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### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW818, CONSTITUENCY FOR CHANGE? OBSERVERS HOPEFUL AS

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW818 | 2008-03-25 14:02 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de/

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHMO #0818/01 0851435
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 251435Z MAR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7289
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000818

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KDEM RS
    SUBJECT: CONSTITUENCY FOR CHANGE? OBSERVERS HOPEFUL AS
    INAUGURATION APPROACHES

    Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

    ¶1. (C) Summary: As candidate Medvedev transitions into
    "President-elect" Medvedev, commentators have begun to speak
    with increasing frequency about political support for a
    reform agenda, not only the expected backing from the
    "liberal" economic elite, but also more broadly amongst
    Russia's business leaders; federal and regional leaders; and
    even among certain strata of society. While none would
    describe this support as a mandate for change, Medvedev
    appeared to be reaching out to this latent base in his
    February 15 Krasnoyarsk speech and during his "seminar" on
    the economy last week with business and financial experts.
    Admittedly, Russia's political experts acknowledge that
    Medvedev's core values are not known, and even less is
    understood about how the Medvedev - Putin "tandemocracy" will
    function, some believe that the prospects for a new "thaw"
    are greater than they have been for years -- if Medvedev
    chooses to take the reform path. Other observers, while
    agreeing that change is necessary, believe that a Medvedev
    who has spent 17 years in the shadow of Putin, is not the
    person to get that ball rolling. End summary.

    A Return to Reform?
    -------------------

    ¶2. (SBU) In recent weeks, we have noted some signs that a
    Medvedev presidency could return to the economic reform
    agenda that Putin supported during his first years in office.
    Economic analysts xxxxx point to the decision not to include
    telecommunications on the list of "strategic sectors" as a
    first sign of a potential shift away from the policies of
    state capitalism. Further, Medvedev has publicly advocated
    new policies to streamline the administrative requirements
    for the fishing industry, potentially a step toward further
    reducing the obstacles to other small businesses across the
    country. xxxxx told us that they saw little chance that
    Medvedev would tackle administrative reform "off the bat" --
    suggesting a more assertive approach to promoting the
    innovation economy than Moscow's economic watchers had
    expected.

    ¶3. (SBU) Encouraging signs on economic reform, however, do
    not necessarily translate into optimism for reform in the
    political sphere. Medvedev has long been with Putin and has
    given no indication that he is ready to wade into the
    difficult waters of political reform. xxxxx identified the challenge of
    gaining control over the "coercive" elements of the
    government - the FSB, the Investigative Commission under the
    Prosecutor, and other organs controlled by Sechin's allies --
    stands as problem number one for the new president,
    particularly given their influence over the state
    corporations and likely opposition to their reform. Actions
    to assert his authority over those powerful players may
    require Medvedev to look for broader support beyond the elite
    in support of his reform agenda.

    Constituencies for Change
    -------------------------

    ¶4. (C) Taking a cue from observers who have focused their
    hopes for change on differences between Medvedev and Putin,
    the BBC Moscow's Konstantin Eggert argued to us that Putin
    had successfully fashioned himself into the "people's
    president" -- one who enjoyed the support of the man on the
    street and was able to convert that image into unassailable
    popularity. Medvedev, Eggert thought, was not that sort of
    man. His personality, background, and temperament suggest
    that he would appeal primarily to Russia's intellectual and
    technical elite, and to middle class businessmen. There is
    some evidence that this stratum is ready for change and could
    provide a constituency for reform, if Medvedev were to pursue
    a new strategy. The educated middle classes, according to
    Eggert, are irritated by the gap between what they have
    accomplished in their lives and the fact that lack of
    institutions means they remain at the mercy of bureaucrats,
    whether they be the traffic police, ministry officials intent
    on shaking them down, or members of the judiciary should
    their troubles cause them to end up in court. Eggert thought
    that this quietly restive part of the population could be a
    potent source of support, but is unlikely on its own to
    "stick its neck out" without leadership from the top.

    ¶5. (SBU) A recent Levada Center poll offers some evidence
    that the looming succession and prospects for change
    entertained in Krasnoyarsk have heightened expectations among
    a significant minority. Twenty-three percent of those polled

    expect that Medvedev will undertake liberal economic reforms,
    while sixteen percent believe Medvedev will rely on the
    middle class for support (only ten percent expected the same
    from Putin when he became President). A reduced number
    --from 52 percent for Putin to 38 percent-- believed that
    Medvedev would rely on the "siloviki" as he proceeded with
    his Presidency. A VTsIOM poll, taken in early March, shows
    that 54 percent of respondents expected Medvedev to take
    Russia on a more "democratic course."

    Dissatisfaction within the Elite
    --------------------------------

    ¶6. (C) xxxxx told us that, in addition to Medvedev's
    potential constituency in the electorate, there is support
    for resuming the gradual economic reforms that Putin had
    begun in his first term, but then abandoned in his second.
    According to xxxxx, Deputy Prime Minister Kudrin, Sberbank's
    German Gref, multi-billionaire Roman Abramovich, and others
    had lobbied for Medvedev as successor in the year preceding
    Putin's decision. They, and others like Minister of Regional
    Development Dmitriy Kozak (although no friend of Medvedev's)
    formed a small, but respected and potentially potent core
    group for reform within the Administration. xxxxx thought
    that Medvedev might bring additional figures with similar
    sympathies into his administration.

    ¶7. (C) Conversations since the election suggest that support
    for a change of course extends beyond the Kremlin walls.
    "xxxxx have
    separately suggested to us that quiet discontent is the norm
    among many -- even those in the United Russia party -- in the
    Duma, but that few are willing to lift their heads above the
    pack unless they have reason to believe that prospects for
    change are real. xxxxx hoped that the economic problems
    would ultimately force Medvedev to change course in order to
    salvage his presidency.

    Will Medvedev Meet the Challenge?
    ---------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) As xxxxx told
    us: "Medvedev is the best of all possibilities." xxxxx who
    had met with Medvedev twice over the years, described him as
    "ready to hear sharp criticism," and "ambitious." xxxxx shared xxxxx
    measured optimism about Medvedev who, "wants power," and
    would use the corruption campaign he had promised to launch
    to make inroads on the "siloviki."

    ¶9. (C) xxxxx agreed that concrete steps would be necessary
    in order to overcome the pervasive "cynicism" and "apathy" of
    those hoping for more. Gauging the number of such people has
    been complicated by the lack of an organization or party for
    them to affiliate with. The personalities at the head of the
    standard, western-leaning Yabloko and Union of Right Forces
    parties have worn thin and street opposition of the sort
    promoted by Other Russia has no appeal for the middle class.

    ¶10. (C) Separately, xxxxx told us xxxxx "on projects I cannot talk
    about," he was convinced Medvedev was looking for ways to
    signal change. The President-elect was adamant on the need
    for internet freedom and the inability of the government to
    control satellite airwaves. Moreover, xxxxx argued that
    Medvedev was sensitive to the repercussions of the
    administration's heartless approach to former Yukos VP
    Aleksanyan's medical condition, although Medvedev was
    unlikely to expend political capital at the outset to tackle
    this case. xxxxx emphasized that the average Russian
    citizen was "as far as the stars" from Western liberal values
    -- seeing even the limited liberalism that Medvedev
    represents as beyond the pale of what a "free and fair"
    election would generate. For a frustrated journalist like
    himself, xxxxx posited that Medvedev offered a reasonable
    route to reform that the "radicals" such as Kasparov and
    Limonov did not.

    The Tandem Factor
    -----------------

    ¶11. (C) Whatever Medvedev's intentions about pursuing a
    reform agenda may be, much will depend on how the
    Medvedev-Putin "tandemocracy" will function; something most
    observers suspect even Putin and Medvedev do not understand
    completely. Some suggest, and Medvedev seemed to agree in
    his "Itogi" interview, that all power resides in the

    presidency and, sooner or later, Medvedev will eclipse Putin
    as first among equals. They see in Putin's stress on
    continuity, efforts to elaborate a strategy to 2020, and
    comments that there is no daylight between him and Medvedev
    on foreign policy, a tacit acknowledgment that Putin's
    ability to chart the course has been curtailed with Medvedev
    in the President's seat. It follows for them that a
    diminished Putin will therefore remain Prime Minister only
    long enough to ensure a smooth transition before bowing out.

    ¶12. (C) Others are less certain. xxxxx believes that Putin did his best to
    handicap Medvedev in preparing him for the presidency.
    Unlike Putin, the President-elect has no network in the
    Kremlin or the regions, unlike Putin who, xxxxx said, on
    becoming President, could count on the loyalty of the
    security services throughout the country. xxxxx thought the
    "siloviki's" continued loyalty to Putin would cause them to
    undercut any of Medvedev's efforts at reform or
    liberalization. In any event, xxxxx said, "Medvedev has
    worked for 17 years in Putin's authoritarian shadow" without
    revealing any liberal impulses. Why would they appear now?"

    Comment
    -------

    ¶13. (C) Under Putin, Russians have seen an improvement in
    their lives and the stabilization of the political sphere.
    Medvedev comes from a different generation and outlook than
    his predecessor and he seems to "get it" that Russia needs
    reform in order to develop. And there is a potentially
    influential stratum of support that is quietly hoping for
    change and waiting for leadership. The question remains as
    to how far Medvedev is willing to go, particularly under
    Putin's watchful eye.
    Burns

`