Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6296 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 96 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1996/11
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lahore Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AMGT AORC AE AR ASIG ABLD AFFAIRS AG APER APECO AO AL AJ AM AEMR AFIN AU AS AID ACOA AX AA AMED AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AC AZ AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BEXP BTIO BF BY BM BU BO BL BIDEN BE BH BG BK BX BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CVIS CMGT CS CBW CO CI CH COUNTERTERRORISM CA CASC CG COUNTER CY CE CDG CACM CDB CD CV CIA CJAN CAN CN COE CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DA DEAX DJ DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ECUN EAIR EC EXTERNAL ECIN EMIN EPET EWWT ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS EIND ER ENVR EZ EN ECIP EINDETRD ENVI EI EINT EREL EUR ET EK ENIV ENNP EUC EFINECONCS ECINECONCS ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS ECA ENERG ENGY ETRO ELN EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FARC FMLN FREEDOM FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GZ GT GTMO GV GTIP GA GH GANGS GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IN IZ IS IT INTERPOL IMO IC ISRAELI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IAEA IO IV ICTY IPR ICRC IACI ICAO IQ ID ITRA INRB ITPHUM IWC IIP IL IA INR ITPGOV IZPREL ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JA JM JAMES JUS JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KSUM KCRM KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KRFD KZ KPAL KISL KPAO KSEP KCOR KIRF KIPR KVPR KU KWMN KTIA KE KR KSCA KAWK KV KPRP KPKO KGHG KBIO KHLS KMDR KN KPWR KCIP KWAC KMIG KAWC KG KOLY KGIC KOMC KS KNPP KFLU KWMM KSTH KSEC KDRG KFIN KUNR KFLO KTIP KPIN KHIV KERG KNEI KIFR KBCT KDEMAF KFRD KICC KFSC KPLS KCRS KGCC KTLA KSAF KCFE KO KTDB KX KIRC KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KACT KRAD KGIT KSTC KBTS KPRV KBTR KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNSD KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS
LE LY LG LH LAB LU LI LOG LO LT LTTE
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MNUC MTCRE MY MO MR MAR MPOS MEPP MA ML MD MRCRE MZ MOPPS MV MAPP MU MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NATO NL NATIONAL NI NU NP NSF NG NO NIPP NPT NS NGO NA NSG NZ NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT
OAS OTRA OVIP OPDC OREP OPRC OSCI OEXC OVP ODIP OFDP OSAC OTR OIIP OPIC OSCE OECD OPCW OIC OFFICIALS OIE
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PINS PEPR PINT PBTS PHSA PSOE POLITICAL PARTIES PSI PALESTINIAN PREF PM PA PE PROP POLITICS PO PBIO PECON PL PU PAK POGOV PRGOV PG PLN PINL POV PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PMAR PGOVLO PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL
QA
RS RW RU RO RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SENV SY SU SMIG STEINBERG SN SR SYR SZ SO SW SF SG SL SIPRS SH SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TU TBIO TSPA TW TRGY TS TX TERRORISM TPHY TIP TI TC TP TH TZ TSPL TO TK TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UNGA UK UN UY UNESCO UP UG UNMIK US UNO UNSC USTR UV UNAUS UNHRC UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VN VTPREL VM
WTRO WI WHO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XR XW XM XF XY XK XA XG XL XS XT XH XZ XC XE XD
YM YI YE YMCS
ZF ZU ZR ZI ZB ZP ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07LIMA3764, NARCO-TERRORISM CAUSING NATIONAL DEBATE IN PERU

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07LIMA3764.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07LIMA3764 | 2007-12-05 11:11 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Lima

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHPE #3764/01 3391146
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 051146Z DEC 07
    FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7447
    INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 5329
    RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ DEC 4636
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO IMMEDIATE 1615
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF STATE AIR WING PATRICK AFB FL IMMEDIATE
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
    RUMIAAA/DIRJIATF SOUTH  IMMEDIATE
    RUMIAAA/USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003764

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    INL FOR CASAS, WHA FOR THOMAS, ONDCP FOR GARNER,

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2012
    TAGS: SNAR PTER PREL PGOV PE
    SUBJECT: NARCO-TERRORISM CAUSING NATIONAL DEBATE IN PERU

    REF: A. REF A:LIMA 3646
    ¶B. REF B: LIMA 3707

    Classified By: NAS Director Susan Keogh. Reasons 1.4(d)

    1.(SBU) SUMMARY: The growing threat of narco-terrorism,
    reflected in the brutal attacks in Ocobamba and Tajyacaja
    (Ref A), has sparked a public debate featuring demands that
    the Government take decisive action to tackle "liberated"
    zones. A factor complicating security operations has been
    confusion about whether the police or military have the lead,
    at a time when terrorism and narco-trafficking have
    increasingly merged into a single "narco-terrorist" threat.
    One noted analyst has made the case that the new narco-threat
    is much greater than Sendero Luminoso (SL) alone ever was.
    However the police-military riddle gets resolved, the debate
    shows Peruvians increasingly recognize that no-go zones
    represent a threat to national security. In para 5 below is
    a brief description of the diverse groups involved in Peru's
    narco-terrorist network, many of them young, fueled by
    poverty and lured into illegal activities by the promise of
    escape. Government security forces have received additional
    budget support to address this challenge, but probably not
    enough; likewise, their existing plans, lacking execution,
    may be unequal to the task. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (SBU) In recent days, media comments and statements by
    government officials, triggered by the recent brutal attacks
    on police in Ocobamba and Tayacaja, have raised questions
    about the nature of the security threat in the emergency
    zones. Some believe the attacks suggest that Sendero
    Luminoso may be resurging. Others say the problem is
    muddier, and consists of ex-army combatants, ronderos (civil
    defense units), narco-cocaleros, and assorted others all
    participating in drug mafia violence.

    ¶3. (C) The rub is that the identity of the perpetrators
    determines which security force has authority to respond,
    with the military taking the lead on terrorism and the
    Peruvian National Police (PNP) on counter-narcotics. This
    arbitrary-seeming division is deeply entrenched, and has
    resulted in both sides pointing fingers at the other. It may
    also have shaped public perceptions concerning the
    government's lack of will to address the problem. A recent
    national poll by IPSOS/APOYO shows 78 percent of Peruvians
    think the GOP is doing "little or nothing" to fight
    narco-terrorists. Notwithstanding recent security successes
    against SL leader "Comrade JL" in the Huallaga Valley (Ref
    B), public skepticism remains high over the perceived lack of
    broader progress, particularly in tackling Sendero in the
    Apurimac and Ene Valleys (VRAE).

    ¶4. (SBU) Former Minister of Interior and noted security
    analyst Fernando Rospigliosi has made the case that
    narco-trafficking is a national emergency "more dangerous
    than Sendero ever was." In his view, terrorism had political
    ideas that could be fought and defeated, whereas
    drug-trafficking has generated money and violence with
    unstoppable corruptive power. Rospigliosi does not believe
    Sendero is growing, but believes that it has morphed into
    hired killers for narco-traffickers. Defense Minister Wagner
    has responded that the PNP should take the lead role against
    narco-trafficking, but supports joint patrolling with the
    Army in intelligence-based operations. Lack of personnel and
    70,000 sq km of mountainous terrain in the VRAE complicate
    the Army's task of capturing the SL leadership. He
    reiterated a promise made in the past - that the state would
    be reinforcing its presence in the VRAE with more Army bases
    and Police stations.

    ¶5. (SBU) Illustratively, at a recent meeting, Prime
    Minister Jorge del Castillo offered a catchall definition of
    who was involved in the Tayacaja attack: "Subversion, linked
    with common crime and narco-trafficking, with the possibility
    of a violent resurgence of Sendero Luminoso." Below is more
    detail on the different groups who are -- either peripherally
    or directly -- involved in the narco-terrorism network in the
    VRAE. The information below is based on credible reports
    from Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) field personnel, police
    intelligence and NGO sources, who work in the VRAE and have
    paid close attention to the growth of narco-related violence.
    --------------------
    ¶A. Sendero Remnants
    --------------------
    PNP sources estimate 350-400 Sendero remnants continue to
    operate in the VRAE, with a military structure based in the
    remote highlands of Vizcatan, (Northern Ayacucho). The PNP
    believes 5 SL columns operate under the command of Comrade
    Alipio (Quispe). Drug mafias pay SL to protect mule-trains
    bringing drugs out of the Apurimac River Valley. Services
    are paid in dollars, which SL uses to obtain weapons, buy
    supplies, and pay members. SL elements also seize weapons
    during ambushes such as the December 2005 attack on a PNP
    convoy out of Palma Pampa. Senderistas still disseminate
    ideological propaganda, assemble campesinos for
    indoctrination, and give out flags, as well as act as hired
    assassins for the drug industry. Increasingly, however, SL
    acts as a narco-mafia, with its own cocaine production
    enterprise, (in the view of many observers, including the
    Minister of Defense in one newspaper interview) following the
    path of the FARC and potentially headed for a takeover of the
    lucrative narcotics business in the VRAE. (Septel we will
    seek to answer more broadly the question: "What does Sendero
    Luminoso (SL) mean today?")

    ------------
    ¶B. Ex-Army
    ------------
    After the Ocobamba attack, unconfirmed local media reports
    claimed that the perpetrators were ex-Army. Paramilitary
    clothing is usually worn during ambushes on the police or
    army: attackers steal uniforms along with arms. In August, a
    Pichari Army NCO was captured by the PNP with 9,000 rounds of
    7.62 mm ammunition stolen from the base. When soldiers have
    completed voluntary service, having learned tactics and
    weapons use, but having earned little money, they are often
    drawn into the narco-trafficking network. A VRAE Army
    commander reported to NAS seeing ex-soldiers who admitted
    they were protecting drug routes, acting as drug couriers
    ("mochileros"), and working in rustic laboratories. The Army
    has tended to adopt a non-interference strategy with cocalero
    farmers, said the same commander, to erode support the SL
    might have among the local population (i.e. eliminating coca
    will push growers onto the side of Sendero).

    --------------------
    ¶C. Narco-cocaleros
    --------------------
    Cocaleros selling leaf to drug middlemen - acopiadors, -
    who come to the door and also collect coca paste for shipment
    by drug organizations, are relatively a thing of the past.
    Recent interdiction operations by DIRANDRO drug police at
    Palma Pampa have uncovered a surge in small rustic
    laboratories inside houses. Other cocalero groups rent
    larger equipped laboratories to drug producers. Mochileros
    are paid an average of 30 USD per kilo to transport cocaine
    base for journeys averaging 3 days to a specific location
    where they are replaced by pack animals or vehicles with
    armed guards. Mochileros are often robbed and killed.
    DIRANDRO commanders have noted an increase in the presence of
    Mexican and Colombian drug cartels in the region since the
    first part of 2007, working alongside Peruvian drug groups.

    ---------------------------------
    ¶D. Civil Defense Units/Ronderos
    ---------------------------------
    Ronderos (Comite de Auto Defensa or CAD) were established
    under President Fujimori to combat Sendero Luminoso. They
    are organized, armed and controlled by the Army. Although
    the GOP prohibits the issue of automatic weapons, NAS
    personnel have seen, on at least one occasion, CAD formations
    carrying FAL 7.62mm automatic rifles during a visit to
    Pichari Army base. Ronderos also purchase automatic weapons
    with money from drug traffickers. Entire communities of
    cocaleros are encouraged to cooperate with/join the Ronda.
    Local sources estimate 40 CAD committees, with 40-60 men,
    operate in the Apurimac/Ene Valley. Ronderos are
    occasionally involved in drug trafficking, and have used
    their arms against police forces during interdiction
    operations. CAD equipment, including weapons, radios and
    clothing, were captured by DIRANDRO during a cocaine lab
    interdiction in Llochegua in October.

    ¶6. (SBU) The population of the VRAE is largely young,
    poor and unemployed. The disaffected gravitate towards
    narco-trafficking as a source of income and activity. A
    local Army commander told NAS that narco-terrorist groups
    recruit from remote communities in the VRAE, preferring
    teenagers lured by the promise of pay. The recent police
    operation against Sendero in Aucayacu, (Huanaco) revealed
    that "Comrade JL" was accompanied by a group of adolescents,
    rather than a group of hardened terrorists. November 29,
    Huanuco Regional President Jorge Espinoza publicly called for
    government initiatives to counter SL ideological inroads with
    local youth on the margins of society.

    ¶7. (SBU) The Government of Peru has stepped forward with
    justifications for budgetary initiatives. On November 21,
    the Interior and Defense Ministers presented a joint request
    to Congress for 400 million soles (133 million USD)
    of increased funding to fight narco-terrorism in the Apurimac
    and Ene Valleys. (Note: The Armed Forces mainly want money
    to buy arms and refurbish bases. The Police particularly
    need ammunition, as well as arms and other equipment. End
    Note). Minister of Economy Carranza authorized a supplement
    of only 50 million soles (16 million USD). The head of the
    Peruvian Joint Command, Adm. Montoya, announced that the
    Ministry of Defense would construct 5 new anti-subversive
    bases in the VRAE to add to the 18 already in the area. The
    Minister of Interior also announced construction of new
    police bases in the VRAE and Huallaga.

    ¶8. (C) Comment: If one goal of narco-terrorists is to
    undermine public confidence in the security of the country,
    they have made some progress judging by the IPSOS/APOYO poll.
    While the recent attacks on police have caused the usual
    polemics against corruption and incompetence on the part of
    the government, there is a deeper undercurrent of concern
    that narco-terrorism presents a serious menace to
    governability in Peru. Most people concur that the VRAE is a
    no-go zone, too dangerous to attempt eradication and
    development projects. Although Minister Wagner continues to
    support the concept of joint operations, to date, Plan VRAE
    and other plans to improve social and economic conditions in
    the area appear to be stymied by the lack of an executable
    security plan. While interdiction operations continue out of
    the PNP base at Palma Pampa and joint PNP-EP operations have
    been occurring around the eradication operations in the Upper
    Huallaga, to date, no joint Police-Army CNT operations are
    being conducted in the VRAE. Additionally, Police
    representatives have told us that the Armed Forces and PNP do
    not share intelligence they have collected on SL in the
    Emergency Zones, indicating a lack of mutual trust.
    NEALON

`