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### Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1296, UHURU KENYATTA - PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09NAIROBI1296 | 2009-06-26 12:12 | 2011-02-27 23:11 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi
Appears in these articles: http://www.the-star.co.ke/

`

    VZCZCXRO9757
    OO RUEHROV
    DE RUEHNR #1296/01 1771213
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 261213Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0005
    INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY 6607
    RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3251
    RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 3123
    RUZEFAA/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/CJTF HOA  PRIORITY
    RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001296

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KE
    SUBJECT: UHURU KENYATTA - PRESIDENTIAL AMBITIONS AND THE

    REFORM PROCESS

    REF: NAIROBI 767

    Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 b,d

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Uhuru Kenyatta appears to be working towards a
    presidential run in 2012. While many have pointed out that
    replacing President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, by another Kikuyu,
    would be unlikely due to anti-Kikuyu sentiments prevalent
    across much of Kenyan society, Kenyatta may be encouraged to
    attempt a presidential run due to shifting political dynamics
    that make potential challengers seem weak.  Interestingly,
    Kenyatta seems to appreciate the need to be seen as
    pro-reform, and we should encourage him to push for action on
    key reform issues. Alternatively, the potential for Kenyatta
    to foment violence to achieve political ends cannot be ruled
    out (he is reportedly a key figure on the list of suspected
    perpetrators of post-election violence). End summary.

    --------------------------------------------
    Kenyetta Preparing For 2012 Presidential Bid
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Although in public and private Uhuru Kenyatta has
    avoided openly declaring presidential ambitions for 2012, he
    appears to be moving to pave the way for a presidential run.
    While conventional wisdom says that another person from the
    Kikuyu ethnic group cannot succeed President Kibaki, a
    Kikuyu, political dynamics that make potential challengers
    seem weak may be encouraging Uhuru and his potential
    supporters to rethink this.

    ¶3. (C) Kenyatta is taking steps that are clearly intended to
    bolster his political standing and mobilize support. His
    appointment as Finance Minister was seen by many as an
    implicit endorsement by Kibaki; it provides a powerful
    platform for Kenyatta to pursue presidential ambitions. The
    budget which he recently submitted to Parliament (septel) has
    virtually bought many parliamentarians as a result of vast
    expansion of the funds designated for the Constituency
    Development Fund (CDF). The CDF is used to fund projects in
    parliamentary constituencies. While use of CDF funds has
    become more transparent and accountable over the past couple
    of years, parliamentarians still wield enormous influence
    over use of the funds, and employ them to enhance their
    political standing and support. No budget presentation has
    ever been greeted with such enthusiasm by
    parliamentarians.(It is important to note that expansion of
    the CDF, if used transparently ) and therein lies the rub )
    can serve a legitimate purpose of helping stimulate the
    economy through infrastructure projects; the economy is
    suffering greatly due to the aftermath of the post-election
    violence and the world financial crisis. Through this tactic,
    Kenyatta also increases the support he is likely to receive
    in working behind the scenes to ensure that parliamentarians
    never approve an independent special tribunal to hold
    accountable those involved in post-election violence. It is
    generally assumed that Kenyatta,s name (and that of his
    prospective ally William Ruto) are on the list of suspects
    the Waki Commission gave to Kofi Annan. (The danger of being
    identified for investigation and possible prosecution is one
    of Kenyatta,s principal vulnerabilities.)

    ------------------------------
    Kikuyu Politics Favor Kenyetta
    ------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Kenyatta must move to ensure solid control of his KANU
    party as a potential presidential vehicle. KANU is currently
    the second biggest partner to Kibaki,s Party of National
    Unity (PNU), holding 14 seats in Parliament, mostly
    representing non-Kikuyu regions. Ex-President Moi,s son
    Gideon could compete for control, but at the end of the day
    an accommodation could be worked out.(Kenyatta was Moi,s
    designated successor and ran in 2002 on the KANU ticket.)
    Gideon Moi and other KANU stalwarts have been pressing
    Kenyatta to focus his energies on rebuilding KANU.

    ¶5. (C) Kikuyu political dynamics seem to be favoring
    Kenyatta. There has been an emerging realization among Kikuyu
    professionals, progressive politicians, and others that it
    would not be healthy for the nation or wise politically to

    NAIROBI 00001296  002 OF 004

    seek to have another Kikuyu replace Kibaki.  That said,
    however, many Kikuyus, including the still dominant political
    class, fear the potential consequences of electing a
    non-Kikuyu (the concerns include worries about their economic
    and political interests, including the potential for another
    ethnic group to exploit anti-corruption efforts against
    them). Kenyatta is slowly but steadily emerging as the most
    likely potential presidential designee of the Kikuyus --
    should they decide to back a candidate for president. Other
    contenders are not gaining traction. Minister of Security
    Saitoti is considered too old, not charismatic, and he is
    tainted by the Goldenberg corruption scandal.  Kikuyu
    dissident Martha Karua, the former Minister of Justice and
    head of the NARC-K party within the PNU, has not gained wide
    support in the Kikuyu Central Province. (Vice President
    Musyoka, the nominal head of the Kamba community, which is
    closely related to the Kikuyu community, remains a potential
    standard-bearer if at the end of the day the Kikuyus decide
    that they should not field their own candidate. However, that
    would be seen as a Kikuyu-Kamba condominium, which might well
    be worse than a straight-out bid by Kenyatta if he can get
    crucial support from the Kalenjin community.)

    ¶6. (C) While Kibaki will not play a decisive role in
    designating his preferred successor, his standing as the
    principal Kikuyu elder and the power that State House wields,
    mean that obtaining his support is important. A number of
    sources report close contacts between Kibaki and Kenyatta,
    and between those two and William Ruto, a potential ally.
    Kibaki,s naming of Kenyatta as Finance Minister was seen as
    at least giving Kenyatta the platform to make a play for
    leadership.

    --------------------------------
    Potential Kenyetta-Ruto Alliance
    --------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Ruto has made a number of private visits to State
    House in recent months, and he and Kenyatta are in close
    contact. They worked together behind the scenes to ensure
    defeat of the special tribunal bill. One rationale for
    cooperation is the importance they attach to promoting the
    welfare of their respective ethnic communities (Kenyatta,s
    Kikuyu community in Central Province and Ruto,s Kalenjin
    community in Rift Valley) in order to avoid a repeat of what
    happened last year during the post-election violence.
    Although tensions between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities
    remain high and make an alliance problematic, the political
    imperatives driving potential cooperation between Kenyatta
    and Ruto cannot be dismissed.(Some of the thinking runs along
    these lines: an alliance among the Kalenjins, Kikuyus, and
    the Kambas assures a winning majority. In the event of
    violence in response to such a victory, such violence could
    be contained to PM Odinga,s Luo ethnic community in Nyanza
    Province and to his supporters in Nairobi,s Kibera slum.)

    ¶8. (C) Tentative, behind the scenes cooperation between
    Kenyatta and Ruto is focused on a deal whereby Ruto uses his
    influence among Kalenjins to facilitate the reintegration of
    the Kikuyu internally displaced persons in Rift Valley; in
    return, Ruto would get a significant share of important
    economic positions for his Kalenjin political allies. What is
    particularly problematic in a potential Kenyatta-Ruto
    alliance is who would get top billing on the presidential
    ticket, but there is some sense that Ruto might accept the
    position of vice president or prime minister, and thus
    prepare the ground for a presidential run in 2017.(Ruto is in
    his 40s.)

    ¶9. (C) Most observers, rightly in our view, believe that
    attempting to have another Kikuyu succeed Kibaki is a recipe
    for serious instability ) perhaps for a meltdown much more
    severe than that experienced last year. While some sort of
    arrangement could emerge between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin
    communities, this seems a distant prospect given what
    happened last year.  (Importantly Moi, rather than Ruto, is
    still seen as the head of the Kalenjin community and there is
    bad blood between those two. If Moi supports Kenyatta, Ruto
    could decide to stay with Odinga, which would mean a split of
    the Kalenjin vote.)

    ----------------------------------
    Politicians Compete For Youth Vote
    ----------------------------------

    NAIROBI 00001296  003 OF 004

    ¶10. (C) Yet another indication that Kenyatta may be preparing
    the ground for a presidential run is his tacit support for
    the creation of a national youth movement. Struck by U.S.
    outreach efforts to grassroots youth movements in support of
    the reform agenda, parliamentarians and other politicians are
    scrambling to try to co-opt the youth.  One of the most
    important of these efforts is the plan underway by Kibaki,s
    son Jimmy and several parliamentarians to launch a national
    youth movement on July 4. Although Jimmy has publicly claimed
    this is intended to push for change across the political
    spectrum, this is a ridiculous assertion given Jimmy,s
    position as a charter member of the vested interests.

    ¶11. (C) There are some indications that this new youth
    movement is intended to co-opt and destroy the grassroots
    youth movements which have been emerging across ethnic lines
    to push peacefully and in a non-partisan manner for change
    (see reftel on our efforts to encourage this). Jimmy and
    those behind establishment of this new youth movement
    attempted to get the Ambassador to attend the launch, which
    he declined to do. One of those heavily involved in setting
    up this youth movement made clear that it is intended both to
    bolster Jimmy,s eventual political prospects (probably to
    run for his father,s parliamentary seat in 2012) and
    potentially to serve as a source of support for Kenyatta.

    ------------------------------------------
    Kenyetta Election Could Push Reform Agenda
    ------------------------------------------

    ¶12. (C) Kenyatta,s potential ambitions could be helpful in
    pushing the reform process.  During a recent conversation
    with the Ambassador, Kenyatta claimed that he is privately
    pushing Kibaki to carry out key reforms, particularly with
    respect to the police and judiciary. It seems possible that
    ) given the clear public frustration with the slow pace of
    reform and our stated concerns -- Kenyatta appreciates the
    need for him, KANU, and PNU to be seen as more pro-reform.
    He claimed to the Ambassador that he is urging removal of
    Police Commissioner Ali and Attorney General Wako.

    ¶13. (C) If he decides to pursue the presidency, Kenyatta has
    several major strengths, but these are balanced and
    potentially offset by important weaknesses. Kenyatta is
    bright and charming, even charismatic. He is enormously
    wealthy, and therefore has not had to engage in corruption.
    Although his wealth is the inheritance from his father,s
    corruption, the Kenyatta family still holds a special status.
    Kenyatta,s liabilities are at least as important as his
    strengths. He drinks too much and is not a hard worker
    (though he surprised everyone by the acuity of the budget,
    which reportedly resulted from some tough work over long
    hours). Perhaps most importantly, Kenyatta has been closely
    linked to the Mungiki (which emerged in the aftermath of the
    Mau Mau and began as a movement in defense of Kikuyu
    traditional values, but which has long since morphed into a
    well-organized mafia-style criminal organization). The reason
    that Kenyatta is assumed to be on the Waki Commission list of
    suspected perpetrators of post-election violence is his
    fund-raising to support Mungiki violent actions against
    Kalenjins during the post-election violence. Some reports
    indicate that Kenyatta has tried to distance himself from the
    Mungiki. (The links between the Mungiki and various Kikuyu
    politicians are at best murky.) Ironically, Kenyatta,s links
    to the Mungiki make him one of those who feels strongly that
    extrajudicial killing must stop (since many of the
    extrajudicial killings have been carried out by the police,
    under Commissioner Ali,s direction, against the Mungiki).

    ¶14. (C) Kenyatta may see shifting political dynamics as
    opening the way for a presidential run.  Odinga is
    increasingly perceived as feckless, unable or unwilling to
    govern effectively and move forward the reform agenda. There
    is growing disillusionment within his camp (as conveyed by
    key interlocutors of Odinga,s Orange Democratic Movement,
    ODM, party to the Ambassador).  Odinga,s being seen as in a
    weakened position may be wishful thinking given his political
    resilience and the fact that he could yet emerge as a
    reformer, but he has clearly lost significant popular
    support. The ODM seems both directionless and less united
    than before.

    ¶15. (C) Comment: Although talk of calculations with respect
    to the 2012 presidential election seems very premature, the
    reality is that politicians are already maneuvering with that

    NAIROBI 00001296  004 OF 004

    in mind. Those considerations will influence their
    calculations with respect to the reform agenda.   The popular
    dynamic in favor of reform will influence politicians,
    behavior in a positive direction to some degree, but this
    will be weighed against considerations of ethnic alliances,
    fund-raising, and personal politics. Continued intensive U.S.
    pressure for implementation of reforms will help drive
    considerations in the right direction towards reform steps.
    End comment.
    RANNEBERGER

`