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### Viewing cable 09BEIJING1761, PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874 AND

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09BEIJING1761 | 2009-06-26 07:07 | 2010-11-29 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Beijing
Appears in these articles: nytimes.com

`

    O 260714Z JUN 09
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4839
    INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO
    AMEMBASSY SEOUL
    AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    CIA WASHINGTON DC
    JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
    DIA WASHINGTON DC
    CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
    OSD WASHDC
    DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
    NSC WASHDC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 001761

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2034
    TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KNNP MOPS EFIN KN KS CH

    SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: CHINESE SCHOLARS ON UNSCR 1874 AND
    POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR CHINA AND WASHINGTON

    Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling.
    Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

    SUMMARY
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Chinese scholars in recent conversations with PolOff
    said that Pyongyang's response to UNSCR 1874 had been "tepid"
    so far and that North Korea's domestic political situation
    did not appear to be tense.  The DPRK had not anticipated
    such a strong reaction to its nuclear test from the
    international community, especially from China and Russia.
    Several contacts insisted that the Six-Party Talks were "not
    dead yet" and remained a good framework to discuss the DPRK
    nuclear issue.  Although Seoul and Tokyo would likely urge
    Washington to take a harder line on the DPRK, Chinese
    scholars urged the United States to take the lead on
    resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and not be "led by
    the nose" by its treaty allies.  One contact proposed a
    U.S.-PRC-Russia trilateral dialogue to generate new ideas on
    the future of Northeast Asia.  In light of the threat posed
    by North Korea, a former MFA official said China should
    strengthen its export control regime and target materials
    related to uranium enrichment activities.  He also urged
    Washington and Beijing to have a discussion about
    strengthening the monitoring of illegal financial activities
    during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue.  End Summary.

    UNSCR 1874
    ----------

    ¶2. (C) Pyongyang's response to UN Security Council Resolution
    (UNSCR) 1874 so far, including the June 13 Foreign Ministry
    statement and the June 15 mass rally in Pyongyang, had been
    "surprisingly tepid," claimed XXXXXXXXXXXX negotiations during a XXXXXXXXXXXX discussion.  Pyongyang's
    threats to weaponize plutonium and begin enriching uranium
    were "empty threats" and it was clear that North Korea had
    run out of leverage.  XXXXXXXXXXXX opined that the DPRK had
    miscalculated and had not anticipated that there would be
    such a strong reaction to its nuclear test from the
    international community, including China and Russia.
    Pyongyang, he added, was "scared" of U.S. military pressure.

    ¶3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted in a XXXXXXXXXXXX conversation with PolOff
    that senior North Korean leaders, including officials from
    the influential National Defense Commission, were noticeably
    absent from the Pyongyang rally protesting UNSCR 1874 that
    had been attended by tens of thousands North Koreans.  This
    signaled to XXXXXXXXXXXX that the domestic situation was not that
    tense.

    ¶4. (C) Pyongyang, said XXXXXXXXXXXX, was unhappy with China's support
    of Resolution 1874.  China would have no problem implementing
    UNSCR 1874 but would do so in its "own way," he added.  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    suggested that China's enforcement would elicit a reaction
    from Pyongyang, and recalled that the DPRK Embassy had
    complained to him previously about China's strict enforcement
    of UNSCR 1718, especially with regard to inspection of
    possible dual-use items.  Regarding new restrictions placed
    on individual North Koreans, XXXXXXXXXXXX expressed concern that it
    would be difficult for Chinese host organizations to confirm
    the details of every individual North Korean participating in
    a visiting delegation.

    ¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX,
    urged the United States and other nations not to go beyond
    the scope of the resolution.  He noted to PolOff in a XXXXXXXXXXXX
    conversation that PRC President Hu Jintao had sought to have
    a balanced response to the nuclear test by supporting
    Resolution 1874 but had failed to fully please Washington or
    Pyongyang.

    Future Nuclear or Missile Tests?
    --------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) Pyongyang would not conduct a third nuclear test
    unless absolutely necessary, according  to XXXXXXXXXXXX.  He
    predicted that North Korea was more likely to conduct a
    missile test, but noted that missile tests were extremely
    expensive for the regime.  North Korea's recent nuclear and
    missile tests had been possible because the country had had
    two consecutive years of good harvests, he speculated.

    Six-Party Talks: "Not Dead Yet"
    -------------------------------

    ¶7. (C) Several contacts insisted that the Six-Party Talks
    remained a good framework to discuss the DPRK nuclear issue.
    The Six-Party Talks were not "dead yet," said XXXXXXXXXXXX.  He urged the United States not to set any
    preconditions on the DPRK returning to negotiations.  The
    United States should be willing to talk to the DPRK so that
    Pyongyang did not become "desperate."  The long-term
    objective was still denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
    and the medium term aim was to prevent more missile and
    nuclear tests and a regional arms race, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    Washington Should Take the Lead
    -------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Several contacts urged the United States to take the
    lead on resolving the DPRK nuclear issue.  Several suggested
    it was essential that Washington not be "led by the nose" by
    Tokyo and Seoul.  XXXXXXXXXXXX acknowledged that, for understandable
    reasons, the ROK and Japan tended to take a harder line on
    North Korea.  While the real threat to South Korea posed by
    the DPRK nuclear test and missile launches was minimal, he
    acknowledged the psychological threat the tests posed to the
    ROK, especially to its economy.  While Washington should
    certainly consult with Tokyo and Seoul, it should be wary of
    being pushed by its allies to take a more strident position.
    "Harsh enforcement" of UNSCR 1874 might push Pyongyang to
    retaliate, cautioned XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    ¶9. (C) China was reluctant to be at the forefront of attempts
    to resolve this issue, assessed XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Recalling
    Beijing's failure to prevent the first DPRK nuclear test in
    2006, XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that China had a credibility issue.  He
    expressed hope that Washington could come up with a bold
    proposal to break the current deadlock.

    ¶10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized the importance of China-U.S.
    cooperation and suggested that if Washington wanted to engage
    in bilateral talks with Pyongyang, Beijing could help
    facilitate the engagement and be a mediator.  XXX also
    suggested a possible U.S.-PRC-Russia trilateral dialogue on
    the future of Northeast Asia as a useful mechanism noting
    that all three countries were members of both the Six-Party
    Talks and the P5.

    Sustainable Security
    --------------------

    ¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that Sino-American cooperation on the
    DPRK issue presented opportunities to address more
    fundamental issues such as the concept of "sustainable
    security."  XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that the United States, despite having
    invested energy, money, and lives on the global war on
    terror, had not necessarily increased the security of the
    American people.  In the long-term, Beijing and Washington
    needed to find ways to guarantee the strategic security of
    other countries, including North Korea.  Doing so would
    require less investment and offer greater security returns,
    he suggested, emphasizing that military power alone would not
    resolve the DPRK issue.  Peaceful multilateral processes,
    such as the Six-Party Talks, would be more effective, he
    concluded.

    Strengthen Export Controls and Financial Sanctions
    --------------------------------------------- -----

    ¶12. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said China was happy to see the adoption of
    UNSCR 1874, but he questioned the effectiveness of the
    counterproliferation and financial sanctions on the DPRK
    regime.  According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the DPRK had a limited stock of
    plutonium, possibly enough for two more bombs, and did not
    appear to have a working uranium enrichment program yet.
    Thus, he concluded, Washington and Beijing should focus on
    preventing the further development of the DPRK's uranium
    enrichment program. XXXXXXXXXXXX suggested that China strengthen its
    export control regime and target materials that North Korea
    might need for its highly enriched uranium (HEU) program.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX advised that the current level of risk posed by North
    Korea's provocative behavior was "affordable" since North
    Korea did not have any HEU in the pipeline or have a
    sustainable source of fissile material.  However, once
    Pyongyang developed its HEU capabilities, the situation would
    become much more dangerous and difficult to resolve, warned
    XXXXXXXXXXXX.

    ¶13. (C) On financial sanctions, XXXXXXXXXXXX urged the United States
    and China to have a discussion about strengthening the
    monitoring of illegal financial activities, possibly
    including terrorism finance, corruption, and proliferation
    finance during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED).
    It would be more effective, cheaper and less risky to
    intercept financial transactions for proliferation-related
    materials, especially since North Korea only had a few
    financial outlets, than to enforce the interdiction of
    contraband goods, suggested XXXXXXXXXXXX.  The global financial
    crisis had spurred international cooperation on financial
    matters and Washington and Beijing should take advantage of
    this opportunity to enhance the monitoring of illegal
    financial transactions.  He emphasized that this type of
    monitoring should be done on a global scale, and not simply
    targeted at the DPRK, said XXXXXXXXXXXX.
    PICCUTA

    NNNN

`