Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6276 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22 2011/03/23

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 96 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
1996/11
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AMGT AORC AE AR ASIG ABLD AFFAIRS AG APER APECO AEMR AO AL AJ AM AFIN AS AU ACOA AX AA AMED AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AID AC AZ AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BEXP BTIO BF BY BM BU BO BL BIDEN BE BH BG BK BX BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CVIS CMGT CS CBW CO CI CH COUNTERTERRORISM CA CASC CG CJAN COUNTER CY CE CDG CACM CDB CIA CD CV CAN CN COE CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DA DJ DEAX DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ECUN EAIR EC EXTERNAL ECIN EMIN EPET EWWT ELTN ECPS ELECTIONS EIND ER ENVR EZ EN ECIP EINDETRD ENVI EI EINT EREL EFINECONCS ET EUR ENIV ECINECONCS EK ENNP EUC ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS ECA ENERG ENGY ETRO ELN EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FARC FMLN FREEDOM FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GZ GT GTMO GV GH GA GANGS GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY GTIP
HO HURI HA HR HU HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IR IN IZ IS IT INTERPOL IMO IC ISRAELI ICJ ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI IAEA IO IV ICTY ICRC IACI ICAO IQ ID ITRA IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IIP IL IA INR ITPGOV IZPREL ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JA JM JAMES JUS JOSEPH JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KSUM KCRM KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KRFD KZ KPAL KISL KPAO KSEP KCOR KIRF KIPR KVPR KU KWMN KTIA KE KR KSCA KAWK KV KPRP KPKO KGHG KBIO KBCT KHLS KMDR KN KPWR KCIP KWAC KMIG KFRD KTIP KAWC KG KFLU KFLO KSAF KOLY KGIC KOMC KS KNPP KWMM KX KSTH KSEC KDEMAF KDRG KFIN KUNR KICC KFSC KPIN KHIV KTDB KERG KNEI KCRS KGCC KIFR KCFE KO KPLS KIRC KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KACT KRAD KGIT KSTC KBTS KPRV KBTR KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNSD KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS
LE LY LG LH LAB LU LI LOG LO LT LTTE
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MNUC MTCRE MY MO MR MAR MPOS MZ MEPP MA ML MV MD MRCRE MOPPS MAPP MU MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NATO NL NATIONAL NI NU NP NSF NG NO NIPP NS NPT NA NGO NSG NZ NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT
OAS OTRA OVIP OPDC OREP OPRC OSCI OEXC OVP ODIP OFDP OSAC OIIP OPIC OTR OSCE OECD OPCW OIC OFFICIALS OIE
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PINS PEPR PINT PBTS PHSA PSOE POLITICAL PARTIES PSI PALESTINIAN PREF PM PA PE PROP POLITICS PO PBIO PECON PL PU PAK POGOV PLN PRGOV POV PG PINL PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PMAR PGOVLO PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL
QA
RS RW RU RO RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SENV SY SU SMIG STEINBERG SN SR SYR SZ SO SW SF SG SL SIPRS SH SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TU TBIO TSPA TW TRGY TS TX TERRORISM TPHY TIP TI TH TC TP TZ TSPL TO TK TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UNGA UK UN UY UNESCO UP UG UNMIK US UNO UNSC UNAUS USTR UV UNHRC UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VN VTPREL VM
WTRO WI WHO WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XR XW XM XF XY XK XA XG XL XS XT XH XZ XC XE XD
YM YI YE YMCS
ZF ZU ZR ZI ZB ZP ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 10BOGOTA13, Peace Commissioner Lays Out Way Ahead on FARC, ELN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10BOGOTA13.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10BOGOTA13 | 2010-01-07 13:01 | 2010-12-08 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Bogota

`

    VZCZCXYZ0001
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHBO #0013/01 0071344
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 071344Z JAN 10
    FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1914
    INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
    RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
    RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
    RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0032
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
    RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
    RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0008
    RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0010
    RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
    RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
    RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0001
    RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0003
    RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA

` `

    S E C R E T BOGOTA 000013

    SIPDIS
    NOFORN

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SNAR PARM ECON CO
    SUBJECT: Peace Commissioner Lays Out Way Ahead on FARC, ELN

    REF: 09 BOGOTA 3281

    CLASSIFIED BY: William R. Brownfield, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

    Summary

    -------

    ¶1. (S/NF) Colombian High Commissioner for Peace Frank Pearl told
    the Ambassador January 5 that his office is preparing "roadmaps"
    for the next Administration on how best to pursue peace agreements
    with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National
    Liberation Army (ELN). Pearl acknowledged that the GOC had
    communicated with both groups in order to develop the road maps and
    build confidence. Both groups have expressed minimum conditions
    for a peace process that is supported by the GOC, the military, the
    private sector, and the international community. In the short
    term, Pearl plans to focus on the humanitarian release of FARC
    hostages and a secret meeting between the GOC and ELN with an aim
    to revitalizing the stalled peace talks. Wild cards include
    President Uribe's possible reelection, support from Venezuelan
    President Chavez, and the FARC's acquisition of "game-changing"
    weaponry such as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). End
    summary.

    Roadmaps for Peace

    ------------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) At a breakfast hosted by the Ambassador on January 5,
    Peace Commissioner Frank Pearl disclosed that when he took office
    in February last year, he assessed that there was not enough time
    left in the Uribe Administration (which ends August 7, 2010) for
    either the FARC or ELN to conclude a peace agreement with the GOC.
    He said his office had instead been focused on developing
    communication channels and building confidence with both terrorist
    organizations. Responses from these contacts, he continued, had
    informed the development of "roadmaps" that define both a desired
    end-state and the process to get there. The International
    Organization for Migration (IOM), supported by USAID, was drafting
    many of the documents. Pearl planned to present these fleshed out
    plans to the president-elect (or to President Uribe if he is
    reelected) in June to help guide the next Administration.

    ¶3. (S/NF) From the FARC, Pearl had seen little interest in
    initiating peace talks. FARC Supreme Leader Alfonso Cano was still
    consolidating his authority and proving his mettle as a military
    commander. It would have been impossible for Cano, he surmised, to
    have broached peace talks so soon after taking the reins of the
    FARC in May 2008. Still, Pearl noted that the deaths of three
    Secretariat members in 2008 had resulted in replacements that were
    more educated, intellectual, and aware of the international context
    of the conflict. This, coupled with an analysis of recent FARC
    communiques, suggested that the organization was open to a
    political solution to the conflict. He said other sources had
    signaled that the FARC's preferred end-state is the transition to a
    series of social networks (presumably comprised of demobilized
    fronts) that interface with a political party. Pearl admitted that
    such a solution was years away, but that having a notion of the
    other side's goals and objectives at the outset was important.

    ¶4. (S/NF) In the short term, Pearl said the GOC would continue to
    pursue the humanitarian release of two military hostages and the
    remains of a third held by the FARC. He said FARC interlocutor
    Piedad Cordoba told him December 24 that release was imminent but

    on December 29 reported that the FARC had rejected a facilitation
    role by Brazil and had counter-offered with Argentina or Sweden.
    The Ambassador counseled that the GOC cultivate the International
    Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic Church as
    interlocutors for the humanitarian release rather than depend
    solely on the Chavez-linked Senator Cordoba.

    ¶5. (S/NF) Pearl contrasted the FARC's situation with that of the
    ELN, which had developed a comprehensive basic framework agreement
    during talks that stalled in early 2008. He said the ELN's Central
    Command (COCE) had indicated interest in reviving those talks under
    appropriate conditions (ref). Pearl commented that the ELN process
    had been facilitated initially by Cuban government officials expert
    in peace talks, resulting in a substantive but incomplete peace
    proposal. The Commissioner confided that he had offered the COCE a
    secret, one- or two-day meeting as a confidence-building exercise.
    He said the COCE is considering the offer but is stuck on the
    meeting location: Colombia (difficult for the ELN), Venezuela
    (difficult for the GOC), or Norway (a logistical nightmare but
    still a possibility). If successful, Pearl contemplated having two
    or three such meetings before the end of the current Uribe
    Administration. The Ambassador reminded Pearl that the Embassy had
    contracted a U.S.-based academic familiar with the process to
    consult on ways for the USG to be supportive of GOC efforts with
    the ELN. Pearl was grateful for USAID assistance in drafting white
    papers that outlined the ELN negotiating positions.

    Common Ground

    -------------

    ¶6. (S/NF) Pearl said that both guerrilla groups had responded
    through sensitive channels with the same four minimum conditions
    for a peace agreement. First, the GOC must be willing to give its
    unambiguous and unanimous support for the agreement. Signing a
    peace agreement, Pearl emphasized, was just the beginning of the
    process and the terrorist groups have, because of historical
    precedent, a deep distrust of the GOC's good faith. Second, the
    military must be included in the process, a reminder that the
    Colombian Army opposed and worked against civilian-led peace talks
    in the 1980s and 1990s. Third, both groups seek participation by
    the private sector, which they view as the true power behind
    Colombian politics. Fourth, the ELN and FARC want some form of
    international accompaniment for the process. Pearl foresees a
    positive role for the international community once the process has
    reached a sufficient level of maturity. International well-wishers
    coming in too early, he stressed, could aggravate the delicate
    process. Regarding a U.S. role, he said that both groups were
    interested in an agreement with the United States over illegal drug
    cultivation, which they viewed as a social problem.

    Wild Cards: Reelection and Venezuela

    -------------------------------------

    ¶7. (S/NF) Pearl said there were two schools of thought about the
    impact of an Uribe third term on negotiations. Some believed that
    the third term would only exacerbate the tensions between Uribe and
    Chavez, which could play to the FARC's advantage. Others thought
    that the reelection would cause the FARC to despair at four more
    years of Uribe's Democratic Security policy and to consider
    negotiations. Ambassador Brownfield added that Venezuela's
    political and material support to the FARC could be a game-changer,
    especially if Venezuela were to give the FARC portable
    surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS). Pearl agreed that such weapons
    could upset the strategic balance of the conflict.

    COMMENT

    -------

    ¶8. (S/NF) Pearl's presentation was structured, logical, and
    rehearsed. He clearly wanted to control our expectations over what
    could be accomplished in the short run. That said, it is a
    realistic plan given that Colombians will be seized with choosing
    (or reelecting) a president for much of 2010. We should continue
    our support of the GOC as it develops these initiatives, being
    careful not to get too far out in front. End comment.
    BROWNFIELD

    EPET @ EL P

`