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### Viewing cable 07PARIS1844, ENGAGING THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07PARIS1844 | 2007-05-10 09:09 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Paris

`

    VZCZCXRO0961
    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
    DE RUEHFR #1844/01 1300917
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 100917Z MAY 07
    FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7044
    INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001844

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT ALSO FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017
    TAGS: PREL FR EUN IR AF NATO IZ TU UNO LE YI RS
    UNMIK
    SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN
    POLICY: FIVE IMMEDIATE ISSUES

    REF: A. PARIS 1789
    ¶B. PARIS 921
    ¶C. PARIS 777
    ¶D. PARIS 1817
    ¶E. EMBASSY PARIS DAILY SIPRNET REPORTS

    Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign policy played only a negligible
    role in the presidential election campaign that concluded May
    6, and Sarkozy has relatively little experience in foreign
    affairs, despite his tenures as Interior and Finance
    Minister. Nonetheless, Sarkozy's personality is such that he
    will want to take the stage at the June 6-8 G8 and June 21-22
    European summits as a full partner. Instinctively
    pro-American and pro-Israeli, Sarkozy is fiercely opposed to
    Turkish EU membership. He has promised that his approach to
    foreign affairs will be different from Chirac's in its
    emphasis on human rights, and has identified Europe, Africa
    and the U.S. as his three immediate priorities. That said,
    generally speaking, continuity will prevail, reflecting the
    non-partisan, consensus support that French foreign policy
    has enjoyed during the Fifth Republic. On Europe, his goal
    is, by overcoming the current institutional crisis, to
    re-impart momentum to European integration and make the EU a
    major player on the world stage. On Africa, Sarkozy
    advocates increased developmental aid as the offset for
    regulating immigration (important for his domestic agenda)
    and has repeatedly called for action on Darfur. He has
    called for a "Mediterranean Union," to include Turkey and
    Israel, as Europe's institutional link to the Middle East and
    North Africa. With the U.S., he seeks a relationship based
    on renewed confidence and trust that still allows for honest
    differences of perspective; most recently, he has pointed to
    global climate change (septel) as his major area of policy
    difference with the U.S.

    ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: The Deputy Secretary's May 16
    meetings in Paris will occur the same day President-elect
    Sarkozy assumes office (Sarkozy himself will therefore be
    unavailable). Beyond welcoming the prospect of improved
    U.S.-French relations, the Deputy Secretary can use his visit
    to send a message on five key U.S. foreign policy concerns.
    We can welcome Sarkozy's willingness to take a tough line on
    Iran, but also will need to impress on him the stakes in
    Afghanistan and the importance of France remaining a key
    partner there. On Iraq, we can expect Sarkozy to drop the
    needling rhetoric on a horizon for U.S. withdrawal, but
    having told the President he "wants to help the U.S. get out
    of Iraq," we should press him to offer a specific, symbolic
    proposal -- such as active French engagement with friendly
    Arab governments -- to associate France with our efforts
    there. In assuring Sarkozy of strong U.S. support for a
    strong Europe, we need to stress the importance we attach to
    keeping Turkey's EU accession negotiations going. Finally,
    we should stress the importance of a united front against
    Russia as Kosovo goes before the UNSC. END SUMMARY.

    A NOVICE IN FOREIGN POLICY
    --------------------------
    ¶3. (C) A presidential election campaign dominated by the
    domestic change and reform thematic left very little room for
    foreign policy. Sarkozy has little foreign policy experience
    and speaks only very limited English. Given his strong
    character and action-oriented agenda, and his desire to put
    France back on center stage, we can nonetheless expect
    Sarkozy to move quickly to assert himself as an equal partner
    at the upcoming June 6-8 G8 Summit in Germany and the June
    21-22 European Council meeting in Brussels. (See ref A for a
    discussion of Sarkozy's views on economic and trade issues.)

    U.S.-FRIENDLIER, BUT STILL A GAULLIST
    -------------------------------------
    ¶4. (C) Most voters went to the polls May 6 convinced that
    President-elect Sarkozy would seek a better relationship with
    the U.S., which he explicitly affirmed in his May 6
    acceptance speech. Sarkozy's opponents had attempted to use
    his September 12, 2006 meeting with President Bush to suggest
    that Sarkozy was a U.S. "poodle" who would have supported the
    U.S. intervention in Iraq, unlike President Chirac. In a
    recent press conference on foreign policy (ref B), Sarkozy
    made clear he had supported Chirac's decision. Then and in
    his post-election remarks, he nonetheless highlighted the
    need for a friendlier tone and more confidence in the
    U.S.-French bilateral relationship (and in NATO-EU
    relations), in a way that also preserves Gaullist (and EU)
    freedom of action. In effect, Sarkozy has already shifted

    PARIS 00001844 002 OF 004

    the focus of U.S.-French "differences" from Iraq and the
    Israeli-Palestinian relationship to climate change and
    Turkish membership in the EU (see also refs B, C and D).

    EU TOP IMMEDIATE PRIORITY
    -------------------------
    ¶5. (C) Sarkozy's first foreign policy priority will be to
    impart new momentum to the EU and show that France is back as
    a key EU player. Sarkozy no doubt knows already that his
    idea of a simplified treaty is acceptable to London and
    Berlin as the best means to avoid new referenda, and he will
    move quickly to ensure that a process can begin by the end of
    the German EU Presidency that would conclude at the latest by
    the end of the French Presidency in December 2008, in advance
    of European parliamentary elections in early 2009. Immediate
    progress on this front would go a long way to overcome the
    sense of malaise and indirection stemming from President
    Chirac's failure to push through the referendum on the
    Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. Sarkozy wants a European
    Union that is a veritable player on the world stage, with
    coherent policies to guarantee its energy supplies and create
    buffers against globalization while harnessing its creative
    energies.

    AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND DARFUR
    ------------------------------
    ¶6. (c) Sarkozy lacks the web of personal relationships with
    African (and Middle Eastern) leaders that, in particular,
    Chirac used to direct French foreign policy. Sarkozy intends
    to make a virtue of his less personalized approach, reviewing
    France's exposure based on a hard-headed re-evaluation of
    French national interests. Sarkozy has identified Africa as
    one of his three foreign policy priority areas (along with
    the EU and U.S.), in line with his domestic campaign focus on
    uncontrolled immigration to France. His interest in
    development assistance for Africa appears aimed primarily at
    offsetting Africans' concern over Sarkozy's domestic
    political goal of reducing immigration from Africa -- and as
    part of a more comprehensive international effort to address
    conditions in Africa that give rise to mass emigration from
    the continent. A review of French national interests may
    augur a lessening of French military engagement across Africa
    or an increased desire to see the EU take over some of its
    missions. Sarkozy has called repeatedly for action on
    Darfur, including prosecution of Sudanese leaders by the
    International Criminal Court, but it is unclear at this stage
    what concrete steps he might otherwise propose.

    MEDITERRANEAN UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST
    ---------------------------------------
    ¶7. (C) We can expect Sarkozy to push hard his signature
    "vision" issue, the idea of a "Mediterranean Union," to
    include Turkey and Israel, which would supersede the EU
    Barcelona process and create an area modeled after, and
    having a privileged partnership with, the European Union.
    Sarkozy has bluntly declared that pursuing Middle East peace
    is not incompatible with ensuring Israel's security, while
    assuring nervous Arab leaders -- most recently Egyptian
    President Mubarak -- that his policies toward the Middle East
    would be largely in synch with Chirac's. On the whole, it
    seems likely that continuity will prevail, although the
    traditionally pro-Arab MFA may have to accommodate Sarkozy's
    greater emphasis on Israel's security needs. It remains to
    be seen to what extent Sarkozy will attempt to leverage his
    pro-Israel orientation for more leverage for France and/or
    the EU in the Middle East peace process.

    MORE HUMAN RIGHTS
    -----------------
    ¶8. (C) Sarkozy has indicated very publicly -- enough so that
    it is reasonable to assume that he will follow through --
    that he intends to place more emphasis on human rights
    issues. He has made clear that he would be less likely than
    Chirac to accommodate even Russia or China in the name of
    realpolitik, citing the situation in Chechnya and his
    opposition to lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. A
    consistent emphasis on human rights could have a significant
    impact on French policy in Africa and the Middle East.

    IMMEDIATE MESSAGES: IRAN, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN,
    EU/TURKEY, KOSOVO/RUSSIA
    --------------------------------------------
    ¶9. (C) We believe that, beginning with the May 15-16 visit
    to France of the Deputy Secretary, the USG should reach out
    quickly to engage the new French government. Beyond
    welcoming prospects for an improved U.S.-French relationship,
    we need to send messages on the following five key issues:

    PARIS 00001844 003 OF 004

    Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, EU/Turkey, and Kosovo/Russia. If
    time permits, the Deputy Secretary may also wish to review
    the state of play on Darfur.

    -- IRAN: Sarkozy views Iran as the most serious
    international threat, and he will be at least as tough-minded
    a partner as Chirac has been. He has expressed a willingness
    to tighten financial sanctions against Iran. While he
    prefers acting under the authority of the UNSC, we believe he
    could support resorting to measures outside the UN framework
    if necessary. The late-May consideration of next steps in
    the UNSC offers a first opportunity to work with the new
    government, and to test and shape its approach.

    -- AFGHANISTAN: MFA Political Director Araud has underscored
    the need for the USG to engage the new government to dispel
    the widespread impression, shared by Chirac, that Afghanistan
    may be a losing cause. Under the impact of the Taliban
    kidnapping of French citizens, Sarkozy recently stated that
    France's role in Afghanistan -- now that the anti-terrorism
    campaign has largely ended and French Special Forces
    withdrawn from OEF -- was no longer "decisive" and that
    French forces would not remain there permanently. The
    Taliban threat against the life of the one remaining French
    hostage is still directly tied to a demand for France's
    military withdrawal form Afghanistan. We will need to
    impress on Sarkozy the importance of French perseverance over
    the mid-term (including through more purposeful public
    statements about the stakes there) and, as the French have
    stressed to us on Bosnia or Kosovo, the importance of "in
    together and out together," which also applies to national
    caveats on the use of forces.

    -- IRAQ: Chirac's departure from the scene should enable
    France to put U.S.-French differences not only aside, but
    behind us. Sarkozy, like most other French politicians, has
    said he would have handled our differences in a less
    confrontational matter. This does not change the fact that
    he (now, in any case) believes Chirac made the right decision
    in opposing the war. Moreover, concern about feeding the
    "President Bush's poodle" accusation might militate against
    any dramatic public change in GOF policy, at least in the
    immediate future, with French parliamentary elections
    looming. That said, we should take him at his word that he
    "wants to help the U.S. get out of Iraq." Our goal in the
    near term should be to push the French toward a more positive
    declaratory policy, working with the new government to
    identify a symbolic turning of the page on France's "let the
    U.S. live with it" attitude of the Chirac/Villepin years.
    One possibility would be active French engagement on Iraq
    with Arab governments of the region.

    -- EU/TURKEY: Publicly and privately, we should encourage
    France to reassume its rightful place in Europe, as part of
    our broader message that a re-invigorated Europe is in the
    U.S. interest. If we decide to participate in an ESDP police
    mission in Kosovo, we should use this as an example -- one
    for them to follow -- of choosing the institutional framework
    for joint action to match the needs of the situation. Luc
    Ferry, a former Education Minister, political commentator and
    close friend of Sarkozy's, has urged that we attempt to
    change Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey's EU membership. While
    a change of heart appears extremely unlikely given Sarkozy's
    political identification with opposition to Turkish
    membership and his categorical statements on the issue, we
    should seek to persuade him to temper his post-election
    rhetoric, allow accession negotiations to proceed, and at
    least not close the door dramatically and completely at this
    time.

    -- KOSOVO/RUSSIA: We should stress the importance of a
    united front in the UN Security Council on Kosovo's
    independence. We would welcome a more active French role in
    persuading Russia not to veto a UNSC Resolution.

    ENGAGING THE SARKOZY ADMINISTRATION
    -----------------------------------
    ¶10. (C) We will know more about the likely foreign policy
    orientations of the new Sarkozy government once he names a
    foreign minister and key advisors are in place. We would
    expect him to designate someone of proven competence (such as
    former FM Alain Juppe, Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie,
    or former FM Michel Barnier). There is no reason to believe
    that Sarkozy will come into office with the intent of
    seriously challenging the Gaullist consensus underlying
    French foreign policy. The MFA will work overtime to ensure
    continuity in French policy positions. Over time, and as he

    PARIS 00001844 004 OF 004

    gains experience, Sarkozy is certain to assert his authority
    over foreign policy more directly. It still remains to be
    seen whether Sarkozy will create -- as proposed by Pierre
    Lellouche -- the French equivalent of a National Security
    Council that would supplant the Presidential diplomatic cell
    and assume a larger role in coordinating French foreign
    policy; we have no indication Sarkozy has personally signed
    on to such a move. It is also unclear whether the
    Presidency's Africa Cell, which has long enjoyed a privileged
    position, will survive in its present form. Sarkozy's desire
    to move away from Elysee-centered personal diplomacy with
    African leaders may mean the days of this bureaucratic
    post-colonial throwback may be numbered.

    ¶11. (C) Although Sarkozy will initially be focused on
    domestic reforms and relaunching the EU, he will also grasp
    every opportunity to showcase his leadership of a
    re-invigorated France on the international scene, confident
    of its place in the world. This entails -- and he will not
    be shy about repeating this point publicly -- establishing a
    relationship of trust and working together productively with
    the United States. The Deputy Secretary's May 15-16 visit
    will offer the first occasion to make our views known to the
    new Administration, as it comes into office (unfortunately,
    this also means that Sarkozy himself will be unavailable for
    meetings). The Defense Secretary's June 5-6 visit to France
    will offer an excellent opportunity to engage the leaders of
    the newly-constituted government.

    Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
    http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

    STAPLETON

`