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### Viewing cable 09BOGOTA3435, SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD'S DEC 2-6 VISIT TO COLOMBIA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BOGOTA3435 | 2009-11-24 15:03 | 2011-03-23 12:12 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Bogota
Appears in these articles: www.elespectador.com/wikileaks

`

    VZCZCXYZ0005
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #3435/01 3281512
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 241512Z NOV 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1170
    INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0249
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    S E C R E T BOGOTA 003435

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/24
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER ECON ETRD EAID SNAR MOPS CO
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ADMIRAL ROUGHEAD'S DEC 2-6 VISIT TO COLOMBIA

    CLASSIFIED BY: Brian A. Nichols, Deputy Chief of Mission, Department
    of State, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    SUMMARY

    -------

    ¶1. (SBU) Your upcoming visit to Bogota and Cartagena is an
    opportunity to reassure the Colombians of our commitment to their
    fight against illegal drugs and illegal armed groups.  Colombians
    have begun to perceive our decision not to be baited by Venezuela's
    bellicose rhetoric and trade freeze as a failure to stand by an
    ally.  Your visit will be a welcome sign of our senior engagement
    and commitment to the bilateral relationship.  President Uribe's
    final decision whether to push for reelection remains the central
    chord of Colombian politics and will define the tone of
    congressional elections in March and the presidential elections in
    May.  Bilateral relations with Colombia remain solid but will be
    tested by our handling of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement
    (FTA) and the regional sensitivities to the Defense Cooperation
    Agreement (DCA).  Despite improving performance on human rights
    throughout Plan Colombia, there are continuing abuses and potential
    for backsliding, especially in the Colombian Army.  The Colombian
    Navy was rocked in November by the surprising reversal of an all
    but certain conviction against a rear admiral suspected of aiding
    narco-traffickers.  After rousing success against the Revolutionary
    Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2008, progress against the
    guerrilla organization has plateaued; there are few prospects for
    peace in the near term.  Post has begun implementing the Colombia
    Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) -- a follow-on to Plan
    Colombia -- with greater focus on expanding state services in
    Colombia's ungoverned spaces where illegal armed groups and the
    illicit economy flourish.  End Summary.

    COLOMBIA IN TRANSITION

    ----------------------

    ¶2. (SBU) Embassy Bogota welcomes the visit of Admiral Gary
    Roughead, United States Chief of Naval Operations on December 2-6.
    Colombian Naval CommanderAdmiral Guillermo Barrera Hurtado and
    Colombian Armed Forces Commander Freddy Padilla de Leon will also
    warmly welcome your visit to Colombia.  Colombia made a dramatic
    rebound from near-failed state to stable democracy over the last
    ten years.  Murder and kidnapping rates have dropped dramatically,
    while rule of law has strengthened through major judicial reforms.
    While Colombia still experiences serious problems with illegal
    armed groups, the conflict has ceased to be a threat to Colombia's
    national security and sovereignty.

    ¶3. (SBU) Colombia's turnaround can be attributed to improvements in
    overall security, but further progress depends on resolving chronic
    issues such as high social inequality and land tenure.  Colombia
    has made significant inroads in confronting narco-terrorism, but
    drug trafficking organizations and illegal armed groups still
    operate in large parts of the country, including along borders.
    Colombia is finally feeling the effects of the global economic
    crisis, though the impact has been lessened by sound fiscal and
    monetary policies that have attracted foreign investment.  Growth
    rates are nil for 2009 but the GOC predicts 2.5% growth next year.
    Poverty rates have also decreased, though unemployment remains a
    major problem.  About 60% of the economy remains mired in the
    informal sector.

    REELECTIONS AND ELECTIONS

    -------------------------

    ¶4. (C) The Colombian Congress passed a law in September permitting
    a referendum on whether President Alvaro Uribe may stand for a
    third term in the presidential elections on May 30, 2010.  The
    Constitutional Court must now rule on the referendum process and
    its impact on the Constitution, a decision that may not come until
    March 2010.  If the Court rules in Uribe's favor, a referendum must
    be held.  Uribe seldom speaks publicly of the referendum,
    characterizing it as a grassroots initiative of Colombian citizens.
    His popularity remains at 65% to 70% after more than seven years in
    office.  Privately, Uribe is doing everything possible to
    perpetuate his presidential career.  Elections to replace the
    entire Congress (166 Representatives and 102 Senators) will be held
    on March 14.  We expect the elections to run smoothly overall but
    are concerned about certain areas of violence and the influence of
    illicit funds during the campaign period.

    BILATERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS

    --------------------------------

    ¶5. (C) Colombia has been a staunch U.S. ally against the threats of
    narco-trafficking and terrorism.  We continue to enjoy a robust
    extradition relationship, though we were disappointed at the
    Supreme Court's decision to deny our requests to extradite the FARC
    operatives charged with taking hostage or attempting to harm U.S.
    citizens.  Colombia is our fourth largest export market in the
    region and a growing destination for U.S. investment.  Our close
    relations have tended to isolate Colombia in the region, especially
    with neo-populist governments such as Venezuela, which regularly
    paints Colombia as an agent of the United States.  This was
    underscored by the regional tensions raised by the DCA.  Despite
    our assertions that the DCA is strictly a bilateral issue, the GOC
    views the agreement as a strategic deterrent against President Hugo
    Chavez.  The Colombians are on the verge of restoring relations
    with Ecuador but have failed in efforts to enlist Brazil to offset
    the rhetoric of Chavez.  The Colombians have recently engaged in
    "security diplomacy," providing training and assistance to
    neighbors (such as Mexico and Haiti) suffering from drug
    trafficking and organized crime as well as to the international
    effort in Afghanistan via a deployment with Operation Enduring
    Freedom as early as the end of 2009.

    VENEZUELA ON THE MIND

    ---------------------

    ¶6. (SBU) Colombian officials worry that Venezuela poses a growing
    military, economic, and covert threat.  The GOC has sounded alarms
    in response to Venezuela's arms purchases, all but open support for
    the FARC, and bellicose rhetoric -- including Chavez' statements to
    "prepare for war" and refusal to meet with that "mobster" Uribe in
    Brazilian brokered talks.  Caracas has blocked imports from
    Colombia, leading to border area confrontations and unrest.
    Bilateral trade, once thought to be of sufficient volume to prevent
    conflict, has fallen over 70% in the last year, leaving local
    observers concerned that the constraints preventing conflict
    between the two states are dwindling.  Colombia has appealed to the
    UNSC, OAS and WTO for help, but seen little response.  Despite
    these incidents, we see no evidence that either side is actively
    preparing for hostilities.  However, as tensions along the border
    rise and perceptions skew, there is a small risk that a local
    incident could spiral out of control.  Real or not, the perception
    of the threat posed by Venezuela has changed Colombia's worldview,

    causing them to seek ever greater assurances of our friendship and
    support.

    ¶7. (SBU) While Colombians generally understand U.S. political
    realities associated with a vote on the FTA, resignation has grown
    within the government, business and academic communities over the
    lack of action on the accord.  The GOC remains committed to the
    agreement's passage, but worries that its efforts will turn out to
    be unsuccessful.  Business community members believe that long-term
    inaction on the FTA will be detrimental to U.S.-Colombian
    relations.  The great majority of organized labor is opposed to
    free trade agreements and argues that the GOC needs to do more to
    respect worker rights and to protect unionists from violence.  In
    2009, 34 unionists have been murdered as of November 17, which is a
    downward trend from the 49 murders in all of 2008.  President Uribe
    publicly adheres to the commitment President Obama made in their
    June 29 meeting to move the FTA forward in the U.S. Congress once
    labor and human rights issues are adequately addressed.

    HUMAN RIGHTS

    ------------

    ¶8. (SBU) By nearly all measures, the human rights situation in
    Colombia has improved over the last ten years.  Serious human
    rights concerns remain, however, especially with regard to the
    Colombian military.  Last year's exposure of military "false
    positives," in which unarmed civilians were murdered and presented
    as combat deaths, led to the dismissal of 51 members of the
    Colombian Army.  We are concerned with the military's commitment to
    investigating these types of cases and its cooperation with the
    Prosecutor General's office.  The Prosecutor General's Office is
    currently processing more than 1,000 cases of extrajudicial
    executions; prosecutions have been slow but there is progress.  We
    are working with the Colombian military to improve their respect
    for human rights as they carry out security operations.  Impunity
    for human rights violations and past crimes carried out by
    paramilitary and guerrilla groups is a serious concern.  The GOC
    regularly stigmatizes NGOs as supporters of terrorist
    organizations, which human rights groups claim fuels growing death
    threats against them.  Revelations that Colombian intelligence and
    law enforcement entities carried out illegal surveillance against
    human rights groups, unionists and political opponents have also
    undermined the GOC's credibility on human rights.  Colombia has
    over three million internally displaced persons (IDPs).

    Consternation Over Corruption in the Navy

    -----------------------------------------

    ¶9. (SBU) A high profile narco-corruption case against a retired
    rear admiral appears poised for dismissal amidst controversy.
    Guillermo ArangoBacci was forced to retire in 2007 based on
    evidence that he had conspired with drug traffickers to help them
    evade U.S. and Colombian interdiction patrols.  Admiral Barrera
    took the additional step of referring ArangoBacci's case to the
    civilian Prosecutor General's Office for criminal charges; the case
    was nearing a guilty verdict by mid-2009.  On November 3, however,
    a new prosecutor assigned to the case petitioned the Supreme Court
    to absolve ArangoBacci on grounds that the investigation failed to
    prove the admiral's guilt.  To make matters worse, both the
    Prosecutor General's Office and the Inspector General's Office
    denounced the Admiral Barrera and other senior naval officers for
    falsifying evidence to frame ArangoBacci.  Ambassador Brownfield

    publicly defended Admiral Barrera's actions in referring the matter
    to the civilian courts, which drew accusations of interference from
    one Supreme Court magistrate and the Colombian press.  However, it
    laid down the marker that we believe allegations of military
    corruption must be investigated--preferably in civilian courts.

    CONFLICT STALLED, PEACE DELAYED

    -------------------------------

    ¶10. (S/NF) The GOC made dazzling progress against the FARC in 2008:
    the deaths of three Secretariat members, the liberation of 15
    prized hostages, including three Americans, and record high
    desertions.  Progress in 2009 has been sluggish, however, with the
    FARC carrying out asymmetrical attacks on selective soft targets as
    the Colombian military tries to grind them down in a slow war of
    attrition.  Some analysts have also pointed to lower operations
    tempo due to local commanders' concern of being accused of human
    rights abuses.  Sensitive reporting suggests the GOC is quietly
    probing the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) to open a
    dialogue, though these efforts appear to be far from fruitful.  We
    do not expect any serious progress on this issue until after the
    elections; the guerrilla groups will likely wait to see whether
    Uribe will repeat in office before considering a broader peace
    process.

    THE COLOMBIA STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE

    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶11. (SBU) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia, we have
    developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI),
    which meshes with Colombia's own National Consolidation Plan (PNC).
    Our efforts initially focus on three priority areas of on-going
    conflict, drug trafficking and social marginalization. PNC/CSDI has
    prioritized addressing the lack of state presence that enables coca
    production and illegal armed groups, and seeks to establish state
    presence in strategic, under-governed parts of the country.  The
    plan is centered on increasing territorial control in these areas
    to provide security for communities; to achieve permanent coca
    eradication; to transfer security responsibility to the police; to
    provide a wide range of socio-economic services to address the root
    causes of marginalization; and to improve the justice sector to
    mitigate illegality.  A major challenge to implementation is
    achieving strong, effective civilian leadership of the PNC.  The
    head of Social Action (Accion Social), Colombia's development
    agency, is the titular head of the PNC effort.  Civilian agencies
    have been reluctant, however, to devote their budgets to the
    effort, often leaving the Ministry of Defense organizationally in
    front.  Other obstacles include the need for a comprehensive GOC
    security strategy to transition from military to police in
    "consolidated" territories; more clarity on a post-eradication
    strategy; stronger presence of the justice sector in CSDI areas;
    and increased funding support for PNC ministries in the GOC budget.

    CARTAGENA AND COCAINE

    ---------------------

    ¶12. (SBU) Cartagena holds many keys to the issues that will play a
    major role in Colombia's future.  With security issues largely
    resolved, the effectiveness of our CSDI efforts will likely become

    evident in the Montes de Maria zone near Cartagena within a year.
    Drug traffickers have increasingly turned to seaborne shipments of
    drugs either in go-fast boats, self-propelled semi-submersible
    boats or hidden in commercial cargo.  Maritime counter-narcotics
    interdiction will be ever more vital to our efforts to combat drug
    trafficking.  Our joint efforts had unparalleled success in 2008,
    with record seizures of cocaine on the high seas, which coupled
    with a record year in eradication led to double digit increases in
    the price of cocaine in the U.S and decreases in its purity.
    BROWNFIELD

`