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### Viewing cable 08SHANGHAI422, SHANGHAI SCHOLARS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER DELAY IN SIX-PARTY

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08SHANGHAI422 | 2008-09-26 06:06 | 2010-11-29 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Consulate Shanghai
Appears in these articles: www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXRO2065
    RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
    DE RUEHGH #0422/01 2700640
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 260640Z SEP 08
    FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7202
    INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2156
    RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1437
    RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1408
    RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1592
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0037
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0237
    RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 1431
    RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1239
    RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0370
    RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 7789

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000422

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2033
    TAGS: CH KN PGOV PHUM PREL
    SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS EXPRESS CONCERN OVER DELAY IN SIX-PARTY
    TALKS

    CLASSIFIED BY: Christopher Beede, Political/Economic Chief, U.S.
    Consulate General, Shanghai, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: xxxxx are concerned about
    the current impasse in the Six-Party Talks, but each varies in
    his diagnosis of its causes and prescriptions for U.S. policy.
    xxxxx claims that a debate has emerged within the Chinese
    leadership over the merits of quick U.S. delisting, as a result
    of Pyongyang's allegedly incomplete nuclear declaration. These
    xxxxx agree that, for the moment, none of North Korean leader
    Kim Jong-il's three sons is likely to be tapped to succeed him.
    xxxxx, North Korea in August questions
    the World Food Program's (WFP) forecast of an imminent famine
    there. END SUMMARY.

    ¶2. (U) xxxxx Korean politics and the
    ongoing Six-Party Talks. xxxxx.

    Deadlock over verification
    --------------------------

    ¶3. (C) xxxxx are concerned about the current
    impasse in the Six-Party Talks, but each varies in his diagnosis
    of its causes and prescriptions for U.S. policy. xxxxx
    view, Washington is primarily responsible for North Korean
    foot-dragging. Under the "action for action" framework, xxxxx
    argues, the United States promised to remove North Korea from
    the State Sponsors of Terror list and Trading with the Enemy Act
    (TWEA) restrictions in return for a complete nuclear declaration
    from Pyongyang. After forty days, it became legally possible for
    Washington to delist the North Koreans in August, but this did
    not occur. xxxxx continues, the United States seems to want
    international inspectors to be able to access North Korea's
    nuclear sites virtually "at whim," and to meet with its nuclear
    scientists. These conditions have given Pyongyang "an excuse for
    their present inaction." xxxxx North Korea is "truly
    disappointed" with this development -- its leaders believe "they
    did something" and are owed something in return -- and, xxxxx
    opinion, it is "difficult for the other Six-Party states to
    blame them."

    ¶4. (S/NF) xxxxx, on the other hand, dissents from this view.
    According xxxxx, the nuclear declaration North Korea submitted
    in May was incomplete. xxxxx claims that critical information
    about secret underwater nuclear facilities located on North
    Korea's coast. For this reason, a debate has emerged within the
    Chinese leadership over the merits of quick U.S. delisting, xxxxx
    continues. One camp believes that continued momentum in the
    Six-Party Talks is critical to their success, and has concluded
    that Washington must adopt a more flexible attitude. The other
    camp, however, has taken the incomplete nuclear declaration as
    evidence that the regime in Pyongyang is truly "a ticking time
    bomb," and regard Washington's tough stance on verification as a
    potential opportunity to finally deal with a persistent regional
    irritant.xxxxx does not believe the United States should delist
    North Korea yet, though he argues Washington needs to find some
    token action it can take now to demonstrate its good faith.

    ¶5. (C) xxxxx is confident that, if the United States
    removes North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terror list and
    the TWEA -- even absent progress on a verification protocol --
    its negotiators will act quickly to reciprocate and permit some
    form of verification. That North Korea has been labeled a state
    sponsor of terror is "an ongoing source of embarrassment" for
    the regime, xxxxx argues, and Washington must not underestimate
    its "desire for face." xxxxx agree that, despite North
    Korea's recent moves to apparently renew its activities at the
    Yongbyon nuclear complex, including its removal of International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seals on equipment, Pyongyang's
    threats are largely for show. As part of the Six-Party process,
    the regime has already taken significant steps toward nuclear
    disablement, xxxxx out, so North Korean leaders cannot

    Shanghai 00000422 002.2 of 003

    actually accomplish very much in the short term.

    Kim jong-il's health
    --------------------

    ¶6. (C) Regarding Kim Jong-il's (KJI) purported ill health, xxxxx
    admit they have been unable to divine what has actually
    happened, noting such information is "top secret" even to North
    Koreans. xxxxx claims that KJI has a long history of recreational
    drug use that has resulted in frequent bouts of epilepsy and
    contributed to his poor health overall. xxxxx recalls
    hearing an unconfirmed report that, in the last several weeks, a
    team of five Chinese physicians traveled to Pyongyang, perhaps
    to tend to KJI. xxxxx cautions against reading too much into what
    he considers "pure speculation." Even if KJI suffered some
    medical emergency, illness "does not necessarily mean he is
    dying or has lost political control, or that regime collapse is
    somehow imminent."

    ¶7. (C) At the present time, xxxxx considers it "likelier than not"
    KJI remains in charge and is making political decisions. xxxxx is
    less certain, quoting reports that long time consort and former
    secretary Kim Ok may be caring for Kim and overseeing policy on
    his behalf. KJI puts a lot of confidence in Kim Ok, notes xxxxx,
    recalling that she was a member of the North Korean delegation
    led by General Jo Myong-rok that visited the Clinton White House
    in October 2000.

    Contenders for future leadership
    --------------------------------

    ¶8. (C) There is consensus among xxxxx that, at least
    for the moment, none of KJI's three sons is likely to be tapped
    to succeed him. xxxxx considers the two youngest sons, Kim
    Jong-chol and Kim Jong-un, far too inexperienced and incapable
    of effective governance. xxxxx, observing that KJI's
    oldest son, Kim Jong-nam, is "too much of a playboy," Kim
    Jong-chol is "more interested in video games" than governing,
    and Kim Jong-un is simply too young. Additionally, KJI had been
    groomed for many years to replace his father and former North
    Korean leader Kim Il-Sung before the latter passed away. In
    contrast, xxxxx, none of the sons has received similar
    preparatory treatment.

    ¶9. (C) The most likely scenario for succession, xxxxx,
    is a group of North Korean military leaders, including civilians
    with close military connections, taking the helm from KJI. xxxxx
    also believes the military is probably best situated to run the
    country, at the present time. Still, if KJI remains in charge
    for another five or ten years, Beijing might then prefer to see
    Kim Jong-nam -- who is more of a known quantity than an ad hoc
    lineup of civil-military elements -- rise to power, xxxxx.

    ¶10. (S)xxxxx that Kim Yong-nam (KYN) -- the president of
    North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly and second in command --
    seems the likeliest candidate to lead a new regime. In recent
    months, KYN has received foreign leaders and represented North
    Korea at many of the same events KJI would normally attend. xxxxx
    also reports that a younger brother of KYN's currently heads the
    Propaganda Department -- a position once held by KJI during his
    ascent to power -- while another relative runs North Korea's
    intelligence outfit. KYN is over 80 years old, xxxxx, so
    even a caretaker leadership role that fell to him would be short
    lived. xxxxx, it is interesting that KYN's family is
    seeded in the same "power positions" long considered important
    by the current ruling Kim family.

    Perils and promise of external exposure
    ---------------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) xxxxx that North Korea is struggling to resolve the
    contradiction between its need for international engagement and
    desire to maintain ideological purity. Objectively speaking,
    exposure to the outside world -- its ways of thinking and
    quality of life -- is necessary to the regime's survival, xxxxx
    points out. From Pyongyang's perspective, someone who has seen
    the world as KJI's sons have might best be equipped to undertake
    reform in North Korea "on his own terms." At the same time, the
    regime has traditionally feared external influence, valued
    ideological purity, and prized ongoing closeness to the regime
    in its prospective cadres. As a result, xxxxx, those who

    Shanghai 00000422 003 of 003

    have traveled internationally are often marginalized within the
    insular North Korean leadership or ousted altogether. In this
    respect, xxxxx, the regime actually resembles China
    during its ideological heyday. It is "no coincidence" that Zhou
    Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, who both had overseas experience, were
    later the victims of purges at home, xxxxx.

    A glimpse beyond the yalu
    -------------------------

    ¶12. (C) xxxxx extremely poor quality of the main road into Rajin, despite
    its role as the key route into that city, one of North Korea's
    special economic zones (SEZ) during the 1990s (the Rajin-Sonbong
    SEZ) that is also equipped with a harbor. xxxxx recalls watching a
    television news program commemorating a North Korean military
    holiday that coincided with his stay, and found it strange that
    only "still photo footage" aired of KJI reportedly visiting a
    military unit that day.

    ¶13. (C) xxxxx not have the opportunity to engage ordinary
    North Korean citizens -- he spoke "only with his minders" -- but
    remembers observing many people walking on the streets, riding
    bicycles, and generally appearing healthy and happy. xxxxx
    recognizes that xxxxx took him only to a small corner of
    North Korea, he claims he saw "no signs of starvation" during
    this time. xxxxx skeptical of the World Food Program's
    (WFP) recent assessment that North Korea may soon be hit by a
    harsh famine, perhaps its worst since 1997. xxxxx,
    argues that whatever happens regarding the food situation, a
    famine will certainly not threaten the regime's political
    stability, asserting that North Koreans will sooner "die
    quietly" of starvation than defy Pyongyang.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶14. (C) Although difficult to verify xxxxx, our discussions suggest a variety of Chinese opinions
    regarding how best to approach the North Korean nuclear dilemma.
    Consensus on the subject continues xxxxx.
    Camp

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