Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AORC AMGT AE AL ABLD AJ AM AFIN AR AEMR APER AO ASIG AFFAIRS AG AS AA APECO AU ACOA AX AMED AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AID AC AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BH BG BEXP BIDEN BO BE BTIO BM BF BY BU BL BK BX BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CS CH CVIS CMGT CBW CO CI COUNTERTERRORISM CA CE CASC CY CG CD CV CJAN COUNTER CDG CIA CACM CDB CAN CN COE CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DJ DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EAIR EPET EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ENNP ECUN ELTN ECIN EC EXTERNAL ELECTIONS ER EIND EMIN EWWT EINT ECPS EFINECONCS ET ENIV EN EZ EK ENVI ECINECONCS ECIP EINDETRD EUC EI EREL ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS ENVR ECA ENERG ENGY ETRO ELN EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FREEDOM FARC FMLN FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GT GA GV GANGS GZ GTMO GH GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY GTIP
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IN IR IC IS IZ IT IAEA ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI ITRA INTERPOL IMO ISRAELI ICJ IO IACI ID IV ICTY IQ ICAO IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IIP ICRC IL IA INR ITPGOV IZPREL ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JOSEPH JA JM JUS JAMES JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KSUM KCRM KTIA KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KOMC KRFD KZ KU KGIC KPAL KISL KPAO KIPR KGHG KSCA KWMN KSEP KCOR KIRF KOLY KV KVPR KE KFSC KN KS KFLO KR KPKO KNPP KAWK KTDB KTIP KFLU KPRP KHLS KCIP KMDR KBIO KUNR KCRS KSTH KCFE KBCT KFRD KAWC KO KX KG KICC KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGCC KPIN KHIV KPLS KIRC KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KACT KRAD KGIT KSTC KBTS KPRV KBTR KWMM KERG KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNSD KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS KSAF
LE LY LG LAB LH LI LOG LO LT LTTE LU
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MNUC MR MV MO MTCRE MAR MY ML MRCRE MPOS MD MZ MEPP MA MOPPS MAPP MU MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NU NO NATO NL NPT NATIONAL NP NI NS NA NG NGO NIPP NSG NZ NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NSF
OAS OTRA OVIP ODIP OFDP OPDC OPIC OEXC OPRC OSCI OTR OREP OSAC OIIP OSCE OECD OPCW OIC OFFICIALS OIE OVP
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PM PINS PBTS PREF PEPR PE POLITICS PINT PL PA PHSA PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PSI PALESTINIAN POV PG PROP PO PBIO PECON PAK POGOV PINL PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PMAR PGOVLO PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL PLN
QA
RS RU RW RO RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SO SENV SMIG SY SU SR SW SYR SG SZ STEINBERG SN SF SL SIPRS SH SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TP TW TU TBIO TRGY TSPA TSPL TS TZ TI TX TC TERRORISM TPHY TIP TH TO TK TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UK UNHRC UNGA UN UP UNSC USTR UY UNESCO UNO UNMIK US UG UV UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNAUS UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WHO WI WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XK XL XM XR XS XF XA XY XW XG XT XH XZ XE XD XC
YM YMCS YI YE
ZF ZU ZI ZP ZR ZB ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 07REYKJAVIK322, ICELANDIC DEFENSE POLICY ONE YEAR AFTER U.S. WITHDRAWAL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07REYKJAVIK322.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07REYKJAVIK322 | 2007-11-09 17:05 | 2011-01-13 05:05 | SECRET | Embassy Reykjavik

`

    VZCZCXYZ0010
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHRK #0322/01 3131701
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 091701Z NOV 07
    FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3492
    INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
    RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE 0065
    RHMFISS/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
    RHMFISS/COMNAVREG EUR NAPLES IT
    RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
    RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

` `

    S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 000322

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR EUR/NB, EUR/RPM
    OSD-P FOR DAVID CATE
    OSD RESERVE AFFAIRS FOR ASD HALL

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
    TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV PINR IC
    SUBJECT: ICELANDIC DEFENSE POLICY ONE YEAR AFTER U.S. WITHDRAWAL

    Refs: A) 06 Reykjavik 85  B) 06 Reykjavik 357
      C) 06 Reykjavik 359  D) 06 Reykjavik 364
      E) 06 Reykjavik 401  F) Reykjavik 01
      G) Reykjavik 69  H) Reykjavik 99
      I) Reykjavik 192  J) Reykjavik 247
      K) Reykjavik 298

    Classified By: Amb. Carol van Voorst for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

    ¶1.  (C) Summary: A year after the closure of U.S. Naval Air Station
    Keflavik and the withdrawal of permanent U.S. forces from Iceland,
    Post agrees with Prime Minister Haarde that the turnover went better
    than either party expected.  After recovering from the initial shock
    of our base closure notification in March 2006, the Icelandic
    Government has solidified its defense links with its neighbors and
    within NATO, successfully hosted U.S. and NATO ship visits as well as
    a multinational air defense and counterterrorism exercise,
    strengthened its Coast Guard in resources and in international ties,
    and begun canvassing for NATO air policing support.  Former base
    properties now house university students and academic research
    centers.  Although several difficult issues remain -- intelligence
    cooperation and the future of the air defense radar system among them
    -- they are partially due to domestic political considerations, and
    will be solved as the new coalition government settles in.  With
    climate change, a likely increase in North Atlantic energy shipments,
    a new focus on Arctic resources, and a more visible Russian presence,
    the High North could easily reemerge as an area of high strategic
    importance in the decades ahead.  U.S. interests in the region will
    be well served by encouraging Iceland to continue to develop its
    security and defense capabilities while we keep our defense
    options--including access to the base--open.  End Summary.

    From protests to robust joint efforts
    -------------------------------------
    ¶2.  (C) When we notified the Icelandic Government in March 2006 of
    the decision to close U.S. Naval Air Station Keflavik (NASKEF) in six
    months, bitter disappointment and, in some quarters, outrage were
    evident.  Commentators predicted the end of the bilateral
    relationship and opined that the 1951 U.S-Iceland Defense Agreement
    was now worthless.  Former Prime Minister David Oddsson let it be
    known that had he been in office, he would have immediately abrogated
    the treaty and ejected the U.S. military ahead of the September
    deadline.  Minister of Justice Bjorn Bjarnason, considered by many
    the most pro-U.S. and pro-NATO member of the cabinet, acidly
    questioned U.S. dependability in defense matters.

    ¶3.  (SBU) A year after NASKEF's closure, the state of the bilateral
    relationship is quite different from the gloomy predictions.  This
    past August, Prime Minister Haarde told former lead negotiator ASD
    Tom Hall and Commander U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) General Tom
    Hobbins that "no one could have imagined a year ago how well things
    would turn out."  Negotiations in 2006 resulted in a technical
    agreement to close the base and a political Joint Understanding
    pointing the way forward.  The continuing defense relationship was
    then made visible to the public by cooperation on two major ship
    visits, a search-and-rescue training visit by a U.S. P-3 aircraft,
    and a large-scale multinational air defense and counterterrorism
    exercise.  Links between the Icelandic and U.S. Coast Guards -- both
    bilaterally and within the newly-formed North Atlantic Coast Guard
    Forum -- continue to grow in depth and breadth.  Exchanges in law
    enforcement training and operational information have shown results
    in counter-narcotics and document fraud detection work.  Politically,
    we have worked together at NATO to gain consensus on a peacetime air
    defense plan for Iceland; transferred Iceland's air defense radar
    system and are nearing completion of future support arrangements; and
    held the first round of high-level Security Dialogue consultations as
    outlined in the Joint Understanding.

    Looking beyond the bilateral relationship
    -----------------------------------------
    ¶4.  (C) Outside the bilateral field, PM Haarde has pressed ahead with
    a strategy of greater engagement with Iceland's neighboring NATO
    Allies.  In early 2007, Iceland signed agreements with Norway and
    Denmark on increased defense and security cooperation, and began
    talks with the UK and Canada along the same lines.  Despite a change
    in government (and Foreign Minister) in May, the GOI has continued to
    flesh out the earlier agreements.  These efforts have resulted in
    increased visits by Danish Navy and Coast Guard vessels, as well as
    the participation of Norwegian and Danish forces in the NORTHERN
    VIKING air defense and counterterrorism exercise in August 2007.
    Norway was among the first NATO Allies to show interest in providing
    aircraft for air policing in Iceland.  MFA efforts to secure periodic
    air policing represent a welcome change in Iceland's traditional
    approach to defense:  a recognition that Iceland must assume more
    responsibility and, to accomplish this, must be more active within
    the Alliance in promoting its own affairs.  The recent MFA briefing
    for all resident NATO ambassadors on air policing was a first:  a
    true lobbying effort directed at capitals.  The brief was a shrewd
    sales pitch, including pledges of significant host nation support for
    the mission, which would be funded out of the first-ever defense
    budget in the Icelandic government's history.  This budget ($8.6
    million of a total GOI budget of $6.9 billion) is a concrete
    acknowledgment that Iceland has realized it needs to provide more for
    its own defense.

    ¶5.  (C) Along the same lines, the GOI has boosted efforts to provide
    for greater domestic security.  In the last year, the Icelandic Coast
    Guard (ICG) has awarded contracts for a new patrol vessel and
    fixed-wing aircraft, while also leasing three search and rescue (SAR)
    helicopters to replace the USAF helos that previously provided SAR
    backup.  Minister of Justice Bjarnason, who controls the ICG, has
    been developing a plan for procurement of permanent helo support and
    has been discussing joint purchases with the Norwegian SAR
    authorities.  The ICG has also continued a practice of robust
    international deployments of the ICG Explosive Ordnance Disposal
    (EOD) team to peacekeeping operations, most recently in Lebanon in
    the winter of 2006-2007.  Post has encouraged the MOJ and ICG to make
    their procurement and training plans with an eye towards maintaining
    the capacity to deploy abroad in NATO or UN peacekeeping operations.

    ¶6.  (U) Smart governance has also mitigated the local impact of
    NASKEF's closure on the community of Reykjanesbaer/Keflavik.  Job
    losses, initially feared to be in the hundreds, were minimal as all
    but a handful of 700-plus former NASKEF employees found new work.
    This was due to quick engagement by the outgoing NASKEF/Iceland
    Defense Force command and the town of Reykjanesbaer in providing job
    referral and counseling services, helped by the robust Icelandic
    economy and a low unemployment rate.  Similar focused planning and
    creative thinking are turning the base facilities into a significant
    plus for the economy and society.  On the first anniversary of the
    March 2006 base closure notification, the Government of Iceland
    announced plans to create a university-level academic institution on
    the former NASKEF site.  The "Keilir Atlantic Center for Excellence"
    has already begun operations.  Among other initiatives, it hosted
    productive meetings with U.S. Assistant Secretary of Energy for
    Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Alexander Karsner and the
    Director of the U.S. National Renewable Energy Laboratory during
    summer 2007.  Discussions are underway about a formal relationship on
    renewable energy research.  Meanwhile, the Keflavik Airport
    Development Corporation (KADECO), established to handle other
    commercially viable real estate on the base, opened 1100 apartments
    for rental by eager university students and brought in nearly $270
    million from the sale of other buildings on the base.

    Remaining Issues: Intelligence, Division of Labor
    --------------------------------------------- ----
    ¶7.  (S) Despite progress, some areas of difficulty remain,
    particularly in the fields of intelligence-sharing and the operation
    of the Iceland Air Defense System (IADS).  These issues are rooted in
    domestic political battles.  On intelligence matters, Icelandic law
    does not authorize any collection other than for law enforcement
    purposes, and the MFA and Justice Ministry are consequently engaged
    in a turf battle over the intelligence portfolio.  The MFA has
    responsibility for coordination with NATO Allies on defense matters
    while police, under the authority of the MOJ, handle international
    law enforcement cooperation.  At the same time, the MOJ-controlled
    Coast Guard and "Viking Squad" special police are the units most
    likely to operate together with NATO military units during exercises
    in Iceland and elsewhere.  As such, the MFA and MOJ have been the
    main players in a tug-of-war over intelligence authority, a battle
    which has thus far stalled serious efforts to provide USG training
    and institute regular intelligence exchanges (a stated goal in the
    Joint Understanding).

    ¶8.  (C) Similarly, the MOJ has tried to grab authority for operation
    of the IADS air defense radars from the MFA, with Minister Bjarnason
    arguing that in peacetime the system plays more of a "homeland
    security" role than a defense role.  Though this argument has not yet
    produced any results, it has been a distraction in the MFA's task of
    reorganizing the Iceland Radar Agency (the state-owned corporation
    that operates IADS) in order to cut costs.  The press has been quick
    to note that recent management decisions have been handled clumsily.
    However, the MFA plans to introduce legislation this winter to
    formally bring the Radar Agency under its authority and clarify the
    agency's status under Icelandic law.  Likely to go unaddressed are
    ongoing questions regarding combat controllers and rules of
    engagement for IADS and any NATO air defense assets it operates with,
    meaning that continued bilateral and NATO engagement on this matter
    will be necessary.

    ¶9.  (C) A further complication is posed by incoming Foreign Minister
    Gisladottir, who is struggling to reconcile her instinctive
    discomfort with the use of force to the defense and security
    responsibilities in her portfolio.  The Social Democratic Alliance
    (SDA) party she leads has never been able to agree on a defense
    policy, not least because of its fairly large pacifist wing.  After
    some early stumbles -- e.g., announcing the news of Iceland's
    withdrawal from the NATO Training Mission Iraq on the day of SACEUR's
    visit to Reykjavik in September -- Gisladottir has proven to be an
    interested student on defense issues.  Even her strong reluctance to
    allow Icelandic peacekeepers to be armed while abroad may be
    softening somewhat in response to interlocutors' arguments that
    unarmed peacekeepers can be as much of a force protection burden as
    they are an asset to deployed units.  Both her senior Political
    Advisor and the MFA Defense Department Chief have told the Ambassador
    in recent weeks of her keen desire for additional information and
    discussion in security matters.  Continued engagement and exposure
    will likely prove the best means to develop the Foreign Minister into
    a long-term partner.

    The Road Ahead
    --------------
    ¶10.  (C) This fall, Minister of Justice Bjarnason and others in
    Iceland have been nearly overcome with "I told you so" fever in
    response to increased Russian air activity and renewed territorial
    claims in the Arctic.  To these observers, the decision to close the
    base was a strategic mistake:  climate change, increased shipping
    routes and oil exploration in the North Atlantic and Arctic, and a
    resurgent Russia will make the High North (and Iceland) more
    strategically significant in the future, not less.  Post has
    countered that the current status quo--ongoing support for the 1951
    Agreement combined with first class maintenance of base military
    facilities, periodic exercises, and an agile U.S. and NATO force
    structure--keep our options open.

    ¶11.  (C) To that end, our military engagement with Iceland should
    continue along current lines.  Regular exercises and operational unit
    visits will demonstrate the U.S. interest in and ability to live up
    to our bilateral commitment.  We should show support and provide
    training opportunities for the Icelandic units most likely to be
    called on in a crisis.  Initial discussions for the NORTHERN VIKING
    2008 exercise have focused on a USN role with the possibility of USCG
    involvement, which meshes perfectly with this aim.  While
    arrangements for a more robust intelligence relationship depend on
    Icelandic domestic political decisions, we should continue to offer
    our assistance and make clear what is available once local obstacles
    are overcome.  Similarly, post will continue to explore ways to
    increase Icelandic participation in U.S. training opportunities, of
    which the GOI has not thus far taken full advantage.  A crucial tool
    in our progress thus far has been EUCOM's provision of an activated
    reserve officer to support Embassy Reykjavik.  This position serves
    as the key link between the USG and Icelandic government institutions
    recalculating their strategic worldview and seeking to improve their
    security capabilities.  Embassy Reykjavik believes funding for this
    position beyond spring 2008 will be essential in helping Iceland's
    transformation into a more active and capable NATO ally.

    ¶12.  (C) Politically, we should continue to support Iceland's efforts
    to increase its defense ties with other NATO Allies and neighbors.
    We also want to quietly but strongly support efforts to improve the
    quality of the national discussion on defense and security affairs,
    such as the FM's appointment on 8 November of a working group to
    study Iceland's strategic environment.  Continued expert- and
    high-level discussions under the Security Dialogue rubric are a
    further means of engagement and should be maintained, particularly as
    Iceland faces up to the possibility of winning election to the UN
    Security Council for the 2009-2010 term.  We should accommodate the
    request for a second series of discussions at the U/S level, in late
    winter/early spring, if possible in the U.S.  These steps will help
    ensure that we and the Icelanders will be in sync as the security
    environment in the High North evolves.

    van Voorst

`