Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6321 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24 2011/03/25

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 96 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1996/11
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AMGT AORC AE AR ASIG ABLD AFFAIRS AG APECO AO AL AJ AM AU AEMR AS APER AID AFIN ACOA AA AMED AROC AFGHANISTAN ADCO AX ASEAN ATFN AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AC AZ AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BEXP BTIO BF BY BM BU BO BL BG BE BIDEN BK BX BH BC BT BBSR BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CVIS CMGT CS CBW CO CI CH COUNTERTERRORISM CA CASC CG CY CE COUNTER CDG CD CV CJAN CACM CDB CM CPAS CN CACS COE CT COUNTRY CAN CWC CLINTON CF CLEARANCE CONDOLEEZZA CIA CARSON CL CR CIS CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DA DEAX DOE DISENGAGEMENT DJ DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ECUN EAIR EC EXTERNAL ECIN EMIN EPET ELTN EWWT ELECTIONS ECPS EIND ER ENVR EZ EN EI EINT EREL ET ENIV EFIS ECA ENERG ETRO ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ELN ECINECONCS EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR EUC ECIP ENGY EK ENNP EFINECONCS EINDETRD ENVI ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FARC FMLN FREEDOM FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GZ GT GTMO GTIP GA GV GH GR GAZA GE GCC GOV GANGS GY
HO HURI HA HU HR HILLARY HUMAN HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IN IZ IS IT INTERPOL IC ISRAELI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IAEA IO IV ICTY IPR ID INRB IQ IWC ICRC IIP IMO IA INR IL ITPGOV ILC IRC IACI IZPREL ITPHUM ICAO ITRA INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JM JAMES JA JUS JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KCRM KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KRFD KPAL KISL KPAO KSUM KSEP KCOR KIRF KIPR KVPR KU KWMN KTIA KSCA KAWK KV KPRP KPKO KGHG KBIO KMDR KN KPWR KHLS KCIP KWAC KMIG KE KG KOLY KGIC KOMC KFLU KWMM KSTH KZ KDRG KFIN KHIV KERG KIFR KFRD KTIP KS KPLS KFLO KUNR KTLA KTDB KDEMAF KICC KPIN KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KAWC KACT KSTC KRAD KBTS KBTR KNSD KMPI KCRS KR KNPP KMCA KBCT KNUP KCFE KVIR KPRV KDDG KIRC KNEI KSEC KSAF KGIT KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KO KRVC KX KTER KGCC KFSC KHSA KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS
LE LY LG LAB LH LTTE LOG LO LI LT LU
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MTCRE MNUC MY MO MR MAR MPOS MEPP ML MZ MOPPS MU MA MASC MP MT MK MI MCC MERCOSUR MD MAPS MV MAPP MDC MRCRE MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NATO NL NATIONAL NI NU NP NIPP NG NPT NS NO NSG NA NRR NZ NAR NSF NGO NE NASA NK NPG NT
OTRA OVIP OPDC OREP OPRC OSCI OEXC OAS ODIP OFDP OTR OPIC OSAC OSCE OIIP OPCW OVP OECD OIC OFFICIALS OIE
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PINS PEPR PINT PBTS PHSA PSOE POLITICAL PARTIES PALESTINIAN PREF PM PA PE PROP POLITICS PO PBIO PECON PL PU PAK POGOV PRGOV PKFK PLN PG PY PFOR PRAM PAO PMAR PSI PUNE PHUMPREL PINL PHALANAGE PARTY PORG PHUS PGOC POLINT PGOVLO PMIL PF POV PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL
QA
RS RW RU RO RIGHTS RICE RF ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SENV SY SU SMIG STEINBERG SN SR SZ SO SG SF SW SL SIPRS SH SYR SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TU TBIO TSPA TW TRGY TS TX TPHY TERRORISM TI TIP TC TH TNGD TSPL TINT TP TRSY TZ TO TR TK TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UNGA UK UN UY UNESCO UP UG UNMIK US UNO UNSC USTR UV UNHCR UNEP UNCHS UNHRC UNVIE UNDP UNAUS UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WI WHO WWARD WTO WHA WTRQ WB WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XR XM XF XY XK XA XG XL XS XH XC XW XE XZ XT XD
YM YI YE YMCS
ZF ZU ZR ZI ZB ZP ZA ZO ZANU ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW1519, TNK-BP INTERNAL FIGHT GOES PUBLIC; BOTH SIDES

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08MOSCOW1519.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW1519 | 2008-05-30 07:07 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXRO6619
    PP RUEHBW
    DE RUEHMO #1519 1510740
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 300740Z MAY 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8302
    INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 001519

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/RUS; NSC FOR MWARLICK

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2018
    TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD PREL PGOV RS
    SUBJECT: TNK-BP INTERNAL FIGHT GOES PUBLIC; BOTH SIDES
    RAISE STAKES

    REF: MOSCOW 1294 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: CDA Daniel A. Russell for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).

    1.(SBU) TNK-BP President, AmCit Robert Dudley, gave an interview to the Russian business daily Vedomosti, which was published in their Monday May 26 edition. In the interview, Dudley aired BP's differences with its Russian partners, including over international projects. The most sensational aspect of the interview was his accusation of "managerial violations" by some in the company that had deliberately understated to the GOR the number of visas needed for the company's expats, putting their status and the company's operations in jeopardy.

    2.(C) In a May 28 meeting with ECMIN, AmCit Shawn McCormack, TNK-BP's Vice President for International Relations (strictly protect) said that BP had made a decision to forcefully respond to the continuing efforts of their Russian partners, especially Alfa Group billionaires Mikeil Fridman, German Khan, and Petr Aven, to undermine BP's position in the partnership (reftels). BP had decided to go forward with a PR campaign, including the Vedomosti interview and a series of press briefings on background that would further expose their partner's bad faith.

    3.(C) McCormack said that there was no truth to the rumor that the Russian partners, collectively known as the AAR group (after the initials of their companies: Alfa, Access, and Renova) had asked BP Chairman Tony Hayward for Dudley to resign. However, BP expected AAR to formally request Dudley's resignation at TNK-BP's May 29 Board Meeting in Cyprus. BP would refuse and given the 50/50 split in the company AAR would be unable to force Dudley out.

    4.(C) xxxxxxxxxxxx

    5.(C) McCormack said the bigger picture remained unchanged: Gazprom still wanted to buy out the Russian half of TNK-BP and pursue a global partnership with BP. The AAR billionaires were using their wealth and connections within the GOR to fight off Gazprom on one front while trying to seize greater control of the company from BP on another. He expected the "war" to continue and even intensify in the coming weeks.

    6.(C) Update: McCormack called late in the evening May 29 to report that the TNK-BP Board meeting had broken down in acrimony following AAR's efforts to remove Dudley, which BP refused, and BP's efforts to force out Khan, which AAR had rejected. McCormack said BP expected the attacks on their executives at TNK-BP, especially Dudley, to worsen in the aftermath. RUSSELL

    0 05/30/2008 3221 ECON,EINV,ETRD,PREL,PGOV,RS TNK-BP INTERNAL FIGHT GOES PUBLIC; BOTH SIDES RAISE STAKES 156028 BP hits back 164519 8/1/2008 12:18 08MOSCOW2237 Embassy Moscow CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO1244PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSRDE RUEHMO #2237/01 2141218ZNY CCCCC ZZHP 011218Z AUG 08FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOWTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9271INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITYRHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002237 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/RUS, FOR EEB/ESC/IEC GALLOGLY AND WRIGHT EUR/CARC, SCA (GALLAGHER, SUMAR) DOE FOR FREDRIKSEN, HEGBORG, EKIMOFF DOC FOR 4231/IEP/EUR/JBROUGHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2018 TAGS: ECON EINV ETRD PREL PGOV RS

    ------------------- BP/AAR Negotiations -------------------

    2.(C) Summers, a UK citizen (please protect), said that BP's dispute with AAR head reached the "end of the beginning" and that BP CEO Tony Hayward had met in Prague with Mikheil Fridman the day before, July 30, to negotiate a "cease-fire." (N.B. The meeting has since been reported in the press.) Summers, however, likened it to an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire in which Khan would play the role of Hamas, ready with some provocation or incident that would restart hostilities. Moreover, of all the partners, Khan was the least leveraged and therefore had the least to lose if the dispute dragged on and the company's performance suffered and payouts were delayed. He also had the least exposure outside Russia were BP to push the button and start seizing the AAR assets through arbitration.

    3.(C) Summers said a longer-term resolution of the dispute would depend on reaching agreement in four areas: picking a new CEO, agreeing on governance issues, agreeing on the level and nature of BP support to TNK-BP, and on "liquidity." He said Dudley was unlikely to return. However, Summers felt Fridman had overplayed his hand, and was now getting pressure from the GOR to resolve the dispute and was therefore unlikely to play hardball on the identity of the new CEO.

    4.(C) Summers said the second issue, corporate governance, was central to control of the company and would be the most difficult to resolve. The structure of the Board, the presence of independent directors, the authorities of the CEO, and structure of the subsidiary companies were the keys to BP protecting its investment in the company. He added that the opaque nature of Russia's legal system made this even more essential from BP's point of view and that any foreign investor in Russia should have in its hands at a minimum the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the head of internal auditing.

    5.(C) On BP's level of support, Summers said the questions revolved around whether BP would provide technical skills to TNK-BP in the form of secondees and if so how many and under what terms. He noted that AAR and the Russian Government knew full well that the company could not be run successfully without foreign employees. First, there were simply not enough skilled Russian petroleum engineers and second the Russian engineers' skills were not to world standards. What the foreign personnel had brought to TNK-BP and other Russian oil companies were not only more sophisticated drilling techniques but also an integrated approach to the work that maximized production. As an aside, Summers said he was very pessimistic that Russia would ever be able to get its production over 10 million barrels a day and predicted instead a steady decline in production as the current fields were depleted and few if any new fields were brought on line.

    6.(C) Summers said liquidity was really AAR's issue as their ultimate goal was to take value out of the company. Decisions would how much to pay out, including in the form of dividends, and how much to invest back into the company. Summers added that while the AAR partners overall goal was clear enough ) make as much money as they could ) they had no real strategy for achieving that and instead approached everything tactically, and that the preferred tactics of the Alfa partners in particular were to play rough. They had felt pressured from the government to sell at a discount, disrespected by a BP that had been weakened by its transition MOSCOW 00002237 002 OF 002 to a new CEO, and had decided to make themselves difficult until they were accommodated.

    7.(C) If the negotiations were to fail, Summers said BP would react decisively. He said BP had not reacted fast enough or aggressively enough as the dispute had gathered steam but was "angry and fully awake" now and ready to go to arbitration if necessary.

    ----------------------------- German Khan and the Godfather -----------------------------

    8.(C) Summers said he had a complicated and sometimes difficult relationship with Khan, though it was not as difficult as Dudley's relationship had been. It was complicated because although they were technically on the same level in the company, Khan as a part owner out-ranked him. However, at the same time, Khan knew very little about the oil business, knew it, and therefore deferred to Summers on running the company. With Dudley, he added, part of Khan's anger was because Dudley was the boss and had thwarted several of Khan's pet projects, such as investing in "rogue" states.

    9.(C) Summers added that Khan was a very difficult person to work with. xxxxxxxxxxxx They had flown out to Khan's hunting lodge, which Summers said was like a Four Seasons hotel in the middle of nowhere. At dinner that evening, Khan had told a stunned Summers that The Godfather was his favorite movie, that he watched it every few months, and that he considered it a "manual for life." Khan had also come to dinner armed with a chrome-plated pistol.

    10.(C) Summers said that after the trip he had gotten a copy of The Godfather and now watched it on a regular basis himself so as to better understand Khan and anticipate his tactics. He added that Khan's aggressive but relatively simple business style was typically Russian where multi-million dollar deals are made in smoke-filled rooms in a matter of a few hours and only later are turned over to the accountants to see if they make sense. It was not a style that meshed well with BP and that culture clash was in part responsible for the acrimony of the dispute, as Khan had never felt BP treated him with sufficient respect.

    11.(C) Summers added that Khan had gone along with Deputy Prime Minister Sechin on his trip to Cuba this week. Khan had been very nervous about the trip, since he would not be the headliner but instead would be surrounded by other powerful Russian oligarchs, including Sechin and Gazprom's Alexander Medvedev. Summers said nothing was likely to come out of the trip. Cuba's potential deposits were small and the geology was complicated. Even Khan was not really interested and Summers doubted any other Russian oil company would be interested either.

    ----------- Visa Update -----------

    12.(C) TNK-BP's VP for International Relations, Amcit Shawn McCormick, updated us the morning of August 1 on the visa situation within the company. According to McCormick, work visas have been trickling in all week for the foreign employees, including a batch of 18 that morning. Although the company is still waiting for 23 additional visas, McCormick said that all of foreign employees in "key/critical" positions, with the exception of Dudley, have now received visas and work permits (this includes McCormick). RUBIN

`