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### Viewing cable 09UNVIEVIENNA536, IAEA:REPLACEMENT NEEDED FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09UNVIEVIENNA536 | 2009-12-01 14:02 | 2011-03-17 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | UNVIE

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUNV #0536/01 3351415
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 011415Z DEC 09
    FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
    TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
    RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0336
    INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0809

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000536

    SIPDIS

    FOR D(S), P, T, S/SANAC, IO, AND ISN
    DOE FOR NA-20, NA-24, NA-25, NE-1, NE-6
    NRC FOR OIP DOANE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN
    NSC STAFF FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
    DOS FOR 1000 ITA/OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
    DOS FOR 1001 ITA/USFCS/TPCC

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2023
    TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA
    SUBJECT: IAEA:REPLACEMENT NEEDED FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR
    GENERAL TANIGUCHI

    REF: A. (A) UNVIE 322
         ¶B. (B) STATE 91301
         ¶C. (C) UNVIE 478

    Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN T. DAVIES, REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)

    ----------
    Summary
    ----------
    ¶1. (C) UNVIE requests development of a U.S. position on a
    candidate to replace Deputy Director General Taniguchi as the
    head of the Department of Safety and Security at IAEA.  The
    current DDG,s contract ends August 2010, but will leave
    office sooner.  IAEA Director General-elect Amano could make
    a decision about who will replace DDG Taniguchi as early as
    December.  With an informal field of unattractive options
    taking shape, Mission recommends that USG identify a specific
    candidate whom Ambassador Davies would advocate to Amano.
    The U.S. must begin lobbying for a candidate as soon as
    possible in order to ensure the position is filled with an
    individual from a like-minded country and aligned with U.S.
    views on nuclear safety issues.
    ¶2. (C) Absent a specific alternative candidate and concerted
    U.S. lobbying, the position will almost certainly go to a
    French candidate (possibly an internal candidate currently in
    a D-1 position).  This outcome would be undesirable and erode
    U.S. influence in the Department.  The French already have
    undue influence over the Safety Department and often front
    for Areva,s interests.  In considering alternative
    candidates, we must also factor in geographic and gender
    distribution as to the four DDG slots likely to come open
    early in Amano's tenure ) Safety/Security, Technical
    Cooperation, Nuclear Applications and Nuclear Energy, as well
    as the newly announced opening for the head of Legal Affairs.
     Russia will undoubtedly seek to retain the Nuclear Energy
    DDG position while China seeks the TC DDG slot.  Thus,
    Nuclear Safety/Security is potentially wide-open for a
    like-minded candidate who can support U.S. interests.   End
    Summary
    -----------------------
    Need a Qualified Leader
    -----------------------
    ¶3. (C) Ref A (paras 6-7) laid out Mission's views on
    replacing current Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety
    and Security Tomihiro Taniguchi.  Incoming DG Amano appears
    receptive to U.S. views on the appointment, in part as he
    recognizes it as part of the process to maximize the IAEA's
    contribution to meeting President Obama's policy goals in
    nuclear security.  First and foremost, the Department of
    Safety and Security needs a dedicated manager and a strong
    leader.  For the past 10 years, the Department has suffered
    tremendously because of DDG Taniguchi,s weak management and
    leadership skills.  Despite our effective engagement with
    others in his department, Taniguchi has been unable or
    disinclined to resolve internal disagreements, has not
    provided much leadership or direction, has not worked well
    with the other DDGs, and has not supported the very important
    work of the Office of Nuclear Security even to the point of
    diverting limited security funds to safety activities.  This
    attitude has hindered progress that the Department of Safety
    and Security could have made over the last several years.
    ¶4. (C)  Taniguchi,s departure provides an opportunity to
    improve the management of this department.  This is
    especially important for the Office of Nuclear Security,
    which will now have more regular budget resources and will
    need firmer direction as it expands over the next few years.
    ¶5. (C)  The new DDG for the Department must have experience
    in both safety and security; (Taniguchi only had a safety
    background).   Also the DDG must be able to manage internal
    and external politics and be able to lead the program rather
    than hinder it.  Finally, the ideal candidate must also be
    able to clearly communicate and make decisions.

    ------------------------
    A "Reliable Person from
    a Reliable Country"
    -------------------------
    ¶6. (C) Lacking a public solicitation to respond to, no formal
    candidates have announced interest in the DDG position.
    Procedurally, for this and each DDG position, DG Amano will
    at some point in his tenure propose a single name to the

    Board after he sorts among expressions of interest that reach
    him from Member States.  In anticipation of this process,
    rumors are circulating in the Secretariat and among Member
    State delegations that Australia, Canada, Argentina, and
    France are all interested in the position.
    ¶7. (C)  Recently, the most prominent Australian candidate
    (Ron Cameron) accepted a position at the Nuclear Energy
    Agency in Paris, thus lowering the likelihood that Australia
    will nominate someone.  Australia does not have a large
    safety program or a very large security program.  Even if
    Australia puts forward a candidate, the individual would
    probably not have the expertise the U.S. would need to
    support them.
    ¶8.  (C)  The first rumors about Canada indicated that the
    former Canadian Ambassador and Board Governor Marie Gervais-
    Vidricaire was interested in the position.  She was one of
    Amano,s earliest and strongest supporters in the DG election
    campaign.  However, the prevailing sentiment among our
    contacts is that she would not be able to get the position
    because she does not have a technical background and her
    husband already works for the Agency at a senior level.
    UNVIE would agree with this assessment, though
    Gervais-Vidricaire was a respected diplomatic interlocutor .
    Although she has demonstrated strong leadership skills as the
    Canadian Governor, it would be best to have technical person
    who is immersed in the issues and the policies of safety and
    security activities rather than a diplomatic generalist to
    head this Department  A more technical person from the
    Canadian regulator or other government organization that has
    both safety and security expertise could be a good
    alternative.
    ¶9. (C)  Argentina's Abel Gonzalez is also rumored to be
    interested in the job.  He works for the Argentinean safety
    regulator, has worked at the IAEA before and remains heavily
    involved in IAEA activities.  He is well-liked at the IAEA
    but many Member States do not agree with Argentina,s strong
    stand on issues, particularly its challenge to the
    proposition that nuclear security is a core mission of the
    Agency.  In our observation, including in annual debates in
    the General Conference Committee of the Whole, Gonzalez does
    not believe that safety and security are different
    activities.  It is unlikely that he would be a strong
    supporter of the Office of Nuclear Security and he would lean
    toward absorbing Security into the Safety activities.  As a
    subject matter expert from a G-77 state with an advanced
    civil nuclear program Gonzalez, if he applies, will be a
    strong candidate for the position, however, not one that the
    U.S. should support.
    ¶10. (C)  Among the &declared candidates8 this leaves
    France, which already has a strong and unhealthy influence in
    the Department of Safety and Security.  The French currently
    hold several key positions in the safety area, including one
    of the two D-1 positions directly reporting to the DDG, and
    there is a French representative in almost every section of
    the safety department.   Many IAEA staff (both U.S. citizens
    and non-U.S. citizens) have complained to Msnoffs about the
    internal politics played by the French management (favoring
    French staff, giving French staff more opportunities,
    influencing results and documents to favor French industry,
    etc.).  One prominent example of this is the undue influence
    of Andre LaCoste, head of the French Regulatory Body, ASN.
    LaCoste is the Chairman of almost every important
    IAEA-sponsored conference, workshop, and committee in the
    safety field.  He has been the head of the Commission of
    Safety Standards for six years and was Chairman of the Joint
    Convention for Spent Fuel and the Convention on Nuclear
    Safety.  LaCoste has used these positions to influence the
    results of IAEA activities with a very blatant French bias.
    This is coupled with the strong presence at the IAEA of
    AREVA, the French government,s reactor designer and vendor.
    AREVA has business interests in all parts of the nuclear
    industry, including uranium mining, conversion, enrichment
    and fuel manufacturing.   Because AREVA is government-owned,
    AREVA representatives are allowed to participate in IAEA
    meetings as French government representatives, and often do,
    giving AREVA tremendous influence over the activities of IAEA
    and access to other governmental officials.  Indeed, the
    French Deputy Permanent Representative departed Vienna last
    summer is now working on secondment at AREVA, illustrating
    the revolving door between the French IAEA presence and
    industry.  Lacoste,s role  is unhealthy because no one

    Member State should have so much influence over the safety
    program, and because it is unfair to other reactor vendors
    (or uranium mining, conversion, enrichment or fuel
    manufacturing companies) that are privately owned, including
    those from the U.S.
    ¶11. (C) A recent example of the French influence came during
    a workshop for newcomers (states considering or embarking on
    nuclear power programs) that took place 3-5 November in
    Vienna.  The purpose was to give newcomers an opportunity to
    discuss issues and learn form each other.  The agenda was
    structured to allow each country to have two speakers, one
    from the regulator and one from the industry.  LaCoste was
    the Chairman and France was the only country with four
    speakers, using more than twice the amount of time allotted
    to everyone else.  In addition, the French position that all
    assistance to newcomer countries should be a service that the
    newcomer country should pay for was the only position that
    appeared in the Chairman,s conclusions of the workshop,
    though  that is not the position of any of the other
    &donor8 countries that gave presentations ) U.S., UK,
    Canada, Japan, Korea, China, etc.  Yet at the end of the
    meeting, LaCoste included in the Chairman,s summary an
    assertion that the conference had concluded newcomers were
    asking for too much assistance and that assistance should be
    restricted (or paid for).  When participants raised their
    hands to object, LaCoste said there would be no discussion of
    the Chairman,s, summary and closed the meeting.  Therefore,
    the French position is now &validated8 because an
    international conference of 45 Member States "came" to this
    conclusion.
    ¶12. (C)  There are many other examples of French influence on
    safety documents and IAEA forums to benefit French interests
    and promote AREVA, or French IAEA staff discouraging Member
    States from considering other countries, reactor designs.
    All of this suggests the U.S. should provide a strong
    alternative to a French candidate.  If the French manage to
    obtain Taniguchi,s position, Mission is concerned that the
    entire Department of Safety and Security may ultimately be
    indistinguishable from another arm of AREVA.  This will have
    a negative impact on the safety and security work and will
    have a detrimental effect on the U.S. nuclear industry,s
    ability to sell reactors overseas.
    ---------------------
    Time To Lobby is Now
    ---------------------
    ¶13. (C)  According to UNVIE contacts, the French are pressing
    very hard for the DDG position and have been lobbying Amano
    heavily, who is indebted to the French for early support to
    his election especially with the EU.  High-level officials in
    the French government routinely called DG ElBaradei during
    his tenure to discuss the hiring of French representatives.
    Because of the importance of this issue to the French
    government, it is likely that President Sarkozy,s office has
    been or will be involved.  Therefore it is imperative that
    the U.S. identify and lobby for an alternative candidate as
    soon as possible.  The U.S. should not wait to find a
    preferred candidate once the French officially announce their
    candidate; it would be much better to find a candidate and
    lobby Amano now and in his first month in office to have an
    influence on the position.
    ¶14. (C)  Consistent with earlier private statements to us
    from the Japanese Mission (ref A) that Amano would avoid the
    poor optics of keeping a fellow Japanese as DDG, we heard
    from Amano,s staff that Amano will give Taniguchi a &golden
    parachute8 and remove him from the DDG position in December.
     This could be in the form of a post as special assistant to
    the DG.  If the DDG position opens in December, the position
    will likely be filled temporarily by rotating the two D-1
    directors in the Department into the DDG position (Mr.
    Philippe Jamet, and Ms. Eliana Amaral). Although not in D-1
    positions, there are two other D-1,s in the Department who
    could potentially also be part of the rotation (Mr. Khammar
    Mrabit and Ms. Anita Nilsson).  Jamet is French and is likely
    to be the French candidate for the DDG position.  This
    rotational experience will make it even more difficult to
    find a candidate who is competitive with Jamet, who would
    also presumably be considered an &internal8 candidate for
    the job.
    --------
    Comment
    --------

    ¶15. (C) It is imperative that the U.S. begin lobbying for a
    DDG safety candidate immediately in order to ensure the best
    interests of the U.S. are met in the Department.  Mission
    urges active discussion in Washington on attributes and
    national obligations that influence our decision, but also
    consideration of specific names.  We will query Amano, about
    how his thinking has advanced and whether he will share with
    us any specific names already brought to him.
    DAVIES

`