Parrilli did in

    his recent meeting with the DCM (See reftel B), Kirchner's

    inner circle always attempts to allay our concerns regarding

    Argentina's relationship with Venezuela.  Although the GOA's

    goals in their dealings with Chavez are primarily economic,

    Chavez's primary goals are political.  President Kirchner is

    playing a dangerous game as he is drawing Argentina ever

    closer to Venezuela.  Chavez, and his ally Fidel Castro, are

    much more capable and adept at manipulating regional politics

    than is President Kirchner.  Kirchner likely thinks he can

    continue to strengthen his ties to the leftist bloc in Latin

    America, while maintaining positive relations with the United

    States.  Kirchner's foreign policy ineptness and lack of

    competent international relations advisors will likely

    prevent him from understanding the potential negative

    consequences of his actions.

    ¶12.  (C) Our experience has been that the GOA is difficult

    government to work with and one with a lack of foreign policy

    expertise.  The Kirchner administration's lack of

    understanding in the international relations area, coupled

    with their sophomoric, 1970s leftist tendencies, make them

    easily susceptible to manipulation by more radical regional

    leaders, such as Chavez and Castro.  It is therefore

    extremely important for the U.S., both in Washington and in

    Buenos Aires, to actively engage the GOA at a high level at

    this critical juncture to avoid any further slippage of

    Argentina towards the Chavez orbit.  Despite differences, we

    have been able to achieve excellent cooperation with the GOA

    on a range of issues, including counternarcotics,

    counterterrorism, non-proliferation and in Haiti.  We need to

    further reach out to the GOA to achieve more cooperation in

    other areas.  The consequences of not maintaining a fluid

    dialogue with the GOA can only be negative for the U.S.  END

    COMMENT.

    LLORENS

    =======================CABLE ENDS============================

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