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### Viewing cable 03ANKARA3694, DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: GENERAL STAFF AND GOVERNMENT STRUGGLE WITH THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
03ANKARA3694 | 2003-06-06 14:02 | 2011-03-22 15:03 | SECRET | Embassy Ankara

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

    061428Z Jun 03

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003694

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2013
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU
    SUBJECT: DEFINING THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY: GENERAL STAFF AND GOVERNMENT STRUGGLE WITH THEMSELVES AND EACH OTHER

    REF: A. ANKARA 2521
         ¶B. ANKARA 2666
         ¶C. ANKARA 2122
         ¶D. ANKARA 1350
         ¶E. ANKARA 0418
         ¶F. 02 ANKARA 7682
         ¶G. 02 ANKARA 7683
         ¶H. ISTANBUL 0776

    (U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Chief of the General Staff (TGS) Ozkok's
    attempt to smother disgruntlement in senior ranks and at the
    same time to warn ruling AK party against perceived
    anti-secular trends has achieved neither goal.  While
    tensions between the military and AK, and within each, will
    continue, we see no likelihood under the current
    constellation of forces for the military to force a change of
    government.  End summary.

    ¶2. (C)  Chief of the TGS Ozkok's May 26 political warning in
    the form of a briefing for selected newspaper journalists is
    yet more evidence that the TGS is very unhappy:

    -- Unhappy within itself (Ozkok is being pressed by a group
    of six to eight senior officers who hold what a broad range
    of journalist, political, and national security analyst
    contacts characterize for us as "Eurasianist, status quo,
    keep-military-procurement-secret" views; other TGS officers,
    such as J-5 chief of agreements Air Force MG Ajar, who is
    well connected to Ozkok, told us he agrees with the
    assessment that Ozkok is too soft on AK).

    -- Unhappy with the AK government, which proclaims itself
    conservative-democratic, but which the TGS and most of the
    rest of the Kemalist Establishment (presidency, most of the
    judiciary, bureaucracy, main opposition CHP, and large
    majorities of the media and academe) charge is both
    incompetent and carrying an Islamist torch.

    -- Unhappy with the fact, flexibility, and speed of change in
    the world.

    -- Unhappy with change at home, where social change from
    below, a growing freedom of debate about many hitherto taboo
    subjects, and the government's attempt to avoid submitting
    its newest package of EU Copenhagen Criteria-related reforms
    to the military-dominated NSC for review all suggest that, as
    ordinary Turks consider where their country should go, the
    Turkish military is beginning to lose its position as the
    ultimate arbiter of republican probity.

    ¶3. (S) As many contacts -- among them premier national
    defense analyst Faruk Demir -- have reminded us, we should
    put Ozkok's latest remarks in the context of a longer series
    of TGS statements and growing military discomfort (refs A-F
    stretching back to October 2002).  Ozkok's aims on May 26
    were six-fold:

    (A) To cut the legs off the press reports, originating in the
    May 23 issue of Kemalist "Cumhuriyet" that "young officers"
    are very uneasy about AK party and the AK government's goals.
     "Young officers" is a phrase redolent of the May 27, 1960
    coup, engineered by young officers against both the
    government of the day and senior commanders, and Ozkok was
    determined (1) to end public speculation that his tenure is
    under question in the officers' ranks and (2) to restore
    discipline in the ranks -- his use of an oblique Ottomanesque
    phrase ("kerameti kendinden menkul kimseler", roughly
    equivalent to "Lord Muck miracle workers") to demean his TGS
    critics made his message to them all the blunter.

    (B) While acknowledging that the TGS is not monolithic in its
    discussions of "ideas", to reject all speculation that there
    are differences of view or any polarization in the TGS (note:
    to protect his image as chief of the TGS, Ozkok felt he had
    to assert that there is no difference of view in the TGS, but
    others, including MG Acar, readily admit to us that there is
    a heated debate, especially concerning Turkey's direction on
    the EU, relations with the U.S., and what to do about AK
    party).

    (C) To declare that the TGS and AK government are not on the
    same wavelength.

    (D) To affirm that the TGS as a whole is "uneasy" with the
    current political situation.

    (E) To reject any discussion of a coup "under this roof" (the
    TGS) but to leave the journalists, and thus the public at
    large on alert (1) by emphasizing that the armed forces will
    continue its secularist struggle "to the very end" within the
    constitutional framework; and (2) by warning that the
    February 28 process (the "post-modern" coup that brought an
    end to the Islamist Erbakan government in 1997) is a cause
    and effect relationship, and "with the reasons for February
    28 continuing, its effects will continue."

    (F) To defend himself against the charges -- which appear to
    originate with the high-ranking generals aligned against him
    -- that he is too democratic and Western-oriented to be a
    strong guardian of core "secularist" values; Ozkok said that
    his attachment to democratic values and the benefits of
    having served in Western billets strengthen his ability to
    defend core values.

    ¶4. (C) Ozkok's briefing has produced sound and fury, but
    uneven effect.

    ¶5. (C) First, press and private commentaries have been as
    openly critical of the military's heavy-handedness as we
    recall ever having experienced in Turkey.  Not one of the
    journalists, analysts, politicians or businessmen we have
    talked to since the briefing sees a coup as possible under
    current circumstances, or even desirable.  However, Demir
    emphasized that the way Ozkok broached the coup subject
    leaves the door open should the AK government's performance
    cause widespread and sharp discontent, thereby eroding the
    resilient support Erdogan and AK continue to have in
    Anatolia.  Some see Ozkok's position as lessened or, more
    broadly, the military's ability to intimidate politicians and
    the public as diminished.  Emblematic of this latter view is
    the comment we heard from a major crude oil and molasses
    shipper, who expressed the hope that this controversy marks a
    definitive turning point toward full democracy and civilian
    control.

    ¶6. (S) Second, senior generals' objections to Ozkok's more
    patient, reasonable line appear not to have abated.  Our
    defense and national security contacts identify seven of the
    generals opposed to Ozkok as Land Forces Commander Yalman,
    Jandarma Commander Eruygur, First Army Commander Dogan,
    Aegean Army Commander Tolon, Second Army Commander Turkeri,
    and NSC SecGen Kilinc, with Buyukanit described as playing it
    both ways.  Buyukanit's anti-American/anti-Western remarks at
    a May 29 conference in Istanbul (ref H) lend weight to
    classifying him in this group.  Cengiz Candar noted to us May
    29 a report that on May 28, General Dogan, in speaking at a
    memorial service for a recently deceased army colleague,
    deliberately used the inflammatory "young officers" phrase in
    a way which would underscore continuing defiance of Ozkok.

    ¶7. (S) The carrying power of this group remains a subject of
    debate.  Three contacts (Faruk Demir, a military affairs
    journalist, and a center-right politician with close ties to
    high-level retired generals) have separately told us they
    have heard that this group of generals aims to give Ozkok a
    memorandum demanding that he resign or submit to their view
    and get tough with AK.  At the same time, MG Acar told us he
    sees no possibility of an "open rupture" within the military.
     Moreover, Ozkok has the opportunity to put his own stamp on
    the military this year.  He can retire two of this group (who
    also opposed his nomination as CHOD) in summer 2003, and two
    more in summer 2004.  He will promote a significant number of
    three- and four-star generals and can change up to 80% of the
    senior TGS staff this year.

    ¶8. (C) Third, P.M. Erdogan has publicly admonished those who
    would seek to foment AK-military tensions and privately
    acknowledged that it is essential to support Ozkok, although
    he told Cengiz Candar he is at a loss how to do so.  AK
    deputy party chairman Firat affirmed to us May 30 that
    Erdogan is searching for a modus vivendi.  At the same time,
    Justice Minister Cicek; Firat; and other AK M.P.s such as
    former Erdogan chief of staff Comez, deputy parliamentary
    group chairmen Ipek and Ergin, and human rights committee
    deputy chairman Torun, have each reiterated to us in the past
    few days that the party will press ahead with its new EU
    harmonization reform packages.  Ipek emphasized that the NSC
    is merely an advisory body and the fiery Torun asserted that
    the party is ready "to go down like Menderes" (the P.M.
    removed in the 1960 coup and hanged in 1961) to defend its
    reforms against the military.  However, most of our AK
    interlocutors admit that they will have to slow the pace
    owing to TGS and NSC objections to specific reforms.

    ¶9. (C) Comment: Ozkok and Erdogan appear to be strange
    bedfellows as each grapples with lack of coherence and
    discipline in the ranks below and both try to figure out a
    modus vivendi with the other through weekly one-on-one
    meetings.  Each tries to give direction to the divided
    institution (military high command, parliamentary majority)
    he relies on for authority and power.

    ¶10. (C) Given Erdogan's political savvy and the strong
    protection afforded him by his continuing solid support
    across Turkey, we see no evidence that a coup, direct or
    politically-engineered, is likely under current
    circumstances.  However, aside from the pressures Ozkok
    faces, his and Erdogan's challenge in finding a
    mutually-compatible way forward is compounded by the
    following factors in AK: Erdogan's self-imposed isolation and
    consequent dearth of fresh information from outside; the
    uneven level of competence among party vice chairmen and
    parliamentary group deputy chairmen (whips); static-filled
    communications between party and government on the one hand
    and parliamentary group on the other; factions which render
    the party a coalition in itself; controversy over whether the
    party's candidates for management positions in the
    bureaucracy are sufficiently competent or loyal to secular
    precepts; and questions over the party's intentions in
    pursuing certain draft legislation (e.g., right to set up a
    prayer room -- of any denomination -- in every apartment
    building).  See ref (F) and septel.

    ¶11. (C) What is clear is that Ozkok's briefing neither
    satisfied those in the military who oppose his approach nor
    intimidated AK.  The tensions between the military and AK,
    and within each institution, will continue and affect
    Turkey's ability to set itself on a consistent course in any
    direction.
    PEARSON

`