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### Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3421, COLOMBIANS SEE UBIQUITOUS VENEZUELAN THREAT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BOGOTA3421 | 2009-11-20 16:04 | 2011-03-23 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: http://www.semana.com/wikileaks/Seccion/168.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0005
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #3421/01 3241641
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 201641Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1112
    INFO RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE
    RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0215
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0002
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO

` `

    S E C R E T BOGOTA 003421

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/11/20
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS ETRD OAS CO VE
    SUBJECT: COLOMBIANS SEE UBIQUITOUS VENEZUELAN THREAT

    REF: CARACAS 1443; BOGOTA 2449; BOGOTA 3313

    CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    SUMMARY

    -------

    ¶1. (C/NF) Colombian officials and observers are increasingly
    concerned about the long-term threat Venezuela poses to their
    country. Experts inside and outside the government worry that any
    small incident along the tense border could spark a costly
    confrontation, given the decrease in communication and increase in
    tension between the two countries. Most believe the main risk
    comes from an unintentional incident, although influential GOC
    advisors claim to be equally worried that President Chavez could
    start a war to distract Venezuelans from their economic woes.
    Still, most of our interlocutors perceive a broader threat that
    transcends the current crisis -- they believe Venezuela has
    isolated Colombia, that its arms purchases will allow it to defeat
    Colombia militarily, and that Venezuelan trade restrictions will
    cause significant economic damage. Real or not, the perception of
    the threat posed by Venezuela has widespread implications for
    Colombian society. The perception that the USG is not supporting
    Colombia is becoming an issue in public commentary and private
    conversation. End Summary.

    NEAR-TERM WORRIES: BORDER FLARE-UP,

    CHAVEZ'S UNPREDICTABILITY

    -----------------------------------

    ¶2. (C/NF) Few in Colombia assess that Venezuelan President Chavez
    plans a full-scale attack on Colombian territory, but officials and
    commentators alike see a much greater risk that the heightened
    tension and increased Venezuelan military presence along the border
    could spark an unintentional armed border conflict. Top Uribe
    security advisor Paola Holguin told us that even though it was
    clear the GBRV could not move 15,000 troops to the border as
    announced (ref A), she worried that what she called the "poorly
    trained and undisciplined" state of Venezuelan troops could cause
    them to open fire without provocation. An analysis in leading
    newsweekly "Cambio" pointed out that the lack of communication
    between the two countries -- along with the atmosphere of mutual
    recrimination and doubt -- could cause such an incident to spiral
    out of control. The analysis concluded that although war is not
    imminent, it is much closer now than during any previous bilateral
    crisis.

    ¶3. (C/NF) These concerns are multiplied by what many here see as
    Venezuela's unpredictability. Presidential Communications Director
    Jorge Mario Eastman told us this volatility made it particularly
    difficult toQredict the Venezuelan leader's reactions in crises
    like the current one. Similarly, Carlos Morales, MFA Acting
    Director for Latin America and the Caribbean, expressed frustration
    over the difficulties his ministry had experienced in trying to
    predict the GBRV's decision-making. Holguin cautioned us that "a
    dictator like Chavez" calculates risk and reward differently from
    that of democratic governments like the USG and GOC --making his
    moves hard to foresee. Colombian media frequently portray Chavez
    as mercurial or even clownish, but our GOC interlocutors believe he
    is quite rational -- just not predictable.

    ¶4. (C/NF) Still, Holguin told us she and other Casa de Narino
    insiders worry about a full-on Venezuelan invasion, even though the
    current conventional wisdom predicts otherwise. She argued Chavez
    was desperate to distract his people from Venezuela's economic
    crisis, likening the situation to Argentina's 1982 seizure of the

    Falklands/Malvinas Islands from the United Kingdom. Holguin
    contended the GBRV had killed the nine Colombians, one Peruvian,
    and one Venezuelan whose bodies were discovered on October 24 in
    the Venezuelan border state of Tachira (ref B) and argued the act
    proved the Venezuelan regime's ruthlessness in attempting to
    provoke a war with Colombia.

    ¶5. (C/NF) Virtually all local observers assess Colombia would
    dominate Venezuela in any armed conflict, as its years of
    experience and better-trained personnel would outweigh any
    Venezuelan hardware edge gained from its recent spree of arms
    purchases. Nevertheless, many worry about the havoc Venezuela
    could inflict in even a short conflict. General Gustavo Matamoros,
    commander of the Colombian military's Joint Caribbean Command
    (which includes long stretches of border territory in the
    northeast), told us earlier in the year that Colombian armed forces
    in the area are far superior to those of the GBRV, but conceded
    that the GBRV could inflict unacceptable physical and political
    damage in border areas before being defeated rapidly. Similarly,
    Eastman noted that given the relatively short distances involved, a
    single Venezuelan bomber could easily drop a bomb on a major
    Colombian city -- an outcome the GOC could not tolerate. Holguin
    argues that Chavez -- whom she called "a soldier who has never
    fought a battle" -- simply does not understand these human costs of
    combat the way that Colombians do, or else he would not risk it.

    LONGER TERM WORRIES: REGIONAL ISOLATION,

    MILITARY IMBALANCE, ECONOMIC DECLINE

    ----------------------------------------

    ¶6. (S/NF) Beyond the current crisis, we hear similar perceptions
    about the broader threat Venezuela poses to Colombia. First,
    officials and observers alike worry Chavez's regional diplomacy
    (fueled in equal measures by oil and ideology) has left the GOC
    alone in the region and surrounded by unfriendly countries. The
    MFA's Morales told us of GOC concern that this has left Colombia
    isolated, with few regional powers willing to speak out against
    Chavez's aggressive rhetoric. Holguin said the region's current
    silence only emboldened Chavez to continue to speak and act
    aggressively -- and to keep generating crises. Although she
    credited the Brazilian Senate's November 11 vote to delay
    Venezuelan entry into Mercosur with Chavez's newly-toned down
    rhetoric, she hoped other countries would be more willing to stand
    up and actively denounce Chavez. Professor Sandra Borda of the
    Universidad de los Andes, an international affairs specialist and
    member of the GOC's Mission on Foreign Policy, told us that
    President Uribe had told a recent Mission meeting that he believed
    this was a deliberate GBRV strategy aimed at spreading
    Bolivarianism and isolating Colombia as one of the few remaining
    opponents of the ideology.

    ¶7. (C/NF) Second, GOC officials in particular are worried about
    Chavez's recent arms acquisitions from Russia, Iran, and other
    countries outside the hemisphere. Morales told us the hardware
    increasingly allowed the GBRV to back up its hostile rhetoric,
    while Holguin conceded that the improved weaponry would eventually
    overwhelm the GOC's current advantages. This is creating political
    pressure on the GOC to respond in kind. According to local press,
    the lower House of Congress will hold hearings in early December to
    determine whether the GOC is adequately prepared to face the
    Venezuelan threat, while U Party Senator Juan Carlos Velez publicly
    insisted the GOC needed to purchase upgraded air defense systems to
    counter the Venezuelan threat. Minister of Defense Gabriel Silva
    told the Ambassador the GOC was also interested in discussing the
    acquisition of anti-tank systems. Professor Borda noted this
    dynamic could spread into a dangerous bilateral arms race, given
    that neither country finds credible the other side's claims to be

    focusing on defensive capabilities.

    ¶8. (C/NF) Finally, Colombians worry about short- and medium-term
    damage to their economy caused by sharply decreased trade with
    their number-two trade partner. September exports to Venezuela
    dropped by 52%, compared with September 2008 numbers. For the
    first half of October, Colombian exports were down 77% compared to
    the same period in 2008. Colombian imports from Venezuela are down
    56% for the first nine months of 2009. Given the high degree of
    interdependence in border areas, such as Cucuta, trade restrictions
    and temporary border closings take a tremendous toll on the border
    region, and the GBRV has taken other punitive steps that will
    continue to drive down trade (ref C). Paradoxically, many in the
    GOC and Colombian business community see potential long-term
    benefits for Colombia in the drop off in bilateral trade, as it
    will put greater pressure on Colombian exporters to diversify their
    markets.

    ¶9. (C/NF) Alfredo Ramos, Director of Economic Integration at the
    Ministry of Trade, described the two countries as natural trading
    partners, noting that neither can readily replace the other.
    Nonetheless, he said it was entirely possible that Chavez could
    drive bilateral trade down to virtually zero in the coming months,
    suggesting continued downward pressure on Colombian economic growth
    against a backdrop of increasing unemployment and stagnant economic
    activity. In a letter to President Obama dated October 29, 2009,
    President Uribe presented this same argument as a reason to push
    forward on the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement.

    USG BECOMING AN ISSUE?

    ----------------------

    ¶10. (C) On November 17, Foreign Minister Bermudez summoned the
    Ambassador to express concern about the USG position in the dispute
    with Venezuela. He suggested that helpful neutrality was not the
    position the GOC was hoping for, and predicted Uribe would drive
    this point home in the upcoming visit by Deputy Secretary
    Steinberg. Perhaps not coincidentally, the lead editorial in
    leading Colombian paper "El Tiempo" on November 20 focused on the
    issue of USG neutrality.

    COMMENT: LEGITIMATE CONCERN OR PARANOIA?

    ----------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C/NF) We can argue the extent to which Colombians have a
    legitimate reason for concern or are simply paranoid. The point,
    however, is that worry about Venezuela abounds in Colombian
    society. It affects politics, diplomacy, the economy, and,
    increasingly, military doctrine. We are confident that Colombian
    leadership will maintain calm in its immediate dealings with
    Caracas, but there will be increasing pressure to demonstrate that
    Colombia is prepared to deal with its volatile neighbor to the
    east.
    BROWNFIELD

`