Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6296 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 96 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1996/11
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AMGT AORC AE AR ASIG ABLD AFFAIRS AG APECO AO AL AJ AM AU AEMR APER AS AID AFIN ACOA AX AA AMED AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AC AZ AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BEXP BTIO BF BY BM BU BO BL BE BH BG BIDEN BK BX BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CVIS CMGT CS CBW CO CI CH COUNTERTERRORISM CA CASC CG COUNTER CY CE CDG CACM CDB CD CV CJAN CIA CLINTON CAN CN COE CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DA DEAX DJ DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ECUN EAIR EC EXTERNAL ECIN EMIN EPET EWWT ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS EIND ER ENVR EZ EN EINDETRD EI EINT EREL EUR ET EK EFINECONCS ENIV ECIP ENNP EUC ENVI ECINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS ECA ENERG ENGY ETRO ELN EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FARC FMLN FREEDOM FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GZ GT GTMO GV GTIP GA GH GANGS GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY
HO HURI HA HU HR HILLARY HUMAN HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IN IZ IS IT INTERPOL IMO IC ISRAELI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IAEA IO IV ICTY IPR ICRC IACI ID INRB ITRA IQ ICAO ITPHUM IWC IIP IL IA INR ITPGOV IZPREL ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JA JM JAMES JUS JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KCRM KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KRFD KPAL KISL KPAO KSUM KSEP KCOR KIRF KIPR KVPR KU KWMN KTIA KE KR KSCA KAWK KV KPRP KPKO KGHG KBIO KHLS KMDR KN KPWR KCIP KWAC KMIG KAWC KG KOLY KGIC KOMC KS KNPP KFLU KWMM KSTH KZ KDRG KFIN KPIN KHIV KERG KNEI KIFR KTIP KFRD KPLS KCRS KFLO KSAF KUNR KIRC KSEC KBCT KTLA KTDB KGCC KX KDEMAF KICC KCFE KO KFSC KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KACT KRAD KGIT KSTC KBTS KPRV KBTR KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNSD KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS
LE LY LG LH LAB LU LI LOG LO LT LTTE
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MTCRE MNUC MY MO MR MAR MPOS MEPP MA ML MD MZ MOPPS MAPP MU MRCRE MV MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NATO NL NATIONAL NI NU NP NSF NG NO NIPP NPT NS NGO NA NSG NZ NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT
OTRA OVIP OPDC OREP OPRC OSCI OEXC OAS OVP ODIP OFDP OTR OIIP OPIC OSAC OSCE OECD OPCW OIC OFFICIALS OIE
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PINS PEPR PINT PBTS PHSA PSOE POLITICAL PARTIES PSI PALESTINIAN PREF PM PA PE PROP POLITICS PO PBIO PECON PL PU PAK POGOV PRGOV PKFK POV PINL PLN PG PMIL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PMAR PGOVLO PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL
QA
RS RW RU RO RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SENV SY SU SMIG STEINBERG SN SR SZ SO SF SG SW SL SYR SIPRS SH SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TU TBIO TSPA TW TRGY TS TX TERRORISM TPHY TI TIP TC TP TH TSPL TZ TO TK TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UNGA UK UN UY UNESCO UP UG UNMIK US UNO UNSC USTR UV UNAUS UNHRC UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WI WHO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XR XW XM XF XY XK XA XG XL XS XT XH XZ XC XE XD
YM YI YE YMCS
ZF ZU ZR ZI ZB ZP ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 08RIGA496, TFGG01: WHAT GEORGIA MEANS TO LATVIA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08RIGA496.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08RIGA496 | 2008-08-15 10:10 | 2011-02-18 00:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Riga
Appears in these articles: http://rusrep.ru/article/2010/11/29/wikileaks_docs_02/

`

    VZCZCXRO1552
    OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
    DE RUEHRA #0496/01 2281013
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 151013Z AUG 08
    FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5169
    INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000496

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2023
    TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM NATO EUN RS GG LG
    SUBJECT: TFGG01: WHAT GEORGIA MEANS TO LATVIA

    REF: A) RIGA 478 B) RIGA 472 C) RIGA 492

    Classified By: A/DCM Tamir G. Waser.  Reason: 1.4 (d)

    ¶1. (C)  Summary: Events in Georgia have dominated the news
    and discussion here like few other events in recent memory.
    Latvians, at least ethic Latvians, look at Georgia and think
    that this could easily be them.  As the EU and NATO have been
    unable to respond forcefully to Russia -- and many members
    advocate for a balanced approach -- Latvians are beginning to
    worry if membership in these two organizations provides them
    the assurances of their security that they had hoped for when
    they joined.  So far, the US willingness to take a tough line
    in opposition to Russian actions and in support of Georgia
    has been well received here, but some key figures are asking
    if the west is fully prepared to deal with a resurgent
    Russia.  We expect that the Latvians will make additional
    requests for tangible signs of our commitment to their
    security in coming weeks and months.  A wild card in Latvian
    thinking is how the personal economic ties many key players
    have with Russia will influence their thinking - and whether
    they continue to believe that they can separate politics and
    business with Russia.

    ¶2. (C) Summary, cont'd.  Also influencing events is the fact
    that roughly one third of the country is ethnic Russian, who
    receive much of their information from Moscow based or
    affiliated news sources.  Their perceptions of the crisis in
    Georgia and our role are diametrically opposed to those above
    and are a reminder of the serious ethnic divide in Latvia.
    Unfortunately, while these events have highlighted the need
    for greater integration in Latvia, the resulting political
    tensions have made integration that much more difficult to
    achieve.  End summary.

    ¶3. (C) Georgia dominates here at the moment.  Most any
    conversation includes some discussion of the situation,
    newscasts and newspapers are covering little else, and
    internet discussions are lively and have wide participation.
    Among Latvians, at least ethnic Latvians, what you hear is a
    sense that this could have been us.  Recalling their own
    history with Russia, Latvians have been visibly demonstrating
    their support for and solidarity with Georgia.  An August 11
    march, advertised only through mentions on newscasts and
    online posts, drew over 1,000 people in support of Georgia.
    Candle lightings outside the Georgian Embassy are well
    attended and Georgian flags can be seen around Riga.
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that sales of Georgian wine and
    mineral water have increased.

    ¶4. (C) In discussing events in Georgia, most Latvians we talk
    to say that they feel the value of NATO and EU membership and
    believe that the possibility that the same thing could happen
    to them is greatly reduced.  At the same time, the divisions
    in both organizations over how to deal with Russia worry
    Latvians.  Comments by Russian Ambassador to Latvia
    Veshnyakov that the Baltics and Poland should not "rush to
    judgment" lest they encounter "unforeseen consequences" did
    not put any nerves at ease.  We reported on MFA views on a
    full re-evaluation of relations with Russia and frustration
    with NATO and EU positions (Ref A), but it is also worth
    noting some of the public comments of key opinion leaders
    here.  Former President Vike-Freiberga said she was
    "surprised and disappointed" that an emergency GAERC was not
    convened until August 13 and that the EU "failed to come out
    with a common, coordinated and condemning stance," in
    contrast to the joint statement by the Baltic and Polish
    Presidents.  Aivars Ozolins, perhaps the country's most
    influential columnist, wrote that the crisis has exposed
    "serious divisions" in the west on relations with Russia and
    argued that Latvia must demand clear plans from NATO to
    defend its territory.  He concluded one recent column with
    the line, "We are in a new cold war and Latvia is on the
    front line."

    ¶5. (C) The question of what Latvia does in response is also
    vexing to key figures.  PM Godmanis was widely praised for
    his visit to Georgia with Baltic, Polish and Ukrainian
    leaders, and for delivering a strong message of support (and
    President Zatlers has been criticized for not cutting short
    his visit to the Olympics in China).  The parliament adopted
    a tough resolution critical of Russia and calling on the EU
    and NATO to reconsider their approach to Moscow.  Latvia has
    reaffirmed its strong support for MAP for both Georgia and
    Ukraine.  But Latvians are frustrated that they cannot do
    more to influence the situation directly.  They want to be an
    active voice in debates at both headquarters in Brussels, but
    feel lost between the big powers.  They see their best hopes
    as getting the Nordics on board with the Baltics, Poland and
    Czech Republic and are heartened by what they view as
    realistic comments on a "changed situation with Russia"
    coming out of Stockholm and Helsinki in particular.  Former

    RIGA 00000496  002 OF 003

    FM Pabriks told the Ambassador that "Now it is important that
    Latvia works to convince the EU that there is no business as
    usual with Russia."

    ¶6. (S/NF) In this, though, Latvia will face its own internal
    challenges.  Many people in Latvia, including key political
    figures, have very lucrative business relationships with
    Russia that they fear losing.  It was telling that FM
    Riekstins, asked about the future of bilateral relations,
    remarked that "business is business." (ref B)  Leaders of the
    People's Party, to which Riekstins belongs, have many
    business deals with Russia, notably in the energy sector.
    Transport minister Ainars Slesers, who has made a fortune off
    real estate and transit deals that rely heavily on Russia,
    stated at the parliamentary debate on Georgia that "although
    Russia clearly crossed a line a in its response, we need to
    at least consider whether Saakashvili does not bear some
    blame for provoking this crisis."  From sensitive sources, we
    understand that immediately after the crisis broke out, the
    Russian Ambassador to Latvia called Slesers and former PM
    (and People's Party founder) Andris Skele to explain Russia's
    position.  We think it is no accident that he called two of
    Latvia's three oligarchs (and while he didn't call Aivars
    Lembergs directly, he also called the parliamentary leader of
    the party closest to Lembergs) to try to play the business
    card to build political support for Russia.  As the days move
    on, key figures in Latvia will likely find that they face
    much tougher choices on relations with Russia than just
    whether to cease NATO military cooperation with Russia or end
    EU negotiations on visa facilitation.  The one exception to
    this may be PM Godmanis.  As reported in other channels, he
    immediately recognized the possibility for Russian
    retaliation through the energy sector and ordered contingency
    plans drawn up.  Unfortunately, we expect that the first
    instincts of many of the other political players will be to
    do everything they can to preserve their personal business
    deals, clinging to their naive idea that business and
    politics with Russia can be separated.

    ¶7. (C) One area where we do expect to see concrete actions by
    the Latvians is to increase their military preparedness.  PM
    Godmanis was clear with the Ambassador that this needed to be
    done, even knowing the costs involved.  (ref C)  The Defense
    Minister has stated publicly that Latvia needs to review its
    own defense posture and privately told us that he will look
    for US assistance in this project.  We can expect further
    political calls for a comprehensive NATO plan to defend the
    Baltics.  Former FM Pabriks suggested to us that Latvia needs
    to look at increasing the size of its military forces, noting
    that Georgia, less than twice as large as Latvia, had 2,000
    troops in Iraq when Latvia had a hard time finding even 100
    to deploy.

    ¶8. (C) The aspect of the Georgia crisis that has ethnic
    Latvian especially nervous is the Russian claim that they
    went in to Georgia to protect Russian citizens.  Latvia's
    population is nearly one-third ethic Russian and half of
    those, more than 420,000 people, are not citizens of Latvia.
    While only a small number (estimated at roughly 20,000) have
    Russian citizenship, Russia has been taking steps to increase
    ties with these "compatriots" through steps such as waiving
    visa requirements to enter Russia and providing access to
    educational and social benefits in Russia.  This population
    gets its information from a completely separate media space
    that relies heavily on Moscow sources for its foreign news.
    As a result, Russian language media here is talking of
    Georgian 'genocide' in South Ossetia, suggesting that the US
    endorsed Saakashvili's move on Tsinkvali in advance, and
    drawing parallels to Kosovo.  (septel will report on this in
    greater detail)

    ¶9. (C) Some Latvians recognize that the lesson of Georgia is
    that Latvia needs to do more to integrate its ethnic Russian
    population and have them view themselves as Latvian (or at
    least European Union) citizens first and Russians second.
    Political scientist Peteris Vinkelis, himself married to a
    Russian, ended a television interview on events in Georgia
    with a plea for the two communities to work together and find
    common ground so as not to become like Georgia.  Other senior
    officials have told us that they would also like to see
    progress on this front.

    ¶10. (C) All of those good ideas, though, go out the window
    the minute politics is injected and there are few issues as
    politically divisive here as integration of the Russian
    speaking population.  With a crowded political field among
    the ethnic Latvian based parties, none of them are willing to
    risk the firestorm that would ensue from advocating any
    change to the citizenship process.  In fact, more likely is
    that they will take steps to, for example, increase the
    number of jobs for which certification of Latvian language
    skills are required.  Logical steps on integration, such as

    RIGA 00000496  003 OF 003

    allowing everyone born in Latvia automatic citizenship, are
    rejected because they are what Moscow has been pushing for
    years and ethnic Latvians are unwilling, as they see it, to
    "reward Russia's aggression in Georgia" by easing the
    requirements for citizenship.  Meanwhile, ethnic Russians are
    unlikely to respond to events by seeking Latvian citizenship
    and some of the more radical elements will hope that Russia
    might decide to make acquisition of Russian citizenship
    easier for this group.

    ¶11. (C) The challenge for the United States policy in Latvia
    given events in Georgia is to consider ways that we can
    bolster our relationship to both assure Latvians of our
    continued commitment to their security and helps them develop
    the tools needed for coping with changed relations with
    Russia, including in their domestic situation.  We will be
    putting our heads together here and sending in some thoughts
    in coming days.
    LARSON

`