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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING2932, PRC/IRAN: PREMIER WEN PUSHES RAHIMI ON DIALOGUE;

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING2932 | 2009-10-22 12:12 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO7040
    OO RUEHBC RUEHCN RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHGH RUEHKUK RUEHTRO RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #2932/01 2951203
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 221203Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6544
    INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002932

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2034
    TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH
    SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: PREMIER WEN PUSHES RAHIMI ON DIALOGUE;
    CHINA URGES COOPERATION WITH IAEA, P5-PLUS-1

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
    Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  On the margins of Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization high-level meetings October 15, PRC Premier Wen
    Jiabao urged Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza
    Rahimi to move forward with direct talks with the United
    States and offered PRC support to do so, according to an MFA
    official.  Wen reportedly reiterated that Iran had the right
    to peaceful nuclear technology, but stressed China's
    opposition to Iranian development of nuclear weapons.  Our
    MFA contact claimed that China recognizes the importance of
    seizing the present opportunity and that the Iranian side did
    as well.  The PRC assesses that Iran's willingness to
    negotiate over the nuclear issue comes from Supreme Leader
    Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, not President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,
    but the Iranian regime remains divided over the June election
    and its aftermath.  Our contact urged the U.S. to downplay
    sanctions and seek positive, even if symbolic, benefits to
    provide Iran in response to progress in the talks.  China has
    been pushing Iran to improve its cooperation with the IAEA
    and assesses that Iran will make good on its offer to allow
    inspectors into the Qom nuclear site.  Beijing believes that
    Iran's nuclear technology is not as advanced "as some
    believe."  Iranian Embassy officials in Beijing expressed
    satisfaction to the Chinese with the outcomes of the October
    1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran meeting and were particularly positive
    on the bilateral meeting with the U.S. side, according to the
    MFA.  Our contact argued that a constituency within Iranian
    society that advocates flexibility on the nuclear issue is a
    force in politics, but that the government will need any
    negotiations to accrue benefits to Iran given the strength of
    the conservative camp.  END SUMMARY.

    Wen Pushes Iranian Vice President on Nuclear Issue
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶2. (C) MFA West Asian Affairs Department Iran Division Deputy
    Director Ni Ruchi told PolOff October 21 that Premier Wen
    Jiabao's October 15 meeting with Iranian First Vice President
    Mohammad Reza Rahimi had been brief due to the press of other
    issues at the SCO Summit.  Ni said that the Chinese side had
    raised the nuclear issue and urged Iran to cooperate with the
    international community.  Wen had pushed the Iranians to move
    forward with direct talks with the United States and offered
    Chinese support to do so.  Wen had stressed that while Iran
    had a right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, China
    opposed Iran's development of nuclear weapons.  Ni claimed
    that Rahimi had responded positively on prospects for talks
    with the United States and said that the Iranians were
    considering how best to do move forward with dialogue.

    Beijing Wants to Seize the Moment, as Does Tehran
    --------------------------------------------- ----

    ¶3. (C) Ni emphasized the importance for China of the October
    1 bilateral talks between the U.S. and Iran in Geneva.  He
    noted that China had a very positive outlook for improved
    U.S. relations with Iran, a development that would be helpful
    for progress on the nuclear issue.  China recognized the
    importance of seizing the present opportunity, Ni said, given
    the poor long-term prospects for Iran to improve relations
    with the international community should progress fail to
    materialize in the near future.  He said that the Iranian
    side also understood the uniqueness of this opportunity and
    the importance of demonstrating progress.  He said that
    Beijing assessed that Iran was willing to make a deal with
    the U.S. on the nuclear issue, adding that this willingness
    came from the Supreme Leader, and that President Ahmadinejad
    was not the decision-maker on the issue.  Ni cautioned,
    however, that the Iranian regime remained divided over the
    June election and its aftermath, complicating efforts by the
    P5-plus-1 to negotiate with the regime.

    Trust-Building a Priority for PRC
    ---------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Ni stressed the need at present to find ways to
    increase Iran's trust in the intentions of the P5-plus-1.  He
    urged the United States to de-emphasize the push for
    additional sanctions and to seek positive, even if symbolic,
    benefits to give Iran in response to progress in the talks.
    He expressed concern that increased pressure from the
    international community would strengthen the consensus of
    hard-liners in the Iranian regime.  Ni reported that Iranian
    diplomats had claimed that while they had a high degree of
    confidence in President Obama's intentions, they remained
    suspicious about his ability to deliver on those intentions
    given political realities in the United States.  He argued
    that China's political efforts to persuade Iran to negotiate

    BEIJING 00002932  002 OF 002

    in good faith represented an important contribution to the
    P5-plus-1 effort to deal with the nuclear issue.

    PRC Urges IAEA Cooperation, Downplays Technical Progress
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶5. (C) Ni said that China had been pushing Iran to improve
    its cooperation with the IAEA and take a positive attitude in
    order to allow the agency to develop trust in Iran's
    intentions.  Beijing understood that technical meetings at
    the IAEA this week had achieved progress, Ni said, adding
    that China hoped to see progress on the Tehran Research
    Reactor fuel proposal.  China assessed that Iran would allow
    inspectors into the Qom site, Ni said.  He stressed, too,
    that Iran's nuclear technology was not as advanced "as some
    believe," and that Iran's overall level of industrial
    development represented a serious impediment to development
    of nuclear technology and particularly to weaponization.  He
    noted that of the 5,000 centrifuges in Iran, less than half
    were actually in operation.

    Iranian Side Upbeat on October 1 Meeting
    ----------------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Ni said Iranian embassy contacts in Beijing had
    expressed satisfaction with the outcomes of the October
    meeting in Geneva, calling the event a "success." Though
    concerned that sitting down with the U.S. would be "a
    mistake," the Iranians had left the U.S.-Iran bilateral
    meeting wanting to continue the process.  Ni suggested that
    some within the Iranian regime understood the need for a
    change in political direction, particularly after the
    difficult June election.  He also reported that the Iranians
    were putting renewed focus on creating an effective plan for
    economic development.

    MFA: U.S. Should Incentivize, Reward Iranian Progress
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶7. (C) On direct U.S.-Iran talks, Ni urged the U.S. side to
    make a clear statement abandoning the notion of regime
    change.  He suggested seeking a "cooperative partnership"
    with Iran on shared concerns such as security in Iraq and
    Afghanistan, and in doing so, recognizing Iran as a major
    regional power.  He recommended offering concrete and
    immediate benefits, especially economic incentives and a
    relaxation of existing sanctions, in response to positive
    overtures by the Iranian side.  These efforts could start
    small, he added, but should be focused on sending a clear
    signal of sincere intentions to Tehran.

    Iranian Leadership Feels Street Pressure on Negotiations
    --------------------------------------------- -----------

    ¶8. (C) Ni reported that based on his travel to Iran,
    considerable debate was taking place among ordinary Iranians
    over the utility of the nuclear program.  Many Iranians did
    not see the use in having nuclear technology and saw it only
    as a source of problems, while others saw value in the
    possession of nuclear technology but were reconsidering this
    view because of progress in talks with the United States.  In
    contrast, a more conservative constituency in Iran was
    disinclined to make any concessions to the international
    community on the nuclear issue.  In light of this division in
    society, Ni argued, the Iranian leadership would not make
    concessions without meaningful and visible compensation.
    HUNTSMAN

`