Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 6239 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt Yemen Jordan

### Browse latest releases

2010/11 2010/12 2011/01 2011/02 2011/03
2010/11/28 2010/11/29 2010/11/30
2010/12/01 2010/12/02 2010/12/03 2010/12/04 2010/12/05 2010/12/06 2010/12/07 2010/12/08 2010/12/09 2010/12/10 2010/12/11 2010/12/12 2010/12/13 2010/12/14 2010/12/15 2010/12/16 2010/12/17 2010/12/18 2010/12/19 2010/12/20 2010/12/21 2010/12/22 2010/12/23 2010/12/24 2010/12/25 2010/12/26 2010/12/27 2010/12/28 2010/12/29 2010/12/30
2011/01/01 2011/01/02 2011/01/04 2011/01/05 2011/01/07 2011/01/09 2011/01/10 2011/01/11 2011/01/12 2011/01/13 2011/01/14 2011/01/15 2011/01/16 2011/01/17 2011/01/18 2011/01/19 2011/01/20 2011/01/21 2011/01/22 2011/01/23 2011/01/24 2011/01/25 2011/01/26 2011/01/27 2011/01/28 2011/01/29 2011/01/30 2011/01/31
2011/02/01 2011/02/02 2011/02/03 2011/02/04 2011/02/05 2011/02/06 2011/02/07 2011/02/08 2011/02/09 2011/02/10 2011/02/11 2011/02/12 2011/02/13 2011/02/14 2011/02/15 2011/02/16 2011/02/17 2011/02/18 2011/02/19 2011/02/20 2011/02/21 2011/02/22 2011/02/23 2011/02/24 2011/02/25 2011/02/26 2011/02/27 2011/02/28
2011/03/01 2011/03/02 2011/03/03 2011/03/04 2011/03/05 2011/03/06 2011/03/07 2011/03/08 2011/03/09 2011/03/10 2011/03/11 2011/03/13 2011/03/14 2011/03/15 2011/03/16 2011/03/17 2011/03/18 2011/03/19 2011/03/20 2011/03/21 2011/03/22

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 85 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1985/03
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08 1990/10
2000/06 2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10 2001/11
2002/02 2002/03 2002/04 2002/07 2002/11 2002/12
2003/02 2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Banjul Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Ciudad Juarez Consulate Chennai Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone Consulate Guadalajara
Embassy Helsinki Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hermosillo Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kathmandu Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul Consulate Kolkata
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Ljubljana Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy Lilongwe Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Mbabane Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Malabo Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Mumbai Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey Consulate Milan
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn Consulate Tijuana
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
ASEC AF AORC AMGT AE AL ABLD AJ AM AFIN AR AEMR APER AO ASIG AFFAIRS AG AS AA APECO AU ACOA AX AMED AROC ATFN ASEAN AFGHANISTAN ADCO AFU AER ALOW AODE ABUD ATRN ASUP AID AC AVERY APCS ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGMT
BRUSSELS BR BA BH BG BEXP BIDEN BO BE BTIO BM BF BY BU BL BK BX BBSR BC BT BB BILAT BMGT BTIU
CU CS CH CVIS CMGT CBW CO CI COUNTERTERRORISM CA CE CASC CY CG CD CV CJAN COUNTER CDG CIA CACM CDB CAN CN COE CM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CACS CWC CF CONDOLEEZZA CT CARSON CL CR CIS CLINTON CODEL CTM CB COM CKGR CONS CJUS
DOD DR DJ DEAX DA DOE DISENGAGEMENT DEA DK DHS DTRA DS DOMESTIC
ECON EUN ETTC ENRG ETRD EFIN EG ELAB EINV EAIR EPET EINVEFIN ES EU EAID EAGR ENNP ECUN ELTN ECIN EC EXTERNAL ELECTIONS ER EIND EMIN EWWT EINT ECPS EFINECONCS ET ENIV EN EZ EK ENVI ECINECONCS ECIP EINDETRD EUC EI EREL ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EFIS ENVR ECA ENERG ENGY ETRO ELN EFTA ECONCS ECONOMICS EUR ECONEFIN EINVETC EINN ENGR ESA ETC ETRDEINVTINTCS ESENV ETRDECONWTOCS EUNCH EINVECONSENVCSJA
FR FREEDOM FARC FMLN FBI FAO FTAA FI FJ FINR
GM GG GOI GT GA GV GANGS GZ GTMO GH GR GE GAZA GCC GOV GY GTIP
HO HURI HA HU HR HUMAN HILLARY HK HSTC HYMPSK
IN IR IC IS IZ IT IAEA ITALY ITALIAN IRAQI ITRA INTERPOL IMO ISRAELI ICJ IO IACI ID IV ICTY IQ ICAO IPR INRB ITPHUM IWC IIP ICRC IL IA INR ITPGOV IZPREL ILC IRC INRA INRO IRAJ IEFIN IF INTELSAT ILO IBRD IMF
JO JOSEPH JA JM JUS JAMES JP JOHNNIE
KSPR KSUM KCRM KTIA KJUS KTFN KNNP KWBG KDEM KOMC KRFD KZ KU KGIC KPAL KISL KPAO KIPR KGHG KSCA KWMN KSEP KCOR KIRF KOLY KV KVPR KE KFSC KN KS KFLO KR KPKO KNPP KAWK KTDB KTIP KFLU KPRP KHLS KCIP KMDR KBIO KUNR KCRS KSTH KCFE KBCT KFRD KAWC KO KX KG KICC KPWR KWAC KMIG KSEC KIFR KDRG KDEMAF KFIN KGCC KPIN KHIV KPLS KIRC KMCA KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KACT KRAD KGIT KSTC KBTS KPRV KBTR KWMM KERG KRVC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNSD KMPI KVIR KNUP KTER KNEI KDDG KHSA KMRS KHDP KTLA KPAK KNAR KREL KPAI KTEX KCOM KNNPMNUC KPOA KLIG KOCI KHUM KDEV KNUC KCFC KREC KOMS KWWMN KTBT KIDE KWMNCS KSAF
LE LY LG LAB LH LI LOG LO LT LTTE LU
MARR MCAP MOPS MASS MIL MX MNUC MR MV MO MTCRE MAR MY ML MRCRE MPOS MD MZ MEPP MA MOPPS MAPP MU MASC MP MT MERCOSUR MK MDC MI MAPS MCC MASSMNUC MQADHAFI MUCN MTCR MG MC MTRE MEPI
NU NO NATO NL NPT NATIONAL NP NI NS NA NG NGO NIPP NSG NZ NRR NAR NE NASA NK NPG NT NSF
OAS OTRA OVIP ODIP OFDP OPDC OPIC OEXC OPRC OSCI OTR OREP OSAC OIIP OSCE OECD OPCW OIC OFFICIALS OIE OVP
PREL PGOV PK PTER PINR PHUM PARM POL PM PINS PBTS PREF PEPR PE POLITICS PINT PL PA PHSA PSOE PU POLITICAL PARTIES PSI PALESTINIAN POV PG PROP PO PBIO PECON PAK POGOV PINL PKFK PMIL PY PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY PRAM PAO PMAR PGOVLO PUNE PORG PHUMPREL PF POLINT PHUS PGOC PNR PGGV PNAT PGOVE PRGOV PRL PROV PTERE PGOF PHUMBA PARMS PINF PEL PLN
QA
RS RU RW RO RIGHTS RF RICE ROBERT RFE REGION RP
SP SI SA SNAR SCUL SOCI SO SENV SMIG SY SU SR SW SYR SG SZ STEINBERG SN SF SL SIPRS SH SNARCS SOFA SANC SHUM SK ST SC SAN SEVN
TP TW TU TBIO TRGY TSPA TSPL TS TZ TI TX TC TERRORISM TPHY TIP TH TO TK TNGD TINT TRSY TR TFIN TD TT TURKEY
USEU UZ UK UNHRC UNGA UN UP UNSC USTR UY UNESCO UNO UNMIK US UG UV UNEP UNDP UNCHS UNAUS UNVIE UNCHC UE UNDESCO USAID UNHCR UNDC USUN UAE
VE VT VZ VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WHO WI WTO WTRQ WWARD WB WHA WBG WMO WEU WZ WA
XK XL XM XR XS XF XA XY XW XG XT XH XZ XE XD XC
YM YMCS YI YE
ZF ZU ZI ZP ZR ZB ZO ZANU ZA ZOELLICK ZK ZJ

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09VILNIUS84, AMBASSADOR AND DEFENSE MINISTER PLAN FOR SECRETARY

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09VILNIUS84.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09VILNIUS84 | 2009-02-10 09:09 | 2011-02-03 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Vilnius

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHVL #0084/01 0410915
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    O 100915Z FEB 09
    FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3275
    INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L VILNIUS 000084

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
    TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL LH
    SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND DEFENSE MINISTER PLAN FOR SECRETARY
    GATES MEETING

    Classified By: Senior Adviser Stephen Mull for REASONS 1.4 (B), (C) and (D).

    ¶1. (U) This cable is an action request. Please see paragraph five. Ambassador Seche is authorized to orally convey information in paragraphs 7-9 in delivering this demarche (but asked not to leave points in written form). Post may not/not provide these points in the form of a non-paper.

    ¶2. (S) OBJECTIVE: (a) To obtain ROYG cooperation with CENTCOM efforts to interdict the smuggling of weapons into Gaza, including through authorization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and helicopter flights over Yemeni territorial waters. (b) To elicit Yemeni agreement to receive an interagency delegation to discuss additional means of cooperation including on enhancement of Yemen's own anti-smuggling capability.

    ¶3. (S) Background: On January 16, 2009, the USG signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Israel on the prevention of supply of arms and related materiel to terrorist groups. We are working on many fronts to implement this MOU, including through interdiction efforts by U.S. military assets in the region. CENTCOM has been tasked with responsibilities pertaining to military implementation of the MOU within its AOR.

    ¶4. (S//NF) We understand a significant volume of arms shipments to Hamas make the short 24-hour transit across the Red Sea from Yemen to Sudan. These shipments usually transit in small groups of flagged and unflagged dhows that use territorial waters, busy harbors, and mangroves to mask their routes and increase their likelihood of evading interception by U.S. or other forces. These intentional tactics, combined with the number of and similarity among vessels, make interdiction difficult once the vessels reach international waters. In a recent case, sparse intelligence and a dhow's use of Yemeni territorial waters allowed a known shipment of arms probably bound for Gaza to transit undetected in international waters past a searching U.S. warship.

    ¶5. (S) Obtaining Yemeni permission to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters over Yemeni territorial waters would greatly enhance CENTCOM's ability to gain the intelligence required to identify and track the dhows as they enter international waters and increase the probability of successful interdiction. Accomplishing this would not/not require sending UAVs or helicopters into the airspace over Yemen's land territory.

    ¶6. (S/REL ROYG) Action Request: To fully support DoD's intent to disrupt and deter illicit arms smuggling, Embassy Sanaa is requested to approach ROYG at the highest appropriate level to request authorization for CENTCOM to fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters over Yemeni territorial waters in an effort to better track dhows and make successful intercepts once they reach international waters.

    ¶7. (S/REL ROYG) Post is also requested to emphasize the importance of the broader interdiction effort to the USG and propose that the ROYG receive an interagency delegation to discuss means to maximize bilateral cooperation in this regard, including on enhancement of Yemen's own anti-smuggling capability.

    ¶8. (S//NF) Our arms interdiction efforts are focused on preventing shipments intended for Gaza. Nonetheless, Gaza-bound shipments represent only one aspect of the broader regional problem of arms smuggling from and through Yemen. The following points discuss several recipient groups and possible destinations (Gaza, Somalia) of arms smuggled from and through Yemen. Post may use its discretion in framing the scope of this conversation in order to maximize the prospects of a positive response. Post may not/not provide these points in the form of a non-paper.

    ¶9. (S/REL ROYG) Points for Oral Presentation: Arms Smuggling in Yemeni Coastal Waters In the past, we have had extensive discussions with your government about the ability of terrorists and other sub-state actors to acquire small arms/light weapons (SALW) sourced from Yemeni black markets and use them to conduct attacks elsewhere. For example, the Strela-2 (SA-7 GRAIL) manportable air defense systems (MANPADS) used in the 2002 attacks on a civilian airliner in Kenya were sourced in Yemen, as were small arms used to attack the US consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2004. We welcome the steps your government has taken over the last several years to stem the influx of weapons to the Yemeni black market from external sources, to take illicit weapons off the streets, and to prevent terrorist access to lethal arms. However, we remain extremely concerned that arms smuggling activities originating in and/or transiting Yemen are still providing a destabilizing source of weapons for the region. The large quantities of black market weapons still available in Yemen are being exploited by regional smuggling networks to provide arms to various non-state actors, possibly including al-Qa'ida associated terrorist groups. (S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have specific information that a weapons smuggling network originating in Yemen is supplying weapons to individuals in Africa who are delivering them to various entities there, potentially including al-Qa'ida associated terrorist groups. (S//REL TO USA, YEM) According to recent information, an extremist associated with the al-Rashaydah tribe, Abu-Fu'ad al-Dindari, agreed to negotiate a weapons purchase between representatives of al-Rashaydah tribe in Sudan which is receiving weapons from Yemen through this network and Somalia-based al-Shabaab. (S//REL TO USA, YEM) This network also provides arms that are smuggled into the Gaza Strip. The weapons are transported by boat across the Red Sea to landing points in Sudan. The vessels are met either on shore or a short distance off the coast. Once landed, we assess that the goods are transported north by car through Sudan. (S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have been able to identify a number of the Yemeni members of this network, including several who are affiliated with al-Rashaydah tribe. One of the most prominent is Ibrahim Abu Hayth. Ibrahim owns at least one boat and may operate a fleet of small fishing vessels that are used to run money and weapons across the Red Sea between Yemen and Sudan. (U) This particular network has smuggled a wide variety of weaponry out of Yemen, including rockets, handguns, anti-armor rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-aircraft guns. (S) We have identified this network and some specific information on its activities. We believe, however, that other arms smuggling networks operating from and through Yemen may exist. (U) Yemen's geographical location and large black market weapons stocks, not to mention, the many armed groups active in the region that are seeking additional arms supplies, make it an inviting target for arms brokers and smugglers to exploit. (U) In Yemen and elsewhere in the region, small, privately-owned boats that can be diverted from legitimate commercial trade for smuggling purposes are widely available. The availability of these means of transport makes maritime counter-smuggling operations a potentially key element of any effort to stem this flow of weapons. (U) Such boats can easily transit the Red Sea and Arabian Gulf using the territorial waters of coastal states, including Yemen, in order to minimize the risks of interception in international waters. The large numbers of such boats that sail these waters adds to the challenges in identifying specific vessels engaged in illicit smuggling activities. (S//REL TO USA, YEM) We have, for example, identified Shaqra, Balhar, Al-Mukalla, Ras al-Sharmah, and Al-Ghayda on Yemen's south coast as possibly key smuggling havens or transit areas for weapons intended for Somalia and possibly elsewhere. End Text. CLINTON

`