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### Viewing cable 09NAIROBI1293, THE REFORM AGENDA - KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON KIBAKI

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09NAIROBI1293 | 2009-06-26 10:10 | 2011-03-14 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Nairobi

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHNR #1293/01 1771047
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 261047Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9999

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 001293

    SIPDIS

    FOR A/S CARSON AND NSC GAVIN FROM THE AMBASSADOR

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KE
    SUBJECT: THE REFORM AGENDA - KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON KIBAKI
    AND ODINGA

    Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger, reasons 1.4 b,d

    -------
    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) The reform agenda will only be implemented if
    President Kibaki and PM Odinga exert strong leadership to
    make this happen.  We must continue to make clear to them the
    importance the U.S. at the highest levels attaches to this
    (which complements domestic-driven pressure for reform).  I
    recently met with interlocutors close to Kibaki and Odinga to
    press our message.  End summary.

    -------------------------------
    Need To Implement Reform Agenda
    -------------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Following up on the May visit by A/S Carson and NSC
    Senior Director Gavin, I recently met with presidency
    Permanent Secretary Francis Muthaura and Minister of Lands
    James Orengo to urge implementation of the reform agenda.
    These meetings were intended to press our messages to
    President Kibaki and Prime Minister, since Muthaura and
    Orengo are, respectively, among their closest confidantes.

    ¶3. (C) My message was essentially the same with both.
    Following up on your visit, I emphasized our continued and
    growing concern about the need to move forward expeditiously
    to implement the reform agenda.  I pointed out that you would
    be returning to Kenya soon, thus highlighting the priority we
    attach to the reform agenda.  I noted concerns in Congress,
    and again emphasized that taking steps now to implement
    reforms would create a more positive context for Kenya at the
    AGOA forum.  I underscored our view that Kibaki and Odinga
    share joint responsibility to exert bold and decisive
    leadership to carry out the reform agenda. I emphasized the
    need for the President and Prime Minister to engage in
    dialogue with the Kenyan people, directly and through their
    teams, regarding the status of the reform agenda. I stressed
    the need for results.

    -------------------------------------------
    Muthaura Admits Slow Pace, Blames Coalition
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Muthaura noted that President Kibaki has recently been
    more outspoken on reforms, including in his Madaraka Day
    address (see septel reporting on Kibaki,s clear statement
    against the culture of impunity).  Although arguing that
    progress is being made, he blamed lack of faster progress on
    differences within the coalition that have obscured the
    reform agenda.  He said that Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga
    are scheduled to meet on June 23 (they did meet; reported
    septel) to review the state of play on reforms and to work
    out next steps.  I urged that the coalition management
    committee be used to promote coalition coordination. The
    committee was established several months ago to promote
    coalition coordination, but has met only once.  (We know that
    Muthaura does not want the committee to meet because he
    cannot control it.)

    ¶5. (C) I pressed particularly on the status of the
    constitutional review process, police reform, and judicial
    reform.  Muthaura noted that the budget just presented to
    Parliament contains substantial funds for the reform process
    (septel reports on the budget).  Muthaura said that Kibaki
    and Odinga are working towards achieving a consensus on key
    elements for constitutional revision.  Devolution of
    authority to local levels has been agreed upon.  Regarding
    division of executive power, Muthaura claimed the two sides
    will agree on &an improved version of what we have now.8

    ¶6. (C) With respect to establishment of a Special Tribunal,
    Muthaura argued that moving too quickly could &even cause
    civil war.8  He claimed that Kibaki and Odinga pushed hard
    when the bill to establish a Special Tribunal was tabled --
    and defeated -- in Parliament. (Note that Kibaki and Odinga
    did meet with Parliamentarians and were, extraordinarily,
    present in Parliament for the vote, but we have heard from
    multiple sources that this was largely window dressing
    without a strong behind the scenes push.)  Muthaura claimed
    that intensive consultations are underway within the
    coalition to work out a way to establish a Special Tribunal.
    If the Parliament cannot be persuaded to pass the
    constitutional amendment bill to establish a Special
    Tribunal, Muthaura said, then the Tribunal may be created
    using the existing constitution and legal structure.  I told
    Muthaura that, a constitutional amendment is essential to
    guarantee the independence of the Tribunal. It would be
    virtually impossible to find a way within existing structures

    to establish a Tribunal that would be credible to the Kenyan
    people and to the international community.

    ¶7. (C) I pressed Muthaura on police and judicial reform.  On
    judicial reform, Muthaura said only that Minister of Justice
    Mutula Kilonzo is focused on judicial sector reform.
    Muthaura claimed that the Task Force on Police Reform will
    yield serious recommendations which will be implemented.  I
    told him that implementation of police reforms will not be
    credible as long as Commissioner Ali remains head of the
    police, given Ali,s involvement in extrajudicial killings,
    corruption, and other abuses.  Police reform should not be
    about individuals but rather institutions, Muthaura
    responded.  After I continued to press regarding Ali,
    Muthaura would only say &we,ll implement the task force
    recommendations, and then see about Ali.8

    -------------------------------------
    Orengo Pessimistic, Blames Leadership
    -------------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) After I reviewed the state of play along lines similar
    to those I employed with Muthaura, Orengo admitted
    frustration about the slow movement on the reform agenda.  He
    said that Prime Minister Odinga must bear substantial
    responsibility for this.  Orengo made clear his view that
    Kibaki and his people do not favor far-reaching reforms, but
    at the same time, he said, Odinga has not been forthright in
    driving implementation of the reform agenda.  Odinga has done
    nothing to reorganize his office to make it more effective;
    Odinga is a poor manager who does not follow up; and he is
    primarily focused on preparing for his presidential run in
    2012, Orengo said.  Odinga has avoided bold moves because he
    is &hostage to his difficult political constituency,8
    Orengo said.  In essence, Orengo concluded, Odinga wants to
    maintain support from the diverse elements of his Orange
    Democratic Movement coalition, and that means he has pulled
    his punches on issues like the Special Tribunal.

    ¶9. (C) Orengo said that, given the lack of leadership by both
    Kibaki and Odinga, he does not believe that the reform
    process will move ahead quickly ) if at all.   Orengo said
    that the new draft national land policy may be discussed in
    the Cabinet on June 25 but, given the sensitive issues
    involved, he was not optimistic it would be implemented
    quickly.

    ¶10. (C) Just as I urged Muthaura to brief Kibaki on our
    conversation (which he agreed to do), I urged Orengo to have
    a heart-to-heart discussion with Odinga.  Orengo said that he
    would do this, and commented that the concerns I expressed
    were valid.  Odinga needs to be shaken out of his
    complacency, Orengo commented.  I told Orengo that it is not
    too late for Odinga to embrace the reform agenda and push
    hard for its implementation.  We want to help him be
    successful as Prime Minister, because if he fails then the
    coalition will fail and the historic opportunity to bring
    about fundamental reform will be lost, with an increased
    likelihood for future instability.

    ¶11. (C) Comment: We must continue to press Kibaki and Odinga
    hard to implement the reform agenda.  They need to know that
    we see them as having shared responsibility, thus
    forestalling their attempts to play the blame game while the
    reform agenda languishes.  Implementation will not happen
    without their decisive leadership.  Both men remain very
    sensitive to U.S. concerns and pressure. End Comment.
    RANNEBERGER

`