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### Viewing cable 08STATE43817, syria's clandestine nuclear program

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08STATE43817 | 2008-04-25 01:01 | 2011-04-10 00:12 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:
Yedioth
Ahronoth
goes
out
only
in
print

`

    O 250101Z APR 08
    FM SECSTATE WASHDC
    TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

` `

    Sipdis

    Sensitive

    E.o. 12958: n/a
    Tags: knnp, dprk, sy, iaea, parm, prel

    Subject: syria's clandestine nuclear program

    ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 3.

    -------
    summary
    -------

    ¶2. (SBU) On September 6, 2007, <> destroyed a
    nuclear reactor Syria was clandestinely constructing,
    we judge with North Korean assistance. The reactor
    site was in Syria's eastern desert region in a
    location called al-Kibar. On April 24, Executive
    Branch officials briefed Congress and the press on
    evidence that lead the USG to conclude that the Syrian
    facility at al-Kibar was a nuclear reactor being
    constructed clandestinely, and therefore in violation
    of Syria's NPT-required safeguards agreement with the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The
    briefing described the basis for concluding North
    Korean assistance and why the reactor would have been
    ill-suited for any purpose other than plutonium
    production for a nuclear weapons program. The
    briefings also included information on the U.S. policy
    approach following the discovery of the facility and
    the Israeli air strike.

    --------------
    action request
    --------------

    ¶3. (U) Posts should draw from the background
    information in para 4 to respond to host government
    inquiries on this issue and for press inquiries as
    background information only. The points in the White
    House press statement in para 5 can be used in full to
    address press inquiries on the record.

    ¶4. (sbu) begin text of background information:

    Introduction

    - You will recall reports that the Israeli air force
    conducted a mission over Syria on September 6, 2007.

    - I want to inform you that the purpose of that
    Israeli mission was to destroy a clandestine nuclear
    reactor that Syria was constructing in its eastern
    desert near a place we call al-Kibar.

    - The Israeli mission was successful - the reactor was
    damaged beyond repair. Syria has completed efforts to
    clean up the site and destroy evidence of what was
    really there, constructing a new building on the old
    site.

    - We have delayed sharing this information with you,
    because our first concern was to prevent conflict.

    - We believe - based on strong evidence - that North
    Korea assisted Syria with the reactor at al-Kibar.

    - We are working with the North Koreans in the
    framework of the Six-Party Talks to focus on North
    Korea's role in this proliferation activity, including
    as called for in the October 3, 2007, agreement, and
    to provide additional explanations as necessary.

    - We have now decided that the time has come to share
    more information on this issue.

    Intelligence

    - Our intelligence experts are confident that the
    facility the Israelis targeted was in fact a nuclear
    reactor of the same type North Korea built
    indigenously at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. The U.S.
    intelligence community conducted an intensive, months-
    long effort to confirm and corroborate the information
    Israel provided us on the reactor and to gather more
    details from our own sources and methods.

    - We have good reason to believe this reactor was not
    intended for peaceful purposes.

    - First, we assess this reactor was configured to
    produce plutonium: it was not configured for power
    production, was isolated from any civilian population,
    and was ill-suited for research.

    - Second, Syria went to great pains to keep this
    secret by taking very careful steps to conceal the

    Sipdis
    true nature of the site.

    - Third, by maintaining secrecy and not declaring the
    site to the IAEA and providing design information, as
    Syria's NPT-mandated IAEA safeguards agreement
    requires, Syria undermined the very purpose of IAEA
    safeguards - to provide the international community
    with the necessary assurance/verification that the
    reactor was part of a peaceful program.

    - Finally, Syria's concealment and lies about what
    happened for months now after the Israeli air strike
    is compelling proof that it has something to hide. In
    fact, after the attack on the site, Syria went to
    great lengths to clean up the site and destroy
    evidence of what was really there. If there were
    nothing to hide, Syria presumably would have invited
    IAEA inspectors, other experts, and the news media to
    the site to prove that.

    Violations of international obligations

    - Article III of the NPT requires Syria to maintain
    comprehensive safeguards over all of its nuclear
    activities. Syria's IAEA Safeguards Agreement requires
    Syria to make early declaration of any new nuclear
    facilities. Specifically, Syria is legally obligated
    to inform the IAEA of such new facilities at the time
    a decision is taken to build them. Syria, however,
    failed to make such a declaration to the IAEA, or to
    provide design information and access during the
    reactor's construction intended to allow the IAEA to
    verify that design information.

    - If North Korea provided technical training, advice,
    services or assistance related to the provision,
    manufacture, maintenance or use of nuclear-related
    items subject to UN Security Council resolution 1718
    to the Syrian Government after the effective date of
    that resolution (October 14, 2006), this would
    constitute a violation of the resolution by both North
    Korea and Syria. Paragraph 8(b) of the resolution
    requires all member states to prohibit the procurement
    from North Korea of nuclear related items contained in
    S/2006/814 (which encompasses the control list of the
    Nuclear Suppliers Group).

    Policy deliberations

    - The existence of this reactor was dangerous and
    destabilizing for the region, and we judged that it
    could have been only weeks away from becoming
    operational at the time it was destroyed by the
    Israeli air force.

    - Specifically, we assessed that once the pumphouse
    and pipe system were complete in early August, the
    reactor could begin operation at any time. Once
    operations began, certainly a military option would
    have been much more problematic with radioactive
    material present.

    - We have long had indications of Syrian covert
    nuclear-related interaction with North Korea, and
    identified the al-Kibar facility in the fall of 2006
    as an enigmatic site. In Spring 2007, we acquired
    information that enabled us to conclude that the Al-
    Kibar facility was a reactor.

    - Information was brought to our attention at that
    time by Israeli officials who had conclusive
    intelligence that a reactor was being constructed at
    that site.

    - The Israeli reports were confirmed by our own
    independent intelligence and analysis and were
    consistent with less definitive information we already
    possessed.

    - At the same time, we conducted our own intensive
    internal policy deliberations regarding what to do
    about this disturbing and destabilizing development.

    - We discussed policy options with the Israelis, but
    in the end Israel made its own decision to destroy the
    reactor. This decision was made by Israel alone - they
    did not seek our consent. Nonetheless, we understand
    Israel's decision.

    - <> saw this reactor, and what Syria may have
    intended to do with it, as an existential threat that
    required it to act to defend itself.

    The way forward with syria

    - Syria's secret construction of this nuclear reactor
    is the latest in a series of unacceptable actions by
    the Asad regime.

    - Syria is a state that supports terrorism,
    destabilizes Lebanon, and is the largest conduit for
    foreign fighters and suicide bombers entering Iraq to
    kill Iraqis, Americans, and Coalition forces.

    - The Syrian Government supports terrorist groups such
    as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizballah, and
    others, including by playing host to leaders of some
    of these groups.

    - Syria is a proliferator in every sense - of
    terrorism, of instability to its neighbors, including
    Lebanon, and now as a recipient and developer of
    dangerous nuclear technology.

    - The Syrian regime, in going down this path, has
    shown a disregard for the security of the region and
    of its own people.

    - We call upon the Syrian regime to reveal the full
    extent of its nuclear activities, as it is required to
    do under the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and
    verify that its covert nuclear-related activities have
    stopped.

    - For better relations with the international
    community, in addition to full disclosure and
    cooperation regarding its covert nuclear program,
    Syria needs to end support for insurgents and foreign
    fighters in Iraq, support for Palestinian terrorists,
    and interference in Lebanon. If willing to do so,
    Syria can expect to be welcomed by the international
    community.

    The way forward -- six-party talks

    - In September 2007, the U.S. began raising its
    concerns with North Korea about nuclear cooperation
    with Syria. We have also raised this matter with the
    other participants in the Six-Party Talks.

    - We have made our concerns known to North Korea in a
    frank and comprehensive way. The North Koreans have
    acknowledged our concerns.

    - The North Koreans have stated that there is no
    ongoing nuclear cooperation with any foreign country
    in violation of applicable domestic and international
    laws and treaties, and that there will be no such
    cooperation in the future.

    - North Korea has agreed to cooperate on verification
    activities in line with its past commitments on non-
    proliferation, including as stated in the October 3,
    2007, agreement, and to provide additional
    explanations as necessary.

    - We have been following Syrian/North Korean
    interactions since the destruction of the reactor, and
    we have not seen the same level of interaction as we
    did before the reactor's destruction, however we
    cannot be certain all cooperation has ceased.

    - We continue to be on alert for signs of any nuclear
    cooperation, and any renewed activities.

    - We remain attuned to potential North Korean
    relationships worldwide, especially given North
    Korea's continued proliferation of missiles and other
    weapons. We plan to follow up on North Korea's
    agreement to cooperate on verification and to provide
    further explanations as necessary.

    - We are working with the Chinese to establish such a
    mechanism within the Six Party framework to address
    proliferation concerns.

    Conclusion

    - We cannot allow the world's most dangerous weapons
    to fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous
    regimes. This is the policy we have applied with
    respect to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and it is the
    policy that we continue to pursue. We are concerned by
    the cooperation between regimes that sponsor
    proliferation, especially when those same regimes also
    sponsor terrorism and foster instability.

    - A Syrian nuclear weapons capability would have been
    a catastrophic development for the Middle East and the
    world. It could spark a nuclear arms race in the
    region, and could escalate already high tensions with
    unpredictable and dire consequences.

    - The international community must come together to
    put a stop to dangerous behavior such as this. There
    is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot
    be tolerated. This episode reminds us of the dangers
    of proliferation and that we must rededicate ourselves
    and act cooperatively to prevent the spread of weapons
    of mass destruction.

    End text of background information.

    ¶5. (u) begin text of press statement:

    Today, administration officials have briefed select
    Congressional committees on an issue of great
    international concern. Until Sept. 6, 2007, the
    Syrian regime was building a covert nuclear reactor in
    its eastern desert capable of producing plutonium. We
    are convinced, based on a variety of information, that
    North Korea assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities.
    We have good reason to believe that reactor, which was
    damaged beyond repair on Sept. 6 of last year, was not
    intended for peaceful purposes. Carefully hidden from
    view, the reactor was not configured for such purposes.
    In defiance of its international obligations, Syria
    did not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency
    (IAEA) of the construction of the reactor, and, after
    it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury
    evidence of its existence. This cover-up only served
    to reinforce our confidence that this reactor was not
    intended for peaceful activities.

    We are briefing the IAEA on this intelligence. The
    Syrian regime must come clean before the world
    regarding its illicit nuclear activities. The Syrian
    regime supports terrorism, takes action that
    destabilizes Lebanon, allows the transit of some
    foreign fighters into Iraq, and represses its own
    people. If Syria wants better relations with the
    international community, it should put an end to these
    activities.

    We have long been seriously concerned about North
    Korea's nuclear weapons program and its proliferation
    activities. North Korea's clandestine nuclear
    cooperation with Syria is a dangerous manifestation of
    those activities. One way we have chosen to deal with
    this problem is through the Six Party Framework.
    Through this process we are working with our partners
    to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the
    Korean Peninsula. The United States is also committed
    to ensuring that North Korea does not further engage
    in proliferation activities. We will work with our
    partners to establish in the Six Party Framework a
    rigorous verification mechanism to ensure that such
    conduct and other nuclear activities have ceased.

    The construction of this reactor was a dangerous and
    potentially destabilizing development for the region
    and the world. This is particularly true because it
    was done covertly and in violation of the very
    procedures designed to reassure the world of the
    peaceful intent of nuclear activities. This
    development also serves as a reminder that often the
    same regimes that sponsor proliferation also sponsor
    terrorism and foster instability, and cooperate with
    one another in doing so. This underscores that the
    international community is right to be very concerned
    about the nuclear activities of Iran and the risks
    those activities pose to the stability of the Middle
    East. To confront this challenge, the international
    community must take further steps, beginning with the
    full implementation of the United Nations Security
    Council resolutions dealing with Iranian nuclear
    activities. The United States calls upon the
    international community to redouble our common efforts
    to ending these activities and preventing the spread
    of weapons of mass destruction in this critical region.

    End text of press statement.

    ¶6. (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive
    reactions as soon as possible.

    ¶7. (U) Minimize considered.
    Rice

    Nnnn

`