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### Viewing cable 04BOGOTA11339, THE UN'S FUTURE IN COLOMBIA \

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04BOGOTA11339 | 2004-11-02 18:06 | 2011-02-18 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: www.letemps.ch/swiss_papers

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    22350	2004-11-02 18:31:00	04BOGOTA11339	Embassy Bogota	CONFIDENTIAL	04BOGOTA10728|04BOGOTA11205|04BOGOTA11207	This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.\
    \
    	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 011339 \
     \
    SIPDIS \
     \
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2014 \
    TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM PINR PREL CO
    SUBJECT: THE UN'S FUTURE IN COLOMBIA \
     \
    REF: A) BOGOTA 11207 B) BOGOTA 11205 C) BOGOTA 10728 \
     \
    Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) \
     \
    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador met with UN special advisor on \
    Colombia James LeMoyne at the latter's request on October 28 \
    and 30.  LeMoyne said that the EU would release a new policy \
    paper on Colombia in January 2005 which would lead to an more \
    engaged approach.  On demobilization, LeMoyne reported that \
    GOC Peace Commissioner Restrepo had requested UN political \
    support and technical assistance.  LeMoyne told the \
    Ambassador that the UN system was not working in Colombia and \
    relations between the UN and GOC were strained.  The SYG had \
    proposed a high-level working group to discuss the situation \
    which will meet later this month.  Foreign Minister Barco \
    will lead the Colombian side.  Of particular concern was the \
    operation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human \
    Rights, whose relations with the GOC and G-24 had \
    deteriorated sharply.  LeMoyne reviewed the latest GOC \
    proposal for Mexican facilitation of talks with the ELN.  He \
    also reported that the FARC was conducting a series of \
    interviews with prominent leaders in Bogota from business, \
    politics and journalism to discuss their views on the current \
    situation, prospects for the future and possible scenarios in \
    which the FARC may consider taking political steps.  LeMoyne \
    said that he doubted the FARC would do anything to help \
    President Uribe but might be willing to "play politics" to \
    see what they could pocket.  He speculated that the FARC \
    might use the Catholic Church, the Swiss, and ex-presidents \
    Samper and Pastrana to pressure President Uribe on the \
    hostages and a humanitarian accord with terms closer to what \
    FARC leaders want. END SUMMARY. \
     \
    ¶2. (C) On October 28 and 30, Ambassador met with UN special \
    adviser on Colombia James LeMoyne during the latter's \
    five-day visit to Bogota.  Issues covered included possible \
    increased engagement by the EU, upcoming demobilizations of \
    the AUC, the future of the UN presence, the status of ELN \
    negotiations with the GOC, and recent FARC activity. \
     \
    ------------------------------- \
    NEW EU POLICY PAPER ON COLOMBIA \
    ------------------------------- \
     \
    ¶3. (C) LeMoyne said the EU position on the Colombian peace \
    process was shifting.  A new policy paper was circulating in \
    Brussels which would be blessed by the Council in December. \
    LeMoyne described it as advocating a more serious, engaged \
    approach in Colombia.  It will establish a framework to do \
    more, he said.  EU High Representative Javier Solana planned \
    to come to Colombia in January to unveil it. (From readouts \
    Embassy has received elsewhere, the EU paper may contain new \
    positive statements but also establish new conditionalities \
    on aid.  That will impede assistance and widen the \
    Colombia/EU gap.) \
     \
    ------------- \
    PEACE PROCESS \
    ------------- \
     \
    ¶4. (C) LeMoyne briefed Ambassador on his meeting with GOC \
    High Commissioner for Peace Luis Carlos Restrepo on October \
    ¶26.  In the context of upcoming demobilizations of the AUC \
    (reftels), Restrepo had requested that the UN provide: (1) \
    public support for the OAS mission, including an appeal to \
    donors for financial and technical support; (2) a strong \
    declaration urging that those who disarm and the communities \
    that receive them not be attacked; and (3) high-level \
    training for GOC officials on demobilization, disarmament and \
    reintegration (DDR).  LeMoyne recommended that the UN, the \
    International Committee for the Red Cross and the Catholic \
    Church expand and deepen their DDR programs already underway \
    in the affected areas. \
     \
    ----------------------------------- \
    REPAIRING GOC RELATIONS WITH THE UN \
    ----------------------------------- \
     \
    ¶5. (C) LeMoyne told Ambassador that his meetings with GOC \
    officials during the UNGA "were not good."  President Uribe \
    remained unhappy with the UN.  As a result, the SYG has \
    proposed that the GOC and UN form a small, high-level working \
    group to discuss the GOC's vision of the UN in Colombia and \
    what the UN thought it ought to be doing.  Barco will lead \
    the GOC delegation to the first meeting tentatively planned \
    for the end of November in New York. \
     \
    ¶6. (C) LeMoyne conceded that the UN system was not working in \
    Colombia, characterizing the various agencies as atomized, \
    defending their own micro-programs.  He noted that helpful \
    but frustrated UNDP (and UN country team) director Alfredo \
    Witschi would be retiring in the spring.  This might be an \
    opportunity to set in motion a new approach.  LeMoyne also \
    underscored that other countries -- the EU, the Nordics, \
    Canada, Mexico, Brazil -- had to weigh in with the SYG and \
    others in the system to energize UN attention to Colombia. \
     \
     \
    ¶7. (C) As LeMoyne saw it, the UN has three missions in \
    Colombia: the Office of the High Commissioner for Human \
    Rights (OHCHR), a revised humanitarian action plan, and good \
    offices.  He had already heard during this trip from FM Barco \
    that GOC officials had lost confidence in the OHCHR presence \
    and want it changed.  The 27 recommendations were now viewed \
    as draconian demands.  In the view of GOC officials, whatever \
    they told the OHCHR in the spirit of cooperation and \
    consultation was used against them.  LeMoyne forewarned that, \
    if the OHCHR report due out soon was seen as unfair by the \
    GOC, "we will have a very big mess on our hands."  On the \
    other hand, the UN presence and the human rights dimension in \
    particular, were important to the Europeans and, with the EU \
    likely to strengthen its involvement, the OHCHR would be even \
    more essential.  The high-level working group needed to \
    tackle this problem first. \
     \
    ¶8. (C) According to LeMoyne, the humanitarian agencies were \
    also not working because of turf battles.  The revised \
    humanitarian action plan, to be launched in mid-November, had \
    little chance of succeeding.  There was not much scope for \
    the good offices role either.   There was little negotiating \
    and unlikely to be any for a while.  U/SYG Prendergast was \
    advocating that the UN lower its profile in Colombia or close \
    down the operation altogether.  LeMoyne consulted with \
    Restrepo on this point who urged that the UN good offices \
    operation not depart.  Restrepo had agreed that increasing \
    the role was equally unwarranted because it would raise \
    illusions which were not true. \
     \
    ¶9. (C) Ambassador agreed that the humanitarian agencies were \
    making a huge effort, but most of it was being frittered away \
    by incompetence.  He also expressed reservations about OHCHR \
    representative Michael Fruhling.  LeMoyne reiterated his view \
    that whatever its problems, the OHCHR presence was essential \
    and would become even more so when the "Law for Justice and \
    Reparations" passed the Congress.  Ambassador responded that \
    the approach of both the OHCHR and leading NGOs on the law \
    had been unhelpful.  Demobilization was happening and the \
    legal framework to deal with senior leaders and those who \
    have committed gross violations of human rights or \
    narco-trafficking remained unfinished.  The result was that \
    Restrepo's position at the negotiating table was undermined. \
    His only response to requests from the AUC for legal \
    guarantees was "no" because he has no legal structure to back \
    him up. \
     \
    ¶10. (C) LeMoyne said he was not prepared to write off the \
    OHCHR but understood that the GOC wanted to.  Barco was more \
    than upset, convinced that the GOC was given no credit for \
    making a sincere effort and that mending relations may not be \
    worth the effort.  Barco planned to travel to Geneva to meet \
    High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour in \
    mid-November to discuss the situation.  LeMoyne wondered \
    whether the mandate of the office was a problem -- could it \
    monitor and offer assistance to the GOC at the same time.  A \
    debate was underway at OHCHR headquarters on the issue.  The \
    office had had three directors and all had ended up badly. \
    Perhaps it was time to review the mandate.  Ambassador \
    disagreed, noting that the U.S. and others were able to do \
    both.  GOC officials could absorb and respond constructively \
    to criticism if convinced that their interlocutors were \
    working in their best interest.  He noted that GOC officials \
    remained fearful of the power and influence of the UN and the \
    possibility that Colombia could land on the agenda of the \
    Security Council.  GOC officials did not draw a distinction \
    between the Council and the UN writ large, and were convinced \
    that the parts of the UN they interacted with were \
    unsympathetic. \
     \
    ---------------------------- \
    STATUS OF TALKS WITH THE ELN \
    ---------------------------- \
     \
    ¶11. (C) LeMoyne said the ELN was fading, no threat to anyone, \
    and under the protection of the FARC.  The little brother-big \
    brother dynamic remained in play: the smarter, more \
    intellectual ELN, dependent on the thuggish and powerful \
    FARC.  The ELN hated the FARC, was frightened of it, and \
    believed it was wrong.  He was convinced that the FARC and \
    ELN were meeting at high levels and maintained an agreement \
    and alliance, and neither would negotiate seriously until \
    things changed.  The ELN was trying to tell the FARC that it \
    wanted international breathing space and needed to take \
    political steps, but the FARC would limit its \
    maneuverability.  Ambassador noted that the ELN remained \
    politically important for the FARC, which would otherwise be \
    isolated.  The ELN might be disappearing as a meaningful \
    piece on the chessboard, but the FARC would do everything to \
    keep it alive. \
     \
    ¶12. (C)  LeMoyne heard that the Mexicans were putting \
    considerable pressure on the GOC to move the negotiating \
    process forward.  The ELN wants to meet the Mexicans directly \
    and Mexico wants the ELN to come to Mexico.  Restrepo has \
    resisted so far, insisting that the ELN respond to earlier \
    GOC proposals.  Nine years of ELN traveling abroad had \
    yielded little.  Restrepo wants the ELN to acknowledge that \
    it has to deal with the GOC.  His latest proposal is for the \
    Mexicans to tell the ELN that Restrepo meet with (jailed) \
    Francisco Galan as a first step.  Then, the ELN would be \
    permitted to go to Mexico for a one day meeting, and the next \
    day, ELN would meet with Restrepo with Mexican facilitation. \
    LeMoyne did not know how the ELN would respond.  He assumed \
    the Mexicans would wince but go along. \
     \
    ¶13. (C) Ambassador responded that the GOC was afraid that \
    Mexican facilitation would turn into a negotiating session \
    with the GOC outside the room.  Restrepo also knew, according \
    to LeMoyne, that whatever travel rights he conceded to the \
    ELN, the GOC would soon be pressed by the Swiss and others to \
    give the FARC. \
     \
    --------------- \
    NEW FARC MOVES? \
    --------------- \
     \
    ¶14. (C) LeMoyne reported that the FARC had assembled a team \
    of interviewers who were soliciting views in Bogota on the \
    current situation, prospects for the future, and possible \
    scenarios in which it could consider taking political steps. \
    The FARC had reached out to a number of prominent individuals \
    in business, politics and journalism.  Some had agreed to \
    talk; others refused.  Most were surprised how easily the \
    FARC was able to move around Bogota.  Characterizing the FARC \
    as a Stalinist, 1950s-style organization whose public \
    statements still mattered, LeMoyne said that the most recent \
    FARC communiqu "was not entirely bad" either.  Finally, he \
    said that FARC leader Manuel Marulanda Velez had cancer and \
    was dying, and an effort was underway to raise the profile of \
    Alfonso Cano.  He expected that an interview with Cano would \
    be published soon, projecting him to a wider audience. \
     \
    ¶15. (C) LeMoyne doubted that anything constructive would come \
    out of the FARC leadership "until President Uribe was \
    re-elected."  The FARC hated Uribe and would do nothing to \
    help him politically or otherwise.  They are convinced, \
    according to LeMoyne, that he will weaken after re-election. \
    Nonetheless, the FARC may want to play politics over the next \
    few months and see what they can pocket.  He speculated that \
    they might use the Catholic Church or the Swiss to test the \
    waters.  Or, they might make peace overtures through \
    ex-presidents Samper or Pastrana to pressure Uribe on the \
    hostages and a humanitarian accord with terms closer to what \
    FARC leaders want.  Or, the FARC could accept a cease fire \
    and play along to see what they could get out of it, with the \
    hope of damaging Plan Patriota along the way.  LeMoyne \
    acknowledged that Plan Patriota has been a strategic hit on \
    the FARC and the leadership would do anything to rid \
    themselves of it. \
     \
    ¶16. (C) According to LeMoyne, the Swiss channel (Jean-Pierre \
    Gontard) remained open, and he and the Swiss government \
    continued to press the FARC for a ceasefire.  Their preferred \
    scenario was to bring the FARC to Switzerland for a direct \
    meeting with GOC officials under Swiss auspices.  LeMoyne \
    noted that Restrepo had told him that if the FARC agreed to a \
    ceasefire, everything was possible. \
     \
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    COMMENT \
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     \
    ¶17. (C) In addition to an exhange of views, LeMoyne was \
    looking to mend fences with the GOC and the G-24 to salvage \
    the UN presence in Colombia.  The latter is worth monitoring \
    closly.  LeMoyne's operation will be part of the GOC-UN \
    evaluation.  He said that he would resign if it became clear \
    that he was impeding progress.  The OHCHR operation has lost \
    the GOC's confidence and exhausted its political capital with \
    the G-24.  A meeting between Foreign Minister Barco and UN \
    High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour would be \
    useful to clear the air.  This is the OHCHR's largest \
    operation outside of Geneva and should be its biggest \
    success.  The GOC needs it to succeed as well.  As the GOC \
    and the UN negotiate their future relationship, other \
    countries active in Colombia beside the U.S. need to approach \
    the SYG on the importance of supporting demobilization and \
    other aspects of the peace process.  In that context, a new \
    EU policy as described be LeMoyne would be welcome.  We \
    understand that UK Foreign Secretary Straw has raised \
    Colombia with the SYG on several occasions over the last few \
    months.  Countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, \
    Brazil and others now need to do the same. \
    WOOD \

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