Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6662 / 251,287

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03 2011/04
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25 2011/03/26 2011/03/27 2011/03/28 2011/03/29 2011/03/30 2011/03/31
2011/04/01 2011/04/02 2011/04/03 2011/04/04 2011/04/05 2011/04/06 2011/04/07 2011/04/08 2011/04/09 2011/04/10

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 96 97 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1996/11
1997/12
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam Consulate Adana American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan Consulate Melbourne
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Of Spain Embassy Port Louis Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Embassy Valletta Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC ABLD AG AE AMGT ASIG AORC AEMR APER AR AFIN ASEAN AM AJ AA AU AL ASUP AS ABUD AMED AX APECO AID AMBASSADOR ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG ADANA AFFAIRS AO ADCO ACOA ATFN AROC AFGHANISTAN AFU AER ALOW AODE ATRN AC AZ AVERY APCS AGMT
BR BL BA BM BEXP BH BTIO BIDEN BO BRUSSELS BT BC BU BY BX BG BK BF BBSR BMGT BTIU BE BB BILAT
CO CH CU CVIS CPAS CMGT CS CI CJUS CASC CA CY CDG CE CG CBW COUNTER CN CKGR COUNTERTERRORISM CODEL CWC CJAN CONDOLEEZZA CIA CD CLINTON CT CARSON CONS CB CR CM CW CACM CDB CAN COE COUNTRY CLEARANCE CACS CF CL CIS CTM COM CV
DR DOMESTIC DHS DAO DCM DEPT DTRA DA DPRK DISENGAGEMENT DOD DJ DEAX DOE DK DEA DS
EFIN ETTC ECON EINV EAGR ENRG ECPS ELAB EPET ETRD EWWT EUN ES EG ELTN EC EAID ER EI EU EZ EN ET EAIR EK EIND ECIN EINVECONSENVCSJA ECONOMICS EXTERNAL ELN ELECTIONS EMIN EINN EFINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ENIV ECUN EFIS EINT ENGR ENNP EUR EAP EEPET ETRDEINVTINTCS ENVI EFTA ETRO ESENV ECINECONCS EINVEFIN ECIP EINDETRD EUC EREL ENVR ECA ENERG ENGY ECONCS EINVETC ECONEFIN ESA ETC ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH
FR FREEDOM FTAA FARC FI FAO FJ FMLN FBI FOR FOREIGN FINR
GM GG GV GH GT GOI GA GTIP GR GZ GE GCC GY GANGS GOV GAZA GTMO
HA HO HUMAN HU HR HILLARY HSTC HK HURI HYMPSK
IR IC IS IT IZ IZPREL IRAQI IO IN IAEA ID ITPHUM ITPGOV ITALIAN IPR INRB IMO ITALY ICRC ICAO INTERPOL IQ IWC IV ICTY INTELSAT IEFIN IA INR IRC IACI ITRA IL ICJ INTERNAL ISRAELI IIP ILC INRA INRO IRAJ IF ILO IBRD IMF
JO JOSEPH JA JP JOHNNIE JM JUS JAMES
KTFN KU KPAO KIRF KJUS KIPR KDEM KISL KCRM KOLY KFRD KCOR KE KWMN KMDR KV KTIA KSUM KPAL KSEP KNNP KSCA KTIP KSTC KGIC KPKO KOMC KFLO KAWC KUNR KS KNPP KIDE KNEI KVPR KICC KBIO KPRP KN KWBG KR KMCA KMPI KCIP KTEX KHLS KGIT KNSD KCFE KLIG KFLU KBCT KZ KOMS KGHG KG KBTS KACT KCRS KGCC KDRG KWMM KAWK KHIV KSPR KRVC KRAD KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KOCI KSTH KTDB KPAI KHSA KTLA KO KFSC KVIR KX KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDEMAF KFIN KNUC KPIN KPLS KIRC KPRV KBTR KERG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNUP KTER KDDG KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KRFD KHUM KDEV KCFC KREC KWWMN KTBT KWMNCS KSAF
LE LY LU LTTE LI LO LH LG LAB LOG LT
MOPS MU MARR MX MASS MCAP MEPI MO MR MNUC MDC MPOS MIL MD MTCRE MK MUCN MY MASC MRCRE ML MA MEPP MAR MAPP MP MT MAS MTS MLS MEETINGS MI MERCOSUR MC MV MZ MOPPS MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MTCR MTRE MG
NL NATO NIPP NP NS NPT NU NO NZ NI NATIONAL NPG NGO NG NK NA NSSP NRR NSG NAR NE NASA NT NSF
OSAC OVIP OAS OSCE OTRA ODIP OFDP OEXC OREP OPRC OPDC OIE OIIP OECD OPCW OVP OPIC OPAD OFDA OIC OSCI OTR OFFICIALS
PREL PTER PGOV PK PHUM PINR PARM PSOE PINS PAK PHSA PAO PREF PM PBTS PF PNAT PE POL POLITICS PARMS PBIO PSI POLINT POLITICAL PARTIES PL PA PROP PO PGOVLO PORG PGOVE PLN PINF PRELP PAS PPA PRGOV PUNE PG PALESTINIAN POLICY PEPR PINT PU PECON POGOV PINL PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PMAR PHUMPREL PHUS PRL PGOC PNR PGGV PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PEL POV
QA
RS RU RIGHTS RO RW RICE RSP RP RF ROBERT RFE REGION
SA SCUL SP SNAR SOCI SY SENV SMIG SU SF SAN SZ SW SR SO SHUM SYR SAARC SL SI SNARCS STEINBERG SN SG SIPRS SH SOFA SANC SK ST SC SEVN
TX TS TRGY TO TH TBIO TU TIP TP TW TC TPHY TSPL TERRORISM TI TURKEY TSPA TD TZ TFIN TNGD TINT TK TR TT TRSY
UP UNHCR US UNSC UN UK UNGA UNMIK USUN UZ UNESCO USEU USTR UNHRC UY UNO UG UNDC UAE UNAUS UNDESCO UNEP UNCHC UV UNDP UNCHS UNVIE UE USAID
VT VE VTPREL VZ VN VM
WTRO WHO WTRQ WBG WI WITH WTO WB WWARD WHA WA WMO WEU WZ
XR XA XF XK XH XM XL XS XG XW XY XE XT XD XZ XV XC
YI YM YMCS YE
ZI ZANU ZU ZO ZP ZR ZB ZF ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07SANJOSE361, COSTA RICA: NEXT ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST ON 26 FEB

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SANJOSE361.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07SANJOSE361 | 2007-02-23 19:07 | 2011-03-03 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2697430.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2697496.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697489.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697532.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697535.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2701964.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/Relacionados/Investigacion2701965.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0053
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #0361/01 0541928
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 231928Z FEB 07
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7320
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 3931

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 000361

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND DS/IP/WHA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
    TAGS: PGOV ELAB ASEC PINR CS
    SUBJECT: COSTA RICA: NEXT ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST ON 26 FEB

    REF: A. 06 SAN JOSE 2431
         ¶B. SAN JOSE 175

    Classified By: CDA Russell Frisbie per reasons 1.4 (b & d)

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C)  1. (C) The next anti-CAFTA protest is scheduled for
    Monday, February 26, with the locus of action likely to be
    San Jose.  Organizers promise a larger event than last
    October's protest, but predicting turnout is impossible in
    advance.  The GOCR has vowed to prevent disruption of
    essential services (not anticipated) and roadblocks
    (probable) while respecting the right of citizens to protest.
     Costa Rican security officials are confident they can
    prevent major disturbances.  With assistance from Post
    (rented busses) as well as Colombia (Post-funded training)
    and Taiwan (vehicles and equipment), the police have improved
    their ability to respond to the protests.  On the other side,
    labor union leaders privately acknowledge that the event
    probably will not be a decisive blow against CAFTA
    ratification.  A less antagonistic but equally determined new
    leadership - the National Front - has become the public face
    of the CAFTA opposition, seeking a "time out" to develop a
    national consensus on the GOCR,s entire development agenda.
    PAC leader Otton Solis has urged CAFTA opponents to take to
    the streets in a celebration of Costa Rican democracy.
    Assuming no violence, both sides will likely declare victory,
    but momentum seems to favor the GOCR.  Anti-CAFTA forces may
    try to mount further (and perhaps more violent) protests
    later, especially around the ratification vote.  END SUMMARY.

    ------------------------
    ANOTHER ANTI-CAFTA MARCH
    ------------------------

    ¶2. (U) Both sides are squaring off for the next anti-CAFTA
    protest, scheduled for February 26.  Led by the "National
    Front of Support for the Fight Against CAFTA," an umbrella
    group drawn from university students and faculty, labor
    unions, and members of various social organizations, the
    protesters plan to focus most of their action in San Jose.
    They plan to assemble at the old national soccer stadium and
    march through downtown to rally at the Legislative Assembly.
    The organizers hope to far exceed the 6-9,000 person crowd
    assembled for the last protest, October 23-24 (Ref A).  As in
    the October protests, a few additional marches and attempted
    road blockages may take place around the country.  The GOCR
    has made it clear, including in stern television
    advertisements featuring Minister of Presidency Rodrigo
    Arias, that the public's right to protest peacefully will be
    honored fully, but no disruption to essential services or
    roadblocks will be allowed.

    ----------------------------
    UNIONS: SIZE DOES NOT MATTER
    ----------------------------

    ¶3.  (SBU) PolCouns and Poloff met with public employees,
    labor union leader and outspoken CAFTA critic Albino Vargas
    and two associates on February 7.  Vargas, as feisty as ever,
    repeated his familiar mantra:  Since the GOCR has refused a
    true national dialogue, CAFTA must be "decided in the
    streets."  The Agreement is illegitimate, anyway, because it
    was negotiated "in secret" by the former administration.
    And, the Arias Administration has no right to "impose" CAFTA
    on Costa Rica because a) Arias "stole" the 2006 election and
    b) Arias should not have been allowed to run again in the
    first place.  When asked why he continued to boycott meetings
    with Arias and other union leaders, Vargas insisted the
    President never listens to their concerns.  When asked about
    the impact if the protest turnout is lower than expected
    (based on just-published CID-Gallup data showing that only
    six percent of those polled supported the protests), Vargas
    insisted "numbers don't matter".  Although he dismissed the
    CID-Gallup figures as biased, Vargas acknowledge that the
    February 26 events probably will not b decisive.  He expects
    the GOCR will claim victoy no matter the tunout.

    -------------------------------------------
    NATIONAL FRONT: NEW FACE FO THE OPPOSITION?
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶4.  (U) The National Front, led byEugenio Trejos, Dean of
    the Technology Instituteof Costa Rica at Cartago, has
    increasingly become the public face of the opposition, part
    of a clear effort to play down the role of the more
    antagonistic unions.  In a long meeting with PolCouns and
    Poloff on February 21, Trejos said he and other Front leaders
    had met with a wide range of protest organizers and GOCR
    officials, including Public Security Minister Fernando
    Berrocal, to urge that the events be peaceful.  Trejos was
    optimistic that ex-presidents Luis Alberto Monje (PLN) and
    Rodrigo Carazo (PUSC) would join the protests to lend them
    more gravitas.  Trejos was fairly confident that the San Jose
    events would remain peaceful, but he warned that the Front
    could not "guarantee" calm everywhere, especially in the
    hinterlands, and particularly if the police "provoked"
    violence.

    ¶5.  (U) Trejos echoed the legitimacy concerns about the Arias
    Administration raised by Vargas.  Insisting that the GOCR,s
    38-seat working coalition in the Assembly was weak, he said
    the best case scenario for CAFTA opponents would be to peel
    away one or two of those legislators, so the GOCR would have
    to halt CAFTA, "listen to the people," and seek a new
    national "consensus," not only on CAFTA, but on the GOCR,s
    entire development agenda.  Trejos said a national referendum
    would be the ideal vehicle to help build the consensus, but
    admitted that it wasn't clear a referendum related to CAFTA
    was constitutionally feasible.  A team of opposition legal
    experts are studying the issue, he said.  For CAFTA
    opponents, the GOCR,s pushing ahead to ratification would be
    the worst case scenario, according to Trejos.  A ratification
    vote in April might provoke real violence, he warned.  The
    contest at hand, he maintained, is about the "60% of the
    population that has not really made up their minds" about
    CAFTA.  Like Vargas, Trejos also dismissed the recent
    CID-Gallup results (that 62% of those who are familiar with
    CAFTA support it.)

    --------------------------
    GOVERNMENT: READY BUT WARY
    --------------------------

    ¶6.  (SBU) The GOCR seems ready for the protests.  The
    intelligence service is confident it knows who the real
    troublemakers will be, but is still wary.  In a detailed
    pre-protest strategy session convened by Minister Berrocal on
    February 3 (the first such planning session in our memory),
    police officials were worried that the February 26 events
    might be more disruptive than those of last October.  Radical
    elements outside of the organized anti-CAFTA groups, for
    example, might block roads in defiance of the GOCR,s
    warnings.  Alternatively, a group of students perhaps aided
    by opposition legislators - could "peacefully" take over the
    Assembly building, forcing the police to remove them, at the
    risk of looking "too aggressive."  Security and screening has
    been tightened at the building to prevent this.  NOTE:
    Poloff will also attend the final pre-protest strategy
    meeting on February 23.

    ------------------------------
    USG (AND COLOMBIAN) ASSISTANCE
    ------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) As in the case of the October protests, mobility is
    the chief concern of the police.  With approximately 450 riot
    police available in San Jose, but only 160 of those
    fully-equipped (and recently refresher-trained by
    Embassy-funded Colombian police instructors), the police may
    need to move resources quickly to potential traffic choke
    points and protest hot spots throughout the capital.  The
    Ministry of Public Security thus asked Post to rent buses for
    their use, using available INL funds.  Post will provide 10
    buses, for February 26 only.  (The police do not believe they
    will need the buses after that.)  Berrocal believes that
    managing the image of the demonstrations is crucial and that
    the government will win this showdown if security officials
    are not provoked into violence with protesters.  Berrocal is
    so determined that he told national police commanders that
    "if blood must be shed, let it be our blood first."  Berrocal
    has announced publicly that police will not be armed during
    the protests.

    ¶8. (C) COMMENT:  The Colombian police instructors, provided
    with the very helpful assistance of Embassy Bogota and the
    Colombian Embassy here, greatly boosted the confidence of the
    police anti-riot personnel.  Poloffs observed this firsthand
    during a visit to the National Police training facility in
    Guanacaste.  Adding to the police's confidence was the first
    tranche of security assistance provided by Taiwan.  An array
    of 125 motorcycles, 60 pick-up trucks and other equipment was
    received in a public ceremony on February 22, deliberately
    timed to be a signal to protesters.  END COMMENT.

    -----------------------
    IMPACT ON THE ASAMBLEA?
    -----------------------

    ¶9. (SBU) CAFTA opponents have maintained pressure on
    legislators, even in advance of the big day on February 26.
    On January 23 and February 12, union leaders including Vargas
    tried to disrupt proceedings in the Assembly by noisily and
    personally threatening legislators from the visitors,
    gallery.  After trying to reason with the protesters,
    Assembly President Fernando Pacheco called the police,
    leading to a brief, but well-publicized scuffle as the
    gallery was cleared.  CAFTA opponents, including Trejos,
    decried this use of "excessive force."  Meeting with the
    Ambassador on February 16, PLN faction chief Mayi Antillon
    said the noisy union leaders had overplayed their hands by
    being "too disrespectful."  She acknowledged, however, that
    some individual legislators - such as Jose Manuel Echandi of
    the PUN -- were concerned for their safety and would be
    allowed to be "absent" on February 26.  (Echandi also
    requested police protection near his residence.)  Antillon
    acknowledged that the protests, if widespread enough and
    violent at all, could make some members of the GOCR,s
    working coalition "waiver" a little.  She remains confident,
    however, that the Asamblea can complete the first
    ratification vote by April.  Once that is done, she predicts
    that the opposition will lose most of its steam.

    --------------------------------------------
    THE PAC,S OTTON SOLIS:  WILL HE OR WON'T HE?
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶10.  (U) And what about PAC party leader Otton Solis, who
    vowed to join the protests when the CAFTA bill was voted out
    of committee last December, and who has taken a higher
    anti-CAFTA, pro-CBI profile since his January visit to
    Washington?  In a lengthy radio interview on February 6,
    Solis said his PAC party was not organizing anything, but
    would join the protests if they were convoked under "correct
    terms," i.e., as "day for Costa Rica." He has since been coy
    about his own participation, and whether PAC would take any
    responsibility for keeping the protests peaceful.  Minister
    of Government Arias insisted to the  media that if Solis
    joined the march, then his participation (as leader of the
    main opposition party) should be "a guarantee that the march
    will be peaceful."   In a TV commercial aired on February 22,
    however, Solis urged those concerned about CAFTA to take to
    the streets on Monday in a peaceful celebration of Costa
    Rican sovereignty.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11.  (SBU) Both sides seem ready and determined for Monday's
    events.  Assuming no violence, both sides are likely to claim
    victory.  Momentum seems to favor the GOCR, however, based on
    the increased discipline and confidence in the Assembly (Ref
    B), the better organization and higher confidence of the
    police, and the CID-Gallup polling data (generally in support
    of CAFTA, against the protests and unfavorable to the more
    notorious union leaders).  The opposition cannot keep holding
    "rehearsals."  But, if the GOCR does not blink in the
    Assembly (and we don't think it will), then the anti-CAFTA
    forces may try to mount further (and perhaps more violent)
    protests later, especially around the ratification vote.  The
    CID-Gallup data also shows that most Costa Ricans expect more
    turbulence before CAFTA is ratified.
    FRISBIE

`