Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6308 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23 2011/03/24

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 96 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1996/11
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AMGT AORC AE AR ASIG ABLD AFFAIRS AG APECO AO AL AJ AM AU AEMR APER AS AID AFIN ACOA AA AMED AROC AX ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AC AZ AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BEXP BTIO BF BY BM BU BO BL BH BG BE BIDEN BK BX BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CVIS CMGT CS CBW CO CI CH COUNTERTERRORISM CA CASC CG COUNTER CY CE CDG CD CV CJAN CACM CDB CAN CIA CLINTON COE CM CPAS CACS CWC CN COUNTRY CLEARANCE CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DA DEAX DJ DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ECUN EAIR EC EXTERNAL ECIN EMIN EPET EWWT ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS EIND ER ENVR EZ EN EINDETRD EI EINT EREL EUR ET ENIV ENVI ENNP EFIS ECA ENERG ETRO EUC ECIP ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS ECINECONCS ENGY EK EFINECONCS ELN EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FARC FMLN FREEDOM FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GZ GT GTMO GTIP GA GV GH GANGS GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY
HO HURI HA HU HR HILLARY HUMAN HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IN IZ IS IT INTERPOL IMO IC ISRAELI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IAEA IO IV ICTY IPR ID INRB ITRA ICAO IQ IACI IWC ICRC IIP IA INR ITPGOV IZPREL IL ITPHUM ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JA JM JAMES JUS JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KCRM KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KRFD KPAL KISL KPAO KSUM KSEP KCOR KIRF KIPR KVPR KU KWMN KTIA KE KR KSCA KAWK KV KPRP KPKO KGHG KBIO KMDR KN KPWR KHLS KCIP KWAC KMIG KG KOLY KGIC KOMC KS KNPP KFLU KWMM KSTH KZ KDRG KFIN KHIV KERG KNEI KIFR KTIP KFRD KPLS KFLO KUNR KTLA KBCT KTDB KDEMAF KICC KPIN KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KGCC KAWC KIRC KACT KSTC KRAD KBTS KPRV KBTR KNSD KMPI KX KCFE KCRS KSEC KSAF KFSC KMCA KGIT KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KVIR KO KNUP KTER KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS
LE LY LG LAB LH LU LOG LO LI LT LTTE
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MTCRE MNUC MY MO MR MAR MPOS MEPP MA ML MD MZ MOPPS MAPP MU MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MV MRCRE MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NATO NL NATIONAL NI NU NP NG NIPP NO NPT NS NSF NSG NA NGO NZ NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT
OTRA OVIP OPDC OREP OPRC OSCI OEXC OAS ODIP OFDP OTR OPIC OSAC OIIP OSCE OECD OPCW OVP OIC OFFICIALS OIE
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PINS PEPR PINT PBTS PHSA PSOE POLITICAL PARTIES PSI PALESTINIAN PREF PM PA PE PROP POLITICS PO PBIO PECON PL PU PAK POGOV PRGOV PKFK PLN PG POV PMIL PY PFOR PRAM PAO PMAR PINL PGOVLO PHALANAGE PARTY PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL
QA
RS RW RU RO RF RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SENV SY SU SMIG STEINBERG SN SR SZ SO SG SF SW SL SYR SIPRS SH SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TU TBIO TSPA TW TRGY TS TX TERRORISM TPHY TI TIP TC TP TH TSPL TK TNGD TZ TINT TRSY TO TR TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UNGA UK UN UY UNESCO UP UG UNMIK US UNO UNSC USTR UV UNAUS UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNHRC UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WI WHO WWARD WTO WB WTRQ WHA WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XR XW XM XF XY XK XA XG XL XS XT XH XZ XC XE XD
YM YI YE YMCS
ZF ZU ZR ZI ZB ZP ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 10DHAKA27, BANGLADESH'S PRIME MINISTER PREPARES FOR ""TRANSFORMATIONAL"" VISIT TO INDIA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10DHAKA27.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10DHAKA27 | 2010-01-10 09:09 | 2011-03-16 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Dhaka
Appears in these articles: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article1541123.ece

`

    VZCZCXRO4229
    OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW
    DE RUEHKA #0027/01 0100916
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 100916Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY DHAKA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9854
    INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2209
    RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2966
    RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI
    RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000027

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR SCA/INSB AND SCA/FO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/10
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ETRD PTER KDEM BG IN
    SUBJECT: BANGLADESH'S PRIME MINISTER PREPARES FOR ""TRANSFORMATIONAL"" VISIT TO INDIA
    Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty.  Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

    SUMMARY
    ========

    ¶1. (C)  Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed will arrive in New Delhi January 10 to begin her most important foreign visit since assuming office in early 2009. Recognizing the inertia within Bangladesh's bureaucracy, the Prime Minister entrusted her own office with preparations for the visit, and her advisors tell us they expect the results to ""transform"" Indo-Bangladesh relations.  Hasina and her team believe that New Delhi would like to use improved Indo-Bangladesh relations to send a message to other neighbors regarding India's willingness to take a new approach to regional issues.  The Prime Minister does not, however, seem to have sufficiently focused on the need to sell any agreement to a skeptical audience at home.  Improved India-Bangladesh ties would serve U.S. interests by bringing greater stability and prosperity to a region that can use more of both.

    PM's Office Finalizes Preparations for Hasina's India Visit

    =============================================

    ¶2. (C)  Dr. Gowher Rizvi, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's Foreign Affairs Advisor, met with the Ambassador early January 10 and reported that preparations had been completed for the PM's visit to New Delhi later in the day.  Rizvi returned from Delhi January 8, concluding his fourth round of discussions with Indian interlocutors to prepare the ground for the PM's visit.  While Rizvi confessed that the Indians had initially been skeptical of what the visit could achieve, he told the Ambassador the stage had been set for agreements to ""transform"" Indo-Bangladesh relations.  Rizvi told the Ambassador that negotiations had been kept very close hold within the GOB, with the Foreign Minister only being brought into the loop within the past week.  PMO Advisors H.T. Imam and Mashiur Rahman had been drafted in the final stage to help push through implementing agreements that had stalled within the bureaucracy.   Rizvi was dismissive of the Foreign Ministry bureaucracy, which he said lacked creativity and vision.

    Focus on Implementing Old Agreements
    ====================================

    ¶3.  (C)  While the Bangladeshi press has focused on new, relatively minor, agreements (extradition, prisoner transfer, electricity sharing, etc.) that would likely be signed during the visit, Rizvi told the Ambassador that he and his Indian interlocutors had instead focused primarily on the need to implement long dormant agreements on transit and interconnectivity. According to Rizvi, there would be agreement on enhancing interconnectivity between India and Bangladesh focused on both expanding rail networks as well as water transport.  The two sides would agree to allow access to Chittagong, Mongla, and Ashuganj ports in Bangladesh to India.  (Note:  Rizvi said of the three, Mongla had proved to be the most controversial given sensitivities in West Bengal to diversion of trade from Kolkata's port.)  Rizvi said that border markets would also be authorized, which would cut down on smuggling.

    And Bilateral and Regional Trade
    ================================

    ¶4. (C) Rizvi saw enormous opportunities for enhanced trade, particularly with India's northeastern states. He said the agreement would also allow for transit of goods from Nepal and Bhutan through India and into Bangladesh.   Rizvi said he had talked with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Montek Singh Aluwalia about the possibility of a future free trade agreement.  According to Rizvi, the Indian leadership was committed to opening trade with Bangladesh, in part to provide competition for domestic industries.  While the Indian States' interests would have to be taken into account, Rizvi said he was confident that the Indians were serious about removing trade barriers.

    Maritime Boundary and Teesta Water Sharing Remain Problematic
     ====================================================

    ¶5. (C)  Rizvi said the one bilateral issue that had proved most complicated during the discussions was demarcation of the Indo-Bangladesh maritime boundary.  Rizvi told the
    DHAKA 00000027  002 OF 002  Ambassador the Indians had been disappointed when Bangladesh unilaterally referred the maritime boundary dispute to international arbitration.  He was slightly more optimistic on water sharing from the Teesta River.  According to Rizvi, both sides had agreed that the first step would have to be a meeting of the Joint Rivers Commission and an agreement to conduct joint hydrological surveys of the river to establish the current water flow.  Rizvi was optimistic that some water sharing would begin even before a final agreement was negotiated.

    PM Neglects Need for Communications Strategy
     ============================================

    ¶6. (C)  Rizvi told the Ambassador he thought the PM was making a mistake by delaying her return to Dhaka until January 13, following a one-day pilgrimage to Ajmer.  Rizvi confided that he had ""sabotaged"" the PM's plan to prolong her stay in India further by adding an additional stop in Kolkata.  Rizvi had argued in favor of an immediate return to Dhaka following the conclusion of bilateral talks on the 12th.  At Rizvi's insistence, the PM will address Parliament upon her return to outline the results of the visit.  Rizvi shared his fear, however, that this 24-hour delay would allow the media and the opposition to put their spin on the visit before the PM had a chance to address the nation.  According to Rizvi, the PM believed that the agreements would sell themselves.  We discussed with Rizvi the possible benefits if the Government were to offer to take the Opposition into confidence and provide a separate briefing on the results of the visit.  We also discussed the value of continued Indian engagement with the Opposition.

    Comment
    =======

    ¶7. (C)  One of the Awami League's priorities since taking office has been to improve relations with India.  The February 2009 Bangladesh Rifles Mutiny dealt a temporary setback to these efforts.  In recent months, however, preparations for the PM's visit to India have been her office's primary focus.  The decision to hand over several high profile Indian insurgents in late-2009 helped to create a favorable atmosphere for the visit.  As a result of the groundwork that has been laid, it appears that the results of the visit could well exceed the Bangladeshi public's expectations and provide a boost to the Government.  In a recent poll, 80 percent of Bangladesh's population expressed support for improved Indo-Bangladesh ties.  At the same time, the political opposition can be expected to criticize the Government for failing to protect Bangladesh's interests. (Poor strategic communications weakened the 2007 - 2008 Caretaker Government's hands as it tried to implement reforms. It appears that Sheikh Hasina's government has not learned this lesson from its predecessor.)  That said, a positive transformation of the Indo-Bangladesh relationship could help bring greater stability and prosperity to a region that could use more of both.

    MORIARTY

`