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### Viewing cable 06SANJOSE2320, NATIONAL ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST OCTOBER 23-24

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
06SANJOSE2320 | 2006-10-23 21:09 | 2011-03-03 16:04 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy San Jose

Appears in these articles:
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasDestacadas/Investigacion2697430.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotaPrincipal/Investigacion2697496.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697489.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697532.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2697535.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/NotasSecundarias/Investigacion2701964.aspx
http://www.nacion.com/2011-03-03/Investigacion/Relacionados/Investigacion2701965.aspx

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSJ #2320/01 2962136
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 232136Z OCT 06
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6385
    INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN JOSE 002320

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/EPSC AND DS/IP/WHA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
    TAGS: ELAB ETRD PGOV ASEC CS
    SUBJECT: NATIONAL ANTI-CAFTA PROTEST OCTOBER 23-24

    REF: SAN JOSE 2312

    Classified By: Ambassador Mark Langdale for reason 1.4 (d)

    -------
    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: A broad coalition of union and student
    groups is posed to square off against the GOCR October 23-24,
    protesting mostly CAFTA but also pay increases below the rate
    of inflation and the high cost of living.  Both sides have
    much at stake.  The anti-CAFTA forces want to shake GOCR
    resolve (and demonstrate their influence) by putting large
    numbers of people in the streets.  If the opposition cannot
    rally their troops now, doing so during the
    December-February holiday period (the GOCR,s target window
    for CAFTA ratification) will be far more difficult.  For its
    part, the GOCR needs to avoid serious confrontation  or
    violence, while maintaining public order.  GOCR officials
    seem moderately upbeat, believing the public is tired of
    union shenanigans and ready to put the CAFTA chapter behind
    them.  The police seem prepared, but have asked Embassy
    assistance to rent busses to re-deploy personnel around
    the San Jose area, if needed.  Some senior government and
    media figures have told us privately that they view this
    showdown more as a test of how Costa Rica should be governed
    than about CAFTA, per se. Our best guess is that this week,s
    events  will be neither be violent nor definitive; the actual
    CAFTA votes in the Assembly  (whenever they take place) are
    more likely lightning rods for trouble.  END SUMMARY.

    -----------------------------
    UNIONS WANT TO SEND A MESSAGE
    -----------------------------

    ¶2.  (U) A broad coalition of public employee union members,
    parastatal workers from the insurance, utility, and
    telecommunications industries, university students, transport
    workers, and agricultural groups plan to strike and hold
    anti-CAFTA demonstrations on October 23 and 24.  According to
    organizers, the groups plan to demonstrate throughout Costa
    Rica, then converge on San Jose to rally at the Legislative
    Assembly to protest CAFTA ratification, pay increases below
    the rate of inflation and the high cost of living.  The
    number of protesters expected to participate in this
    so-called "National Resistance Journey" is unknown, but
    supporters, such as PAC party faction head Elizabeth
    Fonseca,(optimistically) hope to see some of the largest mass
    rallies since the 1949 revolution.  As of late morning on
    October 23, the rallies and protests were still getting
    organized.  Large-scale disruptions of electricity and
    telecommunications are not expected and roadblockages had
    not been scheduled by truck drivers or taxis.

    ¶3.  (U) The two largest teachers unions have called on their
    members to participate in the strike, affecting as many as
    900,000 students.   Members of the national social security
    system (the "Caja"), who operate the public hospital system,
    are expected to join as well.  Some 90,000 medical
    appointments and 1200 surgeries reportedly were rescheduled
    to allow Caja workers to join the protest.  (Emergency
    medical services and care for those already hospitalized are
    scheduled to operate normally.)  Flanked by President Arias
    and Justice Minister Chinchilla, Minister of the Presidency
    Rodrigo Arias announced on
    October 18 that that striking government workers would not be
    paid for their time off the job.  Education Minister Leonardo
    Garnier instructed principals to report absent public school
    teachers and dock their pay accordingly.

    ¶4.  (U) Although President Arias and leading strike
    organizer, Albino Vargas, head of the National Association of
    Public Employees (ANEP), had agreed to meet October 17 to
    discuss various issues including CAFTA and the planned
    demonstrations,  Vargas subsequently cancelled the session,
    claiming that the President would not permit additional union
    leaders and associated anti-CAFTA groups to participate.
    Arias publicly regretted the cancellation and offered to
    reschedule, gaining some points in the media in the process
    (just as Vargas was criticized for canceling).

    -----------------------------
    BOTH SIDES HAVE MUCH AT STAKE
    -----------------------------

    ¶5.  (SBU) Led by the firebrand Vargas, the anti-CAFTA forces
    need to shake the GOCR,s resolve (and demonstrate their
    influence) by putting large numbers of people, especially the
    easily incited students, into the streets.  As this may be
    just the opening salvo in what could become a season of
    protests, the union leadership is unlikely to resort to
    violence - for now.  In their view, the threat of violence
    and the ability to rally large crowds (which unions will
    label as anti-CAFTA, no matter what the groups are
    protesting) may be sufficient to force enough CAFTA
    supporters in the Assembly to think twice about their votes.
    (The PAC,s Fonseca told Pol Couns on October 20 that this
    would be an ideal outcome.)  Some of Vargas,s rhetoric has
    bordered on sedition, however. In an interview published in a
    political newsletter on October 16, he asserted the
    legitimacy of rebellion as a political tool and asserted that
    a "referendum of the street" should decide CAFTA; even having
    all 57 members in the Assembly vote in favor would not be
    enough.  In a television debate with Minister of Foreign
    Trade COMEX) Marco Vinicio Ruis the morning of October 23,
    Vargas was muted, insisting there would be no roadblocks,
    just people exercising their right to democratic protest.  If
    the opposition forces cannot rally an impressive display of
    strength now, doing so during the December-February holiday
    period (the target window for CAFTA ratification), when the
    public is not thinking about politics, will be far more
    difficult.

    ¶6.  (SBU) For its part, the GOCR needs to avoid serious
    confrontation or violence, while demonstrating control by
    maintaining public order.  GOCR officials seem moderately
    upbeat.  According to COMEX Director General Gabriela Castro,
    the unions may have overplayed their hand already with the
    public tired of union maneuvers such as dragging on the Limon
    port slowdown (Reftel), urging teachers and national health
    system workers to join the protests and Vargas,s refusal to
    meet with President Arias.  Castro acknowledged to us on
    October 18, however, that the perception of the protests may
    be more important than the reality. The real "audience" is
    the media, especially television. The GOCR needs to be
    depicted as responsibly respecting the people,s right to
    protest, without losing control. NOTE: Late on October 20,
    the union in the port of Limon announced that it would strike
    October 23-24 in solidarity with the protestors elsewhere.

    ----------------------------------
    POLICE ASK FOR TRANSPORTATION HELP
    ----------------------------------

    ¶7.  (C) In response to our inquiries about preparations for
    the upcoming demonstrations and particularly about any needs,
    the GOCR has only requested Embassy assistance in renting
    four large busses to provide additional mobility to the
    police.  Police Operations Director Eric Lacayo and other
    police officials we have contacted seem confident they are
    prepared to deal with the demonstrators.  Lacayo stated that
    he has orders to keep the roads clear, and unlike similar
    situations under the previous administration, Lacayo does not
    need to request further authorization to use force if
    necessary.  Lacayo told us that he is only concerned, for the
    moment, about three locations: President Arias,s house (a
    few blocks from the Embassy) where protestors had planned a
    "serenade"; the street in front of the ICE (Telecom)
    building, whose union, the largest in the public sector, can
    easily turn out thousands of employees who view their
    economic interests as threatened by CAFTA; and the main road
    to the airport (which may be the site of a large student
    march).  A large-scale march on the airport could greatly
    complicate Lacayo,s efforts to keep streets clear.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶8.  (C) Some senior government (such as 1st VP Kevin Casas)
    and media figures (such as La Nacion Director General
    Alejandro Urbina) have told us privately that they view the
    overall CAFTA showdown more as a test of how Costa Rica
    should be governed than about CAFTA itself.  Vargas in
    particular has questioned the legitimacy both of Oscar
    Arias,s being able to serve a second term, and his
    re-election victory.  More broadly, union leaders like
    Vargas,s deputy Mauricio Castro, mainstream opposition
    politicians like the PAC,s Fonseca and a number of our best
    political commentator contacts lament what they view as
    Arias,s "praetorian governing style," which seems out of
    touch with the people and runs counter to the "consensus" and
    "national dialogue" model long cherished in Costa Rica.
    While we seriously doubt that Arias,s government will be
    jeopardized by the upcoming protests or the final push for
    CAFTA ratification slowed, how his government handles events
    in the next two-three months (including this week,s
    protests) may have a significant impact on the effectiveness
    (or not) of the rest of his administration.
    FRISBIE

`