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### Viewing cable 09BAKU749, PRESIDENT ILHAM ALIYEV - MICHAEL (CORLEONE) ON THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BAKU749 | 2009-09-18 11:11 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Baku

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    VZCZCXRO8966
    PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHROV RUEHSL
    DE RUEHKB #0749/01 2611117
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 181117Z SEP 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1767
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY
    RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3544
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1463

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BAKU 000749

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, DAS KAIDANOW

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2034
    TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ RU TU AM
    SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ILHAM ALIYEV - MICHAEL (CORLEONE) ON THE
    OUTSIDE, SONNY ON THE INSIDE

    REF: A. BAKU 724 AND PREVIOUS
    ¶B. BAKU 534
    ¶C. 08 BAKU 1136
    ¶D. BAKU 526 AND PREVIOUS
    ¶E. BAKU 696 AND PREVIOUS
    ¶F. BAKU 287

    Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary:  Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev
    utilizes distinctly different approaches to foreign and
    domestic policies.  He typically devises the former with
    pragmatism, restraint and a helpful bias toward integration
    with the West, yet at home his policies have become
    increasingly authoritarian and hostile to diversity of
    political views.  This divergence of approaches, combined
    with his father's continuing omnipresence, has led some
    observers to compare the Aliyevs with the fictional
    "Corleones" of Godfather fame, with the current president
    described alternately as a mix of "Michael" and "Sonny."
    Either way, this Michael/Sonny dichotomy complicates our
    approach to Baku and has the unfortunate effect of framing
    what should be a strategically valuable relationship as a
    choice between U.S. interests and U.S. values.  End Summary.

    ¶2.  (S/NF) This striking aspect of President Ilham Aliyev's
    governing style was very neatly summed up recently by the
    witty, but somewhat past-his-prime XXXXXXXXXXXX
    XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect).  Commenting
    on the GOAJ's harsh reaction to the YouTube "donkey video"
    (Reftel A), XXXXXXXXXXXX quipped to the Charge that what one must
    understand about Aliyev, "He's not Michael Corleone, he's
    Sonny."  To some in Baku, XXXXXXXXXXXX Godfather analogy seems
    apt - capturing essential truths not only about Ilham Aliyev,
    but his father Heydar, who becomes by implication the "Vito
    Corleone" of Azerbaijan.  With that in mind, this cable
    attempts to explain who Ilham Aliyev is and why he does what
    h does.  Aside from XXXXXXXXXXXX analogy, it also owe much to
    the appraisals of Michael and Sonny from "The Godfather
    Doctrine (2008)," by John Hulsman and A. Wess Mitchell.

    "That's my family, Kay.  It's not me."
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶3.  (C) Ilham Aliyev inherited a newly independent,
    resource-rich state, brought to order in the post-Soviet era
    by this father, Heydar Aliyev, scarred by a catastrophic war
    with Armenia that resulted in occupation of the
    Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and seven surrounding Azerbaijani
    regions.  He assumed the presidency in 2003, concurrent with
    his father's death, in an election marked by a lack of
    competition and debate, at a time when Azerbaijan's
    re-developed oil and gas resources were being brought on line
    for export.  Dogged by widespread doubts about his
    suitability for leadership based on his age (then 41), lack
    of achievements and a "playboy" image, he oversaw the launch
    of a one million-barrels-per-day oil pipeline, which has
    flooded official and unofficial coffers in Baku and serves as
    the financial backbone of the country.

    ¶4.  (C) The President and his cohorts, who largely were
    carried over from his father's administration, now seek
    predictability, stability and continuity to preserve and
    protect public and private fortunes.  Ilham Aliyev's
    landslide 2008 re-election was followed by a hastily-called
    March 2009 referendum, which among other things removed term
    limits for the President.  Aliyev's cabinet has changed very
    little over the years, with few "reformers" brought in or
    remaining in power.  The Prime Minister position is largely
    ceremonial and weak.  Because of family connections, dynastic
    succession, the strong arming of the opposition and the
    creation of an elaborate patronage/protection network, the
    Aliyev Administration has developed an "organized crime"
    image in some quarters, leading some analysts to see Ilham
    Aliyev at times in a mafia-like role.

    "Never hate your enemies.  It affects your judgment."

    BAKU 00000749  002 OF 004

    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶5.  (C) In their short study "The Godfather Doctrine,"
    Hulsman and Mitchell present brothers Sonny and Michael
    Corleone from "The Godfather" as exemplars of two out of
    three schools of U.S. foreign policy thought (with
    consigliere Tom Hagen representing the third.)  However,
    there are important points they raise about the two that
    apply well to Aliyev and his policies abroad and at home.
    Michael, they write, is a talented balancer of alliances,
    aware of limitations on his own power who, importantly, knows
    when something isn't personal, but only business.  Sonny, by
    contrast, is brash, impulsive, and puts blind faith in force
    to address affronts to the Corleone family.  For him,
    business is personal.  Finally, Sonny refuses to contemplate
    a present or a future in which the Corleone family does not
    dominate New York, despite obvious and growing portents to
    the contrary.

    "This is business, not personal" - Balanced Foreign Policy
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶6.  (S) President Aliyev inherited from his father a clever,
    realistic foreign policy that he has largely maintained.
    With the overarching goal of maintaining and increasing
    Azerbaijan's independence and sovereignty, he encourages
    involvement with NATO and Euro-Atlantic security and
    political structures and supports a policy of westward
    transit of Azerbaijani oil and gas through non-Russian
    channels.  Otherwise, though, he alternates between
    assertiveness and appeasement where his powerful neighbors
    Russia and Iran are concerned.  For example, Azerbaijan
    routinely accuses Russia of supplying Armenia with weapons
    and pointedly absents itself from the Collective Security
    Treaty Organization (CSTO), while participating in GUAM.  At
    the same time, Aliyev constantly plays up his relations with
    President Medvedev with frequent visits and has kept open the
    channels of negotiation on energy issues, concluding a small
    but symbolically important agreement with Gazprom to supply
    gas to Dagestan (Reftel B).  He is assertive enough to defend
    Azerbaijan's prerogative for an independent policy, but
    discreet enough that he is in no danger of joining
    Saakashvili on Moscow's hit list.

    ¶7.  (S) In foreign policy, Aliyev has also been able to
    maintain generally the distinction between "business and
    personal."  For all his bluster about Azerbaijan's legal
    right to liberate the Armenian-occupied territories by force,
    Aliyev has worked constructively on the Minsk Group-proposed
    Basic Principles and developed a reportedly good rapport with
    Armenian President Sargsian - in contrast to the much more
    confrontational relationship between the countries' foreign
    ministers.  Similarly, even as Aliyev regards with horror the
    prospect of Turkey-Armenia rapprochement ahead of
    Nagorno-Karabakh resolution, the President has instructed
    SOCAR to continue gas transit and supply talks with Turkey,
    and no one in Baku has dared to consider a cut in oil exports
    through the BTC pipeline.  The gas transit talks are a
    hardball affair to be sure, but Aliyev surely recognizes that
    Azerbaijan cannot really afford a total rupture with Turkey
    and certainly is not going to go so far as to foreclose on
    options out of pique while the Turkey-Armenia question
    remains open.

    "You touch my sister again and I'll kill you." - The Hardliner
    --------------------------------------------- -----------------

    ¶8.  (S) For all of the cool-headed calculation that generally
    influences Aliyev's foreign policy, his domestic policies are
    another matter.  As Aliyev perceives a challenge to his
    authority or affronts to his family dignity, even minor ones,
    he and his inner circle are apt to react (or overreact), much
    to the detriment of the country's democratic development and
    movement toward Western alliances.  The example of the crude
    retaliation against the young bloggers Emin Milli and Adnan
    Hajizade is the most recent and public example (Reftel A).
    Earlier, defending his decision to rescind licenses for
    foreign broadcasters, Aliyev expressed his anger that Radio

    BAKU 00000749  003 OF 004

    Liberty had mocked his plan to build the world's tallest
    flagpole in the Baku port area, demonstrating exceedingly
    thin skin (Reftel C).

    ¶9.  (S/NF) It is examples like these that inspired XXXXXXXXXXXX
    quip to the Charge about Sonny and Michael.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    elaborated on the point in that conversation, recalling times
    when he was an XXXXXXXXXXXX and similar
    situations arose.  Heydar would never have allowed himself to
    be goaded into ridiculous reactions, he said.  (Note:
    XXXXXXXXXXXX memory on this might be a little selective, but he
    has a point that the space for opinion was wider under the
    last President, a view often echoed by journalists who look
    back to the 1990s nostalgically.  End Note.)  Ilham Aliyev,
    in XXXXXXXXXXXX view, is not inclined to subtlety or
    deliberation in his response to these kinds of issues.

    "I don't feel I have to wipe everybody out.  Just my enemies."Q----------------------------------- --------------------------

    ¶10.  (S) Aliyev takes the actions he does in order to
    eliminate even the semblance of risk to his political
    prominence.  His goal appears to be a political environment
    in which the Aliyev dynasty is unchallenged, which was
    demonstrated by the hastily organized March 2009
    constitutional referendum removing presidential term limits.
    This strangled the hopes of any and all pretenders to
    succession, including his wife (who in Azeri politics is
    thought of as a rival Pashayev, not an Aliyev).

    ¶11.  (S) The dissonance between Aliyev's sensible approach to
    foreign affairs, manifested by the cosmopolitan image he
    presents to Western visitors, with his tailored suits and
    flawless English, and the unpleasant reality of his approach
    to domestic issues raises the obvious question of how these
    two realities coexist.  One explanation is that Aliyev is
    insecure in domestic politics and relies heavily on the
    advice of old-line Soviet-style political figures carried
    forward from his father's administration, such as
    Presidential Chief of Staff Ramiz Mehdiyev.  Alternatively,
    Aliyev's domestic actions are free choices made in accordance
    with his instincts, with Mehdiyev and others playing the
    "heavy.".

    ¶12.  (S) Occasionally, Aliyev's confident tough-guy image
    gives way to an impression that he is yielding on domestic
    issues.  Outside pressure does not always fail.  A recent
    positive example was the outcome of the parliament's
    initiative to ram through a Russian-style law on NGOs.  In
    the face of a domestic outcry - including from
    government-supported NGOs, the Presidential Administration
    intervened to prevent the law as drafted from passing (Reftel
    D).  Likewise, the President recently rejected a bill from
    parliament that would have required foreign-based entities to
    hire vetted Azerbaijanis citizens as deputy directors.  The
    business community strongly opposed this bill (Reftel E).
    Also, the government earlier this year released one of the
    prominent journalists whose imprisonment was widely believed
    to have been politically motivated (Reftel F).

    "Keep your friends close and your enemies closer."
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶13.  (S) Comment:  It is clear that Azerbaijan's future
    development would better suit United States policy goals if
    Aliyev pursued his domestic policies in a manner that
    resembled his foreign policy methods, however imperfect they
    may be.  A full-scale democratic conversion, however, is an
    unlikely outcome, and the record of presidents in this region
    leaving office voluntarily is rather thin.  What is desirable
    and perhaps achievable, however, is that Aliyev would govern
    as a manager of alliances, viewing the political space
    occupied by dissents as a source of ideas and a warning
    system for when policies are hurting the national interest;
    and ceasing to feel that he should strike hard at every
    criticism that arises, or that he can do so without
    consequences.  At least this type of evolution would better
    prepare Azerbaijan for the post-Ilham Aliyev era, whenever

    BAKU 00000749  004 OF 004

    that begins.

    ¶14.  (S) Comment Continued:  Here is where the Godfather
    analogy begins to break down.  In Azerbaijan the role of
    loyal consigliere to the father and the son is played by the
    long-time head of Presidential Administration Ramiz Mehdiyev.
    Mehdiyev is no calm, conciliating Tom Hagen.  We do not know
    if President Aliyev personally ordered the many iron-fisted
    domestic initiatives, although he almost certainly approved
    them, even if after-the-fact.  We do see Mehdiyev's
    fingerprints all over the arrests of journalists, the
    stifling of opposition leaders, the closure of mosques, the
    restrictions on the media and the general law-and-order
    approach to governance.  Is he the puppet or the
    puppet-master?  At age 71 and often seen in frail health,
    this is an increasingly important question.  While the rule
    of 47-year old Ilham Aliyev could continue for decades, it
    would be most likely without the benefit of his consigliere.
    Without Mehdiyev, it is not clear whom Aliyev will turn to
    for help in maintaining the same firm grip on the instruments
    of power.

    ¶15.  (U) "Don Corleone, I need a man with powerful friends .
    . . I need all of those policians you carry around in your
    pocket, like so many nickels and dimes."
    LU

`