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### Viewing cable 09MONTERREY453, MONTERREY SHOOTOUTS LEAVE 17 DEAD, EXPOSE SHORTCOMINGS IN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09MONTERREY453 | 2009-12-14 15:03 | 2011-02-10 12:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Consulate Monterrey
Appears in these articles: http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/02/10/index.php?section=politica&article=006n1pol

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    VZCZCXRO5475
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHMC #0453/01 3481523
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 141523Z DEC 09
    FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4146
    INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5231
    RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9774

` `

    239746
    2009-12-14 15:23:00
    09MONTERREY453
    Consulate Monterrey
    CONFIDENTIAL
    09MONTERREY415
    VZCZCXRO5475
    PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
    DE RUEHMC #0453/01 3481523
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 141523Z DEC 09
    FM AMCONSUL MONTERREY
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4146
    INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5231
    RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEABND/DEA HQ WASHDC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM
    RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHMC/AMCONSUL MONTERREY 9774

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MONTERREY 000453

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/14/2019
    TAGS: PGOV KCRM KCOR ASEC SNAR PHUM SOCI MX
    SUBJECT: MONTERREY SHOOTOUTS LEAVE 17 DEAD, EXPOSE SHORTCOMINGS IN
    STATE'S CRIME FIGHTING APPARATUS

    REF: A) MONTERREY 415

    MONTERREY 00000453  001.2 OF 003

    CLASSIFIED BY: Bruce Williamson, Consul General, US Consulate
    General Monterrey, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    ¶1.  (C) Summary:  A wave of gang violence rocked Monterrey on
    December 4 as well-armed criminals faced down the Mexican
    marines in the Monterrey suburb of Juarez during an attempt to
    arrest a Los Zetas drug gang leader implicated in the
    assassination of a suburban police chief.  The day culminated in
    a major jailbreak which saw 23 alleged gang members and
    sympathizers set free and led to an hours-long shutdown of a
    major northern thoroughfare.  In the aftermath of the action,
    termed by one newspaper as Nuevo Leon's "bloodiest day," 17
    people lay dead, several more were wounded and authorities
    arrested 16 gang members.  Officials are still unsure as to
    whether the original target of the operation, Ricardo Almanza
    Morales, aka "El Gori 1" escaped or was killed in the fight.
    The run-up to the firefight and the events surrounding it
    underscored a concerning lack of coordination, and possibly
    will, among key elements in the fight against the drug cartels.
    End summary.

    Arrest Attempt Becomes Battle
    -----------------------------
    ¶2.  (SBU) On December 4, Mexican marines, dispatched by Navy
    commanders, stormed a ranch in the Monterrey suburb of Juarez in
    an attempt to capture Ricardo Almanza Morales, aka "El Gori 1,"
    the alleged planner of the November 4 execution of the police
    chief in the Monterrey suburb of Garcia (ref A.)  The fighting
    began just before Friday rush hour and much of the later action
    occurred in a suburban area, next to the major highway from
    Monterrey to the border crossing in Hidalgo, TX, which was
    closed for much of the evening.  This phase of the battle
    culminated in a thirty minute shootout during which eight
    members of the Los Zetas drug gang and one marine were killed.
    Nine Zeta gangsters were arrested.

    Phase 2:  Firefight Intensifies
    -------------------------------
    ¶3.  (C) The battle escalated when, following the initial
    confrontation, the marines requested support from a local army
    unit to transport a wounded marine and prisoners from the ranch.
     A group of Los Zetas traveling in a convoy of 10 - 12 SUVs
    attacked the army reinforcements using grenades and high-powered
    assault rifles as they were en route to rendezvous with the
    marines.  A second shootout ensued, in which two more Zeta
    members and one innocent bystander were killed and a young girl
    was mortally wounded.  Multiple vehicles exploded during the
    battle, killing at least two unidentified passengers who were
    handcuffed in the back of an SUV belonging to Los Zetas.
    Military officials arrested seven Zetas during this second
    confrontation and an unknown number of gangsters fled the scene.
     The next day, local newspapers prominently featured graphic
    photos of the dead and wounded along with burning vehicles.  One
    local newspaper, "El Milenio," termed December 4 Nuevo Leon's
    "bloodiest day" in Mexico's drug war.

    Jailbreak in Aftermath
    ----------------------
    ¶4.  (C) Approximately one hour after the second gun battle, a
    group of Los Zetas drove through the gate of a jail in Escobedo,
    another Monterrey suburb, killed two federal police agents,
    wounded several others and released 23 of the 24 prisoners being
    held at the facility.  DEA sources said that fifteen of the
    escapees, including two police officers, were members of a Zeta
    kidnapping cell arrested by the Mexican army in October.  The
    two officers in charge of the jail claimed that they were out
    getting hot dogs when their jail was overrun.  This was the
    fourth jailbreak organized by Los Zetas in Monterrey's consular
    district in the last eight months.  (Comment:  According to law
    enforcement sources, the jailbreaks have become particularly
    troublesome, not just because of their increasing frequency and
    brazenness, but because prisoners (especially police officers)
    who are released by Los Zetas become instantly beholden to them,
    if they were not already.  End comment.)

    Victims or Perpetrators?
    ------------------------
    ¶5.  (C) Press reports and law enforcement authorities claimed
    that the handcuffed passengers killed in the second
    confrontation were kidnapping victims, but Monterrey DEA sources
    said the bodies were burned beyond recognition and may never be
    identified.  Mexican law enforcement sources told Post that
    narcotraffickers now commonly handcuff themselves if it appears
    that capture is imminent in an effort to look like innocent
    kidnapping victims and avoid arrest.  (Comment:  High profile
    kidnappings have continued in Monterrey and its affluent San
    Pedro suburb.  Three prominent San Pedro businessmen have been
    kidnapped over the last two weeks, with one paid ransom

    MONTERREY 00000453  002.2 OF 003

    purportedly around US$ 5 million.  Two of the kidnapping victims
    are still missing.  End comment.)

    "Gori 1 - 4":  The Almanza Brothers
    -----------------------------------
    ¶6.  (C) The marines' target, Ricardo Almanza Morales (aka El
    Gori 1), is one of four brothers involved with Los Zetas.  Each
    of the Almanza brothers is known as "El Gori" (a derivative of
    the word gorilla in Spanish) because of their distinctive facial
    features.  Brothers Raymundo Almanza (El Gori 2) and Octavio
    Almanza (El Gori 4) are both in custody in Mexico.  El Gori 2
    was arrested in May and, according to DEA sources, had been in
    charge of organizing Los Zetas arms shipments from Belize and
    Guatemala.  El Gori 4 is the suspected mastermind of the
    February execution of General Mauro Enrique Tello Quinones in
    Cancun and has been implicated in the 2008 slayings of nine army
    soldiers in Monterrey.

    ¶7.  (C) El Gori 3, Eduardo Almanza, is also associated with Los
    Zetas, but law enforcement sources say that he is the least
    important and influential of the brothers within the
    organization.  All of the brothers were close associates of
    former Monterrey plaza boss Sigifredo Najera-Talamantes, aka
    "Canicon", who was arrested in Saltillo, Coahuila this March and
    are suspected to have been involved in numerous kidnappings and
    homicides in the Monterrey metropolitan area.

    Which "Gori" Was Killed?  Confusion Over Identities
    --------------------------------------------- ------
    ¶8.  (C) The press has widely reported that Ricardo Almanza (El
    Gori 1) died during the first firefight at the Juarez ranch on
    December 4.  However, Post DEA determined that, based on army
    fingerprint records, only Eduardo Almanza (El Gori 4) could be
    confirmed dead.  To further confuse the situation, on December
    8, a woman claiming to be the mother of the Almanza brothers
    told the media that she does not have a son named Ricardo and
    that only her son Eduardo had been killed.  DEA sources also
    confirmed that, contrary to media reports, Monterrey Zeta leader
    Jesus Alvarado-Sigaros, aka "El Flaco," had not been listed
    among those killed in Juarez.

    Law Enforcement, Military Struggle to Effectively Face Cartels
    --------------------------------------------- -----------------
    ¶9.  (C) In Nuevo Leon, the public has applauded the army, with
    many business and civic leaders noting that over the past
    eighteen months it has been the only local institution capable
    of directly confronting the cartels.  In this case, despite
    having intelligence as to Ricardo Almanza's location, army
    officials declined to take action, claiming his hideout was too
    well-fortified.  In contrast, after navy officials learned of
    his whereabouts, they sent the marines to arrest him - the first
    such marine action in the state.  The army was apparently
    unaware of the marines' activities until they called the army
    for support during the operation.  Afterwards, army generals
    complained to Post that the navy action had made them look
    ineffective.

    ¶10.  (C) At a December 7 meeting with CG, ICE, DEA and ATF,
    Nuevo Leon State Prosecutor Alejandro Garza y Garza used the
    events in Juarez to highlight shortcomings in the local law
    enforcement community.  He said that the first two local police
    officers to arrive at the gun battle in Juarez fled the scene.
    (Note:  State Secretary of Public Safety Carlos Jauregui
    confirmed to RSO on December 10 that several police officials
    reportedly fled after the marines appeared.  End note.)

    ¶11.  (C) To further illustrate the complexity of coordinating
    law enforcement actions, Garza displayed aerial photos of a
    parking lot at the Santa Lucia Riverwalk (a popular Monterrey
    tourist destination modeled after the river walk in San Antonio)
    where gangsters armed with semi-automatic weapons were charging
    visitors for parking and using the lot to store stolen cars.  By
    the time the state called the military in to dislodge them from
    the lot (located on state land) and regained control of the
    property, the stolen cars had disappeared.

    Comment
    -------
    ¶12.  (C) The confusion surrounding this latest incident in
    Monterrey served to highlight the lack of coordination and will
    among law enforcement officials as they struggle to deal with
    increasing organized crime violence.  The army, long considered
    the most reliable partner in the struggle to contain the
    cartels, surprisingly refused to take the lead in capturing a
    criminal responsible for assassinating a former army general,
    leaving the navy as the only dependable actor in this case.

    MONTERREY 00000453  003.2 OF 003

    ¶13.  (C) Cartels have continued to operate with impunity in
    Nuevo Leon.  Ricardo Almanza (El Gori 1) moved openly in a large
    convoy throughout the Monterrey metropolitan area for a month
    after being named the prime suspect behind the assassination of
    the Garcia police chief, the state was unable to stop a major
    prison break despite having already been alerted to intense
    criminal activity in the area, and organized criminals operated
    a stolen car ring in broad view on state property.  Authorities
    also lack the forensic capability needed to identify victims
    and, presumably, to conduct thorough crime scene investigations.
     If there is a positive side, it appears that government
    operations have forced Los Zetas to resort to risky jail breaks
    to replenish their ranks with seasoned gangsters.  However, due
    to a combination of police incompetence and corruption, they
    have been able to successfully do so.

    ¶14.  (C) The long-term ability of the government to fight the
    cartels is hampered by budgetary concerns (only around 3.5% of
    the state's budget is dedicated to law enforcement and
    prosecution) and corruption.  Secretary of Public Safety Carlos
    Jauregui and State Prosecutor Alejandro Garza y Garza confirmed
    to RSO on December 10 that Nuevo Leon is having difficulty
    recruiting competent police officers because of low pay and
    safety concerns and that its new C5 command and control facility
    is understaffed.  (Note: In an effort to address concerns over
    chronically low pay, Jauregui has sought to increase police
    salaries and started a program to help officers pay for housing.
     End note)

    ¶15.  (C) Jauregui told RSO that his force of 4,000 police
    officers is 1,000 members below its target size and that, of
    those 4,000 officers, only about one quarter are doing
    substantive police work, the rest being assigned to
    administrative or protective duties.  It is unlikely that the
    state will be able to fill those 1,000 positions any time soon;
    Jauregui admitted that only 10 percent of prospective police
    recruits are able to clear the vetting process.  Until state
    officials address these inherent problems with law enforcement,
    Nuevo Leon seems condemned to take one step forward and two
    backward in its ongoing campaign against organized crime.
    WILLIAMSONB

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